Usually a debate has Pro and Con such that Con is the negation of Pro. Is that the framework with Idealism vs Materialism here?

What is the definitive statement of Idealism here? What specific proposition of the form

"Idealism is true if and only if [fill in definiens here]"

is the Pro so that Materialism is the Con?

Or, equivalently

"Idealism is true if and only if [fill in definiens here]"

is the Pro so that Idealism is the Con?

Otherwise, this is just an open ended airing of disagreeing points of view.

That article is good because it's hard to find layman's terms explanations of forcing and the proposed axioms.

But a couple of points:

"Cantor realized that [the set of natural numbers is 1-1 with the set of odd numbers]".

He "realized" it? It was known for at least 300 years. And probably a lot longer.

"In addition to the continuum hypothesis, most other questions about infinite sets turn out to be independent of ZFC as well."

Questions aren't independent. Sentences are. There are only countably many sentences. So the cardinality of the set of theorems is equal to the cardinality of the set of independent sentences.

/

"Kennedy, for one, thinks we may soon return to that “prelapsarian world.” “Hilbert, when he gave his speech, said human dignity depends upon us being able to decide things in mathematics in a yes-or-no fashion,”"

I hadn't read the speech. That is really interesting about human dignity. I understand why we would seek a decision procedure, but why would Hilbert think our dignity depends on it? So incompleteness would lead Hilbert to abandon hope of human dignity? This is really interesting.

E -> P implies ~P -> ~E.
CORRECT

~(~E -> ~P) is inconsistent with ~P -> ~E.
INCORRECT

Ironic that in a thread about an alternative to head to head debating we have a head to head debate.

I focus more on clarity than adding substance. The latter is hard to do if I believe the argument is lacking in substance. — Yohan

Suppose there are additional facts and logic that would improve your opponent's argument. Then you might easily win the Steelman by bringing in the additional facts and logic.

For example (this is simplified, but you can see the point):

Suppose your opponent's argument is "Capital punishment in the United States should be abolished because it results in racial inequity".

Then you could come back with "Capital punishment should be abolished because (not necessarily in order of importance) (1) it is cruel and unusual punishment violating the Constitution, (2) it societally institutionalizes cruelty, (3) it executes some people who are not guilty, (4) it wrongfully makes some people who are not guilty endure the deprivations of Death Row and the anguish of dreading execution, (4) it is not a deterrent, (5) it violates a philosophical principle that even a person who has committed great evil should be allowed redemption in this life, (6) it results in racial inequity, (7) some victims' families passionately don't want it, (8) the purpose of justice is not always to bring emotional closure to victims' families, (9) it is more expensive than the alternative, (10) imprisonment is punishment enough, (11) it drags the society and state down to the level of the murderer, (12) many democracies, especially allies who have greatest ideological affinity the United States, have abolished it, leaving the United States in a class of nations that are mostly authoritarian and totalitarian".

Then you could win the Steelman decisively.

Then Steelman truly is the opposite of Strawman.

Strawman is either (1) Claiming your opponent has taken a certain position, though your opponent has not, then knocking down that position or (2) Knocking down only the weakest parts of your opponent's position.

So if Steelman is truly the opposite, then Steelman should actually strengthen your opponent's arguments not just paraphrase them better. That would go along with the method of preparing rebuttals. To prepare a rebuttal, one should devise responses not just to what your opponent is likely to argue, but responses to the very best argument your opponent could conceivably argue. And exceptionally convincing argument can be made by presenting affirmatives and also proactively incorporating pre-rebuttals by saying "My opponent may argue that Jones had good reason to believe the gun was not loaded, but here's evidence that he did have good reason, moreover, even if he did not have good reason, then [fill in more pre-rebuttal here]."

MODUS PONENS HOCUS POCUS

I think fdrake and Andrew M had the right idea, but it needed a follow-through. I think sime had the solution in a general form.

I found this problem extremely interesting because in human inference making modus ponens is about as basic and ubiquitous an argument form there is, so it would be astounding to find that modus ponens is not reliable.

