As soon as you can write the sentence as one that contains the pattern K(#S), i.e. a property of a statement, it is philosophical. — Tarskian

That doesn't make any sense. No need to take this any further.

I don't understand you responses to my statements. Seems like you're just stretching your definition to fit my examples. — T Clark

As soon as you can write the sentence as one that contains the pattern K(#S), i.e. a property of a statement, it is philosophical.

Asserting a property of a statement is a statement about a statement.

It works out of the box for Tao and Kant's general assertion about knowledge.

The Tao that can be spoken is not the eternal Tao — T Clark

This goes straight to Yanofsky's characterization of the truth, i.e. most truth is ineffable:

eternal(#S) => ineffable(#S)
or
¬ ineffable(#S) => ¬ eternal(#S)

It revolves around properties of sentences. So, I think that this example is actually captured by the definition.

God will not have his work made manifest by cowards - Emerson — T Clark

toManifest(_owner, _byWhom, _work)

∀ _work ( ¬ toManifest(God, cowards, _work) )

It is a 3-argument predicate while none of the arguments are sentences. This is a similar problem as JohnSaid(#S) or Said(John, #S).

This definition can definitely not handle persons involved, such as "by whom" or "for whom".

If it were not about God, but about an arbitrary person John, then it would be about a physical fact. For example, "John will not have his work made manifest by cowards". In my opinion, "by whom" and "for whom" tend to point to physical facts.

All our knowledge begins with the senses, proceeds then to the understanding, and ends with reason. There is nothing higher than reason - Kant — T Clark

Knowledge(#S) <-> ( Stage1Senses(#S) ∧Stage2Understanding(#S) ^ Stage3Reason(#S) )

S has property Knowledge if and only if S has senses in stage1 and ...

In my opinion, it seems to work.

Cutting to the chase, I suggest that you need to clarify in your own mind whether you wish to capture the existing use of the term "philosophy" or stipulate a definition to be used in a specific context. — Ludwig V

I am interested in a computable predicate, i.e. a computer program or a function, that will be able to distinguish between statements that are philosophical and statements that are not. Therefore, the most important requirement is that it can be implemented as source code.

However, the output does not need to be correct all the time.

We do not require that from Google Translate either. It just needs to be correct "most of the time" or "substantially more often than not".

BTW, is meta-philosophy philosophy or not? - is that a philosophical question? It seems to be an extension of a concept that is used (and therefore defined) within a specific context, which may or may not be considered to be philosophical. — Ludwig V

Is philosophical(#S) is a statement about statement S. So, in this definition, the metaphilosophy is a subdivision of philosophy.

Dogmatically, I would start by saying that philosophy is a practice (or a family of inter-related practices), the scope of which is effectively defined by what its practitioners do when they are philosophizing. — Ludwig V

That would be compatible with the ChatGPT approach.

Let the algorithm read a large sample of philosophy, summarize it into an appropriate numerical data structure, and then get it to discriminate inputs between philosophy and not philosophy.

This approach will undoubtedly still require an underlying notion of what exactly to extract and summarize from the sample ("machine learning"), and therefore, what exactly matters when trying to distinguish philosophy from the alternative.

For example, object recognition in computer vision ultimately rests on relatively simple underlying notions such as haar-like features, without which the discrimination algorithm would not even work properly.

Therefore, without some basic notion of at least what to look for in a sentence, the philosophy-detection algorithm's ability to discriminate can be expected to be disappointingly poor.

One may compare music or the visual or performance arts, or even science itself. — Ludwig V

It is actually possible to detect if any particular sound is music or not, with a tool such as Spleeter from Deezer research:

https://research.deezer.com/projects/spleeter.html

There are, of course, more research budgets available for music than for philosophy. So, the fact that a discrimination algorithm exists for music and not one for philosophy, should not come as a surprise.

Not all sound is music. Thus, there are algorithms available that can quite precisely discriminate between music and other sounds.

The discrimination problem is not necessarily easier for music than for philosophy. It is just that there are people who have worked on a solution for music but not on one for philosophy.

And you proposed

isPhilosophical(#S) IFF S is about another statement.

And I gave examples of statements that were about other statements, but not philosophical, and statements that are philosophical, but not about other statements.

So your definition is void. — Banno

Descartes' "Cogito ergo sum" is a problem. It is covered by "thinking about thinking" but not by "statements about statements". We cannot expect Godel's work to cover philosophy of the mind by using arithmetic. So, it leads to two definitions: "philosophy not of the mind" and "philosophy of the mind".

