Evolution doesn't "produce" our conscious awareness of our experiences. Evolution describes the conditions and facts under which specific biological traits provide survival advantages to biological organisms and thus make it to the next generation.(through changes in allele frequencies).That's a just-so story. How did evolution produce conscious experiences? — Marchesk
Australian(something is wrong with the water down there). Well he needs to do a better job. He needs to stop Strawmaning and understand the role of Neuroscience in our interdisciplinary study of the brain. Better he needs to keep his pseudo philosophical views outside his lab and stop making up excuses out of ignorance to bring them in. (If and only if you reproduce his statements correctly).Maxwell Richard Bennett is an Australian neuroscientist specializing in the function of synapses. He has published a large number of text books and journal articles on neuroscience. — Wayfarer
No for the type you are practicing. My philosophy is ALWAYS based on the latest scientific epistemology and on the actual goals of science....not on made up "problems".You don't demonstrate any understanding of philosophy. — Wayfarer
IS it really? You do understand that conscious states shuffle stimuli giving the illusion of unification through the property of memory?As stated in that article, there is no scientific account for the subjective unity of experience. — Wayfarer
Did you on purpose left the rest of my statement out? I hope it wasn't a dishonest practice but a decision of "economy of word".It can’t. — Wayfarer
What [neuroscience] cannot do is replace the wide range of ordinary psychological explanations of human activities in terms of reasons, intentions, purposes, goals, values, rules and conventions by neurological explanations . . . . — Review of Bennett and Hacker, Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience
If you want to criticize something, you first have to demonstrate that you understand it. — Wayfarer
I have had near and dear relatives saved by neuroscience, for which I am eternally grateful, but that doesn't have any particular relevance to philosophy of mind. — Wayfarer
Jerome Feldman isn't a Neuro or Cognitive scientist
— Nickolasgaspar
Makes no difference to the facts presented — Wayfarer
It depends from the definition. If weOK, science geeks, how do we determine whether an AI is conscious? What do we do? What tests do we give it? — RogueAI
You have a blind spot in respect of the issue at hand. 'Facing up to the hard problem of consciousness' is not trivial or redundant, but a statement about the inherent limitations of objective, third-person science with respect to the nature of first-person experience. — Wayfarer
No it doesn't. Chalmer's asks Why questions. ITs like asking "why the intense wobbling of molecules is perceived as heat by our brains"....the answer will always be "BECAUSE"....... and Marc Solms through his new Theory on Consciousness will add "because it has evolutionary advantages to feel uncomfortable when your biology is exposed to a situation that has the potential to undermine your well being and your "being".So, contrary to all of the journal articles that you continue to cite, the subjective unity of perception, which is a major aspect of the 'hard problem', remains unexplained, and indeed inexplicable, according to this paper, which essentially provides scientific validation for the argument made in Chalmer's original article. — Wayfarer
I have done it many times....Can you state in you own words how the brain generates consciousness? — bert1
That’s because consciousness is a property of organisms, which are a great deal more than brains and nervous systems. Sapiens, for example, have digestive, endocrine, skeletal, respiratory and other systems. Each of these are required for human consciousness.
Neuroscience has a great deal to say about consciousness, but it is not the full story. — NOS4A2
Historical reasons are behind ideas pointing to "magical sources" of consciousness.I think there are historical reasons that lead us to conclude that consciousness is a property of matter. But it also depends on what you think matter (or more broadly "the physical) encompasses. — Manuel
Definition: "Consciousness as used here, refers to the private, subjective experience of being aware of our perceptions, thoughts, feelings, actions, memories (psychological contents) including the intimate experience of a unified self with the capacity to generate and control actions and psychological contents. "*I agree. We do not know if experience is limited to brains. It could be the case that panpsychism is true, or a variant of the idea that some kind of proto-life is found in all the universe. — Manuel
-Actually we do know enough about the phenomenon to be pretty sure (beyond any reasonable doubt) that the conscious awareness of experience is limited to biological brains.It could be. But it could be wrong. We don't know enough to be sure about this. — Manuel
No and no. There isn't any ontological distinction. Its like attributing a different ontology for the property of color and the property of hardness displayed by a rock.If there's a distinction between mental and physical properties then you accept that a) the mental is non-physical and that b) mental things exist. — Michael
They are the same. The word "Natural" can be used as an umbrella term when we want to make a distinction between mental and physical properties of matter.What's the difference between "natural" and "physical"? — Michael
No,its an observer relative term. We classify them base on their differences. Its not an ontological questions. Both emerge from physical structures.So are you arguing for property dualism? — Michael
There are many papers that explains how personal experiences arise from brain function, how pathology, physical injury and intoxication/physical condition can affect their quality and how we are able to diagnose and repair problematic states of consciousness.There are lots of scientific papers on brain activity and behavioural responses. These are not prima facie evidence that they address first-person experience. — Michael
That's one out of many tools available to us.Much of the science on first-person experience depends on taking for granted what people self-report, — Michael