I can't find McGee's article on the Internet. If there is more in the article that materially qualifies the clip in the first post of this thread, then my remarks might need to be modified. But at this time I'm taking the clip at face value along with the quote "is not strictly valid".

If McGee meant this as a joke or magic trick, then I would say it is a very clever and entertaining joke or magic trick. But I take it that it was meant seriously, so I am curious why he didn't himself see the fallacies in his argument. It turns out that, when you unpack his argument, the solution to his challenge is trivial. So it is fun to see a baffling problem turn out to have a trivial solution.
.
I use a hypothetical person named 'Jack' instead of a group of people referred to as 'they.

I take McGee's argument to be fairly couched this way :

We start with premises that Jack has good reason to believe, then we arrive at a conclusion that (a) Jack does not believe and (b) doesn't have good reason to believe. Therefore, modus ponens fails to preserve strength of reason for belief. Therefore, modus ponens is not strictly valid.

That depends on the assumption:

For modus ponens to be strictly valid, modus ponens must preserve strength of reason for belief.

We should accept that assumption, at least for sake of argument.

But (a) is irrelevant. Argument forms don't ensure that people believe the conclusions. People err in their beliefs; that's not the fault of argument forms.

As for (b), argument forms pertain to what is the case, or (granting McGee's assumption) what should be believed to be the case, only relative to the premises. And relative to the premises, it is not the case that there is not good reason to believe the conclusion ~R -> A.

I assigned specific probabilities. But they could be any probabilities, as long as they entail that there is good reason to believe R v A. So here's the example with unspecified probabilities.

prob(R & A) = 0
prob (R & C) = 0

Assume prob(R v A) is great enough that we have good reason to believe R v A.

Assume prob(R v C) > prob(R v A).

The only non-logical premise in the modus ponens is R v A. And trivially prob(R v A) = prob(~R -> A).

So modus ponens does preserve the strength of reason to believe from the premises to the conclusion.

We do have greater reason to believe ~R -> C than we have reason to believe ~R -> A. But that does not contradict that, with either R v A or R v C as the non-logical premise, modus ponens did preserve strength of reason to believe.

Modus ponens is a red herring anyway. It is used by McGee as a needless phony baloney armature for a more simple fact: R v A is equivalent with ~R -> A. That's all we need to know.

So this is the slight of hand that McGee uses to pull off his trick:

(1) He puts the argument into an armature of modus ponens. He makes it seem that the supposedly incorrect inference is the fault of modus ponens. But there is no incorrect inference (strength of reason for belief is preserved from premises to conclusion, trivially as the inference is merely tautological), and the inference doesn't require modus ponens.

(2) He distracts by conflating two different arguments. Yes, ~R - C has greater strength of reason for belief than ~R -> A does, but what is at stake is preservation of strength for belief, not an apples and oranges comparison of the conclusions standing alone.

I'm only saying that in any given context, it would help to be clear which of those frameworks are intended. As far as I can tell, ordinarily Steelman is used for a kind of debate that is a "reverse" debate. But I find it to be an interesting concept, no matter the context.

SMOKE AND MIRRORS desmoked and demirrored

There really isn't a puzzle.

It has not been shown by McGee that modus ponens does not preserve strength for reason to believe.

And the point I mentioned about best strength is not relevant either.

And it has nothing more to do with modus ponens than with tautology itself.

This is so simple that I can't believe I didn't see it.


The only non-logical premise is R v A.

And the conclusion ~R -> A is equivalent with R v A.

So it's just a tautological inference.

The strength of R v A is 65%. And that strength is preserved from the non-logical premise to the non-logical conclusion.


Suppose the only non-logical premise is R v C.

The conclusion ~R -> C is equivalent with R v C.

So it's just a tautological inference.

The strength of R v C is 95%. And that strength is preserved from the non-logical premise to the non-logical conclusion.


That's all. Two different non-logical premises in two different arguments, and their strength preserved in the conclusion in both arguments.

