It's unfortunate, that the categories cannot be implemented in practice due to the workings of the forum. Otherwise, we could have sticky and guidelines for each sub-forum, where the inhabitants of this forum might flourish. — Wallows

What do you mean? Specifically, what is "implementing the categories in practice"? And what is "sticky and guidelines"?

Fascinating.

Unless you go with the Bitter Crank-Terrapin view that "it" refers to the conditions (which is the view of at least one linguist, so Google tells me), it's just a dummy subject, stuck in there to satisfy the syntactical rules of English. In Spanish you'd say "llueve". There's no subject, because of the way Spanish works.

So along with some others here I suspect it's not a philosophical issue.

EDIT: Just noticed that Dawnstorm made the same point.

A question with a view to showing that ethics is about the things we value and not merely about moral comprehension: if I destroy the Mona Lisa for no reason other than wanton destructiveness, is it a simple category mistake to call the action immoral?

I'm sure you can imagine examples. The point is to show that our actions in respect of people or babies or animals or dead bodies or psychopaths do in fact take place in a moral sphere independently of any assessment of individual criteria such as future moral comprehension. The concepts of right and wrong do in fact, in real-world communities, apply to those actions. I take you to be arguing either (1) that they should not apply, that perhaps people all over the world have made a mistake, or (2) for a meta-ethical position whereby you think that the only reason we apply the concepts of good and bad to our treatment of others is that we recognize that they are, or will be, moral agents--that they have individually satisfied some criteria (and hence that principled veganism is based on a mistaken assessment). If your position is the latter, then it seems to me that our moral concern for people with severe cognitive impairment, for the dead bodies of our loved ones, and for pet animals stand as counterexamples.

You do not treat a person well because you've established that they have the mental capacities that you deem to be requirements for morality. And if you treat a person well on that presumption, you do not suddenly treat them as morally insignificant if you later find out that they lack those capacities.

But my wider point was that ethics just is about human actions concerning the things we value. We value pet dogs and most non-psychopaths would not wish to see them tortured. This is an ethical matter despite a dog's possible lack of moral comprehension. Do you disagree?

EDIT: The even wider point is that I think you are appealing to an intuition that is close to my own view, which is about species membership and the moral sphere of human society (which includes animals, though not as moral agents). I.e., I think that individual capacities are a red herring.

The case with infants is different, the infant will grow up and gain moral comprehension — DingoJones

But take the generalized AMC. Some infants may not ever gain moral comprehension--it could be some kind of severe mental disability--and yet they would, obviously I think, remain morally significant.

This probably doesn't go any way towards answering you, but note that I should have said something like: "That is, you could argue that species membership justifies the exploitation (the use) of animals". I didn't mean to suggest an argument in which species membership justifies any treatment that is currently practised, like cruelty.

By the way, @Sir2u amd @DingoJones: the omnivore argument is pretty lame. Surely people here should agree for the sake of argument with the very reasonable proposition that all people could conceivably live healthy lives without animal products? Principle of charity and all that.

Our interaction with animals is not an ethical matter. Ethics are a social contract which animals cannot agree too. What animals DO abide by is nature, survival. That is something humans are capable of understanding, and Id go further and say that humans are already doing that. We are a part of the food chain after all. Its just incoherent, to me at least, to include them in ethics. Even if we ignore that and we focus only on what humans can do to measure animals according to our rules, wouldnt we be obligated to do everything we can to reduce the suffering of animals inflicted by other animals? It doesnt make sense. — DingoJones

I can go along with your position that interactions between non-human animals are not governed by morality, and that animals are not moral agents. The trouble is that the human treatment of animals is part of the moral sphere, simply owing to their involvement in our practices. In doing things with animals we involve them in our relations with each other, and the "ethicality" of those intrahuman relations is thereby in a manner of speaking transferred on to the direct relations between humans and animals.

