Can you see why Hart rejects naturalism? Kantians and post-Kantians look at the idea of a clockwork universe made up of little universal bits with assigned mathematical attributes interacting on the basis of a pre—assigned causal logic, and the say, sure, the universe looks that way becuase we set it up on the basis of these pre-suppositions. — Joshs

Yep, I understand this part of his argument. I've even heard Chomsky talk about the idea of materialism as being incoherent for similar reasons, sans the theistic solutions.

Hart says the same thing, but rather than arguing that we need to investigate how the subject imposes these schemes, or how they arise and change historically through subject-object interaction, he says we need to open our eyes to how the universe is put together, not as components of a giant, ethically neutral machine or clock (naturalism), but as a moral system whose every component has a vital moral role to play in its purposes. — Joshs

Yes, well, Hart argues that mind, language, and life share attributes and are aspects of the Great Mind (God), who makes all of this meaningful. A Neoplatonist would say that, right? It seems to me that he touches upon a lot of post-modern ideas aroudn language and meaning but resolves them instead with classical foundationalism.

Aboutness is a feature of mind, but the object is not. Obviously the object cannot be derived from the physical processes that give the mind its ability to identify objects.

Therefore, P4 is false! :nerd: — jkop

I'll let you comment on this one, since I'm trying to understand Hart not criticise the argument.

This requires a pretty high level of expertise to get fully across, doesn't it?

Also: intelligibility is the property of being understandable, at least in principle, by an intellect. So, arguably, anything in order to be 'intelligible' should require the possibility of the existence of an intellect.

So if physical reality is intelligible, the potential existence of an intellect is requied from an essential feature of physical reality. This would be indeed an odd thing to say in naturalistic views. — boundless

Yes, that's my read too.

Yes, I knew people like this in the late 1970s (I was a kid). They were Christian socialists who located their ideas in teh pre-enlightenment period. There are folk like these left in the Catholic Church in Melbourne where I live. They dislike Rome and find the conservative tradition of the church today to be anathema.

Do you call these sorts of position 'nostalgia projects' or is that too reductive?

Indeed. :up:

Possibly. I think he takes the Gospels as a proto-radical Marxism.

I think the argument goes something like this. Care to criticise how it's laid out?

Premise 1: Naturalism explains everything in terms of physical causes and effects.
Premise 2: Physical causes and effects, by themselves, have no meaning or “aboutness.”
Premise 3: Human thoughts, beliefs, and concepts are intentional—they are about things and can be true or false.
Premise 4: Intentionality (aboutness, meaning, truth) cannot be reduced to or derived from purely physical processes.
Conclusion: Therefore, naturalism cannot fully explain intentionality; the intelligibility of thought points beyond purely naturalistic causes.

Premise 4 would be the most controversial one. It's actually this premise I want elaboration on. It’s interesting because, instead of obsessing over consciousness, this argument treats a single attribute as foundational to a rather complex argument.

Sure, that’s why I think of it as a heuristic, with limitations. And let’s face it: any little maxim that tries to universalise is probably doomed, if only by its blandness.

You tell me.

By default, a theist starts off with:
There is God.
God created man.
Man has the characteristics and abilities as given to him by God.
Naturalism is wrong because God exists and man is created in the image of God. — baker

No that’s a reductionist account, Hart arrives there via philosophical arguments not dogma. He is a Neoplatonist.

I think that the deepest difficulty for strict naturalism is not whether evolution can produce reliable cognition—it clearly can—but whether it can account for normativity. — Esse Quam Videri

Do we know this? Isn’t the question of consciousness still a contested space? But yes on the normativity issue.

So from my perspective, the core issue can be stated simply:

What must reality be like for beings like us to be normatively bound by truth, necessity, and correctness at all?

Once that question is in view, the debate is no longer about science versus theology per se, or about evolutionary psychology, but about whether intelligibility is intrinsic to being or merely a contingent feature of how certain organisms cope with their environments. — Esse Quam Videri

Nice work. Yes, I think this touches on some key points.

But I’m still looking for a statement of Hart’s reasoning I can follow. Some of CS Lewis’ essays seem to come close but that old polemicist irritates me.

Is there a substantive argument that attempts to demonstrate why intentionality and subjectivity can’t originate via naturalism?

Imagine the sense of privilege that can be evoked by the mere speculation that human cognition might have an element of something that is supernatural or connected to god or spirits or anything but the natural world. It serves the interest of theists, mystics or the like. Hence their recurring misrepresentations of naturalism as explanation of survival rather than truth. — jkop

This is an entirely different subject. Again, I'm not much interested in how the argument might be used by some, nor in refutations of it. Hart would openly mock idea that evolution or complexity produces consciousness. He is a trenchant critic of emergence and is deeply read in neuroscience and the philosophy of mind.