/

For reference, here's the setup of the problem:

Suppose there are three candidates in an election: R, A, and C.

Suppose, the day before the election, the polls show 60% for R, 5% for A, and 35% for C.

Let Jack be a person who knows those poll numbers but he slept through the election so he doesn't know who won.

(1) (R v A) -> (~R -> A)

(2) R v A

Therefore, (3) ~R -> A

given their newly acquired knowledge, if Reagan didn't win, then Anderson did. — Andrew M

Exactly.

I realized that this has an even simpler explanation.

As I interpret the situation, ~R -> A is not counterintuitive when derived in the appropriate context. Given the polls, a person has good reason to believe a Republican has won (or will win). But Carter might still have won, despite their good reason, since their good reason is not sufficient for truth. — Andrew M

Now I don't think ~R -> A is counterintuitive. Because it has probability of 65%

You regard 1 as the background assumption, whereas I regard (1 v 2 v 3) as the background assumption — Andrew M

I was mistaken to couch it the way I did.

I deleted this post, because I realized the solution is even simpler:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/567916

This subject sounds interesting.

First, though, it's important to be clear on the differences between (1) proof or demonstration or inference, (2) debate, and (3) cooperative inquiry.

Question: Is it merely a matter of demonstrating understanding of your opponent's argument and being articulate to present it well? Or should you also strive to make an even better argument with more facts and better logic?

Only vaguely related, I heard a good joke today: "I got a college degree, but I didn't learn anything. I had a double major in Psychology and Reverse Psychology."

Just to say proactively:

Some people claim that classifications must obey certain essentialities in order to be correct. For example (I'm not trying to state the more complicated actual zoological taxonomy) a claim that only this classification is correct:

animal (mammal (canine, feline, ...), reptile (snake, lizard ...) ,,,)

But that notion is not viable. For example:

(1) passenger vehicle (Ford (Fusion, Mustang, ...), Honda (Accord, Civic ...), ...)

(2) passenger vehicle (sedan (Ford, Honda, ...) van (Ford, Honda, ...), ,,,)

Both (1) and (2) may be pertinent depending on our purpose.

And we may be wary of the essentialist mistake in mathematics.

Regarding saying that two sets have the same cardinality without saying what that cardinality it is:

like saying that the score in a baseball game is tied -- without saying what the score is. — fishfry

That's really good.

This is not circular:

df: K is a cardinal <-> (K is an ordinal & Aj(j e K -> there is no bijection between j and K))
["K is a cardinal iff (K is an ordinal and there is no bijection between K and an ordinal less than K"]

df: card(x) = the least ordinal j such that there is a bijection between x and j
["the cardinality of x is the least ordinal that has a bijection with x"]

theorem: Ax card(x) is a cardinal
["every cardinality is a cardinal"]

theorem: Aj(j is an ordinal -> EK card(j) = K)
["every ordinal has a cardinality"]

If we adopt a particular systematic and explicit sequence of definitions, and eschew locutions that don't "interock" with one another, then we leave fewer openings for being strawmanned by cranks.

I'm looking at the notion of 'prior' syntactically (others may wish to discuss 'prior' in another sense, but then I'd like to know the definition of 'prior').

So a notation X (primitive or defined) is prior to another notation Y (defined) iff the definition of Y depends on X. (1) So this is relative to the sequence of definitions; different treatments of a theory, even with all the same set of defined notations, may have different sequences of definitions, (2) We need a definition of 'depends on'.

The notations that are defined for set theory are function symbols, predicate symbols, and variable binding operators such as the abstraction operator and the definite description operator. I'm leaving out the variable binding operators for now, because even giving a rigorous definition of the variable binding operators is complicated and requires double induction. So by 'notation' here I mean just function symbols and predicate symbols.

