I have not yet seen a model of cattle ranching that's good for the cattle, the environment and the climate. Migrating herders of ancient times probably did no great harm, but I can't think of one good thing to say for barbed wire fences.

"good for the cattle"? What does that mean? Remember domesticated animals were invented to provide goods and services for humans. Commonly that involves their death or at minimum living in an unnatural situation. If humans don't need the goods and services of domesticated animals the option isn't living a wonderful life, it's to not exist at all.

I agree with you that small scale ranching leads to a better (less bad) quality of life for the animals, that's all I'm saying, take aim at the worst offenders, not the whole inductry.

I do object to heavily industrialized agriculture -- for both animals and plant crops -- which is driven by the usual capitalist impulse to cut costs and maximize profits. Two examples: a) producing corn for ethanol as 10% gasoline and b) massive feedlots which are harmful to both ecology and animal health.

Exactly. When addressing such a broad range of practices, better to target the very worst practices than the topic as a whole since there are both positives and (the well appreciated) negatives. Pretending that ranching is solely negative is a gross oversimplification.

If you come across a child drowning and you have merely to reach out your hand and get your arm wet to save her, do you have a duty to do so? Are you acting immorally if you let her die?

A perfect illustration of the fact that judging an action is incomplete without taking into account the consequences of not performing the action.

Thus, not saving the child is immoral since not reaching out one's arm carries no counter value that can outweigh the action of saving the child.

The OP's "giving to charity" example fails this test, as there are numerous positives associated with alternatives to where to spend one's money aside from giving to charity. Thus not giving every single discretionary dollar to charity is not immoral (even if giving to charity definitely saved lives, which in reality, is not actually proven).

Yes it appears massive. Part of this is that very few (if any) human behaviors are purely positive (good) or negative (evil) regardless of context. Thus in order to determine the morality (or immorality) of this or that choice, detailed contextual effects should be weighed. That is, the cumulative positives and negatives summed to arrive at a final answer that determine whether the overall positives outweigh the negatives. In this usage, the positives are commonly labelled as "justifications" because of their role relative to the known (or imagined) negatives of the behavioural choice.

Creators (gods) are so convenient in the absence of science, to explain all unknowns and (currently) unknowables, that human psychology guarantees humans would invent gods, whether they exist or not. Of course in order to survive after the invention of science (to explain natural phenomena), gods pivot to perform other duties, such as regulating heavenly gates, etc.

You're a shill. :roll:

I've put you on ignore. You reek of the ideology of OnlinePhilosophyClub.

Name calling?

I will specifically continue to follow your postings as you're obviously well versed in Philosophical theory. As a non expert in theory (but with practical expertise in certain areas of philosophical interest) my expectation when posting (typically with a practical slant) is not that my arguments will win the day. Rather I look forward to theoretical critiques as I find the confluence of theory and practice to be significantly more interesting (and important) than the perspective of either in isolation.

Well, in the OP you wrote:

"The latter scenario is morally permissible because either choice (of action or inaction) will result in a bad side effect (of either letting the woman die of cancer or killing the unborn human being) and the bad side effect of killing the unborn is on a par with letting the woman die of cancer." Thus separating hysterectomy from abortion, in your description, which only has the negative effect of fetal death. 2 vs 1, double vs single.

When in reality abortion already has two negative effects (which are in conflict), the fetal vs the maternal interest (survival vs bodily autonomy). Hysterectomy as cancer treatment in pregnancy adds a third, maternal cancer treatment. 3 vs 2, triple vs double.

The OP is NOT contending with whether or not a standard abortion is wrong or not: it is just using it as an example for the principle of double effect, and presupposes that it is wrong and offers a relevant difference between it and the permissibility of performing a hysterectomy.

With respect to whether or not abortion is wrong, which is a completely separate topic, I would say it is immoral because directly intentionally killing an innocent person is always wrong. One cannot do something immoral for the sake of producing a good end: so even if it is good to uphold the autonomy of people, it does not follow that one can kill an innocent person as a means towards that end; just as much as someone cannot violate the autonomy of one person as a means towards saving the life of another (on the flip side).