I’m still trying to understand his specific argument, but I fear I may need to buy his book and attempt to negotiate his baroque prose. Life is too short.

Hart is a theological Platonist retrieving classical participation, Schelling is a speculative post-Kantian rethinking intelligibility as dynamic and self-grounding. — Joshs

Yes, he identifies as a neoplatonist.

The post-liberal politics of Victor Orban, J.D. Vance and Marco Rubio draw from the classical metaphysical thinking of John Millbank and David Bentley Hart, — Joshs

Interesting. Although Hart identifies as a socialist, he mocks MAGA and openly disparages evangelicals which he calls a heretical. He writes amusingly about how much he dislikes all forms of conservative politics (even if he supports a form of Christian nostalgia). He can be quite a bitch.

Nietzsche meant when he said we hadn’t got rid of God because we can’t get rid of grammar, — Wayfarer

Ha! This is exactly what I was saying about this to a friend yesterday. I always paraphrase it as, “If you believe in grammar, you’re a theist.”

Nice. I guess one could go onto argue that language already presupposes access to logical form, universals, truth, and intentionality. You can’t build those out of non-rational processes without bringing them in.

I note that Hart's position has a relationship to Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism (EAAN).

I don't have enough expertise to thoroughly assess this but I find it an engaging idea. One can see how one might go on to argue that reality is intelligible only because it is already configured in terms of mind and language, which are inseparable from one another.

Thanks. As I said, I’m not trying to debunk the argument. I’m trying to get a better account of it. What you’re doing is reading over my very elementary summary of the argument, and I’m not surprised that my version is wonky.

What I'm hoping is for someone to restate the argument properly and then supply some further reasoning in support of it. I’m looking for a clearer philosophical account of why some philosophers reason that intelligibility and intentionality cannot be accounted for under naturalism. I don’t want to have to buy Hart’s book. :wink:

Which part do you question? — Patterner

I have no expertise in metaphysics or ontology, but my sympathies have led me toward simple-minded anti-foundationalism. Exploring this is for another thread. What I really want here is a clear account of this argument at its most articulate. I’m not interested in debunking it or making a counter-argument; I'm just hoping to understand it better.

Say some more, I’m not sure I follow. But if you’re saying that the GR is culturally located, then that’s probably true. Although I suspect there are versions of this that cross cultures and have a similar deflationary expression. Didn’t Buddha say something like, "Don’t be a cunt"? :wink:

I think the argument is meant to be something like this:

P 1: Naturalism explains everything solely in terms of physical causes, laws of nature, and emergent phenomena.

P 2: Intelligibility (the fact that the universe can be understood or grasped conceptually) cannot be reduced to physical causes or emergent processes.

P 3: Any naturalistic account that relies only on physical mechanisms cannot explain the conceptual, law-directed, and rational features that make understanding possible.

P 4: If a phenomenon cannot be fully explained by physical/natural mechanisms, naturalism is inadequate to account for it.

Conclusion: Therefore, naturalism cannot fully explain the intelligibility of the universe.

Someone with better philosophical insight and who agrees or better understands with this argument could improve on this account.

Hart is a metaphysical realist of a classical persuasion. That means that he thinks reality is objectively real, intrinsically intelligible, value-laden, purposive, and metaphysically grounded in God. Human reason isn’t a matter of trial and error representations we place over things, reason is formed by the world’s own intelligible structures acting directly on the mind. In other words, the mind is inclined naturally to grasp the truth of the world. This is a very different from Kant, who argued that categories of human reason are purely subjective in origin, not given to us directly by way by the truths of a divinely ordered purposeful world. Postmodernists
believe that reality originates neither in the world as already ordered in itself, nor from subjectively given categories of reason imposing themselves on the world, but from an inseparable interaction between us and the world. — Joshs

Yes, that seems to be right. My sympathies these days are with the latter.

Can you sketch out the argument being suggested that naturalism can't explain intelligibility and intentionality? How are they (Hart) arriving there?

Naturalism does not assume that we never navigate reality, only experience. On the contrary! The experience is the navigation of reality. That should dissolve the argument (if there ever was one). — jkop

I’m not sure I follow this. The claim that experience constitutes reality is what Hart is arguing, but he sees no reason why naturalism can support this. I don’t have the premises laid out; I’m hoping someone familiar with the argument can supply them. All I can find is Hart stating what I’ve already summarized earlier.

