I mean yes, technically Hezbollah. But remember Lebanon offered to remove Hezbollah from the border on condition that Israel stop its bombing campaign.

The reply was a murder of a Hamas leader in Beirut.

However, Hezbollah have been extremely restrained (given what they could do), because they know that if they go all in, Lebanon will be in ruins.

But there's the issue that if Israel keeps escalating inside Beirut, then the whole country may explode. And by then it would be beyond Hezbollah, even though they would be the single biggest actor inside Lebanon.

Sure, the Houthis have replied and are being quite effective. Are for numb, it's always a possibility. It's just not sustainable to maintain the same level of emotional attachment for a prolonged period - or at least, many people (me included) find it hard to do.

But the Gaza situation is just so awful, that I still think anything could happen, in terms of things blowing up. If Israel were rational, they would just call it a "victory" and just stop the damn thing.

Because finally, and unfortunately, you will get the American politician that doesn't praise AIPAC or Israel. Who simply won't care about it. And why I say this is unfortunate is because then it's going to be real field day for the real anti-semites.

Israel's hope is that there comes another issue which takes the attention away. — ssu

Standard issue so far, but as you indicate, it's becoming less effective. You can only continue this mass butchery for so long, people see the pictures and it just becomes impossible to defend.

I think they are hoping that Lebanon will eventually lose its patience, then Gaza can be forgotten for a bit. Probably not helped by the issue that Netanyahu may end up going to prison for unrelated issues.

War is an excellent motivator for many politicians.

Sure, what else are they going to say? Well, they did say South Africa was the legal extension of Hamas.

But it's all pathetic, having no defense, they hurl insults, which is what happens when your arguments (or rather, propaganda) no longer work.

Yes. It's insane to see, but there it is. And they will keep saying insane things.

Yes he was fantastic, and so was the judge. All of them really.

This case South Africa presented against Israel was superb. Defense against such facts, will be near impossible.

At least one country in the world is doing something serious against Israel.

That's in the Amphiboly if I don't misremember. Allais breaks down that section impeccably, and says pretty much what you say.

The question is, what do we make of it? Me feeling is that Kant was right, though we do not know how Leibniz would have replied. I have not read the Monadology, opting for his New Essays instead.

The issue with Descartes and Leibniz, as I see it, is that they were way too ambitious and too confident in the reach of reason, which Locke and Hume clearly saw as being a total mistake, correctly.

Yet, even after Kant wrote his Critique, we continue with "metaphysics", in manners he may not have approved of. The distinction between what counts and does not count as the bounds of legitimate speculation is not so clear to me.

Him arguing that metaphysics is essentially the topic of God freedom and immortality sounds off to modern ears. Freedom is still relevant.

But I suspect there may be other speculations which are near the borders "beyond all possible experience".

It's tough.

Or….I got it all wrong. There is that, of course, so…… — Mww

You better not.

If so I am doomed. And will say that Kant considers monads to be negative noumena available to introspection!

You have been warned. :grimace:

Yeah - he covers a fantastic deal of territory in that book. We are always going to try some parallels between our "ordinary experience" and whatever science says about the world, it very hard not to do so. We like to have some general intuitions - even if they are mostly misleading in some cases - than "just" an equation, that does nothing for most people.

Sure, as long as we don't find evidence of another intelligent creature, we might as well be the "center" of the universe.

As Wittgenstein famously said, a serious work of philosophy could be done consisting mostly of jokes.

Or as Schopenhauer said, on an individual basis life appears as tragedy, but looked at from a species perspective, life look like a comedy.

If I sometimes laugh to myself, it is because the questions I ask are so difficult to even give a bad guess, then humor must be a component. As I was walking today, I don't know why I was contemplating what constitutes a trivial answer? What makes something obvious to everybody (or most people anyway) as opposed to something that is not obvious?

Maybe something to do with immediate awareness and expectation, but, I couldn't go further. So I laughed - briefly mind you, not like seeing Monty Python or something.

But, at the same time, for me, philosophy fundamentally begins with what Raymond Tallis said, "astonishment".

And if front of the astonishing, I suppose many reactions are valid.

Finally some info on this.

