The issue I raised is whether the active principle of the intellect is a person as one who experiences themselves as such after that principle is separated from the composition of a living individual. Plotinus' view of the soul differs sharply from Aristotle's regarding what elements are being discussed — Paine

Well, Plotinus is entitled to his own views like everyone else. Plato doesn’t say that his followers must follow him ad litteram. But the quote from Gerson is not about Plotinus. He very clearly says what he thinks are Plato and Aristotle’s views on the subject of the intellect’s “survival” or “transcendence” after death:

The activity of intellect in both Plato and Aristotle is impersonal only in the sense of being nonidiosyncratic. The contents of intellect’s thinking when it is thinking that which is intelligible is the same for everyone. If I am nothing but an intellect, then, ideally, I differ from you solo numero. Emotions, appetites, memories, and sensations are not just numerically distinct for different embodied persons, they are idiosyncratic as well, insofar as they depend on a unique body.

According to Gerson, for Aristotle the “surviving” or “transcending” part of man is a type of impersonal intelligence. Gerson’s interpretation sounds reasonable enough to me.

The impersonality of the nous following physical death is I think one of the reasons why Aristotle urges philosophers to self-identify with that higher element in man as opposed to lower elements belonging to the body-mind compound.

As pointed out in my previous posts, it wouldn’t make sense for a philosopher to identify with parts of him that not only are not his true self, but are perishable.

Obviously, if the nous is man’s true self, true knowledge and happiness are attained through identification with the nous and its contemplative activity, as Aristotle says.

But the point I was trying to make is that the way I see it, it is imperative to look at things from a synoptic perspective. And this necessitates not only an ability to see through the anti-Platonist propaganda and disinformation, but also taking into consideration Aristotle’s Platonic background.

As Plato says in the Republic, the Good is the source of all knowledge and of everything that is good, therefore, the Good is the “highest lesson” or the “highest thing to learn” (Rep. 505a).

Similarly, Aristotle begins his Nicomachean Ethics by stating that “the Good is that at which all things aim”:

If our activities have some end which we want for its own sake, and for the sake of which we want all the other ends, it is clear that this must be the good, that is, the supreme good. Does it not follow, then, that a knowledge of the good is of great importance to us for the conduct of our lives? (Nicomachean Ethics. 1094a15-25)

He then says:

What is the highest of all practical goods? Well, so far as the name goes, there is pretty general agreement. ‘It is happiness,’ say both ordinary and cultured people … But when it comes to saying in what happiness consists, opinions differ, and the account given by the generality of mankind is not at all like that of the wise … Some, however, have held the view that over and above these particular goods there is another which is Good in itself and the cause of whatever goodness there is in all these others (Nicomachean Ethics. 1095a15-30)

And he eventually comes to the conclusion that the highest happiness comes from the highest activity which is contemplation (theoria) of higher realities.

The activity of the Gods, which is supremely happy, must be a form of contemplation; and therefore among human activities that which is the most akin to the God’s will be the happiest (Nicomachean Ethics 1178b20).

Plato also says that the Good is the cause of everything good and that it makes the universe good like itself by imposing order on the universe.

Aristotle says pretty much the same thing:

An excessively large number cannot participate in order: to give it order would surely be a task for divine power, which holds even this universe together (Politics 1326a32-33)

The Universe is a system made up of heaven and earth and the elements which are contained in them. But the word is also used in another sense of the ordering and arrangement of all things, preserved by and through God (De Mundo 391b9-11)

There still remains for us to treat briefly, as we have discussed the other objects, of the cause which holds all things together … The old explanation which we have all inherited from our fathers, is that all things are from God and were framed for us by God, and that no created thing is of itself sufficient for itself, deprived of the permanence which it derives from him … It is therefore better, even as it is more seemly and befitting God, to suppose that the power which is stablished in the heavens is the cause of permanence even in those things which are furthest removed from it – in a word, in all things (De Mundo 397b9-398a5)

Thus a single harmony orders the composition of the whole – heaven and earth and the whole Universe – by the mingling of the most contrary principles … all the earth, the sea, the ether, the sun, the moon, and the whole heaven are ordered by a single power extending through all, which has created the whole universe out of separate and different elements, embracing them all on one spherical surface and forcing the most contrary natures to live in agreement with one another in the universe, and thus contriving the permanence of the whole (Politics 396b20-30)

Aristotle also says that the universe is created by an Intellect in conjunction with Nature:

Since there can be nothing incidental unless there is something primary for it to be incidental to, it follows that there can be no incidental causation except as incident to direct causation. Chance and fortune, therefore, imply the antecedent activity of Intellect (Nous) and Nature (Physis) as causes; so that, even if the cause of the heavens were ever so casual, yet Intellect and Nature must have been causes antecedently, not only of many other things we could mention, but of the universe itself (Physics 198a10-13)

If we take an unbiased look at the larger picture, I think a clear Platonic pattern begins to emerge:

1. Supreme principle of goodness.
2. Divine power that orders and holds together the universe.
3. Divine Intellect as cause of the universe.
4. Forms.
5. Immortality of individual intellect.
6. The best life is a life lived in harmony with intellect.
7. Contemplation of higher realities is the highest form of activity, etc.

We can see that, despite differences, Aristotle operates within paradigms that are largely Platonic. This is why IMO we need to bear this in mind in order to understand him correctly.

In any case, it is clear that the nous as an immaterial, eternal and unaffected intelligence plays as much a central role in Aristotle’s system as it does in Plato and Platonism.

What is clearly stated in Aristotle is an interest in understanding causes of events and the reality of actual beings. There is a consideration of the sciences of the first things and the cosmology of eternal objects. But the study of nature as Fusis is also accorded the rank of a theoretical science. Experience in the world is a necessary condition of knowledge. — Paine

Forms clearly play a role in human intellection and cognition:

Now, if thinking is analogous to perceiving, it will consist in a being acted upon by the object of thought (noeton) or in something else of this kind. This part of the soul [the nous], then, must be impassive, but receptive of the Form (eidos) and potentially like this Form, though not identical with it … Therefore it has been well said that the soul is a place of Forms (eide): except that this is not true of the whole soul, but only of the soul which can think, and again that the Forms (eide) are there not in actuality, but potentiality … (De Anima 429a15 ff.).

Of course Aristotle is also concerned with the sensible world. But the fact remains that the intelligible world is higher than the sensible, and the higher part of the soul is higher than the lower. What is higher takes precedence over the lower. This is why Aristotle urges the philosopher to identify with the higher element (nous) in him:

But we ought, so far as in us lies, to put on immortality, and do all that we can to live in conformity with the highest that is in us [the nous which is immortal and divine] (Nicomachean Ethics 1177b30).

Identification with the highest element in man is the whole point of Plato’s and Aristotle’s philosophy. The highest happiness comes from the highest activity which is contemplation (theoria):

The activity of the Gods, which is supremely happy, must be a form of contemplation; and therefore among human activities that which is the most akin to the Gods' will be the happiest (Nicomachean Ethics 1178b20).

According to both Plato and Aristotle the main function of nous, in addition to self-awareness, is contemplation of higher realities.

This means that once the nous has become separated on the death of the body-mind composite, and is “itself by itself”, there will be little activity left other than contemplation.

As the act and experience of contemplation of higher realities is the same in all cases, this means that “personality” in the normal sense of the word ceases to exist.

Gerson writes:

The activity of intellect in both Plato and Aristotle is impersonal only in the sense of being nonidiosyncratic. The contents of intellect’s thinking when it is thinking that which is intelligible is the same for everyone. If I am nothing but an intellect, then, ideally, I differ from you solo numero. Emotions, appetites, memories, and sensations are not just numerically distinct for different embodied persons, they are idiosyncratic as well, insofar as they depend on a unique body.
The identity between a subject of intellection and a subject of the idiosyncratic states of embodiment is deeply obscure. I do not want to suggest that either Plato or Aristotle has anything like a satisfactory explanation for this. But I do wish to insist they share a conviction in general about how to bridge the gap between the embodied person and the disembodied person.
By ‘gap’ I mean the natural disinclination most embodied persons have to embrace the destiny of a disembodied person so described. The shared conviction is that philosophical activity has a transformative effect on embodied persons. As one becomes habituated to the philosophical life, one comes to identify oneself with ‘the better part’. I do not suppose that Plato or even Neoplatonists of the strictest observance believed that such identification could be perfectly achieved while embodied. But as Plato urges in Republic, quite reasonably enough, it is better to be closer to the ideal than to be further away. In any case, for Plato, and, as I have argued, for Aristotle as well, that is the ideal, like it or not (Aristotle and Other Platonists, p. 286).

At the end of the day, the ultimate goal of philosophy is self-knowledge. If self-knowledge is the highest form of cognition, and the philosopher is serious about achieving his or her true identity, then this can be done only through some form of introspective inquiry or self-reflexive thinking that has the nous (i.e., self-aware consciousness or intelligence) itself as its central focus.

The question is how to understand the relation of that principle to a composite being such as a man. Aristotle frames the existence of principles generally through distinguishing the potential from the actual rather than describing particular beings to be participating in a Form — Paine

Correct. Aristotle’s interest in Forms appears to be tied in the first place to attempts to explain intellectual processes. What he seems to suggest is that higher, non-discursive intellect contains Forms that are accessed by lower, discursive intellect by means of images (or mental copies of Forms) and used as a basis for discursive thinking and cognition.

However, like Plato, Aristotle offers no detailed explanation for how exactly the higher intellect relates to the soul or description of what the intellect is and does after the death of the body-soul composite.

I think the reason for this is that the main concern in both Plato and Aristotle is to prepare the philosopher for life after death and this seems to imply the conscious self-identification with that in man that is said to survive death.

When seen in this way, the ultimate purpose of Forms is not to explain the phenomena of the sensible world which are going to be left behind after death anyway, but how consciousness generates experience on higher planes of existence, knowledge of which may enable the individual consciousness to elevate itself to higher modes of experience or existence.

So Forms seem to fulfill a multiple explanatory function:

1. As eternal, unchanging entities, they explain the possibility of knowledge in an ever-changing world.

2. As immaterial, ontologically prior entities, they explain the phenomenon of identity in difference.

3. As principles of order, they explain how universal consciousness, creative intelligence, or divine nous organizes itself in order to generate the intelligible and sensible realms.