We are living, thinking expressions of the principles of the universe. I think it wouldn't make sense if an entity with whatever minimal degree of mental ability that tried to understand the principles of the universe from which it grew couldn't recognize them. We evolved to recognize patterns — Patterner

I’m certainly aware that this is a commonly held view. I don’t know whether it’s correct.

The universe has order, regularities, patterns. If it did not, it would not exist. — Patterner

Certainly our experience of the world suggests patterns, but it’s unclear to me how these reflect the universe itself versus how we function as observers, our cognitive apparatus. That, however, may be a separate matter.

Hart seems to argue that the problem with naturalism is that even if the universe produces conscious beings, it doesn’t explain why they can understand the world. Physical processes create neurons and behavior, but not meaning, truth, or reference. That our minds can grasp concepts and form true beliefs points, Hart argues, beyond mere material causes.

I was hoping someone could unpack this and elaborate.

Most people understand the Golden Rule means to treat others well, and fairly.

It presumes that most people want to be treated well, and fairly.

"Treat others as you would want to be treated." — Questioner

I think that’s the right point. The reality, however, is that ethics is complex, and the Golden Rule is a simplification or, perhaps a heuristic.

I do know that almost all people, most of the time, do not want to be lied to, assaulted, robbed, or killed, and want to make choices and be free to go about their daily lives. The Golden Rule can readily be understood as representing this perspective.

No, Im sorry. I didn't even realize it was a common objection and was just putting it out there. — ENOAH

No need to be sorry, some clever people have put forward this argument over the years. And it shows up on this site every now and then.

Some still accept it has value.

I've usually held that the Golden Rule isn’t about everyone liking the same things; it’s about considering the other person’s preferences and needs. It asks us to use empathy and respect for other's perspectives and preferences, rather than imposing your own tastes.

While I'm in agreement, I’m not sure it’s a principle I follow. For me, morality doesn’t require codifications or prescriptive rules like this.

Yes, that’s the response I have often given to this common objection.

Prayer might be seen as living communion with God, while meditation is a reflective or preparatory exercise that may incline one to prayer, yet is not itself the act of addressing the divine. I suspect many sometimes confuse the two, meditating when they think they are praying, and praying when they think they are meditating. That said, I think they are related but much of this will flow from the definitions you hold.

One might ask this: how many who presume to pray are truly opening themselves to God, and how many are merely rehearsing their own desires, making nothing more than a crass shopping list of wants?

Again, I'm interested in looking at things from the perspective of a (prospective) insider, and specifically, "What would it be like and what would it take to become a practitioner and to obtain the promised results?"

You seem to be interested in some objective, external analysis of the situation and people. It's not clear why. — baker

I’m interested in the same thing. I don’t think it’s correct for you to suggest that because I disagree, I’m interested in a wrong aspect of this discussion, or in some ‘objective’ and erroneous analysis. We’re just having a conversation, and what I said would apply to both an insider and an outsider. I simply resisted the idea you put forward that my argument would not be understood by an insider. But let's move on since this is a minor part of the overall discussion.

A seeker has to know the history and the formal power that the leaders have in the religion he's approaching, even if there are at first unpalatable aspects to this.

Whether a given pope had doubts or not, in history he could make whatever decision he wanted, which shows the abuse of power is inherent in the authority, not the doubting.
Were the Inquisition and the Crusades an abuse of power, or a mere use of power? What if the popes in the past did what they did because they were "further along than you"? — baker

The point I made was that it would be okay for a pope to have doubts, and that this would not make him a bad pope. You took us to stake burning for reasons that are still unclear to me. You introduced the notion of an abuse of power, but to my knowledge the discussion was not about this. It was about whether a follower of a religion, or a pope, can have doubts about their faith and still be a productive member of that faith. I say yes. You seem to say no. I have heard no good reason why.

The more common form of punishment is to slowly push the doubting person out of the group, without this ever being made explicit and instead made to look like the person's own choice and fault. — baker

Yes, this happens especially in fundamentalist groups. But so what? Humans often shun people they disagree with or do not understand. This seems to occur when there is dogma and a kind of certainty that brooks no diversity. It would be nice, wouldn’t it, to expect religious followers or theists more specifically to behave in superior ways to the rest of the community, but they don’t. It seems we can’t expect people in a religion to behave differently from people in a family, a sporting club, or a corporate management group. Does this tell us that religions are just ordinary beliefs in fancy dress, or does it say we strive imperfectly to reach God?

