• Turning the problem of evil on its head (The problem of good)


    You could of course dispute the compatibility of omnipotence with omnibenevolence/omnimalevolence, but that wasn't what our disagreement was about originally. It was your assumption of an asymmetry (which by its nature needed to take the principle of that compatibility for granted) which I argued against.
  • Turning the problem of evil on its head (The problem of good)


    By definition in that case (unless it serves a greater evil). Just as by definition an omnibenevolent God is obliged not to do evil (unless it serves a greater good). This is a logical constraint of the thought experiment.
  • Turning the problem of evil on its head (The problem of good)
    (I suppose presuming omniscience makes the second point inapplicable in this case, but the first point is sufficient disproof anyhow).
  • Turning the problem of evil on its head (The problem of good)


    Doesn't work. Knowledge of good does not morality constitute. And further, consciousness of ability is not a necessary existential condition thereof.
  • Turning the problem of evil on its head (The problem of good)


    If you think nothing people do is relevant to the problem of evil then that's a novel philosophical position to say the least.
  • Turning the problem of evil on its head (The problem of good)


    And there it is, the horribly glib attitude of the bougeois religious in the face of evil. We ask how can an omnibenevolent God preside over, for example, the sexual torture of trafficked children? And cometh the answer: "Meh, day/night; now stop complaining, it's not a hotel around here."
  • Turning the problem of evil on its head (The problem of good)


    An omnipotent X has the ability to create any particular thing but isn't obliged to create any particular thing. Absolute malevolence and absolute benevolence weigh equally as logical constraints here.
  • Turning the problem of evil on its head (The problem of good)
    (So, like un, I don't consider this a serious position but rather a way to shut up the bourgeois religious freak whose response to the horrors of life is "It'll work out fine in the end. Mine's a cheeseburger.")
  • Turning the problem of evil on its head (The problem of good)


    This is one I came up with myself too a while back. I presumed some philosopher had advanced it, which @andrewk has confirmed. Anyway, the idea that this is the worst possible world and ruled over by an omnimalevolent being is hardly less absurd than its contrary. At least advancing the argument seems a fair riposte to the old panglossian chestnut it subverts.
  • The Implication of Social Contract on Social Relations
    Can I help to draw a line under this? Posters can write in as technical or sophisticated a way as they want even it's not helpful or it's irritating to some. Better to send a PM if you'd like some extra clarity. (And I think the population here is more than thirty people, but hey, who's counting?)
  • Post truth


    And where's the evidence of bias in the CBO? The problem is not any particular agency having immunity against charges of bias if they happen to be true, but Trump’s using of the concept of "bias" as an attempted form of immunization against all criticism, and against the dissemination of any facts he doesn't happen to like. You've presumably noticed that tendency?
  • Black Hole/White Hole
    @Terrapin Station It seems an oddly parochial prejudice. What other celestial entities don't you believe in? I get the impression you doubt black holes merely because they're not directly visible.
  • Study of Philosophy


    You missed the part about reproducing the system. Philosophy is a recognized academic discipline and part of its function is to reproduce itself. Apart from that a little imagination will show how it can be applied in the workforce, and that's demonstrated by the fact that philosophy majors do sometimes get hired outside of universities. Similarly do humanities majors. (Actually, you could just put all this more holistically and say the overall system, society, works to reproduce itself and that we live in rather valueless times).

    Anyway, there's a danger here of us falling into the same pattern as earlier exchanges of taking descriptions for endorsements. I find all this, especially as someone who works in a university, objectionable and I look for opportunities to work against it.
  • Study of Philosophy


    As far as I can see, @Carbon's practical evaluation and frank description of academia aren't necessarily in much conflict with the more humanistic angle taken by you and others above. I think he's not unfairly assuming the possibility that @Mary Ellen may have rather unromantic reasons for taking this class, and responding on that basis. As far as his own personal relationship to philosophy or how he thinks academia should be run, he hasn't taken a position as far as I can see, but has been judged mostly on his tone. I'll back him up to the extent that academia is a slog and universities are not run to instill students with an awe of wisdom or even wisdom at all, but to produce individuals who are adept enough at critical thinking to meet a demand in the intellectual market that serves to advance technological development and economic growth, as well as to reproduce the educational system that produced them. That is, if there is a philosophical underpinning to higher education, it's instrumental rather than value orientated. Cry as we might about that, it ain't going to change soon. My only criticism of Carbon would be his indefatigable world-weariness that comes across as less than constructive. From a descriptive point of view, he's more or less on point.

    Questions that raise, and that you've touched on, are: Is there a better way to do this? How do we get there? Worth asking with the proviso that the answers may not be of any help to Mary Ellen.
  • Holy shit!


    I see where you're coming from now.
  • Holy shit!
    However, I find it puzzling why you don't find anything interesting in the content (contradictions) of the stress-induced reactions.

    At the risk of boring you let me repeat myself. Zen Buddhism is especially famous for Koans which are deliberately shock-inducing e.g. what is the sound of one hand clapping? The same thing may be said of other mystical traditions in various religions. All this, of course, indicating that the real truth is hidden somewhere in the lower? brain.

    Does this not merit a careful investigation?
    TheMadFool

    There's a significant difference between the kind of reflexive verbal ejaculate that results in swear phrases, and the sudden shock of deep realization a Zen Koan might cause. Note for a start that the words are going in opposite directions in each case and are absolutely opposed in terms of semantic richness. The Zen Koan is likely, if it's to have any meaningful effect, to resonate with connections that involve higher brain functions. The fact that it may be difficult to articulate that effect in words doesn't mean the higher brain isn't involved. The swear word reflex on the other hand is at best cathartic and at worst embarrassing. In terms of meaning, there's really not much to look for.



    The environment has a role to play in all reactions with a linguistic character, of course. I don't see how that fact isn't accommodated by what I wrote, or how what you've written fits into the issue raised by the OP.
  • Holy shit!
    In other words, instead of simply crying out ''ah'' or ''oh'' or ''fuck'' or ''shit'' why do we have in our reaction-bank contradictions/contraries?TheMadFool

    Semantic content is not so important here as emotional connotation or weight, so the presence of contradictory meanings in our reaction bank shouldn't be cause for puzzlement. What would be odd would be emotionally neutral words finding their way into these phrases. If you meet someone who shouts "book shit" or "fuck jacket" every time he stubs his toe, consider calling a psychologist. Anyway, as it happens, religious, sexual and scatalogical words tend to be among the more taboo or emotionally laden and therefore among the most closely hooked up to the brain areas controlling emotional reaction. Logical opposition in terms of denotation is irrelevant in this context.

    So, it's just normal brain function in the sense that the lowerbrain reacts without involvement of the higher? brain.TheMadFool

    It appears to me that the lower brain is not in harmony with the higher brain at a fundamental level.TheMadFool

    What's interesting, (and this is something Steven Pinker mentions in his book "The Stuff of Thought", which has a whole chapter ("The Blaspheming Brain") on this issue) is that aphasics who have lost the ability to articulate language due to damage to areas of the left hemisphere of their brains can retain the ability to swear, suggesting swear phrases may come packaged in prefabricated formulas stored in the right hemisphere of the brain - the one which is also most implicated in emotional reactions, especially negative ones. Pinker implicates the basal ganglia though rather than the right cerebral cortex (Tourette's sufferers, famous for uncontrolled swearing, for example, have damage here). So, yes, a "lower brain" area, and seemingly not only not in harmony with, but functioning independently of higher brain linguistic systems.

    More or less what apo said in other words.
  • What Colour Are The Strawberries? (The Problem Of Perception)


    Or my phrasing. :-* As long as we don't have to do the debate again, I'm good. (Y)
  • What Colour Are The Strawberries? (The Problem Of Perception)
    Let me put it another way @Sapientia: with the cup/atoms example, you've already accepted the principle that you can see the whole without seeing the parts. Why you can't see that that binds you to admit that what I and un are saying is sensible and coherent is beyond me.
  • What Colour Are The Strawberries? (The Problem Of Perception)


    You remember how all this started, right? A contrived example.
  • What Colour Are The Strawberries? (The Problem Of Perception)
    If the words are not the pixels, then what are they?Sapientia

    If cups are not atoms, then what are they? This could go on all day...
  • What Colour Are The Strawberries? (The Problem Of Perception)


    I responded to the statement at face value and so did @Sapientia. That's a legitimate way to respond to it.