The statements about statements that are not philosophical was about predicates such as PeterSaidThat(#S). So, predicates that merely indicate the origin of a sentence may also be excluded from the definition. It just means that not all predicates are allowed. So, it may mean that there is a list of permissible predicates (or a list of excluded ones).

And you proposed

isPhilosophical(#S) IFF S is about another statement.

And I gave examples of statements that were about other statements, but not philosophical, and statements that are philosophical, but not about other statements.

So your definition is void.

So you agree it is philosophical, but it is not a statement about another statement, and so doesn't meet your definition. — Banno

The definition for philosophy is a predicate:

isPhilosophical(#S)

which is true if S is philosophical.

So, the definition of philosophy is the source code for a particular predicate.

isPhilosophical(#S) is a statement about any other statement S.

Your definition of "philosophy" seems to include things unnecessary and insufficient to philosophy. — Banno

Possibly. That requires an investigation of possible counterexamples. I think that these counterexamples should be quite interesting. Why exactly are they legitimate counterexamples? That will probably shine some more light on the issue.

Anyway, the definition you offer is trivially too broad. "John said it is raining" is about a statement, but not philosophy. — Banno

If SaidByJohn(#S) is a legitimate predicate, then your example sentence would indeed satisfy the definition proposed.

If this is a problem, then how can we exclude it from the definition?

There are precedents for excluding predicates from Godel's language. For example, true(#S) is not definable.

In fact, it would also be interesting to elaborate why exactly your example sentence is not philosophical.

Another angle would be to find a statement that is philosophical but that does not satisfy the definition.

If a statement can talk about other statements, then it can also talk about itself. — Tarskian

The long form:

If it is possible to express a statement about other statements in the language at hand, then it is also possible to express statements about themselves in this language.

A statement about another statement:

K(#S)

A statement about itself:

S <-> K(#S)

This language would only need support for the equivalence operator, i.e. the biconditional.

But then again, I doubt that a language that does not support this operator, or cannot implement it using a detour, is capable of expressing much logic at all. In the end, the equivalence operator is just a simple truth table.

A statement about a fact is not philosophical. For example:

It is raining today.

A statement is philosophical, if it is a statement about another statement. For example:

It is irrelevant that it is raining today.

This explains in simple words what the true meaning is of Godel's incompleteness theorem.

A theory is incomplete if it can express statements about its own statements. In other words, a theory is incomplete if it is capable of philosophy.

Self-referential statements are just a special case of the general case, which is the philosophical statement. If a statement can talk about other statements, then it can also talk about itself.

Philosophical statement:

K(#S)

--> Statement S has property K.

Self-referential statement:

S <-> K(#S)

--> I have property K.

Hence, philosophy is a mathematical capability of the language at hand.

This language's greatest power is also its worst deficiency, because it necessarily makes the language inconsistent or incomplete or even both.

"S ∧ ¬F(r(#S)" is not the same as "S & ~F".
"¬S ∧ F(r(#S)" is not the same as "~S & F". — TonesInDeepFreeze

I left out that detail because it is obvious. So, with the details:

(S is true and F(r(#S)) is false) or (S is false and F(r(#S)) is true)

It is more accurate but also much more impenetrable than:

(S is true and F is false) and (S is false and F is true)

The resulting syntactic noise detracts from understanding what exactly it is about. It muddies the explanation.

and lately, you confuse the predicate F with a sentence. — TonesInDeepFreeze

I simplified F(r(#S)) to just F, because I thought that it was obvious what it was about.

And I don't know why you would suppose that people would care about your synopsis of Carnap if they didn't also grasp the mathematical basis. — TonesInDeepFreeze

If that is truly the case, then the subject may not be suitable for a philosophy forum. I had hoped that it was, but you may be right.

The metaphysical implications do seem out of reach of philosophical investigation. Apparently, they have been for almost a century.

(S ∧ ¬F(r(#S)) ∨ (¬S ∧ F(r(#S))

Meaning:
(S is true and F is false) or (S is false and F is true)

Meaning:
A true sentence that does not have the property, or a false sentence that has the property, or both. — Tarskian

(1) You skipped that I pointed out that:

(S is true and F is false) and (S is false and F is true)

is never the case.

(2)

"S ∧ ¬F(r(#S)" is not the same as "S & ~F".
"¬S ∧ F(r(#S)" is not the same as "~S & F".

F

does not have a truth value. What has a truth value is

F(r(#S))

Saying "F is false" is nonsense.

(3) I agree with this:

C entails that there is a sentence S such that T proves:

(S & ~F(r(#S))) v (~S & F(r(#S))).