I haven't yet come up with a definition of 'depends on'. Intuitively it's that Y depends on all the notations that appear in the definiens for Y, and the notations that appear in the notations in the definens for Y, and finitely backwards until we reach the primitives. So it's inductive. And for a notation there's a tree, not a sequence, back to the primitives. For example in set theory:

n is even <-> (n is a natural number & Ek(k is a natural number & n = 2*k))

So 'even' depends on 'natural number', and '2' and '*'. And each of those depend on previously defined notations, and downwards in a tree to the primitives '=' and 'e'.

But 'even' (or any other notation) could also have been defined in the primitive language alone, without using any intermediary notations. This may make a non-syntactical notion of 'prior' problematic. For example, neither 'ordinal' nor 'cardinal' is non-syntactically prior since both could be defined themselves using only the primitive 'e'. Of course, in practice, the definition of 'cardinal' has 'ordinal' in the definiens. But that is not necessary, as 'cardinal' could also be defined from just '=' and 'e'. Of course such a definition of 'cardinal' would be a massive formula and impractical for people to work with. But 'practical' is not formalized, and what we are investigating is formal syntax. In principle, even if it would not be practical, 'cardinal' can be defined form 'e' alone.

Anyway, for 'prior' I need

Tree(Y) = [fill in formal definition of the tree of notations that branches up to the definition of Y]

X is prior to Y iff X is a node in Tree(Y)

I see your point.

A logic form may not be comprehensive. A simple example:

Let P = AxRx
Let Q = Ra

P
therefore Q
INVALID

AxRx
Ra
VALID

I meant a context where we consider only the characteristics of the die where face 1, 2 and 3 are all possibilities — Andrew M

Right, I understood that.

"If it's not 1 then it's 2". That's not a valid inference (since 3 is also remotely possible) — Andrew M

I don't understand that.

Right, ~1 > 2 is not entailed when there is not a premise 1 v 2. But the reason it is not entailed is just logic. I don't see what the possibility of 3 has to do with.

Maybe you meant that the possibility of 2 should allow ~1 -> 2 as a possibility?

But 'possibility' is bringing a modal operator.

The premises are purely sentential:

[original argument:]
(background assumption) 1
(from background assumption) 1 -> (1 v 3)
(A) (1 v 3) -> (~1 -> 3)
(B) 1 v 3
therefore (C) ~1 -> 3

I do see this:

[revised argument:]
(background assumption) 1
(from background assumption) 1 -> (1 v 2 v 3)
(A') (1 v 2 v 3) -> (~1 -> (2 v3))
(B') 1 v 2 v 3
therefore (C) ~1 -> 3 WRONG

But that doesn't make the original argument incorrect.

if Reagan doesn't win then Carter will. But it's not a valid inference — Andrew M

It is valid from the background assumption that Reason wins.

"Reagan wins" is how we got "a Republican wins", which means "Reagan wins or Anderson wins".

Both ~R -> A and ~R -> C are entailed from the background assumption that Reagan wins.

But ~R -> C is not entailed from just "a Republican wins" which is R v A.

And of course, that is consistent.

So my solution is that there is good reason to believe both ~R -> A and ~R -> C.

Though it is counterintuitive to believe ~R -> A.

So there is good reason to believe something that is counterintuitive. And that is counterintuitive. (Is it paradoxical?) And modus ponens ponens is not invalid. And I think the problem has more to do with disjunction than with modus ponens. That aligns with you and fdrake in the sense that the puzzle results from leaving off Carter in the disjunction.

I said LOL because I was amused/charmed — fishfry

I didn't get why you chose that clause in particular. I see now - it was just the nominated example.

(Disclaimer yes, apology and placation no.)

Well, at least thank you for not saying 'thank you'.

I think McGhee begs the question when he asserts that Jack does not have good reason to believe (3). He does have good reason to believe it. But he also has good reason to believe (4).

/

But what if we changed the argument to this:


(1) (R v A) -> (~R -> A)

(2) R v A

Therefore, (3) ~R -> A


Jack has good reason to believe (1).

Jack has good reason to believe (2).

Jack has good reason to believe (1) and (2) imply (3).

