Do you happen to know where Reid offers his formulation? — Cabbage Farmer
Here's the link for the entire book, for free:
https://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/reid1764.pdf
One passage:
"Anatomy tells us that the wisdom of nature has assigned the mucus membrane, and the olfactory nerves that are run to the hairy parts of this membrane, to the sense of smell; so that a body can’t be smelled when it doesn’t emit any effluvia, or it does but they don’t enter the nose, or they do enter but the mucus membrane or olfactory nerves have become unfit to do their work. Despite all this ·knowledge that we have·, it is obvious that neither the organ of smell, nor the medium, nor any motions we can conceive to be caused in the mucus membrane or in the nerve or animal spirits, have the faintest resemblance to the sensation of smelling."
"
I'm inclined to take issue with Reid's assessment as you relate it here, in part because the account of perception seems biased by disproportionate respect for visual perception. — Cabbage Farmer
Reid on Colour:
"So we have all the reason that the nature of the thing admits, to think that the vulgar apply the name ‘colour’ to the quality of bodies that causes in us what the philosophers call the ‘idea of colour’. That there is such a quality in bodies is agreed to by all philosophers who think there is any such thing as body. Philosophers have thought fit to leave nameless the quality of bodies that the vulgar call ‘colour’, and to •give the name ‘colour’ to an idea or appearance that the vulgar leave nameless because they never think about it or reflect on it. So it seems that when philosophers say that colour is not in bodies, but in the mind, and the vulgar say that colour is not in the mind, but is a quality of bodies, there is no difference between them about things but only about the meaning of a word."
What could be more "grass-like" than the gas we call the grass's odor -- which presumably contains molecules just like some of the molecules of which the grass itself consists, only lately transmitted from that grass to the air around it? — Cabbage Farmer
Perhaps a spray of some kind, which smells like grass, but lacks other smells that may interfere with it in real life, air pollution, dog manure, surrounding plants, etc.
Ordinarily, a horse looks and sounds horse-like. In this regard, the look and the sound of the horse are alike. Moreover, the look and the sound of a horse may be called "horse-like" in that they appear to us when we happen to be in the appropriate physical and perceptual relation to horses: This sound is like other sounds I have heard in a similar connection to horses. — Cabbage Farmer
When you look at a horse, I don't ask myself, how else could this creature look like? When the horse starts racing, it would not be evident to me that his hooves would sound the way they do. In this respect, you can recreate the sound of hooves with your tongue.
But, point taken in so far as I'm privileging vision. It seems to bother me somehow.
To say a resemblance is not immediately apparent is not to suggest that there is no such resemblance. To say a resemblance is roughly grasped is not to suggest it is not grasped. — Cabbage Farmer
You are correct. We construct the resemblance and then we say that sounded like a horse or that looks solid like a wall.
That aside, I suggest that feelings of pain are more like feelings of hunger than they are like exteroceptive modes of perception, and arguably deserve distinct treatment in the present inquiry. I might briefly expand on this point if you like. — Cabbage Farmer
Go ahead, sounds interesting.
What rationalist argument do you have in mind? — Cabbage Farmer
Let me quote Leibniz:
"What is innate is what might be called the implicit knowledge of them, as the veins of the marble outline a shape which is in the marble before they are uncovered by the sculptor"
And a few from Cudworth:
" The essence of nothing is reached unto by the senses looking outward, but by the mind's looking inward upon itself. That which wholly looks abroad outward upon its object is not one with that which it percieves, but it is at a distance from it, and therefore cannot know or comprehend it. But knowledge and intellection doth not merely look out upon a thing at a distance, but make an inward reflection upon the thing it knows... the intellect doth read inward characters written within itself."
"For knowledge is not a knock or thrust from without, but it consisteth in the awakening and exiting of the inward active powers of the mind."
It seems to me the capacities you point to here are not induced in us by the things we perceive, but are natural to animals like us. — Cabbage Farmer
You are right. I should have made it much more clear. It's not so much that Reid argued what
I am saying, it's that I took what he was saying in this direction. His ideas caused me to take his arguments in this direction.
The objects incite in us an innate capacity to react to them the way do, because we are the creatures we are. We never see triangles in the world, we construct them out of imperfect figures. We don't see entire environments, but parts of it, we fill out the rest. We listen to sounds in a pattern which we call music, but which nonetheless are "just" sounds. And so on.
Apologies for the length of the reply, but I felt I had to respond in kind.
Great post by the way.