F expresses a property. F(r(#S)) is true if and only if S has the property expressed by F.

But:

[EDIT CORRECTION: I misread the quote. The quote was a disjunction not a conjunction. Mine is not a counterexample. No true sentence is not equivalent with itself, but every false sentence is equivalent with itself.]

Your quoted characterization did not have the specifications you are giving now. Your quoted characterization was a broad generalization about properties and sentences. — TonesInDeepFreeze

It has always been an explanation about the diagonal lemma:

S <-> ¬F(r(#S))

Meaning:
(S ∧ ¬F(r(#S)) ∨ (¬S ∧ F(r(#S))

Meaning:
(S is true and F is false) or (S is false and F is true)

Meaning:
A true sentence that does not have the property, or a false sentence that has the property, or both.

It was a choice not to provide these details because this kind of explanations quickly become impenetrable in a multidisciplinary environment.

(2) PA doesn't say 'true' and 'false'. — TonesInDeepFreeze

The meaning of the S above is "a true sentence". PA doesn't say it, but that is what it means, for reasons of first-order logic.

(4) There are properties not expressed by formulas, so the generalization should be over formulas, not properties. — TonesInDeepFreeze

In that case, it is not a property in PA, because that would require a predicate in PA. In fact, Tarski's truth is also a property but not one in PA.

It is possible to precisely state all the conditions that apply, but in that case, the explanation becomes impenetrable. Nobody would be interested in a multidisciplinary forum. In order to keep it readable, there is no other alternative than to leave things out.

For certain theories T, for every formula F(x) there is a sentence S such that T |- S <-> F(r(#S)). — TonesInDeepFreeze

First, we replace F by ¬F. If F is a property then its negation is also a property. So, the following is an equivalent statement:

For certain theories T, for every formula F(x) there is a sentence S such that T |- S <-> ¬F(r(#S)).

Next, we replace S <-> ¬F(r(#S)) by the equivalent expression:

(S ∧ ¬F(r(#S)) ∨ (¬S ∧ F(r(#S))

Meaning:

(S is true and F is false) or (S is false and F is true)

Since ∨ is an "inclusive or", we can add "or both":

(S is true and F is false) or (S is false and F is true) or both.

So, it means:

A true sentence that does not have the property, or a false sentence that has the property, or both.

('r' for 'the numeral for' and '#' for 'the Godel number of')

Let C be this theorem:

For certain theories T, for every formula F(x) there is a sentence S such that T |- S <-> F(r(#S)).

Let K be:

"For any property of logic sentences, there always exists a true sentence that does not have it, or a false sentence that has it, or both."

C is not correctly rendered as K.

(1) K doesn't qualify as to certain kinds of theories.

(2) C generalizes over formulas, not over properties.

(3) C doesn't say anything about 'true'.

(4) C doesn't say that for every property of sentences there is a true sentence that does not have the property. C doesn't say that for every property of sentences that there is a false sentence that does have the property.

[EDIT CORRECTION: I misread the quote. The quote was a disjunction not a conjunction. Mine is not a counterexample. No true sentence is not equivalent with itself, but every false sentence is equivalent with itself.]

Moreover:

(5) I showed a counterexample to both prongs of K.

[EDIT CORRECTION: I misread the quote. The quote was a disjunction not a conjunction. Mine is not a counterexample. No true sentence is not equivalent with itself, but every false sentence is equivalent with itself.]

You said that my counterexample is not in PA. So what? It doesn't have to be in PA, it merely needs to be a counterexample to K. And, by the way, K is not in PA, especially since PA doesn't have a predicate 'true'. And C includes PA as one of the T's, but C itself is not in PA.

(6) And with the arithmetization of syntax, both 'is a sentence' and 'is equivalent with itself' are expressible in PA. But I didn't do that, because K doesn't specify any language or kinds of theories.

/

For certain theories T, for every formula F(x) there is a sentence S such that T |- S <-> F(r(#S)).

is not remotely anything like:

For any property of logic sentences, there always exists a true sentence that does not have it, or a false sentence that has it, or both.

Counterexample: Let P be the property: P(S) if and only if S is equivalent with S. — TonesInDeepFreeze

I guess you meant to write:

Let P be the property: P(S) if and only if S is equivalent with P(#S).

In that special case, P is actually Tarski's truth predicate, which is indeed not definable. The conclusion here is that truth is not a legitimate predicate.

Perhaps your reason 3 is the most important to consider. — Jack Cummins

The ones closest to my own experience are Reason #s 1, 5, and 7. I don't have any feeling that there is an unseen order. I was trying to make a complete list. That doesn't mean I buy them all.