So Jack has good reason to believe (3).

Jack has good reason to believe (4) ~R -> C.


I don't see that it changes anything materially.

/

Also, if 'good' is not being used in the analysis, then we can drop it, and just say 'reason to believe'.

I think I might have a solution.

The solution is that it is not puzzling, let alone paradoxical, to have good reason to believe a statement and also good reason to believe the negation of that statement. Happens all the time in life when we are confronted with a tough decision.

Restating the problem:

Suppose there are three candidates in an election: R, A, and C.

Suppose, the day before the election, the polls show 60% for R, 5% for A, and 35% for C.

Let Jack be a person who knows those poll numbers but he slept through the election so he doesn't know who won.


(1) (R v A) -> (~R -> A)

(2) R v A

Therefore, (3) ~R -> A


Jack has good reason to believe (1).

Jack has good reason to believe (2).

Jack has good reason to believe (3).

Jack has good reason to believe (4) ~R -> C.

There is not a contradiction there.

To get a contradiction, we need to derive:

(5) Jack does not have good reason to believe (3)

But it wouldn't be by logic alone, since

~R -> A
~R -> C
~(C & A)

is a consistent set as seen by this model (which happens to be the real world):

R is true
C is false
A is false

Yes, we do get ~(~R -> A).

But we haven't yet derived a contradiction about Jack's good reason for belief. So the burden is on McGhee to show a contradiction, especially since it is not puzzling, let alone paradoxical, that one has good reason to believe a statement and also good reason to believe the negation of that statement.

But still, it does stick in the craw to say "Jack has good reason to believe that if R didn't win then A won".

No more your personal private feelings please. Not even funny anymore. — Corvus

Bad Eliza.

Now you seem more like an Eliza machine than anything.

I was stating a general principle of psychology. It seems you who links the principle to yourself. — Corvus

Ridiculously coy and juvenile dishonesty.

Mother of all inferiority complex is from someone who describes other people or other peoples' writings as stupid on solely groundless personal feelings. — Corvus

That is itself a groundless claim about my mental states.

And you skipped again that I did give specific grounds for claiming that her posts are stupid.

private feelings and mental states, utterly groundless and unfounded. — Corvus

A splendid description of your postings here.

And you're an abysmal interlocuter. No answers from you on a number of questions I've posed that are at the very heart of the discussion. And about your lying about me.

And as much as you talk about appreciating other people's points of view, wouldn't it occur to you that many thousands of intelligent mathematicians and philosophers have keen interest in the subject, so maybe there is something to it? Especially since your dogmatic rejection is based on not knowing anything about it?

I am not suggesting that you need to be interested in it. But your arguments about it and your claims about its inferiority and lack of application are based in sheer ignorance.

Your level of thinking is not much better than someone who never heard of written language and said, "What good are these letter shapes? They don't make sounds come out of my mouth,"

This is the limitation of the symbolic logic.  They dictate that every argument must fit into some set forms. — Corvus

I wasn't talking about formal logic; I was talking about informal logic.

And formal logic doesn't preclude that we have whatever variety of formal systems we want with different forms. And formal logic doesn't prelude that we may construct new system with new forms for arguments that can't be formalized in existing systems. And I don't think that logicians generally disallow that informal logic plays an important role in many contexts in which formal logic has not developed adequate methods or in which restriction to formal logic would be impractical.

Could it be that you just don't like formal logic and so you are responding to it, without knowing anything about it, with false preconceptions about it?

most arguments in real life do not fit into any forms — Corvus

A great amount of everyday reasoning could be formalized, but It is not claimed that all everyday reasoning fits into available forms in formal logic. Moreover, probably the main use of formal logic is in mathematics, computer science, linguistics, and also in the physical sciences, engineering, and in philosophy.

many people think that symbolic logic is not practical for real life applications, to which I agree. — Corvus

You're doing it again! Utterly skipping what has been presented to you so that you can just reassert and reassert over and over that which has already been rebutted.