Of course, it may be argued that Aristotle does not always make the same metaphysical claims as his teacher Plato. However, in practice, Aristotle was seldom studied in isolation. As a general rule, students of philosophy would study the writings of Plato, Aristotle, and other leading philosophers, and would form their own opinion as to which views or combination of views were the most logically and philosophically satisfactory.

This is precisely why the philosophical system that came to be known as “Platonism” is a synthesis of several philosophical schools. Aristotle’s own system consists of Platonic and other teachings combined with his own views.

I was asking for references in Aristotle that supported your suggestion that a soul survived death as a particular unit. — Paine

Aristotle distinguishes between soul (psyche) and “intellect” (nous). He says that the soul is perishable and that the nous is separable from the soul and immortal, eternal, unaffected, etc.

It [the nous] would seem, however, to be a distinct species of soul, and it alone is capable of separation from the body, as that which is eternal from that which is perishable (De Anima 413b24-29).

And it is this [active] intellect which is separable and impassive and unmixed, being in its essential nature an activity. For that which acts is always superior to that which is acted upon, the cause or principle to the matter … It is, however, only when separated that it is its true self, and this, its essential nature, alone is immortal and eternal (De Anima 430a23).

But we ought, so far as in us lies, to put on immortality, and do all that we can to live in conformity with the highest that is in us [the nous which is immortal and divine] (Nicomachean Ethics 1177b30).

All I can say is that it is generally assumed - since antiquity - that Aristotle’s nous postexists the death of the physical body (and associated lower soul) as a particular unit. In any case, I am not aware of any statements to the contrary.

If a modern can understand the assumptions underpinning the idea of nous that were made by the Ancient Greeks then one can understand the concept as it was understood by the Greeks. — Janus

Of course moderns can understand the Ancient Greek concept of nous if it is explained to them, or even better, if they read Plato and Aristotle and see the various senses in which it is used.

The problem is when readers take nous to be synonymous in all respects with modern words like English “intellect”. Depending on the context, nous can mean intellect, but its range of meaning is much broader than the word “intellect”.

‘Ousia’ is a form of the verb ‘to be’ and is nearer in meaning to ‘being’ or ‘subject’ than what we call ‘substance’. — Wayfarer

Correct. This is why ousia (from eimi, “to be”) is also translated as “essence”, i.e., the inherent nature of a thing. “Essence” itself is derived from Latin essentia which Cicero coined to translate Greek ousia.

The same happens with Plato’s Forms being mistaken for “universals”, etc. Without a proper understanding of the terminology used we can't get very far.

We nowadays best interpret nous as intellect. Intellect to us most always connotes thought as reasoning, — javra

That's exactly where the problem is. Reading Plato and Aristotle was always done in the Greek original, even in the Roman Empire and later of course in the Greek-speaking Eastern Roman Empire (Byzantine Empire) down to modern times.

The problem started with attempts to translate Ancient Greek terms into Latin that (even more than modern English) had no equivalent philosophical terminology. In fact, many Latin words were calqued on Greek ones, not always with the best results. This is how we ended up with English "intellect". French "esprit" or German "Geist" is much closer, denoting the intelligent life principle in man that has a wide range of faculties aside from thinking or reasoning.

"Nous" in Ancient Greek has a wide range of meaning, including consciousness, intelligence, reason, mind, understanding, soul, etc., always depending on the context. Among other things, nous is also the soul's faculty of intuition, insight, contemplation, and higher perception or experience.

This is why it is best left untranslated, otherwise we get results that are more confusing than enlightening, as with phronesis, another term with no equivalent in modern languages which is more like "wisdom" but is often rendered as "prudence"!

My advice would be not to try to translate it but to try to understand it. So yes, "understanding" is the key to it in that sense.

It sounds like you are saying the Nous, as a principle, is a substance of some kind. — Paine

Depending on how you define "principle" and "substance", nous can be either, none, or both. However we choose to define it though, Aristotle calls it "immortal", "eternal", "separable" (from the body-mind compound), etc.

What you say here, "to correctly understand Aristotle" is not really true, because you latch on to a small point here, the immortality of the intellect, which is inconsistent with all the parts that I pointed at, and you claim that this is the correct understanding. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's why we must agree to disagree.

No one argues that Aristotle and Plato are identical. The point is that there is similarity and a high degree of harmony between their views, as shown by Gerson and others, not to mention the whole Platonic (or "Neo-Platonic") tradition.

Some key points in common are:

1. Priority of intelligibles to sensibles.
2. Eternality of Forms.
3. Forms (eide) are not the same as universals (katholou). (There are similarities and differences.)
4. Forms in the intelligible realm.
5. Form instances or “images” (eikones) in the sensible realm.
6. Forms make cognition possible.
7. The cognizing subject is the “intellect” or nous.
8. Immortality of “intellect” (nous).
9. Identity of “intellect” or nous and man’s true self, etc.

Though philosophy aims to attain knowledge or wisdom (sophia or phronesis), the ultimate goal of philosophy is the source of knowledge or wisdom itself which is consciousness.

Consciousness is always aware of itself and this self-reflexive awareness is an activity of consciousness that is already there as the background of other activities of consciousness.

In other words, normal activity involves change. The self-awareness of consciousness is an activity that does not involve change as the awareness is of the same changeless consciousness.

When self-aware consciousness (that is already "active" in an act of self-reflexive awareness) becomes active in the ordinary sense, e.g., as in an act of sensory perception, there is awareness of (1) perception, (2) perceiving subject, (3) means of perception, and (4) (external or physical) object of perception.

The perception is the equivalent of knowledge, and consciousness qua consciousness the equivalent of the source of knowledge.

At the highest level of perception (knowledge) consciousness is cognitively identical with the perception. Therefore, the highest form of knowledge is self-knowledge which is knowledge of oneself as consciousness or nous.

This means that the source of knowledge can be discovered only through introspective inquiry or internalization of consciousness. This is not only logical, but also a matter of experience as detailed in my previous posts.

If consciousness is the source of knowledge, then that source is to be found within consciousness itself, at the center of experience which is logically within us as conscious beings. And the way to that center passes through the same states of consciousness we experience naturally, i.e., waking, dreaming, and deep sleep, with self-aware consciousness always in the background of all experience.

Whether we like it or not, because they are an important (and usually neglected) aspect of consciousness, dreams will become more prominent in this process, especially lucid dreams, precognitive dreams, and dream-visions. This is why all philosophers in the Platonic tradition, for example, from Socrates to Proclus and others had precognitive and other dreams in which certain truths were revealed to them.

The bottom line is that humans and other intelligent beings are communicative because the consciousness or intelligence in us is communicative. If we pay attention to consciousness and communicate with it, it will communicate with us and teach us things we did not know before. In any case, we have nothing to lose and everything to gain.

If, on the other hand, we insist on claiming that consciousness does not exist, or that the way to truth is through the study of physical matter, or through the consciousness of lower forms of life, then it's a different story. Either way, as I said before, the choice is yours. Nothing to do with me.

The higher consciousness is best. Therefore the higher consciousness only thinks about itself. Notice the premise which begs the question "the higher consciousness is best". You've presented selfishness as if it were good. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think you are deliberately misinterpreting my statement, as well as ignoring the arguments presented by Aristotle in the relevant sections of the text.

It appears like you do not even distinguish between consciousness and self-consciousness. Perhaps if you did, you would see that these two are not different "levels of consciousness", but self-consciousness is just a special type of consciousness. — Metaphysician Undercover

Of course self-consciousness is a type of consciousness. But self-reflexive consciousness or consciousness being aware of itself is on a higher level than objective consciousness or consciousness being aware of things other than itself. Aristotle himself distinguishes between "active" and "passive" consciousness and clearly classifies the former as higher than the latter.

Anyway, a major plank in the anti-Western and anti-Classical disinformation campaign is the supposed opposition between Plato and Aristotle, Aristotle being variously styled an anti-Platonist champion of Christianity, Islam, and “progress”.

Among the claims made on behalf of Aristotle is that he rejects Plato’s key teachings, the immortality of the soul and the Theory of Forms.

These claims have long been refuted by scholars like Fine (On Ideas) and Gerson (Aristotle and Other Platonists) yet they are still being recycled and promoted by the anti-Platonist brigade.

As Gerson has pointed out, this has reached such absurd dimensions that views clearly espoused by Plato in his works are dismissed as “Aristotelian” or, even worse, as “Neoplatonist”.

The truth of the matter is that none of these claims are correct. Aristotle does seem to reject the immortality of the lower part of the soul (psyche), but not of the higher part called “intellect” (nous). On this point he is in agreement with Plato who holds that less evolved souls are subject to rebirth but that in evolved souls what remains after the death of the physical body is the intellectual or spiritual part which is the seat of consciousness.

Similarly, Aristotle does not seem to reject the Forms as such but only certain interpretations of the Theory of Forms, several versions of which were discussed within the Platonic Academy. In fact, Aristotle does not reject eternal intelligibles and he posits a “Prime Unmoved Mover” whose eternal thinking is of eternal intelligible objects which are similar or identical with Plato’s Forms. He certainly treats the terms “intelligible object” (noeton) and “Form” (eidos) as synonymous:

Now, if thinking is analogous to perceiving, it will consist in a being acted upon by the object of thought (noeton) or in something else of this kind. This part of the soul [the nous], then, must be impassive, but receptive of the Form (eidos) and potentially like this Form, though not identical with it … Therefore it has been well said that the soul is a place of Forms (eide): except that this is not true of the whole soul, but only of the soul which can think, and again that the Forms (eide) are there not in actuality, but potentiality … But the intellect, when it has been thinking on an object of intense thought, is not less, but even more, able to think of inferior objects. For the perceptive faculty is not independent of body, whereas intellect is separable. But when the intellect has thus become everything in the sense in which one who actually is a scholar is said to be so (which happens so soon as he can exercise his power of himself), even then it is still in one sense but a capacity: not, however, a capacity in the same sense as before it learned or discovered. And, moreover, at this stage intellect is capable of thinking itself (De Anima 429a15 ff.).

The intellect’s capacity to “think itself” identifies it as a form of consciousness and highlights the similarity between Plato’s and Aristotle’s conception of intellect or nous. It is this close similarity that enables those familiar with Plato to correctly understand Aristotle.

In the Republic, Socrates gives examples of hierarchies of beauty and knowledge (or truth).