It initially puts a lot of store on the issue of causality vs perceived randomness & spontaneity, as indicated by many findings from Quantum Mechanics.
— christian2017

The author suggests only 3 possibilities:-...
1. A hidden variable/cause
2. True Spontaneity – something happens without a cause
3. True Randomness - different outcomes for no reason – ie. without a cause.
— christian2017

These three are language's - philosophy's - attempt to corral the real, in this case QM, and QM doesn't yet corral. Bell experiments to date rule out #1 - that being what the later tests were testing. #s 2 and 3 are objectionable for "without a cause." The word "cause" itself requiring exhaustive definition before sense can be made of it. In a sense we're on a drunkard's search wrt QM. That leaves us nowhere, but the nowhere is, for now, a fact.

In any case and not just this one, I accept that science and philosophy are connected by "silken ties.., And only by one's going slightly taut... Is of the slightest bondage made aware." (pace, Robert. Frost). But that otherwise are different. Feynman on this, "If you think you understand QM, then you don't."

Your author is trying. That puts him into the category of entertainment - and selling books - but not science or philosophy. — tim wood

I don't know how those quotes got attached to my name. Perhaps you can restate what you were saying unpacked more.

I do agree alot of physics books are more entertainment than accurate information.

Based on what you wrote above as far as what i understand that you wrote, i agree. My initial confusion started with the quotes you posted that were attached to what i said.

The only book i mentioned recently (and i don't know if it was this forum topic) is "A brief history of time" by stephen hawkings. I am very familiar with Newtonian physics.

It initially puts a lot of store on the issue of causality vs perceived randomness & spontaneity, as indicated by many findings from Quantum Mechanics. — christian2017

The author suggests only 3 possibilities:-...
1. A hidden variable/cause
2. True Spontaneity – something happens without a cause
3. True Randomness - different outcomes for no reason – ie. without a cause. — christian2017

These three are language's - philosophy's - attempt to corral the real, in this case QM, and QM doesn't yet corral. Bell experiments to date rule out #1 - that being what the later tests were testing. #s 2 and 3 are objectionable for "without a cause." The word "cause" itself requiring exhaustive definition before sense can be made of it. In a sense we're on a drunkard's search wrt QM. That leaves us nowhere, but the nowhere is, for now, a fact.

In any case and not just this one, I accept that science and philosophy are connected by "silken ties.., And only by one's going slightly taut... Is of the slightest bondage made aware." (pace, Robert. Frost). But that otherwise are different. Feynman on this, "If you think you understand QM, then you don't."

Your author is trying. That puts him into the category of entertainment - and selling books - but not science or philosophy.

My one line hypothesis is that we filter information a priori from an external energy source. Much like Schopenhauer's theory of Metaphysical Will in nature... . — 3017amen

that is too supernatural for me. I'm finding a path towards qualia that is something that I can model and see a plausible utility/mechanics; that is, we are genetically coded to attribute arbitrary, yet largely consistent, value/experience/emotions to various data value phenomenon as a way to create an experience that enables a personal empathy/emotives to data values to make them real (to us as emotive/social creatures) and to share a common experience. So, for the color red, we might be genetically coded to have energetic, aggressive feelings with the data value of red, which may have come (like that for Bulls) about by evolution selecting for such defensive responses to the sight of red blood. Blue feels like a cool/cold color like ice, and peaceful like the sky. etc. To the extent data values in our perceived sensory/motor have been (genetically, by personality, or by nurture) been associated with certain emotive states then they become part of our qualia experience for it, making it feel much more real to us. I find it particularly interesting that synesthetes not only love the cross sensory invocation of emotives and colors on, say numbers, that it actually helps them greatly to process the value data (e.g., out of a vast field of random numbers, they might see all '7s as red and instantly can spot one # 7 out of 1000s of other #s). So, attaching an arbitrary qualia can even have practical utility, beyond my other point of enabling/enhancing the formation of wisdom.

Those were some clever insults there - nicely done.

But seriously, I’m a kumbaya kind of person. When I see a someone assert something that looks obviously wrong, my first impulse is to find common ground and/or to try to re-phrase what that person is trying to say in my own words so as to better explain to that person how they are mistaken. I prefer not to start out by being critical, since that puts the other person into a defensive position and it makes it harder to communicate.

That said, I can see where my approach could be perceived as being disingenuous. So let me start from the beginning.

You appear to be making some basic errors in logic, What you are calling P & Q contain hidden variables and operators. BUT I keep an open mind - it is possible that I am mistaken.

