I also think the "badness" of something is necessarily dependent on a conscious mind, to begin with. That is, though we might argue differently, it seems to already be "the experience" of conscious minds (collectively) that death is bad. So, is it only bad for conscious minds? And if so, once dead, does it cease to be bad for the deceased?
I'll admit, I may not have framed it well. Hopefully you can still find my point. Is being alive a necessary condition of death being bad?
Plato is right. By definition #2, there are no physical limitations. A dog that eats the most, and a dog that eats the least implies two physical limits, which violates #2
Age is degradation, or the slow march towards death. If you didn't die, you wouldn't degrade.
Would I choose to live forever? Yes. I say this because I have the right make up for it. I do not get bored. I do not seek to cause strife or excess resource drain in life. I constantly seek to improve as a person. I mention this because I have another deeper question
The problem is that this idea of yours fails to connect to the larger issue of inferences from group data to individuals. In that sense it is a red herring and also invalid.
Your counterargument is, "Ah, but if we had data for each individual in the group, then that data would supersede the group data for understanding individuals." Sure.
I believe the antecedent state will necessarily result in the consequent state.
I'm a compatibilist, and deny the PAP (Principle of Alternative Possibilities) - IOW, whatever choice we make, we could not have made a different one. Each choice is the product of a person's memories, beliefs, dispositions, and impulses at the point in time the choice is made. When we examine a choice in hindsight, we think of alternatives we might have made - and this gives us the "illusion of freedom".
The false premise in your thinking is the idea that we always have access to superior individual data, and therefore never have need of recourse to group statistical data. If everyone were omniscient your argument would be valid. There would be no need for statistical generalization. Given that we are not omniscient, your argument fails.
Hm, I must disagree here. Among the good looking people, some skate by on their looks while others get bullied for having good looks. For example, in our society there is still jocular contempt for blondes or pretty women in general. Being pretty at a work place means that it is easy for the envious or competitive to cast suspicion on your merits and position, because of the widely spread but false assumption that having good looks is almost always a privilege.
However, no thinking person would use group "probabilities" preferencially over individual data.
— LuckyR
No one said they would.
The group statistic informs us of probabilities, and we are constantly using probabilities to make decisions.
If I may. I think he's suggesting the fact that Marcell Ozuna happens to have an exceptionally higher batting average than the rest of his teammates is a rarity. Out of all the Atlanta Braves team members, any given one would likely be much lesser and closer to .244 than to be in the 5th highest average. In other words, if you picked the Atlanta Braves (batting average of .244) and were to make a bet that a player, selected at random, assuming you don't know the identity or batting averages of any of the players, would be in the top 5 highest averages, over say, the team with the highest batting average, that would be considered foolish as it is much more likely for a randomly-selected player from a team with a much higher batting average to have a higher batting average than one from a team with a much lower batting average.
I realize this is a sub-discussion that happens to be about racial tendencies, which I find iffy, but context-aside, for the sake of the larger, more general discussion not about race from which this one is derived from, that is the bare bones logic as I see it.
But it is reasonable. If group X has Y percentage chance of committing action Z, then—all things being equal—someone belonging to group X has Y percentage chance of committing action Z on average. Progressives have a difficult time recognizing the simple fact that there are rationally sound inferences which move from group data to individual data.
You can behave favorably to evil people. Our behavior towards a person is not an indicator of their inherent good or evil. Do you believe beautiful people are inherently good people compared to less beautiful/deformed people?
You can rearrange this sentence to adequately respond to most charges of racism/sexism/transphobia etc..
Generally speaking, that aspect of the person/group/behaviour/whatever else... is actually not relevant to the policy, and some other aspect is. It is not the fault of policy that it has more frequent interaction with a particular group due to their behaviour or self-affected identity.
Regarding which, do you know how many college students drop out by distracting themselves with drugs? Too many...
Sure, and people get math problems wrong all the time, too. That doesn't mean anything with respect to the question at hand. Suppose you are on a math forum and they are discussing a math problem and you say, "Ah, well it seems that you have arrived at the right answer, but people get the wrong answer all the time. Thus wrongness is not a complete barrier to arriving at an answer." This is an ignoratio elenchus at best, unless it is being proposed as an argument for mathematical (or moral) relativism.
I think the only way a consequentialist can consistently go is to deny that it is immoral to kill an innocent human being: they would have to say that sometimes that is true, and sometimes false.
If it is good to have no children because life is suffering, than life isn’t all bad since we get to make this good decision to have no children.
I would never pull the lever, no matter how many people I would save by doing so. Killing an innocent person is always wrong; and one cannot commit an immoral act to avoid a morally bad outcome.
Jesus Christ. No.
There are simply things I find unbecoming, and not immoral. Aesthetic disagreement is not moral. I don't want to wear bright Orange pants, or be the kind of person who would do so. Doesn't mean anyone who does is even on my bad side.