The schools which take derivatives of the Latin existere [Latin: to exist] as their device, would like to summon up the reality of corporeal experience against the alienated particular science. Out of fear of reification they shrink back from what has substantive content. It turns unwittingly into an example.

they universally-conceptually philosophize that which does not vanish into its concept, that which is contrary to it, instead of thinking it through. They illustrate existence [Existenz] in the existing [Existierenden].

+---+-----------------------+------------------------+----------------------+
|   | Direction of Thought  | Role of Particular     | Role of Universal    |
+---+-----------------------+------------------------+----------------------+
| S | Universal → Particular| Serves as an example/  | Predefined, applied, |
|   |                       | illustration           | illustrated          |
+---+-----------------------+------------------------+----------------------+
| A | Particular → Universal| Engine of analysis,    | Revealed, mediated,  |
|   |                       | problem to be unfolded | contradictory        |
+---+-----------------------+------------------------+----------------------+

It precludes you from becoming more skillful. The disengagement from the art limits your horizon. — Paine

Ignore the “AGI” hype—LLMs are still fancy autocomplete. All they do is predict a sequence of tokens—but it turns out writing code is mostly about stringing tokens together in the right order, so they can be extremely useful for this provided you point them in the right direction.

If you assume that this technology will implement your project perfectly without you needing to exercise any of your own skill you’ll quickly be disappointed.

Instead, use them to augment your abilities. My current favorite mental model is to think of them as an over-confident pair programming assistant who’s lightning fast at looking things up, can churn out relevant examples at a moment’s notice and can execute on tedious tasks without complaint. — Simon Willison

I think it's like this: the score of a symphony is like what Adorno means by form. A particular production of the symphony, alive in time, is part of the content. The remainder he's talking about is the unique aspects of a particular performance, like the way the first violinist connected some notes and kept others separate, or the tempo the conductor set. Haven't you ever gone looking for the perfect performance if Mozart's Requiem? You're looking for details don't appear in the score. Yet every performance you come across is OF that one score. The score is like something holy and separate from the world. The content is made of sweat and tears. — frank

Now "substance" is assigned to the societal totality, which from the theory perspective is the whole of "form". So substance correlates better with form here. Accordingly, "philosophical method" is a property of the individual subject and therefore ought to correlate with content. However, the demonstrated remainder denies the actual truth of this correlation. — Metaphysician Undercover

Adorno’s title for this section is Inhaltlichkeit und Methode, where the word we’ve translated as “content” is actually a higher abstraction, something like “contentuality,” if that were a word. You might think of the title as “Method and the Matter of Content.” — Content and Method

That generation, also Simmel, Husserl, and Scheler, sought in vain for a philosophy which, receptive to the objects, would render itself substantive. What tradition dismissed is what tradition desired. This does not obviate the methodological consideration, of how substantive particular analysis stands in relation to the theory of dialectics. The idealistic-identity philosophical avowal that the latter dissolves itself in the former is unconvincing. Objectively, however, the whole which is expressed by theory is contained within the particular to be analyzed, not first through the cognizing subject. The mediation of both is itself substantive, that through the social totality.

We can absolutely not rest content with “mere words” […]. Meanings inspired only by remote, confused, inauthentic intuitions—if by any intuitions at all—are not enough: we must go back to the “things themselves”. — Husserl, Logical Investigations

the whole which is expressed by theory is contained within the particular to be analyzed

It is however also formal due to the abstract nomothetism [Gesetzmaessigkeit] of the totality itself, that of exchange. Idealism, which distilled its absolute Spirit out of this, encrypted something true at the same time, that this mediation encounters phenomena as a compulsory mechanism; this lurks behind the so-called constitution-problem. Philosophical experience does not have this universal immediately, as appearance, but as abstractly as it objectively is. It is constrained towards the exit of the particular, without forgetting what it does not have, but knows. Its path is doubled, similar to the Heraclitean one, the upwards and the downwards. While it assures itself of the real determination of the phenomena through its concept, it cannot profess this ontologically, as what is true in itself. It is fused with what is untrue, with the repressive principle, and this lessens even its epistemological dignity. It forms no positive telos in which cognition would halt. The negativity of the universal solidifies for its part the cognition into the particular as that which is to be rescued. “The only thoughts which are true are those which do not understand themselves” [Adorno quotes himself, from Minima Moralia].

