Yes, if they can be tested, then you have a better philosophy or system that should be clear.

As an aside, I also think it's interesting to see what system most convinces you, evidence aside. Which is to say that things like idealism, physicalism, skepticism, determinism etc., can't be refuted (or confirmed) by evidence, only evaluated based on reasoning.

In the end it is as you say "a myriad of ways of imagining and understanding things".

And it may be true, that is it may be what really happened. It's unlikely we'll know, though who knows if some information leaks. It's also a good way to beat on China. I'm not defending them here, not Pro or Anti - but with the situation in Taiwan being so delicate, I think other countries ought to be careful here in making accusation, even if they are true.

The thing is, would any state ever admit that they're the ones responsible for a pandemic?

So the circles vicious as opposed to innocuous?

:cool:

There was bad prose prior to postmodernism. Just look at German Idealism or the Cambridge Platonists and many others. The problem here is the content behind the obscurity. If there is content, then the obscurity can be tolerated, if there isn't or if there is very little content, obscurity serves no purpose. But I know some think that the writing itself already indicates "different modes of thought". Okay.

As to your question, all one can do is to look at postmodern art. Consider Warhol's paintings, Pynchon's prose and much of contemporary "literary theory". I can't speak for other people, but I personally enjoy Warhol's paintings and I think Pynchon is excellent.

However, I'm not a fan of "literary theory", I don't see any "theory" worthy of the name. As to a broader cultural impact, that's hard to say. I think it mostly leads to bad writing, rather than good art, but pomo can lead to both.

Aping Mankind, The Knowing Animal, On The Edge of Certainty, Epimethean Imaginings are all good for intro stuff.

Not that he has anything much more complex, just longer or more specialized in terms of topics.

I can see why you say we have to be careful in this specific area. I don't have my mind made up on this topic, and you would know more about the actual details than I would.

Nevertheless, it's not completely clear to me that when we communicate to other people on what a photon does we are telling a story. We may be, but not necesarilly.

Yes, you are right, future discoveries might point out that what's actually going on is not that photons are hitting a detector but "Ztons", a smaller component we had not been able to discover.

It looks to me as if you are describing what you see to a person or an audience when you speak of photons hitting detectors, the issue is if descriptions are stories.

But I can also well see the point that when submitting an article to a journal, it becomes a story of sorts. So I think that much of this hinges on how ample we take stories to be.

Fair enough on deconstruction.

I mean, would speaking about science be necessarily a narrative? It can take the form of a narrative, but I don't think it's strictly necessary. Describing what photons do when they hit the eye or why the Earth goes around the sun is an explanation of observable facts.

Yes, I'd agree that the stance and methodology a person takes is what makes them fit into a specific group of people or school of thought. This however doesn't clear up why postmodern lenses are an improvement over mitigated skepticism, for example.

If you want to go beyond science to other aspects of life, like culture and society, then I could see why postmodernism might be more useful as it is broader than skepticism.

I entirely agree with your analysis. There's also the aspect of being cryptic, which is somewhat different from obscurity which is found numerous times in Wittgenstein. This too has much value. I think Heidegger's obscurity can be valuable on occasion too.

But I do think it's person dependent, in terms of getting value of certain philosophers. Some get lots of value from Levinas others from Quine or Carnap. Likewise with Derrida or Husserl or Hegel. It's not even that continental is obscure whereas analytic is clear, that's often not true.

I'm aware that this criticism of saying someone is obscure for the sake of it is bound to be controversial. I think this is clear with Lacan. Derrida's style is not for me at all.

I haven't found Kant obscure. For me his work is complex rather than obscure. — Janus

I mean, it can be both. I think certain passages in Kant can be called obscure, by this simply meaning hard to understand, not occult or him trying to be hard for the sake of it.

But a lot of his distinctions can be called sophisticated too.