However, if you want to convince me that your logic is sound, we will need to unpack your logic. In order to do this I will be asking you a series of questions - some of which may seem really stupid - but I have to ask them in order to make sure that there is no mis-understanding.

In asking these questions I will be dealing strictly with the underlying logic. Many other folks out here have pointed out that there are some serious semantic issues with your terms, but I will not deal with those. I will be treating your terms as abstract logical variables - so there should be no need to give any real life examples.

If you are willing to do this, then my first question is this:

Going back to your #s 1->3:

1. If moral values are my values, then if I value something necessarily it is morally valuable (if P, then Q)
2. If I value something it is not necessarily morally valuable (not Q)
3. Therefore moral values are not my values (therefore not P)

We need to start off with the term “moral values”. For purposes of analyzing your logic, this must be defined as a set of individual moral values; let’s call this set Moral_Values.

Moral_Values = {mv1, mv2, . . .}

This implies that there is at least one additional set of values that are not moral; let’s call this Not_Moral_Values (for want of a better term). There is then a third set called Values which is the union of Moral_Values and Not_Moral_Values. If, for your purposes, you need to further sub-divide Not_Moral_Values into, say, Un_Values & Miscellaneous_Values, that’s OK, as long as we agree that every moral value is a member of at least one sub-set and that the set Values is the union of the subsets.

I’m using italics here so the variables stand out, but if you prefer to use a different nomenclature and/or different names for these sets and variables that’s fine.

Are we in agreement so far? If not, please clarify. BTW - if you want to continue insulting me? That’s fine too.

Pinkard #s 31, 32

31.
What is familiar and well known as such is not really known for the very reason that it is familiar and well known.

In the case of cognition, the most common form of self-deception and deception of others is when one presupposes something as well known and then makes one’s peace with it. In that kind of back-and-forth chatter about various pros and cons, such knowing, without knowing how it happens to it, never really gets anywhere. Subject and object, God, nature, understanding, sensibility, etc., are, as is well known, all unquestioningly laid as foundation stones which constitute fixed points from which to start and to which to return.

The movement proceeds here and there between those points, which themselves remain unmoved, and it thereby operates only upon the surface. Thus, for a person to grasp and to examine matters consists only in seeing whether he finds everything said by everybody else to match up with his own idea about the matter, or with whether it seems that way to him and whether or not it is something with which he is familiar.

32.
As it used to be carried out, the analysis of a representation was indeed nothing but the sublation of the form of its familiarity. To break up a representation into its original elements is to return to its moments, which at least do not have the form of a representation which one has simply stumbled across, but which instead constitute the immediate possession of the self.

To be sure, this analysis would only arrive at thoughts which are themselves familiar and fixed, or it would arrive at motionless determinations. However, what is separated, the non-actual itself, is itself an essential moment, for the concrete is self-moving only because it divides itself and turns itself into the non-actual.

The activity of separating is the force and labor of the understanding, the most astonishing and the greatest of all the powers, or rather, which is the absolute power.

The circle, which, enclosed within itself, is at rest and which, as substance, sustains its moments, is the immediate and is, for that reason, an unsurprising relationship. However, the accidental, separated from its surroundings, attains an isolated freedom and its own proper existence only in its being bound to other actualities and only as existing in their context; as such, it is the tremendous power of the negative; it is the energy of thinking, of the pure I.

Death, if that is what we wish to call that non-actuality, is the most fearful thing of all, and to keep and hold fast to what is dead requires only the greatest force. Powerless beauty detests the understanding because the understanding expects of her what she cannot do.

However, the life of spirit is not a life that is fearing death and austerely saving itself from ruin; rather, it bears death calmly, and in death, it sustains itself. Spirit only wins its truth by finding its feet in its absolute disruption. Spirit is not this power which, as the positive, avoids looking at the negative, as is the case when we say of something that it is nothing, or that it is false, and then, being done with it, go off on our own way on to something else. No, spirit is this power only by looking the negative in the face and lingering with it. This lingering is the magical power that converts it into being.

– This power is the same as what in the preceding was called the subject, which, by giving existence to determinateness in its own element, sublates abstract immediacy, or, is only existing immediacy, and, as a result, is itself the true substance, is being, or, is the immediacy which does not have mediation external to itself but is itself this mediation. — Hegel/Pinkard

I find in #s 29 and 30 what I have found throughout so far, a sense of running away from Kant's noumenon as fast as possible. Kant found metaphysics in a muddle and resolved it through his synthesis of perception, the thing perceived, and the understanding, which organizes the perception. The cost being that the thing perceived is otherwise inaccessible. (Although entirely knowable as a matter of practical knowledge.)