In their inalienably general elements, all philosophy, even those with the intention of freedom, carries along the unfreedom in which that of society is prolonged. It has the compulsion in itself; however this latter alone protects it from regression into caprice. Thinking is capable of critically cognizing the compulsory character immanent to it; its own inner compulsion is the medium of its emancipation.

The freedom towards the object, which in Hegel resulted in the disempowerment of the subject, is first of all to be established. Until then, dialectics diverges as method and as one of the thing. Concept and reality are of the same contradictory essence. What tears society apart antagonistically, the dominating principle, is the same thing which, intellectualized, causes the difference between the concept and that which is subordinated under it.

The logical form of the contradiction however achieves that difference, because every one which does not suborn itself to the unity of the dominating principle, according to the measure of the principle, does not appear as a polyvalence which is indifferent to this, but as an infraction against logic.

everything which does not conform to such, everything qualitatively divergent assumes the signature of the contradiction. The contradiction is the non-identical under the aspect of identity; the primacy of the principle of contradiction in dialectics measures what is heterogenous in unitary thinking. By colliding against its own borders, it reaches beyond itself. — Dialectics Not a Standpoint

Contradiction is non-identity under the bane of the law — Dialectics Not a Standpoint

On the other hand the remainder of the divergence between philosophic conception and follow-through also testifies to something of the non-identity, which neither permits the method to wholly absorb the contents, in which alone they are supposed to be, nor intellectualizes the contents. The pre-eminence of content reveals itself as the necessary insufficiency of the method.

What as such, in the form of general reflection, must be said, in order not to be defenseless against the philosophy of the philosophers, legitimates itself solely in the follow-through, and is negated therein in turn as method. Its surplus is with respect to its content abstract, false; Hegel already had to accept this discrepancy in the preface to the Phenomenology. The philosophical ideal would be to render the accounting one would give for what one does superfluous, by doing it.

In this section, I think Adorno attributes substantiality to society. — Metaphysician Undercover

The mediation of both is itself substantive, that through the social totality.

The "totality" referred to in the first passage is described as formal, and "that of exchange". The second passage is more difficult but I take Adorno to be saying that the substantiality referred to is logical. — Metaphysician Undercover

No actually. I'm going to reach out to some other moderators and request that you not. — Philosophim

(I) intend to stay out of it — Jamal

I shall leave you to do your thing. — Jamal

we used to have a moderator who warned he would ban anyone who said what you just said — frank

It's from this thread, there isn't much context it's pretty much the direct quote in all it's entirety. — Darkneos

Sorry for ranting. — bongo fury

For some reason it always puts spaces between em-dashes, which is a stylistic faux pas outside a few style guides (basically just AP), and so this is one way to tell between usages—also, it virtually never uses an em-dash for a single trailing clause, instead always bracketing a clause in them. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Anyhow, it seems to me that the main risk of them are:

Sycophantic confirmation bias; anything said to GPT in particular is "genius;"
Hallucination of sources, which is bad for any information environment when they get repeated. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This is obviously missing the point. We knew the order of listing was biased and constantly under attack from bots. It was our job to filter and find actually authored texts, and attribute their epistemic value or lack of it to the genuinely accountable authors. — bongo fury

You honestly now want to defer those epistemic judgements to a bot? — bongo fury

No. Well done you. Getting the thesaurus to suggest whole phrases and sentences is obviously plagiarism. The gaping difference denied, again. — bongo fury

I'm mystified that percipient philosophers can't see a gaping difference between (A) using a search engine to produce a list of texts containing a given string (well done, us and it) and on tother hand (B) swallowing the insulting fantasy of interaction with an intelligent oracle. — bongo fury

That is, I can't understand or sympathise with them admitting to reading the AI summary, instead of ignoring that insulting click-bait and searching immediately among the genuinely authored texts. — bongo fury

Yes — bongo fury

I guess I’m naïve or maybe just not very perceptive, but I haven’t recognized any posts definitely written by AI. There have always been enough overblown and oratorical but poorly thought out OPs and posts here on the forum even without AI that I don’t know how easy it is to tell. Perhaps it would be helpful if people called them out when you see them. — T Clark

Interesting, I haven’t noticed particularly. But I avoid reading lengthy and didactic posts which are often poorly written. The AI stuff I’ve seen often seems peculiarly worded and difficult to read. — Tom Storm

people can educate themselves about that by undertaking a search in whatever search engine they use — Janus

The A.I.-derived OP’s are likely to be better thought-out than many non-A.I. efforts. Banning A.I. is banning background research that will become built into the way we engage with each other. Think of it as walking around with a host of sages constantly whispering purported words of wisdom into your ear, and it is up to you to sort out what is valuable and what isn’t, what is true and what is false. — Joshs

The tool is now ubiquitous. Every intellectual is going to have to factor it into their practice. Time to learn what that means.

