Yep, as a practical matter all of that’s no doubt accurate. I just find the exceptions more interesting, like amateur and (I want to say) buffoon. It looks like the difference between negative to positive and positive to negative is…

I’ll use an example:

If one wants to emphasize that an amateur does something for the love, not the money, and need not be less good at it (photography is a good example because probably most professional photographers spend their working lives doing weddings and don’t have time for anything artistic or challenging)—then one is going to call oneself an amateur, and would be more careful about using it to describe someone else. You’d have to qualify it: “you’re an amateur, and that’s something to be proud of, because it means you do it for the love of it”.

Ok I have more to say. It seems like some words, such as “nerd”, “queer”, and the N-word (not against the rules to mention this word explicitly in quotes but I find myself unable to do it)—these have switched sides, sometimes within a group and sometimes in the wider society. But it seems to me that “buffoon” has an essential double character and that we’d lose something if it became entirely positive.

Of course, I don’t really believe it has an essential character or even that we wouldn’t replace it with similarly double-sided words if it did go mainstream, but I think this may indeed identify different classes of words.

@Janus I want to say that the most interesting and famous philosophers have radically undermined or rejected the premises of their predecessors. If this is an exaggeration, it’s not much of one.

EDIT: should we, along the lines of Kuhn, distinguish normal and revolutionary philosophy? Maybe the analytic logic-choppers and the continental disciples of whichever big postmodern philosopher you care to mention are doing the former.

That's a great example. In these cases it’s not always just a “switch”; it’s because the word is negative, signifying for example an outsider status, that it becomes positive.

It’s debatable if this is what happened with “nerd” or if this is all that happened with it—what’s good about being a nerd is not only some minority outsider subversive thing but actual knowledge, and dedication to something valuable—but I think some words are like that. Maybe the reclamation of racist and homophobic slurs, e.g., queer, is similar.

But as I later said to Javi, we wouldn't want buffoonery to be entirely socially acceptable anyway, because it would then lose it's potential subversiveness. The buffoon undermines serious pretensions. — Jamal

@javi2541997

So, the interesting question for me is: can a word find positive connotations through its negative connotations?

Nonetheless, you are right in the fact that modern use has negative connotations — javi2541997

I didn't really make that claim and it's not something I would make a point of in this case. I think we all know that it's usually derogatory.

I would definitely say "buffoon" is purely negative, I don't think I've ever heard it used in any other way, — Judaka

I think this is because in our significantly Protestant Anglo culture*, being silly is frowned upon, regarded as frivolous and trivial. I believe the role of the jester, clown, fool, or buffoon is embraced by some entertainers though, and these words still retain some of their positive connotations as a kind of background significance.

But as I later said to Javi, we wouldn't want buffoonery to be entirely socially acceptable anyway, because it would then lose it's potential subversiveness. The buffoon undermines serious pretensions.

*To label as “Protestant” or “Anglo” the culture I’m talking about, the industrious culture of seriousness and the refusal of fun, is probably totally wrong, but it doesn’t matter.

Nonetheless, it seems that this word contains negative connotations because Jamal didn't like how I considered myself as a buffoon. — javi2541997

Here is the original exchange:

I would like to wish a good morning to everyone. You all already know that I am the buffoon of The Shoutbox — javi2541997

I wish you good morning but I resent your claim to be the preeminent Shoutbox buffoon. — Jamal

I was playing with the ambiguous character of the word. I was pretending to be affronted that Javi was claiming the coveted title of Shoutbox buffoon, thereby embracing the positive use of the term. At the same time this is also self-mockery, implying that I and others are fools, and in our foolishness we want to be known as buffoons. It’s dialectical.

I'm with Jamal that the word "buffoon" has negative connotations — Judaka

I would like to add a general principle for Jamal, myself, and numerous others: Exercise at least a little generosity in interpreting the words that other people write (or say). — BC

I’d like to point out that I’m being taken here to have some kind of position on this issue, but I don’t recognize it as alluded to in these comments; my main point both in the Shoutbox and in this discussion is that the word “buffoon” has an indispensably double-sided character.

Mostly I like silence, natural sounds, and the occasional human utterance. I prefer—it feels like I absolutely need—silence when I’m reading. I get stressed by constant traffic noise. I get angry at people who use car horns needlessly. I love music but I hate the ubiquity of background music.

But sometimes I love being in amongst the noise of the city and talking and laughing noisily all night.

But what does this have to do with philosophy? We have a social science section and I think noise and ambient sound could be explored in terms of psychology and sociology, and from there it could get philosophical, but the way the OP frames the topic it just seems to be about personal preference. Discussing how silence might help you feel more philosophical is not itself philosophical.