Kant's "knowledge," then, is based in perception. Hegel places it in reason; he seems to take perception uncritically and for granted. That is, there is what we know and how we know it - which for Hegel seems to happen after perception, while for Kant it's all in one batter, baked together.

For Hegel, perception is given, then reason works on it, through aufheben/sublation - this latter a term of art that is deliberately and explicitly left general and non-specific. The process reaches an end - then we know, but at that point, spirit moves on.

Pinkard #s 29, 30

29.
Science of this culturally educative movement is the detail and the necessity of its shaping, as what has been diminished into a moment and a possession of spirit. The aim is spirit’s insight into what knowing is.

Impatience demands the impossible, which is to say, to achieve the end without the means. On the one hand, the length of the path has to be endured, for each moment is necessary – but on the other hand, one must linger at every stage on the way, for each stage is itself an entire individual shape, and it is viewed absolutely only insofar as its determinateness is viewed as a whole, or, as concrete, or, insofar as the whole is viewed in terms of the distinctiveness of this determination. – Both because the substance of the individual, the world spirit, has possessed the patience to pass through these forms over a long stretch of time and to take upon itself the prodigious labor of world history, and because it could not have reached consciousness about itself in any lesser way, the individual spirit itself cannot comprehend its own substance with anything less.

At the same time, it has less trouble in doing so because in the meantime it has accomplished this in itself – the content is already actuality erased to possibility, immediacy which has been mastered. That content, which is already what has been thought, is the possession of individuality. It is no longer existence which is to be converted into being-in-itself. Rather, it is just the in-itself which is to be converted into the form of being-for-itself. The way this is done is now to be more precisely determined.

30.
In this movement, although the individual is spared the sublation of existence, what still remains is the representation of and the familiarity with the forms.

The existence taken back into the substance is through that first negation at first only immediately transferred into the element of self. The element thus still has the same character of uncomprehended immediacy, or, of unmoved indifference as existence itself, or, it has only passed over into representational thought. -As a result, it is at the same time familiar to us, or, it is the sort of thing that spirit has finished with, in which spirit has no more activity, and, as a result, in which spirit has no further interest. However much the activity, which is finished with existence, is itself the immediate, or, however much it is the existing mediation and thereby the movement only of the particular spirit which is not comprehending itself, still in contrast knowing is directed against the representational thought which has come about through this immediacy, is directed against this familiarity, and it is thus the doing of the universal self and the interest of thinking — Hegel/Pinkard

So that when Joe says, "I want to eat an ice cream, and it's necessary for me to go to the store to buy an ice cream to be able to eat it, BUT I ought not go to the store," we can say that he's getting a fact wrong, and we can somehow justify that he's getting a fact wrong. — Terrapin Station

What fact? He identifies a want; he recognizes that in order to indulge this want he most go to the store, but that for some reason, he ought not go. Where is he getting anything wrong?

Let's do it by the numbers:
1) "I want to eat ice cream." By assumption this is a fact, nor is he mistaken about it.

2) "It's necessary for me to go to the store to buy ice cream to be able to eat it." Again true by assumption.

3) "But I ought not to go to the store." For some reason, in which case presumed true. Of course in #3 he may be mistaken - wrong - but then so might he have been in #s 1 and 2. But #s 1 and 2 are given. The "wrong" must then be with #3. What is it?

Pinkard #s 26, 27

26. Pure self-knowing in absolute otherness, this ether (sic) as such, is the very ground and soil of science, or, knowing in its universality. The beginning of philosophy presupposes or demands that consciousness is situated in this element. However, this element itself has its culmination and its transparency only through the movement of its coming-to-be. It is pure spirituality, or, the universal in the mode of simple immediacy.

Because it is the immediacy of spirit, because it is the substance of spirit, it is transfigured essentiality, reflection that is itself simple, or, is immediacy; it is being that is a reflective turn into itself. For its part, science requires that self-consciousness shall have elevated itself into this ether in order to be able to live with science and to live in science, and, for that matter, to be able to live at all.

Conversely, the individual has the right to demand that science provide him at least with the ladder to reach this standpoint. The individual’s right is based on his absolute self-sufficiency, which he knows he possesses in every shape of his knowing, for in every shape, whether recognized by science or not, and no matter what the content might be, the individual is at the same time the absolute form, or, he has immediate self-certainty; and, if one were to prefer this expression, he thereby has an unconditioned being. However much the standpoint of consciousness, which is to say, the standpoint of knowing objective things to be opposed to itself and knowing itself to be opposed to them, counts as the other to science – the other, in which consciousness is at one with itself, counts instead as the loss of spirit – still, in comparison, the element of science possesses for consciousness an other-worldly remoteness in which consciousness is no longer in possession of itself.