As examples of different kinds of beauty he lists a beautiful girl, a beautiful horse, and a beautiful lyre (Hippias Major 287e-289d).

“Beautiful” in this particular context means pleasing to the eye. Obviously, one may argue that in addition to her pleasant looks, a girl can be pleasing to other sensory faculties such as touch, or she may have a beautiful voice. A horse lover might say that the horse, in addition to beautiful shape and color, also possesses power, speed, and a pleasant grassy-earthy scent. The music lover might insist that in addition to being beautifully crafted, the lyre produces beautiful sounds, etc. But for our present purposes, we will limit ourselves to sight and say that all three are equally beautiful.

Having shown that there are different kinds of beauty, Socrates next proceeds to show that there are different degrees of beauty, saying that even a beautiful girl would be “ugly” compared to a Goddess. So, basically, the beautiful girl is more beautiful than the average girl, the Goddess is more beautiful than the beautiful girl, and Beauty itself is the most beautiful of all.

The same applies to knowledge. There are different kinds (e.g., astronomy, mathematics, logic) and different degrees:

1. Illusion (eikasia)
2. Right belief (pistis or right opinion doxa)
3. Knowledge based on reason (dianoia)
4. Intuition or insight (noesis).

Similarly, as stated before, there are different states of consciousness and degrees of wakefulness such as waking, dreaming, deep sleep, etc., and different substates within each of them that may be classified according to the prominence of different elements of cognition.

As Plato says:

“This reality, then, that gives their truth to the objects of knowledge and the power of knowing to the knower, you must say is the Form of the Good, and you must consider it as being the cause of knowledge and truth, and an object of knowledge“ (Rep. 508e1-4).

Here we have all basic elements of cognition:

(1) Object of knowledge
(2) Power or means of knowledge
(3) The knowing subject or knower
(4) Knowledge or awareness itself.

1. WAKING STATE. If we take visual perception in the waking state as an example, the cognitive element in the first stage is the object of sight, when objective consciousness predominates.

But if we defocus our vision from the object (as when gazing into midair) and mentally focus on the act of seeing, the object becomes less clear and instrumental consciousness takes over, giving rise to a second stage analogous to the dream state (as in daydreaming).

As we draw our attention further inward, the object of perception becomes even less clear and subjective consciousness becomes more prominent.

Finally, the object of perception fades into a barely perceptible, indeterminate mass of color, and knowledge or awareness itself becomes the dominant element. It is at this point that we get a first glimpse of Aristotle’s “pure and unaffected intellect” followed in descending order by cognizing subject, means of cognition, and object of sensory cognition.

The "pure and unaffected intellect" is consciousness in itself prior to the emergence of cognizing subject and other elements of sensory cognition.

2. DREAM STATE. The next-higher state is the dream state proper, where instrumental consciousness is the dominant element and takes the place of the objective consciousness of the waking state. In this first stage, consciousness of the physical world is dormant and memory and imagination take over, creating a dream world in which subjective consciousness is completely submerged.

In the next stages of the dream state, as the instrumental and subjective aspects of cognition take over, the subject can become aware of the fact that it is dreaming. It is at this point that lucid dreams and precognitive dreams occur.

It now becomes clear that the “intellect” or nous, i.e., consciousness itself, generates or projects the subjective, instrumental, and objective elements of cognition.

It is only when we have reached this stage that we become aware of the true power of consciousness and we begin to understand statements to the effect that “intellect thinks itself”, “intellect (nous) and intelligible object (noeton) are identical”, etc. (Metaphysics.1072b21).

Though mostly ignored by scholars of Classical philosophy, dreams played an important role in Ancient Greece and in later Hellenistic culture, and prominent Platonists like Proclus are known to have experienced visionary dreams.

I have no idea if any of this can be corroborated by strict scientific methods, but Classical philosophy is about practice and personal experience and IMO those who take the time to find out for themselves are likely to know more about these matters than those who don’t.

So we'll just have to agree to disagree. No big deal. I'm sure @Jack wants his thread back, anyway, and I've got other things to do .... :smile:

And to grasp these lower realities we must allow our minds to unite with, and become one with the lower beings, in order that we might understand them, and the levels. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, it looks like you may have surpassed even yourself there. :smile:

I think we already are at a higher level than most other creatures. If you seriously believe that man can elevate himself to higher levels of consciousness by identifying with earthworms and snails, then perhaps your real difficulty is not metaphysics but psychology.

Anyway, all I’m saying is that Aristotle can be interpreted in more ways than just according to Aquinas or Marx.

The fact is that Aristotle has a lot in common with his teacher Plato, which is only natural. He even got the idea of the “Unmoved Mover” from Plato who says that the soul is a principle of self-motion.

In respect of the soul, Plato and Aristotle have very similar views.

Essentially, what Plato is saying is that the embodied person is an image of its own disembodied self, and the disembodied self is an image of Creative Intelligence or Creator-God.

The first step in the ascent of the soul to Creative Intelligence (Nous Poietikos) is self-identification with the disembodied self which is the intellect or nous. As true knowledge is available only to the nous, it is easy to see why.

I have already given lucid dreams as a clear illustration of how man can consciously ascend to higher cognitive states by transcending lower ones. And in exactly the same way the subject can stay awake and conscious during a lucid dream, it can also do so during deep, dreamless sleep, the result being pure unaffected awareness.

In fact, with some practice, this can be achieved even during the waking state. Awareness is always there, that’s why we are conscious, intelligent living beings. All is needed is to pay attention to it instead of focusing on thoughts, emotions, and sense-perceptions. Admittedly, it does take some practice but it is absurd to claim that consciousness or intelligence is incapable of self-reflexive awareness.

What we need is not to experience the consciousness of a mollusc but a consciousness that is higher than the one we already have. As I said, consciousness is always there. The only thing that changes, like changing images on a screen, are objects and states of consciousness. And they all depend on two factors, (1) attention and (2) identification. These in turn depend on the will-power of the subject. Any conscious subject has the power to choose between objects of attention and self-identification, and by doing so, to move up and down on the awareness scale.

If by ascending to the level of non-discursive consciousness man attains true knowledge, or at the very least he knows more than before, it is nonsense to claim that philosophy in Plato’s and Aristotle’s tradition “sends people in the wrong direction”.

IMO such claims are an expression of the prevalent prejudice against Classical philosophy that is part of the growing international effort to deconstruct, cancel, and erase Western culture.

There seems to be a general perception that ancient philosophers didn’t properly understand the concept of knowledge, so they couldn’t possibly have conceived of anything like self-reflexive thought, consciousness, awareness, or truth.

The truth of the matter is that philosophy begins with consciousness or awareness. Socrates himself tells us that:

I am aware that I am wise neither in great things nor in small things (Apology 21b)

Nihilists and other anti-philosophers choose to see nothing here but an admission of ignorance. But they do nothing but demonstrate their own ignorance and lack of understanding. For in reality, the key words are not the denial of knowledge but the affirmation of awareness: “I am aware” (synoida emauto). What matters is awareness. Awareness that there are limits to our knowledge implies awareness of the existence of some things that we have no knowledge of.

This is the beginning of philosophy in the original sense. The awareness that there are realities “out there”, i.e., outside our everyday experience and knowledge, that we don’t know and don’t understand and that it is our task, as intelligent beings endowed with awareness and understanding, to inquire into these realities.

Though some claim that consciousness is a modern concept, Ancient Greek philosophers had several terms that expressed the idea of consciousness or awareness and of being conscious or aware, which shows that they knew far more than is commonly assumed. Aristotle himself uses terms like aisthanomai (“to have cognitive awareness or consciousness”) and by the time of Plotinus many related words were in use in the Greek language, e.g., synaesthesis, synesis, syneidesis.

What most of these words, including Socrates’ synoida have in common is the particle syn (“with”, “together”) – that later appears as con in Latin conscius and its modern European derivatives – which expresses the union or bringing together of separate cognitive elements as to produce consciousness or awareness and understanding.

It is thanks to this unifying property of consciousness that man seeks to unify, organize, and expand his knowledge of himself and of the world around him. Self-knowledge or self-awareness is the core around which consciousness establishes its entire field or sphere of awareness and knowledge. This applies to human consciousness as much as to divine consciousness.

Aristotle’s logic is as follows:

(A). God is thinking what is best.
(B). God is best.
(C). Therefore God is thinking himself.

And, as above, so below. Substitute "higher consciousness" for "God" and you get the idea.

Consciousness, therefore, and in particular self-reflexive awareness, is absolutely central to all intellectual effort and particularly to philosophy as a practical, spiritual endeavor.

Self-knowledge, i.e., knowledge of one’s true identity is, after all, the ultimate goal or telos of philosophy - as per the Delphic maxim that was universally acknowledged throughout the Greek world. And the means to achieve self-knowledge is self-reflexive thinking which is an introspective activity of consciousness.

This is why it is imperative to look beyond appearances and, in particular, beyond later propaganda and disinformation and understand the true meaning of ancient philosophical works like those of Plato and Aristotle.

My personal view is that every philosophical work can be, and should be, interpreted on more than one level according to each reader’s intellectual and spiritual capacity.

However, as I said before, those who choose to see nothing in Aristotle aside from superficial and irrelevant things like “circular motion” are free to do so.

You've spent this whole discussion with me trying to find ways to dismiss the principal part of On the Soul, the dependencies of the powers of the soul, because this is not consistent with what you preach. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think it’s the other way round. I am reminding you of the points Aristotle is making throughout the book and that you choose to dismiss. Here is your own statement:

Therefore these passages you have quoted, which were derived from that intuition, ought to be dismissed as misguided. — Metaphysician Undercover

And I am definitely not “preaching” any more than you are. In fact, I am not preaching anything, I am simply pointing out the inconsistencies in your position.

You said “there is no such thing as "pure, unaffected intelligence" in human beings.”

But I have demonstrated to you that your claim is contradicted by Aristotle and by observable facts.

You admitted that both Plato and Aristotle said we ought to try to approach the divine. Here is your own statement:

And they both said that we ought to try to approach the divine as much as humanly possible — Metaphysician Undercover

Yet you are now trying to dismiss Plato and Aristotle by claiming that they “don’t understand the word divine” whilst you of course do. :smile:

As a matter of fact, the term “divine” (theios) as used by Ancient Greek authors has a number of meanings including “super-human”, “extraordinary”, “excellent”, “perfect”, “pure”, “immortal”, etc., without necessarily having any “religious” connotations.