Thank you very much. :pray:

I read this one! How did you become interested in Plotinus? — frank

As I am working on Cudworth's philosophy, I found that he frequently cited Plotinus in favor of his views and I found such views very interesting.

So, I got this book originally for Kindle, but wanted a paper back for closer study, it's very good.

Re-reading:

Plotinus by Eyjolfur K. Emilsson

Reading:

The Final Curtain by Keigo Higashino

Sure, it is an account that may sound persuasive to some, but I do appreciate him attempting to sketch out a framework of our mental activity and I do sympathize with his focus on trying to provide an alternative to scientism (which he calls "materialism", which I don't think necessarily follows at all).

I agree—I tend to see 'mind' as a verb not a noun, and I see mental functions as one kind of physical function. The tricky part is that the physical aspects of mental functions are well-hidden from us; we don't so easily feel the physical aspects of mental functions as we might, for example, with digestion. We don't feel our brains, I mean that's why they can be operated on without anaesthetic. — Janus

Very tricky yes. I mean, I agree that at least some important non-mental physical aspects are not felt by us, and obviously some parts of the brain play a role in experience which as parts, are not felt as experience.

But then we do know, from the inside, what a brain is "like" by having experience, given that experience must arise from this organ. The issue is, what parts of it are we experiencing? That's very hard to know at this stage.

I wonder if there isn't some merit to the concept, if reframed in terms of us being elements of a social species, whose thoughts are very much a function of of our encounters with conspecifics. — wonderer1

There's an element of that, it's hard to think so otherwise, but even taking this to account, I don't see how this expands to objects being "disassociated boundaries", with people you could say that, but I don't see how this entails creates Kastrup's idealism.

And I think that's what substance in the philosophical context, at least, means "that which stands under" or something like that. — Janus

Ah - ok. Yes, this is reasonable. I believe that the mental is another aspect of the physical though, so it's not an opposition, but your point is well taken.

But I'm really not referencing cosmological or physics theory, I'm just going with the more basic fact that everything seems to be constructed of energy in its manifold configurations and conditioned by energy exchange and entropy. We don't know of anything that escapes those conditions. — Janus

Energy yes - as far as I know, I think this applies. Entropy is tricky though, is the universe an open or closed system? What is order and what is disorder? Ben-Naim has written about this, it's quite interesting.

If one does. I'm saying that 'substance' is a poor choice of words, for the reasons I gave. I'm not denying the reality of the mind. — Wayfarer

Yes, substance is problematic and dated. But if qualified, it can be used, though it can lead to confusions.

Talk of mental substance, when everything we know tells us that mental phenomena are entirely dependent on this energetic foundation seems to me to be incoherent. We may not fully understand the idea of physical substance, but we have no idea at all of what mental substance could be. — Janus

That's a bit misleading I think. I agree with you that Kastrup, while interesting in some areas, goes off the wall with attributing "dissociated boundaries" to objects, this is an extreme extrapolation.

But I think we have a pretty decent idea of what mental substance, if one wants to use that term is, we have it with us all the time, it's what we are best acquainted out of anything. Which is why we can read novel, participate as jurors, pass laws, create art, etc.

The nature of the non-mental physical, is rather stranger. We only understand 5% of it, from a theoretical standpoint, even here, we have plenty of problems understanding this 5%, it's the other 95% of the universe, that we know almost nothing about, save that it needs to be postulated in order to make the 5% we do know, work.

At his age, it's not very plausible, he likely thinks every other person is serious deluded. Oh well.

Which he denies exist. Saw an extended interview with him the other day. His views on consciousness are frankly embarrassing to me. It's as Galen Strawson says you need to be trained to believe in this eliminitavist lunacy.

I mean, if we are talking about conceivability, it's also conceivable that the mind of supreme being exist, absent anything else, that is, no matter, no physics - no "material substrate".

Reductionism is of limited use.

These zombie arguments are kind of pointless. They show nothing, outside of the fact that we can imagine stuff. Sure, that's why we write fiction and stories.

It's just an excuse to rehabilitate behaviorism to show it is wrong again, and to paint consciousness as magic, whereas everything else in the world is just normal "expected stuff".

It is not a-priori evident that non-conscious things with complex behaviors should be evident or obvious at all.