Each of these two parts seems to the other to be an inversion of the truth. For the natural consciousness to entrust itself immediately to science would be to make an attempt, induced by it knows not what, to walk upside down all of a sudden. The compulsion to accept this unaccustomed attitude and to transport oneself in that way would be, so it would seem, a violence imposed on it with neither any advance preparation nor with any necessity. – Science may be in its own elf what it will, but in its relationship to immediate self-consciousness, it presents itself as an inversion of the latter, or, because immediate self-consciousness is the principle of actuality, by immediate self-consciousness existing for itself outside of science, science takes the form of non-actuality.

Accordingly, science has to unite that element with itself or instead to show both that such an element belongs to itself and how it belongs to it. Lacking actuality, science is the in-itself, the purpose, which at the start is still something inner, at first not as spirit but only as spiritual substance. It has to express itself and become for itself, and this means nothing else than that it has to posit self-consciousness as being at one with itself.

27. This coming-to-be of science itself, or, of knowing, is what is presented in this phenomenology of spirit as the first part of the system of science. Knowing, as it is at first, or, as immediate spirit, is devoid of spirit, is sensuous consciousness. In order to become genuine knowing, or, in order to beget the element of science which is its pure concept, immediate spirit must laboriously travel down a long path.

– As it is established in its content and in the shapes that appear in it, this coming-to-be appears a bit differently from the way a set of instructions on how to take unscientific consciousness up to and into science would appear; it also appears somewhat differently from the way laying the foundations for science would appear. – In any case, it is something very different from the inspiration which begins immediately, like a shot from a pistol, with absolute knowledge, and which has already finished with all the other standpoints simply by declaring that it will take no notice of them." — Hegel/Pinkard

Pinkard #s 21, 22

"21. However, this abhorrence of mediation stems in fact from a lack of acquaintance with the nature of mediation and with the nature of absolute cognition itself. This is so because mediation is nothing but selfmoving self-equality, or, it is a reflective turn into itself, the moment of the I existing-for-itself, pure negativity, or, simple coming-to-be.

The I, or, coming-to-be, this mediating, is, on account of its simplicity, immediacy in the very process of coming-to-be and is the immediate itself. – Hence, reason is misunderstood if reflection is excluded from the truth and is not taken to be a positive moment of the absolute. Reflection is what makes truth into the result, but it is likewise what sublates the opposition between the result and its coming-to-be.

This is so because this coming-to-be is just as simple and hence not different from the form of the true, which itself proves itself to be simple in its result. Coming-to-be is instead this very return into simplicity. – However much the embryo is indeed in itself a person, it is still not a person for itself; the embryo is a person for itself only as a culturally formed and educated rationality which has made itself into what it is in itself. This is for the first time its actuality. However, this result is itself simple immediacy, for it is self-conscious freedom which is at rest within itself, a freedom which has not set the opposition off to one side and left it only lying there but has been reconciled with it.

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22. What has just been said can also be expressed by saying that reason is purposive doing. Both the exaltation of a nature supposedly above and beyond thinking, an exaltation which misconstrues thinking, and especially the banishment of external purposiveness have brought the form of purpose completely into disrepute.

Yet, in the sense in which Aristotle also determines nature as purposive doing, purpose is the immediate, the motionless, which is self-moving, or, is subject.

Its abstract power to move is being- or-itself, or, pure negativity. For that reason, the result is the same as the beginning because the beginning is purpose – that is, the actual is the same as its concept only because the immediate, as purpose, has the self, or, pure actuality, within itself.

The purpose which has been worked out, or, existing actuality, is movement and unfolded coming-to-be. However, this very unrest is the self, and for that reason, it is the same as the former immediacy and simplicity of the beginning because it is the result which has returned into itself. – What has returned into itself is just the self, and the self is self- elating sameness and simplicity."

re #s 17, 18 above. It's long been an axiom of mine that there is an upper limit on the meaning that can be loaded into sentences and paragraphs on certain topics. And a corollary, if the selected text is not too long, it should not be too difficult to figure out what it means. The main use of this axiom for me has been to help me know when I'm on the wrong track or looking in the wrong direction. And sometimes I have to back off and suspend judgment until something adds clarity so that I can again move forward. The above paragraphs are full of terms that in their context I cannot attach any firm meaning to.

the true not just as substance but just as much as subject. — tim wood

And here are three: substance, subject, true, and add a fourth, universal.

or, it comprises not only the immediacy of knowing but also the immediacy of being, or, immediacy for knowing. — tim wood

It is not clear to me yet that there can be any such thing as an immediacy of knowing. So for me, this is at the moment a word salad, with terms whose meanings cannot be what they seem to be - at least not without some violence.