Peirce, for instance, can be obscure in some areas and quite clear in others. Being obscure in itself is not bad, what matters is if there's content behind the phrases. Whitehead is a perfect example. I think he has plenty of interesting things to say, but his jargon is very difficult to understand, at least in Process and Reality.

Yes, that's correct. The German Idealists got lots of prestige in university positions and were lauded by many. Schopenhauer speculated that part of the reason they glorified the state was due to the positions they had in universities, of course, this criticism most heavily levied at Hegel.

It is legitimate to say that Schopenhauer said this out of jealousy, there may be some truth to this, but I just think he really disliked obscurity, making a notable exception for Kant.

Ah, I see, you're going down the Peterson line. Ugh, he's so mediocre and his understanding of most things he talks with confidence about is so low, it's a bit surprising he's so popular. He just calls "Postmodern Marxist" to anybody he disagrees with, usually mentioning no one who fits that category, as you point out.

I was thinking about Chomsky specifically, whose met with Kristeva, Lacan and Foucault.

In either case, I think it's fair to call most of them leftist. How far left is an open question. But Lacan's leftism I suspect is a ruse.

Did not know that about @Joshs, but was aware that Derrida wrote a book on Marx.

@Kenosha Kid

There's something that's not clear to me, which may be relevant for the thread.

What specifically is there in pomo that is of use to thinking about science that stands out as opposed to say, Humean skepticism or some other variety of common sense?

As typical, anybody criticizing postmodernism has to be from the right. — ssu

I assume this is meant as ironic?

I mean, it's easy to sound "leftier" than anybody if no one understand what you're saying...

I think it makes more sense to think about evil acts or evil actions more than it is to think of as a person as being evil. Not that we cannot think of obvious examples of people who can be considered evil.

But I think that thinking in this manner may help free us somewhat of the "metaphysical" dimension of good and evil, once we recognize that all of us have the capacity to do anything.

Acts can often be grey, in that there may some evil intent, but that may not be the main motivating factor for saying or doing such a thing. One example that comes to mind is humor, such as making fun of a person who did something stupid or whom we dislike. If we make fun of them, there may be a tinge of malice in our statements, but it's not at all the main component of our act.

And so with evil, the same with good. And in this manner, both exist and are human constructions, which takes nothing away from reality.

:100:

That's been exactly my experience too. Again, exceptions, Foucault and the edge case of Deleuze.

The novelists, on the other hand, I think were (and are) quite good. That's a matter of taste.

That's fair, interest and excitement is a matter of taste after all.

As for Russell, he might have been influenced to some degree by the early Wittgenstein, so it's possible. But he didn't much care for the latter Wittgenstein's work, which is the more popular and influential one.

I used to like Heidegger more than I do so now, though I still find parts of him interesting.

Husserl I like a bit more, though I personally am learning from Dan Zahavi how to approach him. If you have more suggestions for Husserl, I'll happily look. But not Derrida.

I'm not a believer in the whole "naturalization" business, I think it can be misleading. I tend to follow the rationalist/innatist/nativist camp of Chomsky and McGinn.

Well put. Sagan was also quite good. Dawkins, on the other hand, goes a bit overboard when he speaks of science.



Absolutely. There's no problem at all with saying this. But it's easy to state, one doesn't need to say strange things to get the point across.

Well, it's our day to disagree on topics today, hah.

I agree with Strawson here as well as Chomsky and Russell. I think Dennett's account can't actually be formulated.

But I do agree that I doubt that quantum physics will end up playing a direct role in consciousness. Here I could be way off, but as of now, I don't see a connection.

That's the way it should be with any author. Just like you did, offer some way into someone's thought and proceed.

But I have to say, I'm just not inclined to like Derrida. I don't like his followers, I've read a few of his essays and I didn't think them to be particularly interesting. Just like some people dislike or don't think much of Hegel, Heidegger or anyone else.

It's just not the type of philosophy I'm attracted to. But thanks for the pointers.