Likewise, to just anticipate the first response, abortion is not a case where one is violating the autonomy of the mother as a means to saving the life of the unborn child. There is an unborn child and its mother who does not want to be pregnant (for whatever reason) to start out, and now one must decide whether they are going to (1) kill the unborn child as a means towards respecting the mother's wishes or (2) let the woman's wishes be violated. In the case of the former, they are committing an immoral act; in the case of the latter they are letting something bad happen (at best) because they cannot do anything that is morally permissible to remedy the situation.

Again, this has nothing directly to do with the OP; but I am more than happy to discuss it.

I know that. My point was/is that the abortion/hysterectomy example is a particularly poor demonstration of the Principle of Double Effect because abortion already has two effects (maternal and fetal impacts, positive and negative) and therefore hysterectomy (as cancer treatment) adding another, makes it it a triple effect.

Is infinitely close to zero = zero? Like .999...=1?

Practically speaking? Yes. Conceptually? No.

While statistically accurate, philosophical logic/arguments should cover all eventualities.

What about the second party of the question, where I let the universe decide which world Alice teleports to?

Ah, that's an actual statistics question. The answer is it's a chance that is infinitely close to zero.

Are Bob's chances of teleporting to Alice's world zero?

I get that you're trying to explore statistics, but if one drills down into the OP, as written, it devolves into an exploration of the limits of machines to choose "randomly" among an infinite number of choices. Which is to say: wholly inadequate. Thus the answer is: not zero.

It is akin to the question: if an account holder can choose between 68 to the 8th power, number of possible passwords, what is the chance of guessing their password? This isn't a statistics question, it's a human behavior question.

The word "abortion" is for ideologues what a squirrel is for dogs. When they see the word they forget themselves immediately and are compelled to make a pro-choice argument. It cannot be denied that they have been well trained. Yet it's at least lucky Lucky didn't launch into a violin solo. :grin:

I don't entirely disagree. Bringing up abortion to make one's point is akin to bringing up Hitler to accomplish the same thing. It's not a sign of a well thought out argument. But it is what it is.

This bodily autonomy was trampled the moment a decision was made to create another body that has its own rights — among others the right to live. Even then, the argument is not about law-making.

Perhaps you're unfamiliar with the existance of sexual assault. Whose "decision" are you referring to? The rapist's?

I meant that declaring that killing is immoral while ignoring that violation of an adult human's body autonomy is also immoral, is missing the key issue of the topic of abortion.

Traditional Abortion vs. Hysterectomy

The morally relevant difference between killing an unborn human being to be rid of an unwanted pregnancy and killing an unborn human being by performing a hysterectomy to save the mother from cancer is that:

1. The former scenario uses an innocent person as a means to bring about the desired end (of not being pregnant), thereby making the killing directly intentional and (thereby) immoral; whereas

2. The latter scenario uses the hysterectomy as a means to saving the mother’s life from cancer and doing so has a bad side effect of killing an unborn human being, thereby making the said killing indirectly intended.

The latter scenario is morally permissible because either choice (of action or inaction) will result in a bad side effect (of either letting the woman die of cancer or killing the unborn human being) and the bad side effect of killing the unborn is on a par with letting the woman die of cancer.

Thoughts?

I don't necessarily disagree with your analysis, though it bears noting that humans are pretty well versed in decision making while weighing relative personal risks. Though human perception of risks are often skewed. Similarly, substituting societal benefits and risks for personal ones is not much of a stretch.

Part of the problem with the traditional trolley problem is that it assumes (which is reasonable in a Thought Experiment) that there is a completely accurate prediction of various outcomes.

As to the abortion example, your comments make the (common) error of omitting the immorality of trampling the bodily autonomy of an adult human should abortion be outlawed.

Right. No doubt about it, one's past experiences alters one's brain-state which at least influences decision making moving forward.

Exactly. Determinism basically is a self fulfilling prophecy in the sense that you can never "go back" and do a "do over" and make a different choice (thus disproving Determinism). Though there are numerous examples of making choices in ALMOST identical situations, yet come up with different choices, where it makes an unbiased observer wonder just how different those brain-states really are.

No it's definitely not. That's Determinism. And no, your "choice" isn't "influenced" by your brain-state, it's determined by your brain-state.