Of course there is evidence, through establishing strong correlations between the claim and the phenomenon in question, by analyzing brain scans, blood profile (elevated hormones), behavior and interview. Sure we can not experience their experience of pain in real time but this is not an issue. Forensic methods are present in all disciplines of science.But, of course, someone saying "I am in pain" is not the same thing as the first-person experience of pain, and so that there is scientific evidence of the former isn't that there is scientific evidence of the latter. — Michael
Well it depends form the meaning of the word. This is why I always use the term "natural".If the phenomenon is mental, and if the mental is non-physical, then the phenomenon is non-physical. — Michael
IT is physical since the mechanisms are physical, the emergent property is Natural (mental property).That it has a physical cause isn't that it, itself, is physical. — Michael
This is what you demand from scientists and any third person to do....to experience your experience.I don't know what you mean by science experiencing something. — Michael
Of course it is, just look at the huge bibliography on the phenomenon...Scientific books and papers can not be written without analyzing the actual phenomenon.Either my first-person experience is susceptible to scientific analysis or it isn't. So which is it? — Michael
Historically speaking there is a pattern with philosophers and early scientists where when they reached the limits of their contemporary knowledge, they "blamed" the supernatural for keeping secrets from them. (Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, the early fathers of QM.etc).In science and in Natural Philosophy, supernatural realms are not used as excuses for our failures to figure things out. — Nickolasgaspar
Well the argument is unsound. You have a huge error in your third premise.1) all physical phenomena is susceptible to scientific analysis
2) we have first-person experience
3) some aspect of first-person experience is not susceptible to scientific analysis
4) therefore, some aspect of first-person experience is not a physical phenomenon — Michael
Because the purpose of this discussion is to assess the evidence either for or against the neuroscientist's claim that consciousness can be exhaustively explained by brain activity, — Michael
ITs more reasonable to reject all metaphysical worldviews and proceed with what we can actually investigate and verify.It is perfectly correct not to beg the question and assume either materialism or dualism from the start. — Michael
-So you are recycling hot air?? You are defining conditions in scenarios without knowing the real properties of the interacting concepts!No it doesn't.
If God is real then...
If parallel worlds are real then...
If magic is real then...
I'm not assuming anything about what's possible. — Michael
-So why are you doing this? There are far more meaningful scenarios to apply your '' ifs''on. Why insisting in its "philosophical value" when your statements demand way to many ifs to be proven true first before your statement finally acquires its philosophical validity..?I don't know if it's possible. I also don't know if it's impossible. Unlike you I'm not going to beg the question and assume that materialism is the case – that everything, including consciousness, is physical. — Michael
If consciousness is non-physical then there is no evidence that consciousness is physical. — Michael
This isn't difficult Michael..You are suggesting an ontology. This ontology needs to be assumed by definition. The same is true of its qualities.No I don't. — Michael
Again too many ifs and assumptions. — Nickolasgaspar
One if, no assumptions. — Michael
It has philosophical value if it's true. — Michael
I'm just pointing out the problem with Isaac's question — Michael
-Ok, it took me some time but I think get what your goal is.It doesn't then follow that it doesn't exist.
If it does exist then any explanation of consciousness that does not include this thing doesn't (exhaustively) explain consciousness at all. — Michael
Sure, but I don't see the Philosophical usefulness in that statement, meaning that you introduce an additional bigger mystery(non physical-whatever that is) in an attempt provide an answer to a "begging the question fallacy" (if there is a non physical aspect).I'm not assuming anything. My argument is only that if there is some non-physical aspect to consciousness then there cannot be any physical evidence that this non-physical aspect doesn't exist. — Michael
-Only if that "something else" is ''designed" to leave no traces for our scientific methods to find. In that case that untraceable "something else" is indistinguishable from something that doesn't exist! So why even talking about it?I'm not arguing that something else involved. I'm only argued that if something else is involved then we can't have scientific evidence of it. — Michael
Sure, but "ifs" need to be demonstrated not assumed.I'm not saying that brain activity isn't responsible for it. I'm only saying that if there is some non-physical aspect to consciousness then there can be no physical evidence of this non-physical aspect. — Michael
And so that specific aspect of it isn't identical with brain activity, which is accessible in real time. — Michael
It's very straightforward logic...and its susceptible to the GIGO effect. When we feed garbage dataa we receive garbage results.If A is inaccessible and B is accessible then A isn't B. It's very straightforward logic. — Michael
i.e. A(consciousness) is not an entity and it isn't inaccessible.Only a specific aspect of it isn't accessible in real time. We have the tools to investigate the impact of an experience, compare it to other people's experience and understand it the causal relations to the responsible mechanisms.If subjective experience is inaccessible and brain activity is accessible then subjective experience isn't brain activity. — Michael
First of all ,we have access in the evaluation of the subjective aspect of an experience. We have metrics for profiling blood, brain scans, behavior analysis, interviewing.How so? If the subjective aspect of consciousness is inaccessible to science and brain activity is accessible to science then ipso facto the subjective aspect of consciousness isn't brain activity. — Michael