Again, for about the fourth time now:

You are typing into a computer that could not have been conceived, engineered, and programmed without formal logic. How more "real life" can that be?

df: K is a cardinal iff K is an ordinal and there is no ordinal j less than K such that there is a bijection between K and j.

There is no mention of 'cardinal' or 'cardinality' in the definiens.

df: the cardinality of S = the least ordinal k such that there is a bijection between S and k.

There is no mention of 'cardinal' or 'cardinality' in the definiens.

/

I don't use the term 'logically prior', but in context it probably would be fully explicated by induction on terms. Basically that a term T is prior to term Y iff the definiens in the definition of T does not depend on Y but the definiens in the definition of Y does depend on T. What requires induction on terms is the notion of 'depends'.

In that sense 'ordinal' is prior to 'cardinal'

Only thing I was saying is that, it is not a philosophically justifiable, acceptable or meaningful statement. — Corvus

It's a statement about the quality of the content of a certain piece of writing. Such a statement would not ordinarily be subjected to full standards of philosophical justification.

And what is really ironic is that you are all over the place making claims about me that are factually incorrect, and for which you don't even have probable evidence. Moreover a whole bunch of informal fallacies from you.

And you continue to skip that I gave explanation for why I say what she wrote is stupid. What is the name for the fallacy of just skipping rebuttals and reasserting over and over what has already been rebutted?

That's all. — Corvus

No, that is not all. You're leaving out 'ontological' now and especially 'infallible'.

And I wonder whether you have an answer for my question: What do you take to be the difference between empirical evidence and ontological evidence?

The whole of your arguments and the conclusion was inconsistent and invalid from the theories of the Informal Logic — Corvus

What specific argument are you referring to? My argument that what she wrote is stupid? You haven't shown any fault in it. You haven't even mentioned any aspect of it other than its conclusion.

Informal logic deals with a wide range of considerations, but, I think, most saliently in its critical considerations ('critical' in the sense of criticism of arguments), non sequitur (in various forms as labelled with names for fallacies) and rhetoric and its persuasion.

You've not shown that my remarks are "invalid" in those respects. And I remind you that even such things as emotional language don't entail that other parts of an argument are not good. As for inconsistency, you have not shown that there is any set of my statements that entail a contradiction. You are full of bluster, and that's not all.

That's really good. It puts the puzzle in stark formal terms and takes out the background noise about the historical election facts. Thanks.

In the broader context of all the die faces, the inference would be invalid — Andrew M

I don't get that. The logic is monotonic. So how can adding premises make the argument invalid? And how would we formalize the inclusion of a broader context? I surely see the point that not mentioning (2) relates to the problem, but I don't know how we would formulate that other than just mentioning it, and how it would overturn an argument in a monotonic logic.

Meanwhile, I'm inclined to think that a solution would center around problems with the notion of "good reason to believe".

Now please stop saying that I said the poster is stupid. And please do not further perpetuate the strawmen you've set up. And please stop making things up about me.
— TonesInDeepFreeze

You started this argument, not me. I am just responding to your arguments. — Corvus

You posted links to another poster on the Internet. I critiqued her posts and I said what I think of her postings overall, including that what she said is stupid. And then more back and forth between us in which I explained your errors in the subject. That doesn't warrant that I should be strawmanned or lied about.

It doesn't matter whether you said she was stupid or what she said was stupid. — Corvus

It matters to me that I not be represented as saying something I did not say.

The point was that your statement was your private mental feeling or judgement or state, not the external worldly fact or object. That is the only point. — Corvus

Obviously it's my opinion that what she said is stupid. But I gave ample explanation supporting that opinion.

you misunderstood again. — Corvus

Where did I misunderstand you previously?

Why should you suppose that other people will agree with a psychological reflection of someone without critical objective ontological infallible evidence? — Corvus

"objective ontological infallible evidence"

Only by the wildest stretch of a notion of what 'ontological' means would we say that talking about whether someone is stupid involves ontological evidence. Or what even is ontological evidence as opposed to other evidence?