You can choose to flip a coin, you can choose to follow through with the choice determined by the coin or you can choose to go against what the coin is telling you to choose. Thus there are choices within choices. But in a Determinist universe, all of these choices feel like choices (to you), yet were always going to end up being the "choice" determined by the chemical, electrical and anatomic state of your brain at the moment of choosing. Thus not a "real" choice as most folks understand the definition of the word.

Excellent question. Either things are as they appear and you truly choose between options, or your act of choosing is an illusion, that is you go through the motions of "choosing", but it's not really a "choice" since you are destined to always "choose" a particular "optionć due to your brain-state at the moment of choosing.

Because having a dog at the low end (say, 1 bowl) and another at the high end (2 bowls), doesn't preclude having a limitless number, ie it's not limiting.

Sorry for misunderstanding. Yes, exactly my point.

You think so? In my mind dying is a process (of becoming dead), death is the last point of the process of dying and dead is one's state of being upon death.

If you mean: are my comments gender specific? Then, no.

I also think the "badness" of something is necessarily dependent on a conscious mind, to begin with. That is, though we might argue differently, it seems to already be "the experience" of conscious minds (collectively) that death is bad. So, is it only bad for conscious minds? And if so, once dead, does it cease to be bad for the deceased?

I'll admit, I may not have framed it well. Hopefully you can still find my point. Is being alive a necessary condition of death being bad?

Well, since "bad" is a subjective descriptor, there needs to be an observer to give an entity that label. But the observer need not be the person dying. It is true, though that whatever factor an observer evaluates to bestow the "bad" label, it likely preexisted the observation (and potentially the observer himself) and might postdate him as well (say, after his death).

Plato is right. By definition #2, there are no physical limitations. A dog that eats the most, and a dog that eats the least implies two physical limits, which violates #2

Incorrect. There are an infinite number of quantities between 1 bowl of food and 2 bowls, just as there are between 1/infinity and infinity.

I totally understand where you're coming from. It's naturally frustrating when real life statistics don't match up with theory.

Though I have to admit that this is the first time I've observed a reference to a journal article on an online Forum being labelled as an invalid argument.

Have a nice day.

Age is degradation, or the slow march towards death. If you didn't die, you wouldn't degrade.

Well, since immortality is a fictional fantasy, it can actually be anything one can imagine. Most simplistically (over simplistically, IMO), presume they'd be in perfect health and ignore completely how they'd finance living forever, which essentially rules out retirement, ie working at your (potentially deadend) job forever.

Would I choose to live forever? Yes. I say this because I have the right make up for it. I do not get bored. I do not seek to cause strife or excess resource drain in life. I constantly seek to improve as a person. I mention this because I have another deeper question

Really? Have you seen how infirm a 100 year old person is? I can barely imagine how incredibly decrepit a 200 year old you would be, let alone 300. And you have to exist at that level (and worse), for eternity? Just shoot me in the head.

Let alone, trying to make your retirement savings last for eternity. So you'd end up the most feeble person you've ever seen, living by the side of the road. Not for me.

Death, to a human, is nonexistance. Nonexistance for a human is normal. You were nonexistent for 13.7 billion years, you existed for less than one hundred years, then you'll be nonexistent until the end of time. Why sweat the details about an infinitesimally small fraction of your total time?

The problem is that this idea of yours fails to connect to the larger issue of inferences from group data to individuals. In that sense it is a red herring and also invalid.

Well, given the extreme frequency of ecological fallacies when Real World inferences to individuals from group data is attempted, one practical solution involves using individual data (LP1).

But you don't have to take my word for it, how about the National Academy of Sciences?

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6142277/

Your counterargument is, "Ah, but if we had data for each individual in the group, then that data would supersede the group data for understanding individuals." Sure.

That's the point I'm making. Glad we agree.

My comments stem from the very common dismissal of members of groups based on their group membership alone when individual data is available, typically in the form of an application form, CV or test score.

As an aside, I've acknowledged several times that group data excels at describing groups (what it's designed to do). Though I haven't focused specifically on the idea that in the absence of individual data that group data is better than nothing. Just as you haven't that when using group data on individuals, one should continue to collect new individual performance data as the chance of an initial miscalculation is moderate.