I’m not moving it to the Lounge as yet. Let’s see what happens.

But just because “buffoon” is often now derogatory doesn’t mean we can’t use it differently to make a point, as I’ve seen people do with the word “amateur,” which can be quite derogatory but comes from the word meaning “lover,” so an amateur is someone who does something for love, not money, and this needn’t imply a lack of skill.

So this is a kind of reclaiming. One could contrarily celebrate the role of the jester in society by proudly calling oneself a buffoon or a fool. It works for “buffoon” better than for “fool” because it retains a bit more of its less derogatory meaning.

I think perhaps a philosophical discussion needs a linguistic hierarchy of three classes of words. Most words being working class, taken for granted, over-worked and underpaid attention to; then some middle-class words, pedantically defined, and always following the rules of logic; and finally some few aristocratic words that are what the discussion is all about.

Which might suggest that one's philosophical instincts in this discussion are somewhat indicative of ones' class loyalties. Or it might just be a big tease. — unenlightened

I’m not sure what to say about this but I like it.

Your comments had me puzzling over the difference between an artist and an artisan. I had thought of this previously as a difference in the narrative, but if one takes your definition, there is something of ritual involved as well - magic involving ritual. — Banno

Oddly though, the common distinction between artisans and artists is that the things the artisan makes are functional. But art in magic ritual is functional too.

Fair question. I'm a fan of Austin, who's method involves the close and detailed analysis of the terms of our language, the "tools of trade"; I use that sort of analysis in my own considerations, having the OED and various etymological dictionaries at hand. This is quite a different process to mere stipulation, seeking an understanding of the historical development of terms and their interrelationship. Rather than closing the conversation off, this approach invites further commentary and comparison. — Banno

:up:

But it doesn't go down well in a forum. such as this, where if any attention is paid at all it's in order to point out how irrelevant it is. — Banno

I don't know. Sometimes it works.

A term such as Dasein is stipulated. It's what folk now call a term of art, a neologism, having no history, or rather not relating to any etymology, imported into English with a vast baggage. It's no good to reject the use of Dasein, so one might look to the use; but notice that the place the word is mostly used is in discussions of what it means... These are grounds for suspicion. — Banno

A couple of things. One is just that you can probably imagine a better example (unless you mean that this sort of issue is common to all such exegesis). Second point is that you're just calling into question the very project of trying to understand Being and Time. That's all very well but it wouldn't be a very philosophical engagement in this case.

I gave the example above of using a definition at the commencement of an argument. That's not problematic, indeed it is setting up the furthering of the discussion by admitting the limitations of context, and so inviting critique — Banno

Not sure I understand this. Isn't this the kind of definition we've been talking about?

Yes, the failed definition is also a success. It's a metaphor. As a matter of style, it's offered exclusively. But perhaps the speech act should be interpreted as a gift, as a good place from which to peep at a complex phenomenon for a moment. — plaque flag

Interesting to look at these together:

Only exaggeration is true. — Adorno

Art is magic delivered from the lie of being truth — Adorno, Minima Moralia

I think the latter is not a metaphor so much as, like the former itself (as you pointed out), an exaggeration. There may be exceptions, it may not stand up to scrutiny, but it shows something about art nonetheless, and not really or entirely by analogy. My thread title is a bit like that, though obviously not as subtle. It might not be mere clickbait, but an exaggeration to make the point that often, definitions should not be used in philosophy.

Did you check absoluteaspiration’s post on his consciousness account? That’s what I commented on. Is it an accurate précis? — apokrisis

Ah, I thought you meant Zizek. Don’t know if it’s accurate.

Earlier I was thinking about people who'd say 'nothing is true.' I use to like this kind of radically open-minded aphorism. — plaque flag

Makes me think of Adorno's one: "only exaggeration is true".

Well, I agree dammit.

But what I don’t think I’ve seen from you (could be wrong) is when in philosophy you think definitions are good. Is it possible to be specific here, even, dare I say, to offer some sort of definition?

For example, I’ll quote myself again:

On the other hand, what if someone wants to explore the meaning of Dasein and a hostile party butts in with, say, Adorno's excoriating analysis of Heidegger's abuse of language and celebration of irrationality? Would that be philosophical? I think the answer is at least sometimes no, so what's the difference here? — Jamal

Couldn’t we say that if the task is exegesis, it’s no good to reject the definition of Dasein given at the beginning, before we’ve explicated it?

EDIT: actually you did say that the definition of art I gave might be useful.

But overwhelmingly I agree that ".. it’s in the use of term that we can understand the meaning of concepts, not primarily by definitions", and indeed I've taken this further, suggesting elsewhere that the notion of a concept is a reification of the use of the term at issue; that all there is to a concept is the use of the associated words. — Banno

I realized you thought so and was worried it would come up, because I thought it wasn’t relevant, that I could conflate them without anyone noticing too much, and without affecting the debate.