Ah. Thanks, I'll be sure to take a look at them. :up:

And I found that one you mention for free, actually:

https://www.partiallyexaminedlife.com/?get_group_doc=36%2F1362087066-BryantDifferenceandGivenness.pdf&fbclid=IwAR0yCvNGPKKzKcfP8jOsZ0vB0BxLukHmplfK3q21wTt45w8mJSnTdxHULHM

Yeah. I mean, it kind of makes me feel a bit for those parts of it that are good like Foucault, Ecco, Pynchon, Zizek, etc.

But, many people think differently, I guess.

:ok:

such as Badiu and Lacan. But not Derrida or Deleuze. They were trying to convey new and difficult concepts, so the appearance of obscurity goes along with the territory. — Joshs

I'm not sure about that. I had a pomo phase, which is why I can talk about this a bit. I read both primary and secondary literature on many of these guys.

By far the one who had the most useful literature was Lacan, despite his conscious decision to be obscure. Bruce Fink, Phillip Hill and others were quite good. I of course never saw in Lacan what they said about him, but the stuff they put out in the intros, was quite good.

I put most effort in trying to understand Deleuze. The book by Claire Colebrook was inscrutable, all it did wad repeat the word "difference" many times over. Other books, like his alphabet, just repeated the words with no insight. Eventually I just read many parts of A Thousand Plateaus, I got some fancy vocab and a vague idea, but not the rewards one would expect given the effort put in.

On the other hand Manuel DeLanda's Delueze-based work was quite good. As are the novels of Michael Cisco, who explicitly thanks Deleuze. Cisco is a genius.

When I've done similar things with Aristotle, Kant, Husserl and Whitehead the effort more than paid off, you could just see it.

I felt like Derrida was mocking me. And his followers weren't much better.

I'm maybe missing some IQ points, it's very possible. But given my experience with other figures, I don't think it's me, cause' I really tried to understand.

Perhaps they will be found. Maybe it's probable. But the subjective "side" of consciousness, I don't think that's explained even if quantum phenomena are involved somewhere in the process.

Strawson goes over this view in his Realistic Monism. I mean, it ends up becoming a verbal dispute, because even if experience is not at the very bottom of things, it has the potential to become experience given certain interactions, which is almost the same as saying that they are found in the bottom stuff in nature. Only that it arises via certain quantum processes.

Not that there's anything wrong with panpsychism or protopanpsychism or anything similar, but I don't think it's correct to say it's a new paradigm. The idea is by now more or less known. What changes is the emphasis of in what part of the process experience emerges, not so much the basic framework.

But even if correct - and there's no way to verify these views via experimentation - I don't know how it's an explanation per se. One is stating that at bottom, experience arises, hence there can be consciousness as we understand it. I'm still puzzled by the problems associated with consciousness.

Yes. Camus was excellent, Sartre too in his novels. I should've said, by the late 60's something happened that made many of the French intellectuals write poorly.

But, point well made.

True, but not a pomo-specific thing. I think more a French and German thing, right? (I'm thinking of the French and German existentialists in particular.) Lyotard, of what I've read, isn't particularly difficult in the scheme of things. — Kenosha Kid

You're right. Actually, I've read that much of this goes straight back to Kant. He was very, very obscure but quite substantive. Then look at German Idealism, all of it, minus Schopenhauer, was extremely dense. France used to be different, they strove for clarity as seen in Descartes, Diderot and so on.

Something happened post WWII were they became obscure suddenly. I think this is improving now. Lyotard is ok, not particularly hard, but I think you can notice him forming certain sentence structures which appear (to me anyway) to want to impose insight on you. He goes on to say that science is "imperialistic".

Sure, scientists have done quite horrible things. Science itself, or philosophy or any other subject itself is perfectly fine, most of the time.

It's mostly direct quotes from many Postmodernists in which they use well defined scientific terms and use in to speak of power, or politics, in short making connections that don't exist. But it was illuminating to me.

I'm no scientistic person by any means, but if I were to start saying something like masculine power can be seen to be manifested in general relativity, I would be ridiculed, rightly so.