Not addressed to me I know, but, thanks for the clarification. :up:

And happy 2024 to you and yours, am looking forward to exchanging books and ideas on mutual interests.

It would be a mistake not to talk about politics, especially if it's controversial.

Most philosophers up until recently were very much involved in current events, so, it is a crucial topic to cover because it is important and part of the tradition.

Of course, the risk is much higher in that people will be nasty and the like, but that should be navigated, as is done here.

Because that is one of the goals of the developments of AI, so of course questions about consciousness are going to rise.

I didn't say that AI is going to cause us to marvel about gravity or mutations. What I am saying is that without these two, we wouldn't be alive to try to make sense of experience, nor would we be around to create such machines.

On that basis alone, these things merit much more wonder that they often do. But we are much more ignorant about them then we are about consciousness.

My main disagreement is the emphasis in which consciousness is held to a problem, over and above anything else, it's a very recent and narrow focus in philosophy. There's a lot more to say, but it's late here so I won't go into detail now, tomorrow (or whenever) sure.

Certainly, Locke and Schopenhauer cared about consciousness (Locke's "ideas of sensation" and "ideas of reflection", and Schopenhauer's "representations"), hence hey wrote entire books dealing with how it is we come to acquire knowledge. But they did not see consciousness as more problematic than other properties of the world.

Well, there is historically a hard problem of motion, that was made worse when Newton discovered gravity, which to his dismay made no sense to him.

I think an appropriate way to look at these things is to see that they are all at bottom mysterious. As Schopenhauer said:

"The tendency to gravity in the stone is precisely as inexplicable as is thinking in the human brain, and so on this score, we could also infer a spirit in the stone. Therefore to these disputants [between 'spiritualists' and 'materialists'] I would say: you think you know a dead matter, that is, one that is completely passive and devoid of properties, because you imagine you really understand everything that you are able to reduce to mechanical effect. But… you are unable to reduce them… If matter can fall to earth without you knowing why, so can it also think without you knowing why… If your dead and purely passive matter can as heaviness gravitate, or as electricity attract, repel, and emit spark, so too as brain pulp can it think."

I think that is accurate perspective. Or take Locke:

Whether Matter may not be made by God to think is more than man can know. For I see no contradiction in it, that the first Eternal thinking Being, or Omnipotent Spirit, should, if he pleased, give to certain systems of created senseless matter, put together as he thinks fit, some degrees of sense, perception, and thought... it is no less than a contradiction to suppose matter (which is evidently in its own nature void of sense and thought) should be that Eternal first-thinking Being...Body, as far as we can conceive, being able only to strike and affect body, and motion, according to the utmost reach of our ideas, being able to produce nothing but motion; so that when we allow it to produce pleasure or pain, or the idea of a colour or sound, we are fain to quit our reason, go beyond our ideas, and attribute it wholly to the good pleasure of our Maker. For, since we must allow He has annexed effects to motion which we can no way conceive motion able to produce, what reason have we to conclude that He could not order them as well to be produced in a subject we cannot conceive capable of them, as well as in a subject we cannot conceive the motion of matter can any way operate upon?

(Bold added).

I could add more from Hume, Priestley even Leibniz, and others.

So yeah, I think there is a deep mystery as regards to oxygen, gravity, mutations, liquidity, and virtually everything, on equal footing with consciousness.

Gravity for one. If we didn't have gravity, we would not have neuroscience, compute science, philosophy, etc.

Electromagnetism too, if we didn't have that, we wouldn't have a universe, or at least, nothing with life or of any interest would be around.

Oxygen is another important one, which would also render everything we adore obsolete, nitrogen too. Iron.

Mutations: no mutations, no speciation. Plate tectonics.

And on and on and on.

Philosophy is the main field we are talking about.

I wouldn't like - at this moment anyway - to repeat what I've said too many times before. I don't believe that the "hard problem", should be considered uniquely so.

I think there are good historical reasons to be suspect of believing that there is such a thing as "the" hard problem, I think there are many (hard problems), and highlighting one at the expense of others shows how little awareness there is on the history of this topic, which was debated by Descartes, Gassendi, Locke, Leibniz, Hume, Priestley and others.