Uummm... if acknowledging the reality that groups stats are designed to describe groups and don't describe individuals as accurately as individual statistics do, is "undermining", then I guess you're right, I'm an underminer. Though just to be clear the relative strengths and weaknesses of the two would still be the case if I never posted in this thread. It's not about me.

I believe the antecedent state will necessarily result in the consequent state.

Fair enough, which is the standard Determinist view, I guess I'm not seeing the Compatibilism in your outlook, since by your own description there are no viable alternatives to the final outcome. I don't believe it is accurate when you use the term "choices" to describe impossible alternatives.

I'm a compatibilist, and deny the PAP (Principle of Alternative Possibilities) - IOW, whatever choice we make, we could not have made a different one. Each choice is the product of a person's memories, beliefs, dispositions, and impulses at the point in time the choice is made. When we examine a choice in hindsight, we think of alternatives we might have made - and this gives us the "illusion of freedom".

Do you believe there is an element of randomness (or unpredictability) to the decision making process? Or does antecedent state A always lead to resultant state X, never Y.

The false premise in your thinking is the idea that we always have access to superior individual data, and therefore never have need of recourse to group statistical data. If everyone were omniscient your argument would be valid. There would be no need for statistical generalization. Given that we are not omniscient, your argument fails.

Now you're just trying too hard. (As you know) I never stated that individual data is always accessible. Merely that (when available) it's superior to group data. Thus when making important decisions, the prudent judge seeks out the best input. Not controversial.

Hm, I must disagree here. Among the good looking people, some skate by on their looks while others get bullied for having good looks. For example, in our society there is still jocular contempt for blondes or pretty women in general. Being pretty at a work place means that it is easy for the envious or competitive to cast suspicion on your merits and position, because of the widely spread but false assumption that having good looks is almost always a privilege.

While what you describe exists, it exists as a (minor, statistically) backlash against the pervasive huge advantage that the very attractive appearing, have over the ordinary and the unattractive.

The sociological literature has demonstrated this advantage repetitively over a long time.

However, no thinking person would use group "probabilities" preferencially over individual data.
— LuckyR

No one said they would.

You seem to agree that individuals being judged on their own merits (individual data) is superior to judging individuals based on their being a member of a group (group data). That's my main point (which I predicted above that "you knew already").

Arguing whether inferior data is of no benefit, marginal benefit or minimal benefit is a perfect example of a distinction without a (practical) difference.

The group statistic informs us of probabilities, and we are constantly using probabilities to make decisions.

Your commentary would make logical sense in cases where individual data doesn't exist (all you have to go on is group data). However, no thinking person would use group "probabilities" preferencially over individual data. If another team is going to trade for a specific Brave, no one is going to conclude, "well, since the Braves average batting average is low, we'll get to offer a low salary" for a specific player. They'll base their offer on the specific stats of the player, the Braves team averages don't enter into the calculation.

Of course, you know all of this already, hence my surprise why I'm forced to to review the obvious.

If I may. I think he's suggesting the fact that Marcell Ozuna happens to have an exceptionally higher batting average than the rest of his teammates is a rarity. Out of all the Atlanta Braves team members, any given one would likely be much lesser and closer to .244 than to be in the 5th highest average. In other words, if you picked the Atlanta Braves (batting average of .244) and were to make a bet that a player, selected at random, assuming you don't know the identity or batting averages of any of the players, would be in the top 5 highest averages, over say, the team with the highest batting average, that would be considered foolish as it is much more likely for a randomly-selected player from a team with a much higher batting average to have a higher batting average than one from a team with a much lower batting average.

I realize this is a sub-discussion that happens to be about racial tendencies, which I find iffy, but context-aside, for the sake of the larger, more general discussion not about race from which this one is derived from, that is the bare bones logic as I see it.

Oh I know that's what he's trying to say, problem is that because the difference between groups is smaller than the differences within groups, examples like this are, in fact NOT rare, they're common. Hence the inability to reliably predict individual variable stats from group averages.

Though the erroneous belief that they are is the "rationale" behind stereotyping.