What Aristotle is trying to convey by his description of “God” or highest reality is eternity, perfection, etc.

Far more important, and what you apparently choose to ignore or deny, is his description of God as an intellect, i.e., as intelligence or consciousness or, otherwise put, his description of intellect, intelligence, or consciousness as “divine” and as the supreme goal of philosophic life.

No one can deny that man himself has intelligence or consciousness, which is precisely why man can approach God. or a higher intelligence or consciousness.

Man approaches the divine by first approaching the divine in himself and by self-identifying with it. In other words, by elevating himself to a higher mode of experience or state of consciousness. It is only from that higher state that an even higher state can be approached.

You cannot stay at the foot of a mountain and have an all-round perspective from the top of the mountain at the same time.

If you start from the premise that there is nothing higher in you, it is the same as saying that you have no ability to climb the mountain. And if you haven’t got the ability, or believe not to have it, there is no point trying or even thinking about it. In which case, there is no point reading Plato and Aristotle!

As they say, where there is a will, there is a way. Philosophers like Plato and Aristotle are merely pointing in the right direction. Higher states of consciousness or modes of experience can be attained only through that faculty or power of consciousness, the nous, that has the capacity to experience those higher states.

Obviously, this faculty or power is more developed in some individuals than in others, in the same way some have a natural ability to experience lucid dreams, for example, i.e., states of consciousness in which the subject is aware of both the dream and of themselves as a consciously dreaming subject. If in that state you focus on the awareness itself, then you will be very close to the “pure unaffected intellect” described by Aristotle.

The fact is that most people on this planet do not read Plato and Aristotle and even if they did, they wouldn’t understand a thing in the same way they wouldn’t understand a book on advanced higher math or formal logic without some previous training.

So it all comes down to (a) natural ability and (b) training, both of which are the reader’s problem, not the writer’s.

My own position is that humans cannot know what a higher reality is unless and until they have actually experienced it or at least they have had an inkling of it. If humans are conscious, intelligent beings, then it makes sense to try to find out if there is a higher intelligence “out there” or, indeed, within us.

This is why Plato and Aristotle are not “misguided” at all, their intuition is spot-on.

Knowledge is essentially self-reflexive. A knowing subject cannot know unless it is aware that it is in a state of knowing. On a higher level, when the intellect or consciousness is separate from all other things, consciousness is at once object and subject.

This is what Aristotle is pointing to when he speaks of “two intellects”. There is a discursive intellect (dianoesis) and a higher, non-discursive intellect (noesis). And the two are further reducible to one. Similarly, the individual intellect and a higher intellect can be united into one.

Plato doesn’t just say “to approach the divine” but to become like the divine or be assimilated to the divine.

If Philosophy (in the Ancient Greek sense) is love of and quest for truth, and the truth is a higher form of consciousness, intelligence, or knowledge, then this is what man ought to assimilate himself to.

When we really want to achieve something, we want to make that achievement ours which implies a degree of identity with that which has been achieved. For consciousness to desire to experience a higher state of itself is entirely natural and logical.

Some people claim that God is an old man sitting on a throne in the sky. How exactly is that any better or more logical?! If “circular movement” makes no sense to you, I would focus on the intellect bit and see what can be discovered in the process. If you choose to not even try, that is a different matter. But then you can’t say that Plato and Aristotle don’t know what they are talking about.

It seems to me that you are taking a dogmatic and not very philosophical position, which is why you are “dismissing” the whole Platonic tradition, as well as the opinion of top scholars, and even of Aristotle himself. If, as @Wayfarer says, you have been doing this since 2011, then perhaps it is time for you to take a fresh look at things. The choice, of course, is entirely yours.

Therefore these passages you have quoted, which were derived from that intuition, ought to be dismissed as misguided. — Metaphysician Undercover

It looks like you are dismissing a lot of passages there. In fact, far too many for your argument to hold. :smile:

And they both said that we ought to try to approach the divine as much as humanly possible, as evidenced by the quote I just gave you, from your own reference — Metaphysician Undercover

Of course both Plato and Aristotle say that the philosopher ought to try to approach the divine as much as humanly possible, this is precisely why I quoted Aristotle on it!

But we ought, so far as in us lies, to put on immortality, and do all that we can to live in conformity with the highest that is in us [which is immortal and divine] (Nicomachean Ethics 1177b30). — Apollodorus

How do you reckon the philosopher is supposed to "approach the divine"? Surely, not with the body or mind that according to Aristotle perish at death? He can approach the divine only with the intellect or nous which Aristotle clearly says is immortal, eternal, pure, and divine.

This is exactly what Plato states in the Phaedo and elsewhere when he says that only what is pure can approach the pure.

So, I would suggest you stop "dismissing" passage after passage that contradicts your interpretation and try to look at the contradictions in your own statements.

You said that “there is no such thing as "pure, unaffected intelligence" in human beings.”

Yet Aristotle says that the intellect is “pure (unmixed) and unaffected”:

It is this [active] intellect which is separable and impassive and unmixed, being in its essential nature an activity. For that which acts is always superior to that which is acted upon, the cause or principle to the matter … But this intellect has no intermittence in its thought. It is, however, only when separated that it is its true self, and this, its essential nature, alone is immortal and eternal (De Anima 430a23).

When we are in deep, dreamless sleep, for example, our intelligence is pure and unaffected by thoughts, emotions, or sense perceptions.

Moreover, as can be seen, Aristotle himself defines active intellect here as an “activity”, which is “uninterrupted thinking”.

And since the active intellect, when separated from the body-soul compound (syntheton), is its true self and nothing else, the only thing it can “think” about is itself in an act of self-reflexive awareness. Self-reflexivity is a defining property of intellect or consciousness. There is no self-reflexivity in any other part of the soul, be it sense-perceptions, emotions, or thoughts.

Incidentally, this self-reflexive awareness is to some extent present even in deep sleep, i.e., it is ever-present and ever-active, as Aristotle says.

In any case, it is clear that the whole discussion is about thinking in the human soul – the whole book is entitled “On the Soul” (Peri Psyches) – and that Aristotle uses the intellect’s self-reflexivity to argue for its incorporeality and immortality. He does NOT "refute" this anywhere.

Of course, God or the Prime Mover is also intellect or consciousness but he is Universal Consciousness whilst a human being's “active intellect” is individual consciousness.

However, the two are essentially identical and the recognition of this identity leads to the self-realization of individual intellect or consciousness.

This is achieved "as far as humanly possible" during embodied existence and more fully after death when, as Aristotle says, the intellect, nous, or spirit is separated from the body-mind compound and therefore free to unite with the divine.

"Approaching the divine" is nothing but "unity with the divine" when once all factors that separate the two divine elements, the individual and the universal, have been removed.

Pretty simple and easy to understand IMO. And it doesn't require dismissing any passages either from Aristotle or Plato ....

This is wrong. That is not the definition of "intellect", it is the definition of "divine thought". — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, that's where you are wrong again. The intellect is the divine element in man as Aristotle clearly says! And what is divine has divine thoughts.

Right, it is "affirmed" in those specific passages, but it is refuted by the principles and the logic laid out in the rest of the book. — Metaphysician Undercover

I disagree. Aristotle affirms it because that is his position. He doesn't say anywhere that he refutes it. And it is not inconsistent with the rest of the book at all. As I said, it may be inconsistent with your interpretation of Aristotle, but that is a totally different issue.

If you think about it, if you make for yourself a pair of shoes and use them for walking, you might be right in saying that you depend on your shoes for walking, but it would be wrong to say that you depend on them in an absolute sense.

The same goes for the “intellect” or “nous”. It may partly depend on the body-mind or body-soul compound in everyday life. For example, the soul’s sense-faculties will depend on the physical sense-organs for sensory input from the surrounding environment, and the soul’s reasoning faculty will depend on the data supplied by the sense-faculties.

However, the intellect or nous does NOT depend on either soul or body to exist as intellect. At the most, the soul’s reasoning faculty depends on the intellect, and the intellect depends on the reasoning faculty, etc., in the performance of certain functions in the embodied state (in the same way you depend on your shoes to walk on the street or on your car to drive from one place to another).

But the intellect does not depend on either soul or body in an absolute sense, being separable from the body-soul compound and being its true, eternal and unaffected self when so separated, as Aristotle clearly says.

Unlike the body-soul compound (syntheton) which is destructible, the intellect is indestructible and unaffected:

For if it [intellect] were destructible, it would be particularly owing to the enfeeblement that comes in old age, but as it is what occurs is just as in the case of the sense organs … Old age is owing not to something experienced by the soul, but occurs in the body … thinking and speculating deteriorate when something in the body is being destroyed, but it [intellect] itself is unaffected. Discursive thinking and loving and hating are not affections of that [intellect], but of the one who has that [intellect], in so far as he has that. Therefore, when he [the person] is destroyed, he does not remember or love. For it was not the intellect that [remembers and loves], but that which has [body and intellect] in common that was destroyed. Intellect is perhaps something that is more divine and is unaffected (De Anima 408b18-29).

Unlike the body which is destructible and the parts of the soul which are inseparable from one another and destructible, the intellect is separable from body and soul and eternal:

But as regards intellect and the speculative faculty the case is not yet clear. It would seem, however, to be a distinct species of soul, and it alone is capable of separation from the body, as that which is eternal from that which is perishable. The remaining parts of the soul are, as the foregoing consideration shows, not separable in the way that some allege them to be: at the same time it is clear that they are logically distinct (De Anima 413b24-29).

The intellect is separable, unmixed, impassive, immortal and eternal:

And it is this [active] intellect which is separable and impassive and unmixed, being in its essential nature an activity. For that which acts is always superior to that which is acted upon, the cause or principle to the matter … But this intellect has no intermittence in its thought. It is, however, only when separated that it is its true self, and this, its essential nature, alone is immortal and eternal. But we do not remember because this is impassive, while the [passive] intellect which can be affected is perishable and without this does not think at all (De Anima 430a23).

The intellect is divine and superior to the body-mind compound, and so is its activity and its happiness:

In proportion as this divine element is superior to the composite being, so will its activity be superior to that of the other kind of virtue (Nicomachean Ethics 1177b25).

