On the positive side he is certain that he exists, certain that he thinks, and imagines, and senses. On the negative side, just as what he imagines and senses can be called into doubt, so too can what he thinks, for they are all part of his thinking. If what he thinks can be doubted, if even what he doubts can be doubted, is he then hopelessly lost is doubt? Will his certainty that he exists be sufficient to serve as his Archimedean point? — Fooloso4
I think we can see that some animals have preferences, and so display intentional behavior. This might not be obvious in simple 'one-off' acts, but extended observation and testing I think would show the difference.
The idea that animals are machines and hence, for example, feel no pain seems absurd to me, and is abhorrent. — Janus
Are the senses alone sufficient? Given the connection between mind and body, which he will discuss, perhaps the problem arises only in abstraction, when mind and body are artificially separated and not treated as a union. — Fooloso4
As we see with Zeno and the denial of motion. Does this fall under logical formulations? — Fooloso4
His mechanistic view of optics allows that animals without mind can see, otherwise they would not be able to move around in the world. — Fooloso4
he lists several things that come through the senses:
Yet although the senses sometimes deceive us about objects that are very small or distant, that doesn’t apply to my belief that I am here, sitting by the fire, wearing a winter dressing-gown, holding this piece of paper in my hands, and so on. It seems to be quite impossible to doubt beliefs like these, which come from the senses.
... the sky, the air, the earth, colours, shapes, sounds ... no hands or eyes, or flesh, or blood or senses ... — Fooloso4
In other words, in the Theatetus Socrates first postulated that our senses gave us the criteria (measure) for knowledge, but abandoned that picture simply because our senses can be wrong, or not generalizable from person to person. Of course it remains to be seen how and thus why we need to posit an “intellect” rather than training our expression of cold to language. — Antony Nickles
If I would predict his next step, it would be that the separation of sensation from that-which-could-be-deceived (“intellect”) would only be to maintain the integrity of our senses while controlling the framework by which we are deceived, to structure our failing. — Antony Nickles
But when we ask the world questions, like: is that a star I sense? Or an airplane? We want the world to speak, not our own intellects. All the human truth teller is doing is repeating what the world has said. The intellect is just supposed to aid us in hearing the world correctly, right? — frank