But now it’s come up, it is interesting. Adorno and Hegel always complain about reification too, but for them it’s not the concepts as such that are to blame, but an overly rigid use of them. Maybe this amounts to the same thing.

Do we ever see productive discussions between those who don't share definitions and assumptions? — Janus

I think so, but maybe sometimes less for the primary interlocutors than for bystanders. Reading discussions over the years I’ve been happily struck by insights that amounted to rejections of the definitions.

In a discussion of phenomenology's relationship with post-structuralism, for example, would there be any value contributed by a participant who only wanted to argue that neither phenomenology nor post-structuralism can contribute anything of philosophical value? — Janus

Yeah, it might be a matter of degree or something. I was asking the same sort of question above:

On the other hand, what if someone wants to explore the meaning of Dasein and a hostile party butts in with, say, Adorno's excoriating analysis of Heidegger's abuse of language and celebration of irrationality? Would that be philosophical? I think the answer is at least sometimes no, so what's the difference here? — Jamal

You and banno apparently don't like the fact I think definitions are important. — T Clark

This is not true. If you’d been paying attention to my posts (and that’s another thing) you’d see that I’m quite open to the idea that definitions are important, and I positively want people to disagree, including you. The thread’s title is just sensationalist.

You brought it up, not me. — T Clark

No, it was you. You first personalized things when you started talking about my approach to philosophy, implying that it was tied down to particular philosophers and their works. In contrast, you described your own approach. As I say, this could have been interesting if you had actually explained how these different approaches played out in our different attitudes to definition, but you didn’t want to pursue that. It was enough for you to state your opinions and tell me that you cherish them for important personal reasons. Why should I care?

And now, you have become somewhat aggressive towards Banno for no good reason that I can see, other than your epic personal feud.

I don't think that's true. Example please. — T Clark

Just in this discussion you’ve done it with me (described above), and you’ve done it again with @Banno:

Getting into arguments about the meaning of words is examining the substance and details of a particular position. — Banno

Sometimes yes. Often no. As I noted, and you ignored, sometimes I want to look at a particular view of an issue and not talk about how others might define the issue. You often don't respect that desire. It is inconsiderate and unphilosophical. The solution is always simple, if you don't want to address the issues as laid out in the OP, go somewhere else. You seem to be unable to do that. — T Clark

Here, instead of tackling his point you end up talking about Banno himself, doing the old ad hominem. It genuinely seems to me that you literally do not want to discuss the topic: you think the way you think and that’s that. It is not right on the money, because it doesn’t address the point in a philosophical way. Try imagining someone who agrees with Banno but who you like: what would you say to them if they made the same point? The principle of charity is key.

I’ve seen it in other discussions. I think you can be forgiven for sometimes expressing your exasperation or personal animus when you find Banno’s approach significantly, shall we say, divergent from your own. It’s just not philosophy though. No further questions. I rest my case.

I would call it amusing PoMo tosh — apokrisis

PoMo style deconstruction, employing the usual suspects of Marx and Freud. — apokrisis

Zizek is famously critical of postmodernism, which is why modernists such as Marx and Freud are important reference points for him (despite what you see as their Romantic reaction). Universalism and the political importance of the subject, two things Zizek seems to like, are eminently nonpostmodernist, don’t you think?

Political dissent once dealt with real world issues, like the disequilibrium between labour and capital. But again citing Fukuyama, the political focus has shifted to the distractions of identity politics. — apokrisis

This criticism of the Left is very much in line with Zizek’s.

Maybe it’s because postmodernism is his philosophical milieu that he comes across as postmodernist.

Again - it's very personal to me — T Clark

So what? I don't think it means that because it's personal to you, the very fact that it's personal to you is all you need to talk about. There are the philosophical issues too. You often seem to forget that.

Baloney. If you don't want to play by the rules I set up in my OP, there are other threads to go too. My OPs always leave plenty of room for disagreements, but they focus on the issue I am interested in discussing. I don't start discussions offhandedly. I have a specific purpose in mind. Generally, it's because I don't understand something and want to examine it closer and I want help from you guys. — T Clark

This is what we're exploring here. It certainly doesn't help when you put people in boxes and assume, well, that's the way you are and I'm the way I am because I was an engineer and there's nothing to be done. It's irrational, anti-philosophical, trivial and distracting. And now I'm doing it too.

On the other hand, what if someone wants to explore the meaning of Dasein and a hostile party butts in with, say, Adorno's excoriating analysis of Heidegger's abuse of language and celebration of irrationality? Would that be philosophical? I think the answer is at least sometimes no, so what's the difference here?