I was going to share my Chomsky thread, but just saw you participated in in.

So, if people are still debating the "hard problem" a thousand years from now, that would just be the utter death of the field.

It would be very general, and the semantic issue can't be completely taken away. But it would be something like there is at bottom, one kind of stuff in the universe. Why is it one kind as opposed to two or many?

Because if they don't share the same nature, our intuitions tell us that they cannot interact even in principle. Dualism as a metaphysical view is problematic, pluralism would be a nightmare: many different kinds of stuff making up everything there is, doesn't make sense.

So, choosing monism as a necessity, all that's left is to call whatever remains something, and here we just choose, I think "physical", rightly understood, is less problematic than mental or ideal.

If not, then "natural" might even be better. But the issue of the scope of science cannot be under-emphasized, by "natural" or "physical", reductionism should not be entailed such that if we say either of these words, we are merely pointing out to metaphysical "substance", not to view that physics or nature explains everything. It doesn't.

My usual spiel, physicalism (a version of materialism) doesn't really have a good definition anymore, because there's nothing which can sensible be made that physicalism can be opposed to.

Even idealism, where it differs, is at bottom, an issue of semantics. For one can say, all that exists are minds and ideas, but very few would deny that ideas come from brains in human beings.

That, or your a substance dualist - and then you have the traditional problems of interaction and unification.

Nevertheless, one should be careful, because physicalism does not (or should not) entail phyciSalism, the idea that everything can ultimately be explained in terms of the stuff physics says. That seriously distorts the purview of physics.

So yeah, not a bad term, but these metaphysical views often boil down to semantical problems.

I don't have strong objections to compatibilist notions of free will, as a matter of pragmatic necessity for beings as complex as we are. I just see a lot of value in awareness of what a compatibilist free will needs to be compatible with. — wonderer1

That's fair enough.

Nevertheless, keep in mind that the best theory we have in physics, quantum mechanics, suggests probability, not determinism, unless you follow someone like Sabine Hossenfelder.

I'm sure Sapolsky would recognize the difference, and perhaps would go into detail about how the reflex finger raise was a result of a chain of events that didn't go beyond nerve paths between brain and spine. Whereas in the case where the finger raise resulted from someone having written a post on TPF, the causal path was vastly more complicated. It seems clear to me that Sapolsky understands that most of us model the world with our thinking playing a starring role in what we do. — wonderer1

Ah, ok. That is a step forward.

Even without metaphysical (free will) freedom, there is such a thing as freedom as determined by the laws of physics (the freedom to phase through a wall). But even if I grant that to you, which I am willing to, you make a point about freedom existing because people in Copenhagen have more freedom than in Palestine. I show that this does not depend on metaphysical freedom and so much so that it is completely relative (Palestinians have the freedom to bear arms, Danes don't). Your point about modern politics is therefore completely unrelated to the discussion. — Lionino

Wait what? The freedom to phase through a wall? That's not freedom, it's a fact about wat physics says can or can't be done, but either way it's not about choice and consequence in any relevant sense in which those words are used.

If we have freedom to go to the left as opposed to turn to the right, if we have the freedom to say a sentence or not say a sentence, then political freedom of course follows.

But let's put that aside, since you think it's entirely irrelevant.

Because, as I said, the point or meaning of a proposition is separate from whether it has truth value or not. You are doing what some other users here do and basically saying "Ok but so what?/Who cares?" in reply to a discussion topic. That is not philosophy.

In any case, the OP is short and poorly formulated, it does not even fulfill the requirements to make a thread as put in the rules. — Lionino

That happens, given the frequency of people posting similar questions, most times people are nice enough, sometimes they're not, that's normal.

Sure, several threads don't meet the criteria asked here. If the discussion is decent, it's tolerated, though a better phrased OP would surely lead to a better discussion.

By the way, I didn't say "who cares", I am asking the determinist to tell me what consequences follow from this belief, which is an appropriate question.