More importantly you skipped my remark that it is a ridiculous standard to hold that convincing should require infallibility. And as to the fact of what people believe, obviously people believe all kind of things, and often on good grounds, without basis of evidence that infallibly proves.

if you said X is a book, then it is possible to find the ontological ground for it. — Corvus

It's possible to find the empirical basis.

What is your distinction between empirical evidence and ontological evidence when it comes to talking about whether a certain person is stupid?

It can be also argued that the statement existed inside your mind only - so depending on what your ontological stand is, it is also possible. Are you an idealist or materialist? See your old little symbolic logic has been confusing and muddling your thoughts. — Corvus

Empty razzle dazzle followed by a gratuitous, false, and sophomoric attempt at an insult.

Now please stop saying that I said the poster is stupid. And please do not further perpetuate the strawmen you've set up. And please stop making things up about me.

Ontology just means the way things exist either in material or mental world, nothing sophisticated or complicated. — Corvus

Please, commonplace discussion about whether certain people are stupid or not is not ontology.

But it is up to the reader either to accept the book's points or go his own way and establish his own logic too. You seem to be denying the latter case, — Corvus

QUOTE ME. Quote me where you think I claimed that one should not establish a new logic system. Hell, I encourage anyone who would do that.

You are strawmaning me yet again.

just blindly following the books and what those authors said. — Corvus

First, you have no statements from me that suggest that I have not read about logic critically or that I accept everything in the books I read. You are fabulating about me now.

Second, the large part of the material in textbooks in symbolic logic is not something one accpets or rejects but rather it's explanations of abstract systems.

I feel all of your points are from some old logic books — Corvus

First, how would you know what is old and what is contemporary in formal logic when you know nothing about formal logic?!

Second, the points that have come up in discussion are pretty basic, so it's not as if the context has changed so dramatically in recent years.

Third, that books are old doesn't entail that they don't hold valuable information or insight.

not really practical or useful in real applications such as debating or clarifying philosophical problems. — Corvus

On what basis would you say that when you don't know anything about the subject of formal logic?! Sheesh!

It is far more interesting reads than the symbolic logic books. — Corvus

I would not deny you reading what you find interesting and not reading what you don't find interesting. That has nothing to do with anything I've said. I am not even remotely debating what should be interesting to people. I don't even have any concept of what should be interesting to people. .

You are ridiculous. And what is really ironic that you are so hopped up about informal logic yet you are blowing it with informal logic left and right. You argue like a bum: blatant non sequiturs all over the place, ignoring refutations given you so that you can just go on to reassert and reassert what has already been refuted, strawmaning, and moving the goalposts

The inference was drawn from your comment about the Informal Logic and Critical Thinking books. — Corvus

They are not some mixed up ideas, as you suggested. — Corvus

No, I did not claim they are mixed up ideas. I asked a question sarcastically. And you just now skipped my remarks about that in the post:

my point went right over your head like a 747. You had conveyed some terribly mixed up ideas about logic and you said you got those ideas from a logic book. My point is that I bet the book didn't say those things but instead you misconstrued or misremembered the book. But if the book really did say those things, then, yes, that book is quite bad. — TonesInDeepFreeze

And even IF (though I did not) lambaste a couple of books that would not remotely entail that "the whole world should exist for symbolic logic and its traditional concepts."

And even IF (though I do note) thought that informal logic is not good, that would not remotely entail that "the whole world should exist for symbolic logic and its traditional concepts", since I might think there are other subjects just as good as or EVEN better than formal logic.

To recap:

If I thought informal logic is hooey, then that doesn't entail that I think the world should live for formal logic.

If I insulted a couple of books, then that doesn't entail that I think the world should live for formal logic.

And I did not insult those two books. My point is that I bet you misunderstood them because I can't imagine that a book on informal logic could be as mixed up about the subject as you are.

And in fact, I love informal logic and I think it is vital. And I told you that in the post above.