I see that Fooloso4 has posted already. He quotes Spinoza, "By substance, I mean that which is in itself, and is conceived through itself: in other words, that of which a conception can be formed independently of any other conception."

Our hazard here - maybe just my hazard - lies in accepting something like this from Spinoza as explanation. My problem is that I have no idea what it means to have a single unitary conception "formed independently of any other conception."

I take my business here to understand, not to add meaning, nor allow myself to suppose I understand if I don't. Were Hegel here, I'd say, "Wha-at," and ask him to go through it again.

I think Fooloso4 just above has got some of it, but not all. But at the moment it seems to me Hegel is allowing himself to float a bit, no feet on the ground. And it's his business to get back to ground, not-so-much ours to build a ramp under him. Maybe in the next paragraphs....

Pinkard #s 17, 18

"17. In my view, which must be justified by the exposition of the system itself, everything hangs on
grasping and expressing the true not just as substance but just as much as subject.

At the same time, it is to be noted that substantiality comprises within itself the universal, or, it comprises not only the immediacy of knowing but also the immediacy of being, or, immediacy for knowing. – However much taking God to be the one substance shocked the age in which this was expressed, still that was in part because of an instinctive awareness that in such a view self-consciousness only perishes and is not preserved. However, in part, the opposite view, which itself clings to thinking as thinking, or, which holds fast to universality, is exactly the same simplicity, or, it is itself undifferentiated, unmoved substantiality.

But, thirdly, if thinking only unifies the being of substance with itself and grasps immediacy, or intuition grasped as thinking, then there is the issue about whether this intellectual intuition does not then itself relapse into inert simplicity and thereby present actuality itself in a fully non-actual mode.


"18. Furthermore, the living substance is the being that is in truth subject, or, what amounts to the same thing, it is in truth actual only insofar as it is the movement of self-positing, or, that it is the mediation of itself and its becoming-other-to-itself.

As subject, it is pure, simple negativity, and, as a result, it is the estrangement of what is simple, or, it is the doubling which posits oppositions and which is again the negation of this indifferent diversity and its opposition. That is, it is only this self-restoring sameness, the reflective turn into itself in its otherness.

– The true is not an original unity as such, or, not an immediate unity as such. It is the coming-to-be of itself, the circle that presupposes its end as its goal and has its end for its beginning, and which is actual only through this accomplishment and its end."

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Pinkard #16

#s 17 and 18 seem to go along with this, but combined are too long for one entry. No law against looking ahead at them.

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"16. In so doing, this formalism asserts that this monotony and abstract universality is the absolute, and it assures us that any dissatisfaction with such universality is only an incapacity to master the absolute standpoint and keep a firm grip on it.

However much there was once a time when the empty possibility of imagining things differently was sufficient to refute a view, and however much the general thought, the same mere possibility, had also at that time the entirely positive value of actual cognition, nonetheless nowadays we see the universal Idea in this form of non-actuality get all value attributed to it, and we see that what counts as the speculative way of considering things turns out to be the dissolution of the distinct and the determinate, or, instead turns out to be simply the casting of what is distinct and determinate into the abyss of the void, an act lacking all development or having no justification in its own self at all.

In that mode, to examine any existence in the way in which it is in the absolute consists in nothing more than saying it is in fact being spoken of as, say, a “something,” whereas in the absolute, in the A = A, there is no such “something,” for in the absolute, everything is one.

To oppose this one bit of knowledge, namely, that in the absolute everything is the same, to the knowing which makes distinctions and which has been either fulfilled or is seeking and demanding to be fulfilled – that is, to pass off its absolute as the night in which, as one says, all cows are black – is an utterly vacuous naiveté in cognition.

– The formalism which has been indicted and scorned by the philosophy of recent times and which has been generated again in it will not disappear from science even though its inadequacy is well known and felt. It will not disappear until the knowing of absolute actuality has become completely clear about its own nature. – Taking into consideration that working out any general idea is made easier by first having it right before us, it is worth indicating here at least very roughly what those ideas are. At the same time, we should also take this opportunity to rid ourselves of a few forms which are only impediments to philosophical cognition.