Greek and Indian philosophy - parallels and interchanges Some people seem to have an unwillingness or inability to see similarities between Platonism and Indian monistic philosophy.
For example, while noting some similarities, Gregorios writes that “the Plotinian concept of emanation finds no precise parallel in Indian thought” – P M Gregorios “Does Geography Condition Philosophy? On Going Beyond the Occidental-Oriental Distinction”.
As a matter of fact, the concept of the manifest as an emanation of the unmanifest is not altogether unknown to Indian philosophy. And the Plotinian concept of the One abiding in itself, proceeding out of itself in creation and reverting back to itself (mone, proodos, epistrophe) is certainly comparable to the Indian concept of emanation, abidance and withdrawal (sRshti, sthiti, samhāra) that we find especially in monistic traditions like Abhinavagupta’s Kashmiri Shaivism. Even the concept of “the One” (Greek “to Hen”, Sanskrit “Ekam”) is obviously essentially identical in both systems.
As regards differences, both systems admit five faculties of perception (sight, hearing, smelling, tasting and feeling by touch) as powers of the soul, whereby it perceives or “takes in” features of the world such as color, etc. However, in addition to the five cognitive powers of perception, the soul in Indian philosophy also has five motor powers through which it acts on or interacts with the physical world: locomotion or moving about in space, speaking or uttering sounds, excreting, procreating and grasping or taking hold of things.
This seems to be one area to which Platonism appears to give less attention than its Indian counterparts.
Also related to perception, is the Indian theory of impermanence or momentariness (kshanikavāda) which Abhinavagupta seems to have adapted to his own system from Buddhism. Briefly, it holds that an object is perceived in a rapid sequence of very brief units of perception (kshana, moments) which are combined by the mind into a seemingly solid and more lasting image of the object.
I can’t find anything comparable in Platonism but I think that together with the five motor powers of the soul this could be added to Platonism without major difficulties. Obviously, Abhinavagupta was an untiring thinker and his system is extremely elaborate – some, including myself, would say too elaborate – but I tend to believe that Platonism may benefit from borrowing a few elements of it in so far as they are consistent with its own fundamental tenets.