The intellect being divine, its happiness is divine and separate from the moral happiness of the composite person (body-soul compound):

These moral virtues, being bound up with the feelings too, will also belong to the composite person. But the virtues of the composite person are human. Therefore the life that conforms with these virtues, and the happiness that belongs to it, are also human. But the happiness of the intellect is separate [i.e., not human but divine] (Nicomachean Ethics 1178a20).

Therefore the philosopher must strive to become immortal (in this life) by acting in conformity with the intellect which is immortal and divine:

But we ought, so far as in us lies, to put on immortality, and do all that we can to live in conformity with the highest that is in us [which is immortal and divine] (Nicomachean Ethics 1177b30).

Clearly, these statements and many others are not isolated “mistakes” or “inconsistencies”, they form a consistent and coherent whole with the rest of the book - and with Plato's own position.

I was looking through a scrapbook from the old forum, 2011, we were having the exact same argument then, so there's no point thrashing over it again and again. — Wayfarer

I was beginning to suspect something on those lines, but I think that clarifies everything .... :smile:

Your account reflects the distinctions Aristotle is making. But the phrasing of this remark should be reconsidered:

"In contrast, when separated from the body, it reverts to its essential, contemplative state." — Paine

"Reverts" in the sense of no longer being a "higher", non-discursive and a "lower", discursive intellect, but just intellect itself as it really is when separated from the body-soul composite.

the contrary idea, that the active intellect is completely immaterial and directly united to the soul, is refuted. — Metaphysician Undercover

The active intellect's immateriality, immortality, and independence in relation to the body-soul is not refuted at all, it is affirmed as the passages I quoted clearly show, and as acknowledged by scholars like Gerson.

You said that “there is no such thing as "pure, unaffected intelligence" in human beings.”
Yet Aristotle says that the intellect is “pure (unmixed) and unaffected”.

You said “it is impossible for an intellect to exist without a soul”.
Yet Aristotle says that the intellect is separable from body and soul, and immortal.

You said that “the higher intellect depends on the lower intellect”.
Yet Aristotle says that it is the lower (thinking or reasoning) intellect that depends on the higher intellect (that only “thinks” or “contemplates” itself).

You said that you "do not deny the postexistence of intellect".
Yet you say that Aristotle refutes it.

Etc., etc.

Aristotle clearly says that the intellect is truly itself only when separated from the body and that man must “put on immortality” by self-identifying with the immortal intellect, for the obvious reason that there is no other way of becoming immortal and supremely happy.

The very definition of intellect according to Aristotle is “that which thinks itself” as stated at Meta. 12.1074b and as quoted earlier.

So there can be no question of the intellect “depending” on anything other than itself.

This is precisely why Aristotle refers to the first principle of all as an intellect.

You said yourself that you are dismissing Aristotle's own statements:

So I would dismiss this point as inconsistent with his overall logical structure. — Metaphysician Undercover

And it looks like you are also dismissing the views of respected scholars.

So the question seems to be whether you are dismissing a point as inconsistent with Aristotle’s overall logical structure or as inconsistent with your interpretation of it ....

The problem is that taking the sentence as it stands is what is inconsistent with the conceptual structure he has laid out in the book. That's why It's better to recognize the "it seems", and notice that this might be an idea which is actually being refuted. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, you are saying that you "do not deny it" but you are also saying that it is an "idea which is actually being refuted". So what exactly is being "refuted" and how?

It is generally accepted in the literature that Aristotle believes in some form of immortality. He seems to reject the immortality of the whole soul but accepts the immortality of that part of the soul referred to as "intellect" or nous.

Gerson says:

The claim that Aristotle rejects the immortality of the ‘whole’ soul is, I think, as much beyond dispute as the claim that he accepts the immortality of intellect … If the only question here regards the immortality of intellect, the evidence, viewed without prejudice, is overwhelming that Aristotle, like Plato, affirms it

- L. Gerson, Aristotle and Other Platonists, pp. 54, 286

We must bear in mind that the immortality of the nous was central to Plato’s teachings and that Aristotle was Plato’s long-time pupil. If Aristotle had disagreed with Plato on such an important point, he would have made this clear in no uncertain terms. But nowhere does he do so.

On the contrary, at De Anima 408b18-29 he clearly says that the intellect “seems not to be destructible” and he gives a reason for it:

For if it [intellect] were destructible, it would be particularly owing to the enfeeblement that comes in old age, but as it is what occurs is just as in the case of the sense organs … Old age is owing not to something experienced by the soul, but occurs in the body … thinking and speculating deteriorate when something in the body is being destroyed, but it [intellect] itself is unaffected. Discursive thinking and loving and hating are not affections of that [intellect], but of the one who has that [intellect], in so far as he has that. Therefore, when he [the person] is destroyed, he does not remember or love. For it was not the intellect that [remembers and loves], but that which has [body and intellect] in common that was destroyed. Intellect is perhaps something that is more divine and is unaffected (De Anima 408b18-29).

What he is saying here is that in the same way old age is experienced by the body and not by the soul, the destruction at death is of the body-mind person, not of the intellect which remains unaffected.

And because the mind that remembered and loved is destroyed with the body-mind person, the sole remaining element in man, the intellect, “does not remember or love”, memory and affection belonging to the mind that has been destroyed.

Aristotle asserts the immortality of intellect again later on:

And it is this [active] intellect which is separable and impassive and unmixed, being in its essential nature an activity. For that which acts is always superior to that which is acted upon, the cause or principle to the matter … But this intellect has no intermittence in its thought. It is, however, only when separated [from the body-mind compound] that it is its true self, and this, its essential nature, alone is immortal and eternal. But we do not remember because this is impassive, while the [passive] intellect which can be affected is perishable and without this does not think at all (De Anima 430a23).

He does not say "it seems" here. Clearly, the active intellect is an uninterrupted contemplative activity that is immortal and eternal and that endows the passive or thinking intellect (a.k.a. reasoning faculty or logos) with the power to think when in the embodied state. In contrast, when separated from the body, it reverts to its essential, contemplative state.

These are not some obscure and random remarks that we can lightly dismiss. On the contrary, the more we look into it, the more we see that they are consistent with Aristotle’s overall framework.

In any case, since the intellect according to Aristotle is capable of existence in separation from the body, I don't think it can be argued that it is dependent on the body in an Aristotelian context.

Clearly, the higher powers of the soul are dependent on the lower, and the active intellect is described as a higher power than the passive intellect. So if he happened to mention at a couple places that the active intellect might exist separately from the body, I would simply dismiss these mentions as inconsistent, and therefore mistaken. Notice his use of "it seems" at your referenced paragraph: "The case of mind is different; it seems to be an independent substance implanted within the soul and to be incapable of being destroyed. If it could be destroyed at all it would be under the blunting influence of old age." 408b 18. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is not clear at all to me that the higher powers of the soul are dependent on the lower.

If the soul or any other part of man preexists the body then it can equally well postexist it.

Aristotle’s frequent use of phrases like “it seems” is one of the reasons why I said that I find some of his statements “vague” or “evasive”. If they are “inconsistent” that makes it even worse, not better.

In this particular case, I can see no reason why he would have suddenly decided to “contradict” himself. If the statement was obscure it would be a different matter. But it is quite clear.

So I think it would be better to ignore the “it seems” bit and take the rest of the sentence as it stands.

the Eastern conception of avidya (translated in some texts as 'nescience') carries the implication that real knowledge is itself salvific. I think you find that in Platonism and ancient philosophy generally - — Wayfarer

Correct. By definition, knowledge is salvific in the sense that it saves the knower from ignorance and from the suffering resulting from it.

This is also implied in philosophy as a quest for truth, knowledge, or wisdom. At the very least, ignorance
causes uncertainty, doubt, confusion, etc. that results in mental suffering. Knowledge eradicates the root cause of suffering and the absence of suffering leads to happiness.

This is why higher states of consciousness and, in particular, self-consciousness or self-realization (i.e., awareness of one's true self) are universally associated with enhanced peace of mind and a sense of happiness.

The kind of reality that the soul has, and the kind of reality that a higher intelligence might possess, are of a different order to what we understand as existence. — Wayfarer

Correct. But the sense in which terms like "survives" and "exists" are used becomes clear from the context.

Intellect or Nous is self-reflexive intelligence or consciousness.

At the highest level, i.e., at the level of God (or Aristotle's Unmoved Mover), the activity of intellect is one in which subject and object or knower and known are identical. In other words, intellect “contemplates” or “thinks” itself.

As Aristotle says:

If Nous (Intellect) thinks nothing, where is its dignity? It is in just the same state as a man who is asleep. If it thinks, but something else determines its thinking, then since that which is its essence is not thinking but potentiality, it cannot be the best reality … Therefore Nous (Intellect) thinks itself, if it is that which is best; and its thinking is a thinking of thinking (Metaphysics 12.1074b).

At the individual, human level, the intellect has two aspects:

1. A higher, non-discursive, intuitive-contemplative one which directly “contemplates” or “sees” eternal intelligible realities (noeta) that are like itself, divine entities, or God.

2. A lower, discursive, reasoning one that grasps reality indirectly, by means of thoughts, images, and memory (memory being a function of the lower intellect’s image-generating faculty).

Aspect 2 is the intellect as reasoning faculty as it normally operates as part of an embodied soul.

Aspect 1 operates to full capacity outside the embodied soul, but it is also active in the embodied state, e.g., by illumining or inspiring the lower aspect, during moments of intuition or insight, or when contemplating higher realities.

This is why Aristotle urges self-identification with the higher intellect as the only way to experience higher realities and enjoy the happiness associated with that experience.

Basically, despite “disagreements about Forms” there is substantial agreement on core teachings between Aristotle and Plato.

This whole “deification” motif of being enlightened, to me at least, might be an utterly wrongminded approach to it. — javra

This is how I see it, too.

As stated before, religion may assist the Philosopher (i.e., the seeker after truth) in disengaging from mundane activities and experiences and focus his or her conscious attention on higher modes of experience. Religion also has an ethical import. But religion or at least the lower forms of it must ultimately be transcended, especially if the ultimate goal is a state in which human consciousness and "ultimate reality" are in a state of unity with one another.

Plato (and Platonism in general) aims to do precisely this by offering a metaphysical framework that starts with the deities and ethical code of conventional Greek (Athenian) religion and progresses upward to cosmic gods, to the universe as a divine, ensouled being, to the creative intelligence that generates the universe, and culminates in the "Ineffable One" which is the source of all intelligence, knowledge and truth.