I think just about anything can be "included in ethics" that concerns human actions, so the human treatment of animals is or can be an ethical matter. Let's agree that animals are not moral agents. Does it follow that human actions involving them are not a matter for ethics? I don't think so. Some version of the argument from marginal cases (AMC) can be used to show this. E.g., the treatment of infants is a matter for ethics even though they might have no concept of right and wrong.

Notice that the AMC is not here being used to argue for anything so strong as animal rights, and in my opinion it doesn't even show that the exploitation of animals is wrong. What it shows is that human actions that involve beings--human, non-human, and maybe even non-living (dead bodies)--without the mental abilities we consider as normal for humans--such as the concept of self, right and wrong, and temporal self-awareness--are ethically significant, or can be.

One intuitive way to see how this is so is to observe that the cruel treatment of animals may do harm to humans. The knowledge of cruel practices, and certainly the witnessing of or taking part in those practices, may have a brutalizing effect on people. I don't want to make any argument depend on this, but it's one way to look at it.

And it seems to me quite difficult to claim that the treatment of pets is not an ethical matter, which your position implies.

Now if I'm right and it is an ethical matter, you could still argue that it is not wrong to exploit animals, perhaps by invoking the significance of species membership (which includes the so-called "marginal cases"). That is, you could argue that species membership justifies our treatment of animals, even though it doesn't justify the claim that the treatment of animals is not ethically significant at all. This would probably be something like my own position, e.g., we can eat meat without doing wrong, so long as we don't treat the animals cruelly.

As BC says, hover over the discussion title to see the category. Also, when you're in a discussion the category in the left menu is emphasized in bold (though not on mobile).

The effects: conscious experiences, will never be the things they are experiencing. It is nonsensical to even think that could be the case, and to even ask the question: "How can we see things as they really are?" — Harry Hindu

Yes indeed.

215. Here we see that the idea of 'agreement with reality' does not have any clear application. — Wittgenstein, On Certainty

Darwin explicitly uses it as a metaphor. I can't see in what way he treats it as a deity. On the contrary.

Otherwise, you seem to be railing against the popular conception of evolution. I agree that people get it wrong, but in my experience they don't seem to misunderstand it in the way you describe, and in any case I don't see how such misunderstandings are caused by a metaphor.

EDIT: By far the worst popular misunderstandings of evolution are: evolution as a ladder leading to humans (which predates Darwin), and the related idea that e.g., humans evolved from chimpanzees

what the metaphor is for — Wayfarer

To help people understand natural selection: it is as if there were a breeder selecting suitable variations.

Because it is assumed in all naturalistic accounts that there is no agency at work, and yet in the above, the metaphor is precisely one of agency, something that acts. This is the subtle duplicity at the heart of evolutionary biology qua philosophy. — Wayfarer

How is it duplicity if it's explicitly metaphorical?

EDIT: sorry @Marchesk, this is off-topic

Just use a single thread for all of them please.

Yes, in fact I agree. But given Marchesk's definition of indirect perception as the perception of mental objects (as intermediaries between things "out there" and consciousness), one could say that an awareness of one's own perception is an example of indirect perception, in a manner of speaking. However, I'm not sure that this kind of awareness is what he means by "conscious perception".

when I'm conscious of driving, the content of my perception is a conscious experience, which is mental. I'm no longer directly perceiving the car on the road. Instead, I'm perceiving a world of feels, sounds, colors, smells, and so on. — Marchesk

There's a missing premise here. You assume the equivalence of the content of perception and the objects of perception.

But the content of perception--if it means anything at all--is the way things look, sound, taste, and yet it is the things that look, sound, and taste that way. To say that you are perceiving the way things look, sound, taste, is tantamount to saying you are perceiving your perception (one can attend to one's own perception, but this is not what you are talking about (or is it?)).

Also, in an ecological direct perception account, the "non-conscious" absorption in an activity in an environment is paradigmatic of perception. To be conscious of one's experience sounds to me like those cases where one attends so much to one's own experience that successful absorption breaks down--as when you focus so much on what your hands and feet are doing that you momentarily lose the ability to drive.