For example, if you're poor and female and new to the religion, you'll be considered as something of a spiritual retard and treated like this (at least metaphorically, but possibly physically, too). And this is by people you are supposed to depend on for your spiritual guidance. So what do you do? Do you accept that they are "further along than you" and that you need to accept their treatment (however abusive you find it)? — baker

This may well be the case if the religion is misogynist, classist, and elitist. In such cases, it seems we have a religion where more followers need to doubt those doctrines and work to reform beliefs. This is, of course, how religions around the world have modified some of the practices such as those you describe above and have become, often owing to secular influences, more inclusive and generous. I’m not aware of a religion that doesn’t acquire its attitudes and behaviors from mainstream secular life, it’s just that some source those beliefs from earlier times, or from more radical or conservative values.

To an outsider, this makes sense. To an insider or a prospective insider, it doesn't. — baker

That sounds like a kind of argument from authority. The authority in this instance is the insider, whose world the outsider could not possibly understand. I'm not convinced.

Really? And you don't mind submitting to such a doubting pope? You don't mind if such a pope, being the Grand Inquisitor, orders people like you (including you) to be burnt at the stakes for heresy? — baker

How did we suddenly arrive at stake burning? Whether a given pope had doubts or not, in history he could make whatever decision he wanted, which shows the abuse of power is inherent in the authority, not the doubting. Of course, no pope has ordered this in centuries, nor could one today. So I’m not sure what this point is doing here.

What I want is to put yourself in the shoes of a seeker, an outsider even, or at most a beginner, who shows up in a religious organization and witnesses there are double standards: those higher up in the hierarchy don't have to act in line with the tenets of the religious organization, but those lower in the hierarchy do, and are punished if they don't. Now what do you make of it? — baker

Well, this doesn’t really address the issue of whether holding doubts within a belief system is good or bad. What you describe just seems to be common human behavior. But what do you mean by a 'double standard'? Are you referencing a hypocrisy, or a bifurcated belief system with different practices for each stream? An elitist stream and an ordinary or folk stream?

Who is punished for not holding a particular belief today, except by faiths with narrow, intolerant, and fundamentalist belief systems? Apostates are hanged in some Islamic countries. Do we consider this an authentic expression of God’s will? Perhaps some robust doubt might be reasonable here.

As an aside, isn't it the case that in hierarchies there is often a large gulf between the top and lower levels in terms of belief? Sometimes this is simply a question of education and sophistication. Beliefs about the nature of God, built from classical theism and held by an educated Jesuit, will be completely different from the God beliefs built from the theistic personalism of a common believer.

My posts are not about how leaders should act, but about how a seeker can understand the actions of those leaders when they preach one thing and expect it from the lowly others, but they themselves don't adhere to what they preach. — baker

I'm sure there are a range of interpretations possible. For one thing, a leader may say, "I don’t need to do this because I am further along than you, but you do."

And finally, humans themselves. What should they do? What should they do? Even in everyday life, machines already do our laundry, robot vacuums, and so on. And tomorrow, will a specially trained robot entertain and educate our children? Provide attention to our wives? What will remain for us? — Astorre

Are we anywhere near this yet? If you want household chores properly done, you hire someone to do them or do them yourself. Robot vacuums are pretty shit, and who actually uses machines for most of these tasks?

But if machines and AI replace humans, this could be a great thing. Many, perhaps most, jobs are shit. Imagine lawyers being replaced by AI, this could democratise access to the law.

We seem addicted to catastrophic visions of the future. It passes as common sense that everything is getting worse and that the future will be apocalyptic. But so far, in my lifetime (in the West), things have been better every decade in terms of technology and available free time. Many of us currently seem to be hypervigilant, spotting impending disasters everywhere: environmental, political, technological. Every cloud seems to have a grimy lining.

If ordinary people don't participate in politics, what is the chance really for democracy to work? — ssu

Yes. One of the most powerful tools of the status quo and certain corporate interests is the idea that all is hopeless, all parties are the same. If people give up, nothing can change.

This is exactly what the 'you must completely adhere to the teachings or you are going to get nowhere' folks in the thread, and the usual mindset I see when I have asked similar questions elsewhere in the past, are like imo. Fundamental uncritical faith or you are not practising at all. — unimportant

I think there are many people in religion and politics for whom rigid categories and binary thinking make sense. It’s how they see the world. For them, it’s all or nothing; you’re either for me or against me, that kind of thing. They tend to think in absolutes, with little room for nuance or ambiguity.

Also didn't he become enlightened by refuting all the myriad systems he tried before and looking for his own way? — unimportant

Yes, I think that’s right, and that’s why I labelled him a doubter earlier. From what little I know, he seems to have doubted (perhaps eschewed is a better term) rigid categories, established authorities, hierarchies, rituals, and inherited structures. But when someone establishes a new system, it is generally predicated on rejecting the "sacred truths" of other systems.

How far would he have gotten if he followed these 'total faith in one school or nothing' folks? There would be no Buddhism. — unimportant

I have a minor knowledge of the history or development of Buddhism, but that's an interesting line of inquiry. Religions tend to have a scattered period of formation followed by ossification and rigidity. I have a mild curiosity about Buddhism, but it’s been many years since I read about it. To me, in my culture it often seems to be the religion some Westerners embrace when they fail to find Christianity satisfying and simultaneously find themselves unable to be secular humanists. It’s been the counterculture faith.:razz:

Really? You believe than an honorable person will take on positions of power in a religious organization whose tenets they doubt? — baker

Of course. But you overstate this. They might take issue with some or several things, not all things. I would have serious concerns with someone who is 100% accepting of any philosophy or religion.

You like a pope who doubts God exists, for example? — baker

You pick an unlikely one. But a Pope who doubts aspects of doctrine and practice is natural.

And that said, a Pope who doubts particular accounts of God (theistic personalism or a vengeful God) yes, absolutely.

This matter doesn't seem to be an either/or situation.

An honorable person will simply not take on positions of power in a religious organization whose tenets they doubt. — baker

That’s obviously your strong opinion. But I don’t think doubt is the same thing as dishonesty or bad faith. Nor do I think it can be shown that certainty is a prerequisite for integrity. Many religious traditions have been shaped by doubters, dissenters, and people who challenged prevailing beliefs. You may prefer to divide the world into exceptional figures who doubt and challenge, like Jesus or the Buddha, and everyone else who should kneel in deference, but that strikes me more as the posture of an arch-conservative, rather than a fact. I don't know where you are coming from in this maybe you can say soem more.

I don’t see how hiding their doubts would indicate a greater seriousness. If they’re serious about preserving the religion then yeah, I suppose hiding one’s doubts about it could show a serious effort to towards the conservation of it. For a serious spiritual seeker, on the other hand, questioning and doubt may come with the territory. — praxis

I’m essentially with you on this. A lack of doubt is a red flag for me. People without doubt tend toward fundamentalism or zealotry. Certainty, and deference to power, are seductive for certain people: acolytes and followers, most notably. Certainty is also the perfect mindset if you wish to practice a little mass murder.

I think it’s pretty much the same with all religions: they promise salvation but only deliver limitations. — praxis

Or they promise limitations and deliver salvation. Depends on your point of view. :wink:

The only earphones I’ve ever owned are the little ones that sit inside your ear, like suppositories.

I don't know exactly how Allison would respond to this. I suspect he would say something like "I think my interpretation is better grounded than alternatives, and I am prepared to defend that claim even if it is ultimately not coercively demonstrable by appeal to neutral, public criteria." — Esse Quam Videri

Hmm, almost anyone can make that point and then go on to assert virtually anything about a given matter with impunity.

There are few things more tedious than debates about the meaning of Bible verses, so I apologise for even raising Mark, which interestingly never presents us with a resurrected Christ.

With the resurrection, God vindicates the executed one. The system that killed him is exposed and violence is judged, not justified. Seen in this light the meaning of the resurrection becomes: "liberation is costly because the world violently resists it — and God sides with the one who bears that cost". That is not blood-fetishism, but moral realism. — Esse Quam Videri

I’m not convinced by this account, but it’s nicely argued. Perhaps it's a bit too small to fully explain the significance of the crucifixion, or why an omnipotent God would find it necessary to undergo such a ritual to make a point about violence that seems largely lost on the religion inspired by the story; particularly given the extreme brutality the Church has employed over the centuries in imposing its vision.

But I’ll include this in my list of potential interpretations and, in time, perhaps further material will emerge that will make sense of this story. Maybe we need a competition for the best interpretation of the story. Apologies to we should probably stop here.

I think such matters boil down to intersubjective agreement. This is never unanimous, there are always dissenters, and the mores or systems we have, whether informal codes of conduct or formal laws, were built up over time. Some are now obsolete, some are too weak, and some are simply silly. The question is whether we think people would behave respectfully towards each other without the law.

Some might consider them related. :wink:

Yes, as I said earlier, the resurrection is subject to as many critical interpretations as Moby Dick. I suppose that suggests the matter isn’t really about uncovering “truth”, but about an aesthetic response to a narrative, shaped by time, culture and whatever values you hold.