We also need to bear in mind that the word "divine" in this context need not have the usual religious connotations. It may simply refer to a state of "perfection", "eternity", etc. In fact, this is how it is often used by Plato and others.

as I see it, the whole point of the scholastic 'doctrine of the rational soul', was that it was the power of reason to see the forms that represents the incorporeal soul, the very capacity that differentiates humans from animals. — Wayfarer

On the Platonic model, which Aristotle seems to agree with, it may be said that man has five basic aspects:

1. Intuitive-Contemplative (Nous a.k.a. “Intellect”)

2. Reasoning or Thinking (Logismos)

3. Emotive (Thymos)

4. Desiderative (Epithymetykon or Eros)

5. Physical or Somatic (Soma)

The intuitive-contemplative aspect or nous is that which contemplates or “sees” eternal intelligibles (noeta) like itself, this being its defining function.

Aspects one and two can also be described as "active" and "passive" intellect, respectively.

In any case, the nous is the real self of man. It is associated with the four lower aspects in different states of embodiment or disembodiment.

It's counter-intuitive because we want to believe that the conscious mind has control over the material body, in the Platonic way, because that is the illusion we get from the perspective of the conscious mind. But in reality the material body has a fundamental grip on the mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

If it is an “illusion”, then Aristotle himself contributes to it in no small measure by making frequent references to the mind being controlled by the intellect which is the “divine” and “guiding” principle in man.

Unfortunately, the effect of chemical imbalance on the human brain does not seem to throw much light on the subject.

I think more important is the question of whether the intellect, soul, or any other part of man survives the death of the physical body.

There may well be two aspects of the intellect, one active and one passive. There is no reason why there shouldn’t be.

But the point is that according to Aristotle one aspect is perishable and another is not.

So we have one aspect of man, the “active intellect”, that is immortal and survives the death of the body-soul compound. Thus far Aristotle is in agreement with Plato. It is generally accepted that Plato posits a part of the soul, the intellect or nous that is immortal. There is some disagreement on whether the whole soul is immortal, as in the Phaedrus, or only the intellect, as in the Timaeus. But there is no dispute that at least the intellect in Plato is immortal.

So I think it is safe to say that Aristotle and Plato agree on the intellect being immortal. A question that would remain to be answered as I said before is whether the immortal intellect is personal or impersonal.

For Plato, immortality is clearly personal. The intellect that survives the death of the physical body has distinctive personal traits including memory, etc. In fact, there is some indication that this is what led later Platonists to introduce the concept of an “astral body” (ochema) that the soul uses as a vehicle during disembodied states and that serves as a link between the soul and the physical body during embodied states.

In contrast, Aristotle seems to favor an impersonal conception of immortality.

Therefore:

1. If Aristotle agrees with Plato that the intellect is immortal, as he seems to be doing, it is difficult to argue that the intellect is dependent on the body as this is clearly contradicted by the intellect’s ability to exist without the body.

2. If Aristotle thinks that the surviving intellect is impersonal, its only activity is the contemplation of eternal intelligible objects (such as Forms etc.).

You're just providing further evidence for my points. — baker

Wrong. You're just providing more evidence for our points. Maybe it's time to re-examine your assumptions and revise your whole approach to the issues discussed?

Buddhism isn't after the truth in the general sense you're using the word here. — baker

The sense is "ultimate reality", whatever that may turn out to be. But thanks for clarifying that Buddhism (or at least your version of it) isn't after truth.

There is no Buddhist who is losing sleep over your not seeing any evidence that Buddha attained enlightenment. — baker

Well, if Buddhism isn't after truth, of course Buddhists won't lose sleep over lack of evidence for their beliefs. They say that ignorance is bliss, but in your case it looks like ignorance is the shortcut to "Nirvana".

Upon which you pile on more evidence-free claims. — baker

I don't know about that, but your own "evidence" seems to consist in having a very short fuse. Another sure sign of indoctrination and self-radicalization IMO.

Maybe "religion" is not your only complex, after all .... :smile:

Therefore we must establish new, distinct terms for the immaterial existences, Forms, which are prior to matter, rather than calling them intelligences. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, this is why I said from the beginning that it is necessary to properly define the terms used like "soul", "intellect", etc.

If we are saying that intelligence is a product of the body, then we will need to define "intellect" (nous) as something other than intelligence, not just the Forms. And the problem with that is that nous is used in the general sense of "intelligence" as much as in the sense of "intellect", "reason", or "mind".

But I think the main problem with Aristotle is the vague language he is using. Presumably, he largely agrees with Plato, as otherwise he would indicate disagreement. But the way he puts things tends to leave a lot of room for doubt.

Regarding the soul, Aristotle says that its powers are infinite in number, and that the division into “parts” is only for the sake of convenience.

If a soul were to be divided into two halves, each half would contain all the parts of the soul, a fact which implies that, whilst the soul is divisible, its parts are inseparable from one another (De Anima 411b26).

As to the part of the soul with which it knows and understands, whether such a part be separable spatially, or not separable spatially, but only in thought, we have to consider what is its distinctive character and how thinking comes about (De Anima 429b1).

Regarding the intellect, Aristotle says:

And he [the good man] does it for his own sake for he does it on account of the intellectual part of him, which is held to be the self of the individual (Nic. Eth. 1166a15).

And it would seem that the thinking part is, or most nearly is, the individual self (Nic. Eth. 1166a20).

A person is called continent or incontinent according as his reason is or is not in control, which implies that this part is the individual (Nic. Eth. 1168b35ff).

Contemplation is the highest form of activity since the intellect is the highest thing in us (Nic. Eth. 1177a20).

So if the intellect is divine compared with man, the life of the intellect must be divine compared with the life of a human being. And we ought not to listen to those who warn us that ‘man should think the thoughts of man’, or ‘mortal thoughts fit mortal minds’; but we ought, so far as in us lies, to put on immortality, and do all that we can to live in conformity with the highest that is in us [i.e., the intellect]. Indeed it would seem that this is the true self of the individual (Nic. Eth. 1177b30-1178a).

The answer seems to be that Aristotle posits a “material intellect” and an “active intellect”. The material intellect is the soul’s faculty of thinking. It is capable of being affected and perishable. In contrast, the active intellect is not a part or faculty of the soul but is independent of it. As such it is immaterial, eternal, imperishable, and self-existent, and it makes thinking possible. Aristotle also calls this intellect “divine” and “impassible” (De Anima 408b13, 430b5).

The exact relation of the immortal intellect to man is not entirely clear, though. Also unclear is whether it is individual or collective/universal.

In any case, the only intellect available after the death of the body-soul compound seems to be something that is impassible and unaffected, and has no faculties of thinking, feeling, memory, etc.

This would make the surviving element of man (if this is what Aristotle's "immortal intellect" is) quite incapable of being judged in the afterlife and of experiencing pleasure or pain as a result, as I said. So yes, this is definitely one thing that renders attempts to harmonize Aristotle with Platonism and Christianity problematic.

Another thing we need to bear in mind is that many of Aristotle's works are lost. If all of his writings were available to us, we would perhaps have a more complete account of his views.

Or does it just say that determining the difference is very hard? — Tom Storm

Correct. Very hard but not impossible. And in some cases, like Blavatsky, as a classical example, not even so hard.

What matters at the end of the day is to use our judgement and avoid blindly accepting a "guru" and his teachings just because they meet some psychological need we may happen to have.

And, let's face it, humans in general tend to be emotion-driven creatures which is what makes it so easy for them to be manipulated.

The objective analysis of facts indicates that it is this psychological trap that people tend to fall into and once they are in there they will do everything in their power to convince themselves and others that it isn't a trap.

If we start from the premise that Philosophy in the original or true sense is love of, and quest for, truth and that systems like Buddhism also aim to discover the truth, then it becomes clear that those who have fallen into the "guru-trap" may be taking the quest for truth less seriously than they should.

For example, from what I see, there is no evidence that Buddha attained enlightenment.

There is no evidence that Buddha’s enlightenment, if he attained it, was better than the enlightenment attained by people from other traditions.

There is no evidence that Buddhists on here have personally attained enlightenment by means of Buddhist practices, etc., etc.

I'm not saying that this applies to Buddhism exclusively but, basically, what tends to be the case is that what we’ve got is evidence-free assertions that are being defended by means of other, similarly evidence-free claims.

Even when we are (or think we are) on the road from appearances to truth, traveling in the wrong direction remains a very real possibility that should not be ignored ....

Sure, but if we go in this way, then as Aristotle shows, the separation of the soul from the body is only hypothetical. — Metaphysician Undercover

The way I read Aristotle, he believes that the soul depends on the body, belongs to the body, and therefore it perishes with the death of the body (De Anima 414a20ff.)

If we are saying that the intellect depends on the soul, then there can be no intellect after the death of the body-soul compound.

On the other hand, Aristotle refers to the intellect as “divine” and as the “true self” of man.

He also implies that the intellect is immortal, when he says that man must put on immortality and live in conformity with the highest within him (Nic. Eth. 1177b30).

However, his position on the intellect is ultimately not entirely clear.

He is equally evasive on the divisibility of the soul. In discussing the soul as having a rational part and an irrational part, he says:

Whether these are separate like the parts of the body or anything else that is physically divisible, or whether like the convex and concave aspects of the circumference of a circle they are distinguishable as two only in definition and thought, and are by nature inseparable, makes no difference for our present purpose … Probably we should believe nevertheless that the soul too contains an irrational element which opposes and runs counter to reason – in what sense it is a separate element does not matter at all … (Nic. Eth. 1102a30-1102b25)

So it isn't just a matter of the intellect being "deficient". Aristotle himself does not seem the most reliable writer on this topic. If Aquinas accepts everything Aristotle says, he may find himself in conflict with his own Christian views.

I think it would be more consistent to see reality as a hierarchy of intelligences and both soul and body as created by a higher intelligence, as in Platonism and similar systems.

I don't see why this is difficult for you, it is simply a statement by Aristotle of what has been observed. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are saying that "it is not necessary that the intellect be a part of the soul". But some souls apparently do have an intellect. In their case, the intellect is part of the soul. The intellect cannot be at once part of the soul and separate from the soul.

This means that the parts of the soul have no separate existence from each other . The "separation" is only hypothetical.

