Note that the link is now down and perhaps the domain needs to be renewed — Leontiskos
Do your posts go to the "drafts" even after posting them? — javi2541997
I mean, when I post a comment in a discussion, it is also being kept in the drafts. I answered to Tom Storm in a discussion and curiously such reply went to the draft too. Like if I never posted it when I actually did. — javi2541997
I will be more careful in the future — RussellA
Many philosophers believe that the first task is finding a theory of meaning in language. Given such a theory, they can then turn to the problems of philosophy. However, for Wittgenstein, whose first interest is in philosophy, it is this interest in philosophy that makes him then interested in language, but concludes that there is no theory of meaning in language that will enable the solving of philosophical problems. It is incorrect to say that Wittgenstein is an ordinary language philosopher in the sense that JL Austin is.
Wittgenstein urges throughout his later work that mistaking a grammatical claim for a philosophical one is a common source of philosophical confusion, Wittgenstein says that the philosophical problems that concern him are not empirical problems, but are problems solved by looking into and recognizing the workings of our language.
Wittgenstein often insists that he is not presenting a philosophical argument. In PI 109 he writes "We must do away with all explanation and description alone must take its place", whereby such descriptions get that purpose from philosophical problems.
For Wittgenstein, a standing source of philosophical confusion is the tendency to transpose a remark concerning the grammar of an expression into a substantive claim about the things referred to in the expression. For example, from PI 246 is the sentence “Only I can know that I am really in pain; another person can only surmise it”. This is clearly false, as that on many occasions we can know full well that someone else is in pain, there is no surmising about it. The grammatical difference between the first person "I have a pain" and the third person "he has a pain" wrongly becomes a substantive philosophical problem
For Wittgenstein the first step is to acknowledge the confusion between statements of grammatical fact and the use of them in the search for substantive philosophical meaning. — RussellA
:chin: — Noble Dust
I feel the same, although of course I'm not English — Noble Dust
I'm sure I've posted Oceansize many times here, but do you know them — Noble Dust
This really is a sermon on Marx. I love it. — Moliere
I meant to say that isn't he making an assumption that things in themselves, are plural? The fact that he is referring to plurality by speaking of "things" adds individuation, which is an additional attribution to the general idea of the "thing-it-itself". — Manuel
colour perception is not just cultural — RussellA
On the one hand, a wavelength of 420nm is a different colour to a wavelength of 470nm, but on the other hand, even though we can distinguish them, we perceive them both as the single colour blue. — RussellA
we should discuss why this was never put in The Lounge — javi2541997
This thread could in theory lead to a discussion about what grammar is. I come from linguistics, and I've often felt confused about how philosophers use the term grammar. It sometimes feels like philosophers think grammar is the structure of thought, when it's just the structure of language.
"Jack-in-the-box" and where the plural goes is actually a pretty good example. People here keep talking about Jacks and Boxes, but the grammatical structure does suggest you tag the -s onto Jack. — Dawnstorm
The discussion here about "jack-in-the-box" is mostly humorous, but it does show that grammar and thought needn't be the same. — Dawnstorm
Perfectly good word there, fine example of where to put the S — Sir2u
Great minds discuss ideas; average minds discuss events; small minds discuss people; tiny minds discuss grammar.