I've seen cases in which people start saying stuff which is not too far from Deepak Chopra, though they seem to think they're being serious.

I did not know that Badiou was subject to a hoax. I'm not against hoaxes per se, but at this point as @Kenosha Kid has pointed out, they can be abused. The point is well established by now.

I think Ecco, Pynchon and Wallace should be included within pomo. It actually makes the case for it as movement have much more substance, in my opinion.

Badiou's popularity in the US is due, in large part, to Žižek no doubt. I think Žižek is quite entertaining and I'd put him apart from the usual crowd, even if he discusses many of the pomos.

Foucault was probably the best of the Parisians, whatever else one may think about how far one should take his analysis. Deleuze, at least for me, is an edge case. I think his vocabulary was on the whole, innovative and his emphasis on difference, strange, but not bad. The problem is that as far as I know, I don't know Deluzians who have actually tried to defend Deleuze in Fashionable Nonsense.

I think those accusations merit serious discussion. And Deleuze's Difference and Repetition is obscure in the extreme. I tried like a few different "intro books' to Deleuze, and I don't think I've ever read worse "introductions to" on anybody.

I know some may like Derrida, I do not. Nor Lacan, who is problematic for many reasons. For these two, I really think they tried to be as obscure as possible.

As for the rest Lyotard, Baudrillard, Guatarri, De Man, Althusser and the rest, I can't say much, other than they share a style and prose which has not been good for literature, imho.

This is true. It's still popular in the US. France has moved on, I think.

I had in mind Sokal and Bricmont's Fashionable Nonsense, which presents a good argument on "pomo science". As for the Sokal affair in general, yeah, I agree it shows many problems in academia/publishing.

What gets me in the willful obscurantism. If they have something to say, say it clearly. Foucault could be quite clear when he wanted to. To say that there are many different perspectives and that one should be critical of what scientists say, is not particularly hard to state or understand, I don't think.

This critique could be made of many: Kant, Husserl and even Aristotle can be very obscure. There's a difference between not being able to write clearly vs. making something hard on purpose. I think Parisian pomo's - with some exceptions - do the latter. It can mislead people into thinking they're being deep. Adding bad science to it makes it worse.

But if you stick to people like Rorty, Wallace and the like, then I perceive something more coherent.

Sure. I mean, it's fine if you want to focus on the skeptical side, or on the problem of "metanarratives", that can be useful.

However, I would think that someone like you would be concerned when serious physicists like Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont show how many of the figures belonging in this school of thought, make science a total metaphor, making meaningless statements about how math and physics relate to politics or power.

And I personally think that science has several important limits when it comes to what it can hope to explain.

These were already real before the postmodernists got involved. — Kenosha Kid

Exactly.

Except God. And the limitless capability of the rational mind. Perhaps he did doubt these once each, in a perfunctory manner. — Kenosha Kid

Sure, we pick out those things we can still find useful today.

So use radical doubt and see what reason tells you. We know reason is not all encompassing, but if we use it judiciously, we might be able to make sense of the world.

We don't need God anymore - or at least, many of us no longer see it as necessary.

As an aside, not referring to you, but it bothers me that Descartes gets so much crap these days. It's not as if a scientist born in Descartes time would've obviously come up with general relativity, or would've obviously had seen how thought and matter cannot be metaphysically distinct.

I think Descartes is exactly on point highlighting our reason, it's an honorable aspect of being human. It's just that it's not all encompassing, as you rightly say.

I see.

Well, it's a question of dispute to claim that the postmodernists achieved something of which few people have caught up on. I think Susan Haack, Galen Strawson and Raymond Tallis do very, very good work and none of them agree with Kant on much.

Not that agreeing or disagreeing with Kant by itself is worthy of praise or derision. Just more evidence of how influential Kant was, for good or ill.