Sure. There are many ways that humanity has culturally come up with, to deal with our innate tendedncies in a more prosocial way. Religions provide some such tools, for example Christianity and Buddhism. I wish I was more knowledgeable about the roots of the more enlightened Nordic perspectives, but I haven't looked into it and am open to reading recommendations. — wonderer1

Yes, me too on the Nordic angle, have seen a few decent documentaries on YouTube, heard stories from reliable sources, but I'm sure there are books on the topic, which is very interesting, quiet removed from the US justice framework, which is on the whole, too harsh.

The extent to which people are educated, to have a more accurate perspective on human nature and how to deal skillfully with having a human nature, might change. I think this is a reasonable hope that Sapolsky and I share. — wonderer1

Sure - education is a never ending process which offers everybody plenty of benefits, we create better societies and the like.

Now, there's something that's been indirectly tackled, does your view on us not having free will, include, say, that you are forced to reply (or not) to this sentence here and does that include the ability to merely lift a finger as well?

I'm unsure if Sapolsky would agree that there is felt (perhaps illusory) difference between lifting one's finger right now, and then have someone tap your finger such that it raises out of reflex. This is important.

Right, and the data would require a book length treatment to lay out well. — wonderer1

Agreed.

That's fair enough, though I do not see how to proceed. This now becomes speculative metaphysics which, to be sure, is fun, but more often than not doesn't lead anywhere.

But keeping something so broad so as to argue that a simple being acts any possible world is nebulous in the extreme.

For sake of a total baseless guess, perhaps it can be said that the simplest possible thing is the cause of everything in the universe, somewhat akin to the singularity in the big bang, but ever simpler.

So, this simple being would thus necessarily be responsible, in an extremely remote and far off manner, for everything that there is.

Aside from this, I can't invent anything else that is intelligible in the least.

I mean, sure I can read Sapolsky but I prefer to see your arguments, reading we do in our own time this place is to discuss ideas.

However, with a more accurate understanding of our own nature we can become more cognizant of that nature and develop skill at seeing beyond our kneejerk monkey-mindedness. — wonderer1

That's fine - yet I think we already have instances in which people do not automatically go with kneejerk reactions. Compare the Nordic justice system with the US'. They are just night and day, one of them is much more humane, the other is just punishment or mostly based on more primitive notions.

But, as I understand it - especially the Nordic one - which is extremely little, is that both of them are based on the notion of freedom of the will, what changes is the way society reacts.

So suppose blameworthiness is an illusion and we have rationalized our view of each other as free willed agents, because although simplistic, it fits with the monkey-minded ways we tend to interact with each other. Wouldn't there still be value in recognizing our proneness to such illusions, and in developing skills at seeing through such illusions. I personally find it valuable to have at least some skill in that. — wonderer1

Let's suppose it is an illusion. What changes? Not much. People will be prone to knee-jerk judgments and others will not. You could say that those who are more rational don't think free will is real, but then one would need evidence for this. I strongly suspect that even those who are less judgmental would not all fit into the camp of determinists, not that you are claiming this, I know.

Either way, we need data for this.

We can still aim for more humane treatment of people who commit crimes, irrespective of the belief in freedom of the will. Because you then have to attempt to explain the other side of the problem:

A criminal will say I had no choice but to do what I did. But then the judge will reply, I have no choice but to condemn you as I will.

Something is off here.

No spatial dimension? That's not entirely clear. If something has no spatial dimension, how can we say it exists in the world (as opposed to how we could imagine it to exist in our minds)?

Well, your second question assumes there are possible worlds, maybe, maybe not. But you'd first have to say what leads you to believe that it could act in a way that if has effects on this world.

If you can state how this belief carries force for you, then we could proceed. Otherwise, it seems to me like we are stuck.

It's not simple to change the way people think, but we certainly do effect each other's thinking, and we have fields such as education that would make no sense apart from an understanding that people's thinking can be changed. Perhaps your paradigm, for understanding changes in human thinking, is a bit unrealistic? — wonderer1

Sure, we change our minds all the time, we thought we knew X and discovered something we didn't know, and now we believe Y. The deeper a belief is entrenched the harder it will be to change one's mind, but if it's not something deeply held, it can be done without much difficulty. Beyond that, it is very hard.

But that quote you provided by Sapolsky looks like what others who deny free will say, especially the phrase:

"it’s very hard, and at times impossible, to uncouple from our zeal to judge others and to judge ourselves."