    No it is the scientific definition which is exclusive. It reduces "seeing red" to a particular sort of seeing red, whereas the common understanding of seeing red includes the scientific instance as well as others.Metaphysician Undercover

    You've missed the point. The regular unqualified definition of "red" includes two senses which are in certain contexts exclusive of each other (the "red" strawberries example being one).
  • What Colour Are The Strawberries? (The Problem Of Perception)
    "To be red is just to look red" only when you pretend the scientific definition, which is encompassed in the regular dictionary definition, is not actually encompassed in it. Use the qualification and then fine. But that's a different statement.
  • What Colour Are The Strawberries? (The Problem Of Perception)


    Your meaning is exclusive. (And I'm talking about the meaning of the word "red" in general not as used in a specific context. Remember you said "to be red is just to look red". That's what I objected to not "to be red is just to look red when I'm talking about looking at red strawberries, or whatever...")
  • What Colour Are The Strawberries? (The Problem Of Perception)


    Every dictionary in the word will disagree with you and say the regular definition encompasses both.
  • What Colour Are The Strawberries? (The Problem Of Perception)


    If your meaning is idiosyncratic or controversial or even simply debatable then you need to highlight that immediately or people will respond to the regular meaning. And to expect them to respond to the unqualified statement as if it were the qualified one would be to expect them to accept your meaning.

    What are the dark shapes? Do atoms have colour? I see the dark shapes, and the dark shapes are pixels, therefore I see the pixels, or I see the pixels as dark shapes.Sapientia

    Do you really still want to insist that when I look at a screen with no individuated pixels (or even barely individuated ones) on it that it's nonsense for me to say "I don't see pixels, I see words". If no, we've nothing left to argue about. If yes, then all I have left to say is that that's a very unreasonable attitude.
  • What Colour Are The Strawberries? (The Problem Of Perception)
    My phone has a retina screen.Sapientia

    But you said:

    The pixels are visible to the naked eye, but the atoms are not.Sapientia

    Why are unindividuated pixels more visible than unindividuated atoms?

    I am nevertheless seeing a number of pixels, am I not? That's what those dark shapes are.Sapientia

    "I am nevertheless seeing a number of atoms, am I not? That's what that cup is."
  • What Colour Are The Strawberries? (The Problem Of Perception)


    Sure, that's what my first post on all this pointed too.
  • What Colour Are The Strawberries? (The Problem Of Perception)


    This is the gerrymandering. My objection was to the statement "to be red is just to appear red" not to the statement "to be red is just to appear red when what I mean by red is...". You don't get to define "red".
  • What Colour Are The Strawberries? (The Problem Of Perception)


    Never hear of a retina screen? I guess I must have a better phone than you. :P But even when the pixels are theoretically visible, we don't generally see them, we just see the words. As I said before, I don't think it's illegitimate to say you see pixels, but it's not nonsense to say you don't either.
  • What Colour Are The Strawberries? (The Problem Of Perception)


    I'm aware a scientist wearing red-tinted glasses wouldn't have a problem reading a number off a screen. I think you know my example was meant somewhat humorously. Anyway, if you accept there is a science of colour then you accept that to be red is not just to appear red.
  • What Colour Are The Strawberries? (The Problem Of Perception)


    There's two ways of looking at it. I made it clear in my first post. I'm not saying either is nonsensical on its own terms. However, if you claim that to be red is just to look red, that's equivalent to saying there can be no science of colour. But there is. So, you're wrong.
  • What Colour Are The Strawberries? (The Problem Of Perception)
    How can you see the words if you can't see the pixels? You cannot. The words would not appear to you if not for the many tiny black pixels which form the shapes which we recognise as words. What you're saying is absurd. It's not analogous to to, say, a cup and the atoms which compose the cup. I can actually see the pixels, and so can you.Sapientia

    "How can you see the cup if you can't see the atoms? You cannot. The cup would not appear to you if not for the many tiny atoms which form the object which we recognise as a cup."

    It's not absurd at all, it's a perfectly legitimate way of speaking.




    It's pretty simple guys, red is either something there can be a fact of the matter about at some level or it is not. And there either exists a science of colour that is not nonsensical or there does not. If every human being in the world right now put on red tinted glasses that would not in the slightest change the scientific understanding or abrogate the scientific meaning of the term "red".
  • What Colour Are The Strawberries? (The Problem Of Perception)


    Hmph. If I want to know the peak wavelength range of a particular colour, I'll ask the scientist not wearing the rose-tinted glasses.
  • What Colour Are The Strawberries? (The Problem Of Perception)


    I just see words. Anyway, what's a pixel if it's not part of a word, shape or colour? I'm not saying you can't speak of the situation coherently as you do. It's just not the only way of speaking about it. There's nothing odd in what un said.