Postmodernism started as a report on the postwar West. It was empirical first of all, not theoretical. — Kenosha Kid

Maybe you're right. I doubt that anyone coming out of the postwar West would have used that term or even agreed with what it came to mean. If the question is that of information and control of people, the PR industry, was ahead of all of them, clearly. They actually impacted the world to a degree which is hard to conceptualize.

then we're accepting an event prior to which there was a general belief in special neutral, objective frames of reference from which you can judge the truth of certain statements and after which there was a general belief that no such frame exists — Kenosha Kid

You'd have to give one or two examples, otherwise I'm not sure I follow.

Russell was aware about points of view and frames of reference, he went to jail for resisting WWI, one of the very few to do so. When asked later in life why he never commented on the crimes of Communists, he replied by saying "there was no need." That's all the media talked about.

So it's not as if pomo came and suddenly people became aware of different perspectives.

In this regard it seems to me that something like deconstruction is warranted. The lack of a neutral perspective justifies a wariness about accepting the perspective of the author without examination. — Kenosha Kid

Sure. I mean that's a sane attitude.

Maybe now I'm the one being confused but the birth of modern philosophy was with Descartes, who said that it was a good idea to, at least once, doubt everything.

I think that's a fine attitude to have in general, when warranted, of course.

:100:

Posters from the UK here can say if this is the case. I suspect that Trump didn't help in the cases of Brazil and Britain.

Not sure about India.

But when it comes to places like Germany, France and the like, I think they're rebelling despite what Trump said.

I was just looking at some live streams on RT and in France some people are nuts. These anti-vaxers are insane. I understand a small minority of people have legitimate issues with vaccines, but this is overblown.

:roll:

Good riddance. He murdered several hundreds of thousands of his countrymen/woman and yet they are the ones that riot against him losing an election.

But he was not alone, Bolsonaro in Brazil, Modi in India, Johnson in Britain, etc.

And we all pay the price for such sycophants.

Yeah, Fauci could have said what he should have said, but it wouldn't have made a difference. Only Trump could have done that to an extent, in relation to the stupid people. Problem is, outside the US, lots of countries in Europe listen to Fauci, and that could have well helped the deniers.

But outside of totalitarian countries and a few exceptions in Asia and Oceania, there is a segment of the population who just don't listen. I don't know when such attitude could lead to charges of second degree murder.

And who knows if the mutation after the Delta variant will be much worse. Just mind-boggling.

That's the problem. And I understand that people want a life and are tired of confinement and local business are having a horrible time. That's to be granted.

But it's as you say, the carelessness of other people can cost the life of me or my loved ones. And the damn virus would be much weaker by now if everybody got a vaccine.

As long as many people continue to resist vaccination, the longer this will go, quite apart from the severe problems of vaccine distribution in developed vs developing countries, which all but guarantees this will go on for quite a while.

I guess a compromise would be best: keep things partially open, no masks in OPEN places in which other people are far away, that kind of thing. But to have sports stadiums full of people, or in door restaurants, is quite risky.

So, I'm seeing that the Delta strand is now ravaging the world. It's already pretty ugly in the UK, South Africa is a disaster as well as South America and the Caribbean.

It looks like the US will be quite ugly given 6 weeks or so. Damn, this is very long...

As I understand it, Being and Time was extremely influential for postmodernism, that came out in 1927. And also for existentialism and phenomenology. Maybe postmodernism would've arose with Husserl alone, I don't know.

Derrida's De la grammatologie came out in 67', Foucault's Les mots et les choses: Une archéologie des sciences humaines came out in 66'.

So I'd have to know who you have in mind when you say postmodernism. That's just the thing, is postmodernism over? I have no idea. There's talk of post-postmodernism, I don't know what that means.

That comes out of phenomenology, which precedes postmodernism. Merleau Ponty died in 1961, whereas post-modernism came out in the late 60's early 70's.

It also depends on if it is correct to label Heidegger as a postmodernist, which is not clear. But then he would be the very best of pomo, in my opinion.

Zahavi is a Husserlian phenomenologist. I was just reading him the other day.