In other words, he lives and judges people as if we had free will (because if we really don't then how could we judge? It would be an illusion.), but then says we really don't have it.

So, it becomes a kind of game of sorts, we don't have free will, even if almost all of us act as if we do, but then this could lead (the belief that free will is false) to a society in which people are more cognizant of that fact and hence we would have less severe laws for crime, we'd understand other people's faults better and so on.

I agree that we can still be nicer to each other regardless of free will or not. But, if we act as if we have it, then I don't see how an argument against it, carries much force.

The discussion is about control over mental operations, not about the electromagnetic force inhibiting your freedom to phase through walls or a valley hampering your freedom to bike to the neighbouring city. Social/physical freedom are not the same as metaphysical freedom. If you wanna make the opposite point however, I am open to hearing it. Otherwise, you are completely missing the point of the thread to take the opportunity to talk about modern politics. — Lionino

If you don't have metaphysical freedom, the freedom to move an arm or choose to get up now and read a book or not or any other trivial thing, how can you have any other freedom? So no, I certainly do not buy the notion that metaphysical freedom is opposite any other freedom, in fact, it presupposes it, as do the laws in the societies we live in.

The utility or meaning of something bears no importance on its truth.

One day the server where this website's data is hosted will come apart and your comment will be lost —at best 10 people will ever read your comment. What is the point of making comments? — Lionino

Yeah, and Newton's discoveries will fade, and we will all die.

It bears just enough meaning to merit arguing we don't have it ...

What is the point in saying we don't have it, if all of us, including the most die-hard determinist lives as if they do have free will?

The point of coming to this site, is to discuss issues pertaining to philosophy - if people read great, if not, fantastic. But plainly you are making an effort which could be used for something else to attempt to convince people we don't have something we very much seem to have.

That's an interesting take, perhaps correct.

Then let' say the simplest object has one property, this property aligns with the simplest possible thing that could exist which must have at least one property.

What could this be?

A point in space?

I've wondered about this.

The point I tried to convey is that you are using freedom in common sense meaning, as in the freedom to drive a car or the freedom to spouse certain ideologies. OP is talking about metaphysical freedom — free will basically.

Obviously "freedom to wield AK-47s" is a reply made in jest. — Lionino

It's an extension of freedom of the will. If you are in a war zone, your freedom is severely hampered. Sure, one could say that people have a choice to try and stay alive or they are free to walk to areas they know will be bombed and choose to die.

Unless they deny free will, in which a person has no choice but to live or die.

But, I do take this to very basic levels. Suppose you don't have free will. Ok. What's the point is trying to let people know about this? You can't change what they think and if they do change based on what you say, then there is freedom to choose based on reasons.

If someone really believes that we do not have free will, then why do anything at all? Just stay in bed. Why bother doing things? Unless you suspect that there is something more than being forced all the time to do whatever circumstance dictates.

I find this rather puzzling. Yes, it's true, having a doctorate may make me seem to be "higher in the ladder", but all that means is that I had the time, interest and opportunity to do something I thought would be worth doing.

What bothers me to no end, is how little I know about the darn history, everything you read or contemplate leads to 20 other topics and 20 other obscure figures and it's impossible to read it all, much less know it in-depth.

On the other hand, your mastery of Kant is awe-inducing. I will read the Critique again, even more carefully, probably a commentary, it will be long and maybe I'll fail to do what I have in mind. But even if I do pull it off, I'd still be behind you.

Heck, I've read Locke, Hume and Leibniz twice, both times with quite a bit of care. And I still fear I misunderstood many, many aspects. Nowhere near what you do with Kant. The only similarity in me would be Chomsky, but he doesn't have a Critique or an Essay Concerning Human Understanding. And his linguistics stuff, once it goes beyond lay-audiences, is beyond me.

So, don't sell yourself short.

For sure. I don't recall how I felt about Skinner and his skin, I read him in high school. Looking back though, it's just so incredibly poor. But finding a wife is not so bad a price to pay to put it with it, I'd think. :)

Oh yeah, some fringe stuff can be very good, taken with care and salt. For literature it pays off though, and so far as I can see, a good novel is the best psychology a person can get.