EDIT: maybe that means that I kind of agree with you, or at least with this: perception is sometimes direct and sometimes indirect

The feeling is a property of a system involving the perceiver in an environment, so no, I wouldn't accept your formulation.

No, it's the water that is the object of perception in cases both of feeling that's it's cold and feeling that it's warm.

EDIT: in fact, the framework of direct vs indirect takes us down the wrong path here, I think. So yeah, temperature perception is a good example.

Therefore, our perception has a component that isn't in the water itself, since water can't feel cold or hot. — Marchesk

Well yes, perception is relational, depending on both perceiver and perceived (I'd also want to add the environment and the actions of the perceiver, but we can leave it aside for now).

Temperature perception is variable in a way that colour perception is not, and this is expressed in the way we talk and think about hot/cold vs green/blue/red etc.

The reason for supposing the green is mental is because it's being generated in the brain — Marchesk

Our bodies (eyes, brain, etc) respond in specific ways to our environment. To me that doesn't make colour merely of the body. It is how we see things, and the way we see things is owing to the way our brains and eyes are (and how we behave). But still, it is the things that are green.

NOTE: Haven't we been here before March, many many years ago? :rofl:

The relational account holds that the leaves themselves are green (under certain conditions etc). This entails that it is not something mental that is perceived, which is your definition of indirect perception.

Thus direct perception on this account depends on both perceiver and perceived. As seems kind of obvious when you think about it.

And if the fact that different perceivers perceive in different ways were enough to kill off direct perception as a philosophical position, then the fact that dogs can't see green would have resolved this issue a while ago.

I can't think of a way of saying it more clearly.

I think you're missing the point.

Because color and taste are in the brain, not out there in the world. — Marchesk

Why do you reject the relational account, under which colour is a property of perceived things, as perceived in a certain way in a certain environment?

Yes, but our experience isn't of the chemical makeup, but rather of color. And if that color occurs in the brain, then it's hard to see how we could be directly perceiving a red apple. — Marchesk

I don't see why. Evan Thompson's description is consistent with an account of perception that has been described as "direct". But then, different people mean different things by "direct perception". The substance of my post was the bit about colour being essentially relational.

Perhaps not, but it does still leave all of Chalmers' arguments for the hard problem in play. How do we account for brain events having color experiences? — Marchesk

I'm not sure. With some kind of combination of evolutionary biology, ecology and phenomenology, I'd guess. That's handwaving, I know.

2. Does this entail that direct perception is false, being that secondary qualities (color, taste, etc.) are not properties of things themselves, but rather coding schemes that relate to the chemical makeup of sugar or reflective surfaces of leaves (using the two examples above)? — Marchesk

But the chemical makeup of sugar or reflective surfaces of leaves are properties of those coloured things.

Being coloured a particular determinate colour or shade … is equivalent to having a particular spectral reflectance, illuminance, or emittance that looks that colour to a particular perceiver in specific viewing conditions. — Evan Thompson

It's the leaves--not an "idea" or representation--that are green, but they only look green to certain perceiving beings in certain environments. Thus, colour is entirely relational. According to taste one could see this as a deficiency in the language--because of the way we use "colour", we can't say whether colour belongs solely to us or to the things we're looking at--or else one could see it as expressing the essentially relational nature of perception.

3. We know that color experience is produced after the visual cortex is stimulated. This can the result of perception, memory, imagination, dream, magnetic cranial stimulation, etc. If a person's visual cortex is damaged enough, they lose all ability to have color experiences, including being able to remember colors. It's hard to avoid concluding that color experiences are generated by the brain. But that sounds like the makings of a cartesian theater, which Dennett has spent his career tearing down. — Marchesk

I don't think saying that the brain produces the experience of colour entails that there is an interior spectator. I imagine Dennett might say, not that the brain produces colours for us to look at internally, but that the relevant events in the brain just are those colour experiences. That's not how I would put it myself, but I don't think the Cartesian theatre is entailed either way.

I'm not sure if being thoughtful is the same as being philosophical, I only know that I do make my brain work a little bit extra, and I have the urge to exchange thoughts with others.

I'm here hoping to be enlightened; and although I'd rather stay anonymous, I'd gladly make exceptions for minds I admire, and add them to my circle of friends. That would be the best rewards I could hope for! — jaofao

Seems like you'll be a good addition to the forum jaofao :smile:

Welcome

We already have a category for psychology: "Humanities and Social Sciences". It's not dedicated to psychology alone, but that seems proper on a philosophy forum. But one tricky area that might require some rejigging of categories is cognitive science, which seems to be a mix of psychology and philosophy, among other things.

EDIT: Actually though, the Philosophy of Mind category seems to cover that.

As long as jamalrob doesn't mind, it can stay there — Baden

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I see.

I could be wrong but I don't think Tiff was talking about discussions that have been moved to the Lounge. Discussions are moved to the Lounge if that's where they fit. What's the problem?

Well, we've removed all Lounge discussions now, and that's now my favourite option.

It's odd. Some people just prefer the traditional forum design (I don't mean just PF, but in general on the web), though they never seem to be able to properly explain what they like about it, at least in my experience.

The thing I don't like about using the categories is that the individual active discussions are not listed. I think this is pretty bad for a forum home page.

Oh, it looks like we've already implemented the third option, All discussions excluding the Lounge category. Very well.

Here everything is packed into one page — Posty McPostface

The old forum had that page as well, and it's really the only one I used ("New Posts" I think it was called). The difference here is that I made that page the home page, that's all. Anyway, see the breakaway discussion for my opinion about the home page.

Note that "All discussions" is effectively active discussions or new posts. That's what I like about it, but I have noticed that it means the front page often doesn't have much quality philosophy on it, and is taken up with politics and lounge stuff.

So from that point of view I quite like the idea of using the categories as the home page. I'll wait for a while and then I'll probably try it out.

Realize, not realise. Who's been teaching you antiquated (look it up) English? — Hanover

In fact, -ize is older than -ise.

I'm almost at a native level of speaking English [...] Ugh... I meant "less words" — Benkei

Fewer words.

We currently have $196, and we have a number of monthly and quarterly subscriptions.

Thanks all.

Firstly, sites like this are tyrannies, not democracies, and the site owner rules absolutely. Secondly, there is no justice system, but an editorial one.

So the final recourse of us peasants is only to find or create somewhere more congenial to cast our pearls, or put up with the foibles of the local executive.

But in the meantime, we assume that our dictator is benevolent and seeks to appoint benevolent servants. I'm pretty confident that such is the case here, and by and large, the regime succeeds in fostering a lively debating community with a minimum of unpleasantness and folly. I think it should be encouraging that a couple of mods have been found unsuitable for the task and reduced to the ranks.

From the pov of the administration, as the site expands, they can no longer be on top of everything, and have to rely more and more on their undercover agents, which you can join by flagging stuff that needs attention. Since, by hypothesis, the administration is benevolent, they are concerned to know from us what we think needs attention. If nobody ever complains, they will think they and the site are perfect.

So flagging, pms, and feedback are important ways to influence them and guide the conduct of the site, as petitions to the tyrant and his minions. At the same time, one should be a little cautious not to get a reputation as a constant moaner and unreliable witness, who will likely be ignored.

In the case of a thread being moved, merged, or some such decision, I would think a reasoned appeal by pm is the best course, though I will just come out and say that I do not believe that there is such a thing as 'the philosophy of Trump'. (I think that is your current concern?) But hopefully, such matters can be discussed and minds can change or not without any acrimony. Its not a personal matter on either side, is it?

So say what you want and don't want, complain about decisions you disagree with, argue politely, and then don't bang on forever about it, but decide to live with it or not.

Here endeth the old fart ramble. — unenlightened

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