The fact that people can obtain different levels of consciousness does not imply that a person can obtain "pure unaffected intelligence". — Metaphysician Undercover

It doesn't exclude the possibility, though. Who decides that "humans cannot obtain pure unaffected intelligence" and on what basis?

the intellect is not directly dependent on the soul, it is dependent on what lies between it and the soul, and this in turn is dependent on the soul. — Metaphysician Undercover

This only means that the intellect is dependent on the soul. And the soul is a form of intelligence, as is the intellect. So it boils down to intelligence depending on intelligence, i.e., on itself.

Therefore the intellectual power is dependent on the sensitive power which is dependent on the nutritive. It's very consistent with the evidence of evolutionary development — Metaphysician Undercover

The theory of evolution states that intelligence evolved from physical matter. Yet you are saying that "the soul constructs the physical body". How does the soul do that?

That is not a judgment of any being, but more directly the result of our earthly actions and thoughts. — Athena

Well, I for one can see nothing wrong with that.

If humans have a conscience, it seems probable that in the after life when they no longer are distracted by mundane matters, conscience will play a larger role.

In which case, those who have committed wrong actions will be "punished" by their own feelings of guilt, etc. and will thereby be prevented from being happy, which would be equivalent to "hell".

In contrast, those whose conscience is clear will be able to enjoy the soul's natural state of happiness, which would be equivalent to "heaven".

In other words, the "divine judgement" as described in some religious traditions may be metaphorical.
But even then, the suffering or happiness as a result of wrong or right actions, remains real ....

The intellectual power is dependent on the sensitive power, which is dependent on the nutritive power. — Metaphysician Undercover

To be quite honest, the idea of the higher depending on the lower sounds a bit strange to me. Either the soul has powers or it has not. If it has, then it has them by virtue of being a soul, i.e., a living intelligent being endowed with powers.

If the intellect depends on the soul, how does it survive becoming separated from the soul?

Aristotle’s division of the soul into “parts” seems to be theoretical because he also divides the rational part into two as he does with the irrational part.

So I think it is perfectly possible, in fact likely, for the “intellect” (nous) and “soul” (psyche) to be one indivisible entity.

The difference between souls may consist in one part or aspect of a soul being more dominant than the others. Among humans, for example, one in whom the nous is dominant would be “spiritual”, one in whom reason is dominant would be “intellectual”, one in whom emotions are dominant would be “emotional”, etc.

The fact that one aspect is dominant does not necessarily mean that the others are absent. They can be less active or dormant.

There is no such thing as "pure, unaffected intelligence" in human beings. — Metaphysician Undercover

In that case, humans can never attain higher states of consciousness either through Philosophy or by any other means.

Moreover, if the “intellect” continues to be affected even after being separated from the soul, what is the difference between an “intellect” with and an “intellect” without soul?

What is the purpose of Philosophy or spiritual practice?

How does the soul “construct the body”?

etc. ....

Human beings do not make divine judgements. — Metaphysician Undercover

By "divine judgement" I meant that on Plato's account, as in Christianity, souls are judged after death - by some divine authority, not by other humans.

If the "intellect" is all that remains after death, this poses a problem for those systems that believe in after-death judgement.

The soul does have separate parts, that is well explained by Aristotle. That is why one soul has many different powers, what we might call different faculties. — Metaphysician Undercover

Aristotle does explain, but I think what is essential is how we read "parts" (mere or moria).

For example, he says:

Some hold that the soul is divisible, and that one part thinks, another desires. If, then, its nature admits of its being divided, what can it be that holds the parts together? Surely not the body; on the contrary it seems rather to be the soul that holds the body together; at any rate when the soul departs the body disintegrates and decays (De Anima 411b24)

Basically, Aristotle holds that the soul is divisible into many souls, as can be seen, for example, from plants and certain living creatures that carry on living after being cut into segments, but that each soul is not divisible into soul-parts.

In other words, each soul would retain its three aspects described by Plato in the Republic, i.e., reasoning (logismos), emotive (thymos), and sensual (epthymetikon or eros).

The difficulty arises when we separate the intellect or intelligent spirit (nous) from the soul (psyche).

If, pure, unaffected intelligence (nous) is separable from the soul (psyche) on the death of the physical body, then there is no possibility of divine judgement.

Moreover, if experience or state is impersonal and identical in all cases after death, then Philosophy or spiritual practice during embodied life becomes redundant.

... we cannot equate "the soul" with "the intellect", as is demonstrated by Aristotle and accepted by Aquinas ... "the soul" is understood to be at the base, prior to the material body, and the material body is constructed by the soul in a bottom-up manner. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think the issue starts with how we define “soul”, “intellect”, and the way they relate to one another.

If we separate the intellect from the soul, for example, we run the risk of falling into a similar trap to when we say that the soul has "separate" parts.

Equally problematic are the hypotheses that the soul constructs the body, that the body is a medium between soul and intellect, etc.

We would need to explain how the soul “constructs” the body, etc.

The 'treasures of western culture' that you constantly refer to are never part of the educational curriculum in public schools, I guess you might encounter them in Catholic schools. — Wayfarer

The 'treasures of eastern culture' that you constantly refer to are never part of the educational curriculum in any public schools that I am aware of.

I guess it might be different in Australia though. :smile:

The reason is the Occidental classical tradition you’re referring to is to all intents more remote from modernity than the Eastern schools which have maintained their relevancy and occupied the vacuum caused by their collapse. — Wayfarer

"Relevancy" and "modernity" of Pali suttas? In the Western world? "Relevant" to whom?

Even in India, Pali suttas are something that only a very small minority know of. Buddhists are 0.70% of the total population!

I think the real reason for the spread of "alternative" systems in the West is that they have been promoted by people with an anti-Western agenda ....

I think Baker enjoys being a contrarian just for the sake of it. I can't think of any other explanation for the absurd and cynical generalizations she comes up with. — Janus

I think it's probably safer to not even think about it .... :smile:

They also generally disparage and misrepresent Buddhism. — baker

Pretty much the way Buddhists and Hindus disparage and misrepresent Christianity.

In any case, there can be no doubt that fraud is the most frequent crime worldwide, after domestic violence and rape. Most of it is banking and ATM fraud but religious or “pious fraud” is also widespread. Though more difficult to prove and prosecute, it doesn’t mean it isn’t happening. And a lot of Eastern "gurus" and their Western imitators are obviously fake.

In addition to religious fraud, religious violence is also on the rise. The anti-Christian and anti-Western movement started in the 1900’s has now turned into hundreds of attacks on Christians and churches across India:

Violence against Christians has been seen by Human Rights Watch as a tactic used by the right-wing Sangh Parivar organizations to encourage and exploit communal violence to meet their political ends. The acts of violence include arson of churches, conversion of Christians by force, physical violence, sexual assaults, murders, rapes, and destruction of Christian schools, colleges, and cemeteries … According to the All India Christian Council, there was an attack on Christians recorded every 40 hours in India in 2016. In a report by the Indian organization Persecution Relief, the crimes against Christians increased by 60% from 2016 to 2019 …

Violence against Christians in India – Wikipedia

I don't know how much of a difference there is ultimately. — Wayfarer

Ultimately, none. That's why "Christians" who reject the one are undermining the other. And that's how we end up with clergy who are not sure if God exists or whether they should be Christians or something else ....

But the Christian Church brought that on itself. — Wayfarer

With some help from the outside, yes. However, the real Church is not the organizational structure but the people. And they have no reason to abandon what is valuable in Christian teachings. On the contrary, especially in this day and age of spiritual ignorance, disorientation, confusion, and darkness, a degree of return to tradition seems advisable.

What Western converts see in it, is often very different to what it is for those for whom it is the native culture. — Wayfarer

Correct. And most Asian Buddhists neither meditate nor worry about "Nirvana". In fact, a lot of them want to be as Western as possible, which is rather ironic IMO.

Anyway, the way I see it, Westerners would be better off learning more about their own traditions instead of getting involved in things they often don't understand.

I think a first step in this direction is to not try too hard to see differences between Platonism and Christianity. If we leave external and superficial aspects aside, their deeper teachings show that there is more that unites the two traditions than divides them.

The symbolism of light found in both of them is a good example. As is well-known, Jesus says "I am the Light of the World" and the NT has many references to light:

And you [John the Baptist] my child, will be called a prophet of the Most High;
for you will go on before the Lord to prepare the way for him,
to give his people the knowledge of salvation
through the forgiveness of their sins,
because of the tender mercy of our God,
by which the rising sun will come to us from heaven
to shine on those living in darkness
and in the shadow of death,
to guide our feet into the path of peace (Luke 1:76-79)

For God, who said, “Light shall shine out of darkness,” is the One who has shone in our hearts to give the Light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Christ (2 Corinthians 4:6)

We also have the prophetic message as something completely reliable, and you will do well to pay attention to it, as to a light shining in a dark place, until the day dawns and the morning star rises in your hearts (2 Peter 1:19)

We know that Greek was widely spoken in the Roman Empire and the Egyptian city of Alexandria (founded by Alexander the Great), which was an important center of Hellenistic philosophy, exerted significant influence in the region at the time of Jesus. St Paul himself was well-versed in Greek philosophy and in the school of his teacher Gamaliel students were instructed both in Jewish and Greek wisdom:

Rabbi said: Why use the Syrian language in the land of Israel? Either use the holy tongue or Greek! But is Greek philosophy forbidden? Behold Rab Judah declared that Samuel said in the name of Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel, There were a thousand pupils in my father's house; five hundred studied Torah and five hundred studied Greek wisdom ... (Babylonian Talmud, Sotah 49b)

What is unquestionable is that the concept of divine knowledge as an enlightening force is central to Christianity as it is in Platonism where the Good, the Source of Knowledge and Truth, is compared to the Sun who illumines the world.

The final goal is clearly stated in Christian texts:

For when the mind is commingled in the Good, that distinction which it formerly possessed is no longer known or seen; and, further, when there is in it One, no longer are there counted with it Two: for the time is appointed and destined to be when Two shall be no more; for it is evident that whatsoever is divided, is divided from One, but if division be removed, of necessity All will become One (Book of the Holy Hierotheos IV.21)

Plotinus and other self-realized teachers of Platonism explain:

All the divine orders proceed from the one first principle of the whole, that Plato was accustomed to name the One and the Good, and they proceed also from the bi-formed causes which become manifest directly after this first principle, which Socrates in the Philebus has called Limit and Unlimited, and which other sages used to honour with other names …. So it is necessary for unification that both things pre-exist, namely the unitary transcendence of the monadic and demiurgic God, and the final turning back towards that One by the generative and dyadic cause. This is because the communion of the greater beings in one nature is completed in this manner: while the higher beings are established in themselves and in the ones more divine than themselves, the lesser beings give themselves to the powers of the higher ones (Proclus, in Remp. 133.20-134.25)

Of course, like today, there were some who liked to philosophize and speculate about the nature of God, his relation to the soul, etc., but those who were serious about spiritual realization got with the program and got on with the actual practice, and achieved what they had set out to achieve without much talking.