For example say someone starts a discussion proposing to deal with how semiotics or phenome nology helps us understand the nature of consciousness and the human relation to the world. There would be little point in someone asserting that semiotics and phenomenology don't do either of those things, because that would just signal that no discussion is possible between those two interlocutors, at least so it seems to me. — Janus

Whereas definitions, if respected, would shut them out from the start.

So...

That's true but doesn't augur well for discussion between those who do not share basic assumptions or definitions. — Janus

But with the definitions and assumptions in place and an expectation that others abide by them, those who don't share them are not involved at all. To put it mildly, that's not always good.

Excuse me for butting in folks...

It is inconsiderate and unphilosophical — T Clark

It might be inconsiderate, but it is not necessarily unphilosophical. Classically in philosophy, there is questioning the question. To do this might be to go against the wishes of the asker, who just wants a straight answer. It’s a refusal to abide by the terms of the debate as set out. But this is exactly what philosophy ought to do. The same goes for definitions.

You seem to be unable to do that. — T Clark

I see you’ve managed to personalize things again. This is a discussion about definitions, not the various personalities of TPF and how they behave. Some would say it’s inconsiderate of you to disrespect the topic in this way, in that you have failed to follow your own advice and “address the issues as laid out in the OP”. In this case I think it’s also unphilosophical. (I’m not asking you to stop it, by the way)

In one of your posts in reply to me a few pages ago, you appeared to interestingly combine this personalizing approach with something philosophical, or metaphilosophical. You suggested that the reason we saw the same situation differently was that we had different approaches to philosophy. I asked you how this played out, but you were not interested enough to answer, so that avenue fizzled out. Maybe this time it won’t (it’s the same issue).

I meant @Streetlight actually. I didn’t know Sheps was into Zizek. Whatever happened to Sheps eh. Never made it over here I don’t think.

Try this:

https://iep.utm.edu/zizek/

I have not yet read any of his hardcore philosophy books, but as far as I can tell his interest is in subjectivity, from a psychological and political point of view, rather than in consciousness, that which is explored by analytical philosophers in terms of the concepts you’ve mentioned (qualia, emergence). When the word comes up in his works it’s probably about “false consciousness,” the Marxian concept. So it could be that he doesn’t have anything like the theory you’re imagining.

I could be wrong though. We used to have a member who was familiar with Zizek, but he’s no longer here unfortunately.

Proudly declaring your ignorance. Not a good look.

Beliefs are truth-functional though, and art in the service of false beliefs is thereby a lie.

Adjourning a meeting was never involved in spiritual practices. — Jamal

That was hasty of me. Does this kill my point?

Not really. Adjourning a meeting was never the means by which the favour of benign spirits and the protection from malign ones was effected.

But:

Adjourning a meeting is magic delivered from the lie of being truth.

This doesn’t work. Adjourning a meeting was never involved in spiritual practices.

Teach me; how else can naming a ship be distinguished from magic, other than by their being seperate instances of the same thing? — Banno

Very well, Socrates, I’ll play along. I’m not saying it has sharper boundaries than the notion of a game, so I’m not saying that Adorno’s definition of art requires a definition of magic, but I can say that magic, unlike naming a ship, involves the belief in supernatural entities such as spirits and demons that inhabit the things of nature, and that magic spells are often effected by means of symbolic objects made to resemble or represent these things or their spirits and demons.

But…

I suspect Adorno wants to grant a special status to art that I might deny. — Banno

I suspect this is true, even though his definition does not rule out the idea that naming a ship is a kind of magic.

Good point, but it’s a bit like referring to communism or militant atheism as religions. Naming a ship and declaring a meeting adjourned can be distinguished from magic incantations and rituals, and not only by the fact that they’re separate instances of the same thing.

I could say that meaning is pointing if that would help?

Like that, for a start. Setting out a definition in order to ground an argument is already taking a stance, which may itself be brought into question.

Moreover, we might think in terms of Searle's status functions and institutional facts. Language builds on itself, so that saying it is so makes it so, or counts as its being so. — Banno

I'm afraid I'm going to have to entirely agree. Sorry.

Maybe I'll even agree — T Clark

Woah, steady on! No need to go that far.

But aye, I did think my post would be in sympathy with your pragmatic conception of knowledge.

No worries, feel free to follow it wherever it goes. It’s actually quite relevant to my previous discussion called “Magical powers”, so it’s not that I don’t find it interesting.

I’m not opposed to your sagacious and fascinating thoughts, but I wasn’t really endorsing Teddy’s definition so much as interpreting it to demonstrate how the right kind of definition can work philosophically.