If you need to cheat to pass your exams or publish your research, then in the end it is you who suffers. But if AI can be used in a way than actually expands your brain, then that ought to be encouraged.

PF seems a suitably low stakes place to evolve some social norms. — apokrisis

Had Zizek posted that here without us knowing it him, he'd be ridiculed relentlessly. — Hanover

Nope, across the board people do end up stupider for using it. — Darkneos

Studies have found that people who use AI have lower cognitive ability than people who don't, you're making yourself worse off for using it. — Darkneos

To be clear, I am not saying that Aristotle's accidents are equivalent to Adornos non-identical. Equivalence itself is taken as an identity type of relation which would be misleading in this context. I am using Aristotle's approach to the object, defining it as primary substance, as an analogy to help understand Adorno's approach. So I am pointing at a similarity between the two. — Metaphysician Undercover

So I am definitely not saying concepts=bad, and intuitions=good — Metaphysician Undercover

This contingency meanwhile is not so radical as the criteria of scientivism would wish. Hegel was peculiarly inconsistent when he arraigned the individual consciousness, the staging-grounds of intellectual experience, which animated his work, as the contingent and that which is limited. This is comprehensible only out of the desire to disempower the critical moment which is tied to the individual Spirit. In its particularization he felt the contradictions between the concept and the particular. Individual consciousness is always, and with reason, the unhappy one. Hegel’s aversion towards this denies the very state of affairs [Sachverhalt] which he underlined, where it suited him: how much the universal dwells within that which is individual. According to strategic necessity he denounces the individuated as if it were the immediate, whose appearance [Schein] he himself is destroying. With this however the absolute contingency of individual experience disappears, too.

It would have no continuity without concepts. Through its participation in the discursive medium it is, according to its own determination, always at the same time more than only individual. The individuated becomes the subject, insofar as it objectifies itself by means of its individual consciousness, in the unity of itself as well as in its own experiences: animals are presumably bereft of both. Because it is universal in itself, and as far as it is, individual experience also reaches into that which is universal. Even in epistemological reflection the logical generality and the unity of individual consciousness reciprocally condition one another. This affects however not only the subjective-formal side of individuality. Every content of the individual consciousness is brought to it by its bearer, for the sake of its self- preservation, and reproduces itself with the latter.

Through self-awareness it is possible for the individual consciousness to emancipate itself, to expand itself. What drives it to this is the misery, that this universality tends to exert its hegemony in individual experience. As a “reality check” experience does not simply mirror the impulses and wishes of the individual, but also negates them, so that it would survive. That which is general in the subject is simply not to be grasped any other way than in the movement of particular human consciousness. If the individuated were simply abolished by fiat, no higher subject purified of the dross of contingency would emerge, but solely one which unconsciously follows orders. In the East the theoretical short-circuit in the view of the individuated has served as the pretext for collective repression. The Party is supposed to have a cognitive power a priori superior to that of every individual solely due to the number of its members, even if it is terrorized or blinded. The isolated individual [Individuum] however, unencumbered by the ukase, may at times perceive the objectivity more clearly than a collective, which in any case is only the ideology of its committees.

In place of the old bourgeois society, with its classes and class antagonisms, we shall have an association, in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all. — Communist Manifesto

Brecht’s sentence, the Party has a thousand eyes, the individual only two, is as false as any bromide. The exact imagination of a dissenter can see more than a thousand eyes wearing the same red- tinted glasses, who then mistake what they see with the universality of the truth and regress. The individuation of cognition resists this. The perception of the object depends not only on this, on the distinction: it is itself constituted from the object, which demands its restitutio in integrum [Latin: restitution in whole] in it, as it were. Nevertheless the subjective modes of reaction which the object needs require for their part the unceasing corrective in the object. This occurs in the self-reflection, the ferment of intellectual experience. The process of philosophical objectification would be, put metaphorically, vertical, intra-temporal, as opposed to the horizontal, abstract quantifying one of science; so much is true of Bergson’s metaphysics of time.

In Praise of the Work of the Party

Man has only two eyes;
The Party has a thousand eyes . . .
Man alone can be annihilated;
The Party cannot be annihilated.