So personally, I can see little justification for rejecting Western traditions in favor of reciting Pali suttas, chanting mantras, and walking around in a sari. Though I am sure some would disagree.

It’s certainly something I don’t usually associate with mainstream Christian philosophy. — Wayfarer

I'm sure you are not the only one. It shows that some Westerners are more knowledgeable about Eastern traditions than about Western ones. It's a phenomenon I come across every day ....

By the way, I wasn't being "condescending" at all, I was just wondering whether as someone who has studied comparative religion, you really don’t know the difference between divine illumination as an explanation for cognitive processes and divine illumination as an activity leading to union of the soul with the divine, or you were just taking the mickey. That's all.

And since we were talking about "Nirvana", here is another interesting perspective that I think should not be ignored:

To many Americans, Buddhism is about attaining enlightenment, maybe even nirvana, through such peaceful methods as meditation and yoga. But in some parts of Asia, a more assertive, strident and militant Buddhism is emerging. In three countries where Buddhism is the majority faith, a form of religious nationalism has taken hold: in Sri Lanka, in Myanmar, in Thailand ….

Nirvanaless: Asian Buddhism’s growing fundamentalist streak – Religion News Service

You will find precious little reference to it outside Orthodox Christianity and some specific mystical texts. It's practically non-existent in Protestant theology. — Wayfarer

You will find precious few Buddhists constantly referring to "Nirvana" (though indoctrinated Western Buddhists or New Agers may be a different matter).

And, as I was saying earlier:

... under the influence of Protestantism, Liberalism, Romanticism, Freemasonry, and Marxism, there was growing rebellion against tradition and a lot of intellectuals believed that they should start creating. i.e., inventing, their own religion or cult .... — Apollodorus

However:

Contrary to what many think, theosis is not just a doctrine of the Eastern Orthodox Church, though it plays a more central role in the thought and practice of that tradition. Carl Mosser, in a paper arguing that Calvin’s theology includes a doctrine of theosis, observes that “no major Western theologian has ever repudiated the doctrine of deification.” Mosser alludes to others who have shown the presence of the doctrine in the thought of Protestants including Luther, Jonathan Edwards, Augustus Hopkins Strong, C. S. Lewis, and several evangelicals, as well as early Anglicanism and Methodism. The doctrine is also receiving increased attention from contemporary evangelicals ...

- M. W. Austin, The Doctrine of Theosis.

Note that the author claims that the theory was 'decisively refuted' i.e. abandoned as part of Christian doctrine. I'm going to revisit that article to understand why. — Wayfarer

I think the article is not the only thing you will need to revisit. :smile:

1. There is a difference between (a) divine illumination as an explanation for everyday cognitive processes and (b) divine illumination as an activity leading to union of the soul with the divine (theosis).

2. Divine illumination in sense (b) has not been “refuted” or “abandoned” in Christianity. It remains part of the spiritual progress consisting of purification (katharsis), illumination (photismos), and union with the divine (theosis) culminating in “enlightenment” proper.

3. There is a difference between the mind itself being “luminous” and the mind being illuminated by a higher intelligence resulting in enlightenment.

Here is an illuminating quote from Christian writings:

Every procession of illuminating light, proceeding from the Father, whilst visiting us as a gift of goodness, restores us again gradually as a unifying power and turns us to the oneness of our conducting Father and to a deifying simplicity ... The purpose, then, of Hierarchy is the assimilation and union, as far as attainable, with God – by perfecting its own followers as Divine images, mirrors most luminous and without flaw, receptive of the primal light and the supremely Divine ray, and devoutly filled with the entrusted radiance, and again spreading this radiance ungrudgingly to those after it ...

- Dionysius the Pseudo-Areopagite, The Heavenly Hierarchy (ca. 400-500 AD).

4. If some Buddhist texts refer to the mind as “luminous” it does not follow that the Indian terms “Nirvana” and “Moksha” are derived from a word denoting “light”.

5. The word “enlightenment” itself may not be used very often in Western traditions but there are still equivalent terms such as henosis (“union”) in Platonism and theosis (“deification”) in Christianity.

Concerning the awakening of the soul as a result of divine illumination, Proclus in his Commentary on Plato’s Republic writes:

Plato has called such an illumination “possession” because the illumination takes charge over the whole of those who are moved by it, and because it moves those who are illuminated out of their own activities into its own character … The soul that is hard and resistant and impassive to the divine illumination stands in opposition to the action of possession, since [this soul] belongs more to itself than to that which illuminates, and does not easily take an impression of the gift from that source. [Such a soul], possessed by all kinds of opinions and filled up with reasoning that is shifting and divorced from the divine, overshadows the divine inspiration, mixing with the impulses from this its own ways of life and activities. So it is necessary for this soul, which is going to be possessed, to have taken on beforehand both of these qualities together: to be both gentle and innocent, so that it may be entirely receptive and sympathetic towards divinity, but impassive and unreceptive towards all other things and unmixed with them … The awakening is an unsleeping effort of the soul and an unyielding activity and a turning back from the fall into becoming towards the divine (in Remp. 180.25-181.25).

It follows that Greek philosophers were familiar with concepts such as “illumination” (ellampein) leading to “awakening” (anegeirein) and "liberation" (lysis) which is a state of perfection (teleiotes) “beyond the realm of becoming”.

Rather a sweeping claim, don't you think? But as the OP is about 'enlightenment', I will return to that theme. — Wayfarer

I don't see it as a "sweeping claim" at all. Every system has its own myths. Christianity, too, has some truths and some myths. The mythical elements, e.g., that "Platonists" converted to Christianity en masse can be easily debunked as I have just shown.

Similarly, the idea that the concept of "enlightenment" has no equivalent in Western traditions seems unfounded to me. In fact, the concept probably originated in the West where as I said we find terms like "illumination" (ellampsis, photismos) going back to Plato and the Church Fathers.

In contrast, Indian terms do not seem to derive from "light". They tend to be based on concepts like "cessation" and "liberation" or "release". "Liberation", "salvation", do occur in Western traditions.

The exact significance of Jesus in Early Christianity is difficult to determine at present. Jesus was probably seen differently by the masses than by the Hellenistic-educated or -influenced classes. The masses left few written records of their beliefs, so we are left with the views of the educated classes and they do seem to have interpreted Jesus in a way that was compatible with Hellenistic religion in general and with Platonic philosophy in particular.

We need to bear in mind that Hellenistic culture was the dominant cultural element at the time especially in the eastern parts of the Roman Empire. This is precisely why the NT was written in Greek and Jesus himself was iconographically represented in Hellenistic style, either as a human teacher wearing a Greek philosopher's mantle (during his mission on earth) or (following his ascension to heaven) as God seated on a celestial throne like Zeus.

Even Buddha got a Greek-style robe in Indian temple art:

Greco-Buddhist art - Wikipedia

So, I for one, tend to agree with @Tom Storm.

Philosophy (i.e. philosophy in the Greek tradition) is love of and quest after Truth.
Platonism aims to attain union with Truth.
Christianity aims to attain union with God, who is Truth.

Basically, if any system enables its followers to attain Truth, then that system is good enough for me.

Plotinus is said to have attained some experience of Reality. We do not know whether this amounted to "supreme realization". But it was more than twice.

He says:

Often I wake up from the body into myself, and since I come to be outside of other things and within myself, I have a vision of extraordinary beauty and I feel supremely confident that I belong to a higher realm, and having come to identity with the Divine, and being established in it I have come to that actuality above all the rest of the intelligible world (Ennead IV.8.1.1-11)

Plotinus himself never publicly proclaimed this and his writings were published after his death. It was his pupil Porphyry who said that he witnessed this on four occasions during his time with his teacher and that he attained this himself once:

To this God, I also declare, I Porphyry, that in my sixty-eighth year I too was once admitted and I entered into Union (On the Life of Plotinus, 23).

It’s the kind of thing for which hard proof is never possible. — Wayfarer

Correct. This is why claims of someone being a "true jnani" or "enlightened" must necessarily belong to the domain of belief. And this applies to Buddha himself.

One point I want to call out in this regard, is that there is really nothing corresponding to 'enlightenment' in the Christian lexicon. — Wayfarer

I don't think we can infer from this that there is no enlightenment in Christianity. Christianity does have the term "illumination" (photismos) that leads to deification (theosis), just as Platonism also uses the term "illumination" (ellampsis) leading to oneness (henosis) with the Absolute.

You ought to consider why, in the early Christian era, many of the Greek-speaking fathers of the Church, for example Origen and Clement, who were thoroughly versed in Platonism, thought it nevertheless necessary to proclaim the truth of Christ. — Wayfarer

Christianity may have its own myths, but I think they are just as easy to debunk as those of the New Age movement.

Here is a possible answer:

1. "Thoroughly versed" in a particular system is not the same as thoroughly practiced and experienced in that system.

2. Those with actual practice and experience of Platonism, e.g., Plotinus, Porphyry, Proclus, Syrianus, Damascius, and many others, did not embrace Christianity.

3. When the Platonic Academy at Athens was closed in 529 AD by Christian emperor Justinian, its members preferred to leave for Persia rather than embrace Christianity.

4. The vast majority of the population that converted to Christianity were simply Pagans, i.e., followers of the Hellenistic religion prevalent at the time, not necessarily Platonists. We must not confuse religion with philosophy.

5. One possible reason for Christianity’s initial success in attracting followers is that it appealed to emotion and it promised salvation through faith. But, again, this applies to the general population, not necessarily to spiritually advanced Platonic philosophers.

6. If Christianity itself admittedly adopted aspects of Platonism, and the Platonic corpus was preserved and continued to be studied by Christians, it may be argued that there was something missing in Christianity.

In any case, I don’t see the “superiority” of Buddhism over Western traditions (or of Eastern enlightenment over Western enlightenment) as established …. :smile: