Particularism and Practical reason There is a sense in which the search for moral certainty through theory is as much an abdication of moral responsibility as an attempt to to fulfil it. So, I share the particularist's discomfort with attempts at universalizing moral principles. In fact, there's good evidence to show that this kind of universalizing is what the
least moral among us fall back on to fill the vacuum of their moral character. I've just been listening to an interview with a researcher who questioned prisoners diagnosed with anti-social personality disorder on their moral beliefs, and their answers tended to be very much in line with rule-based systems of morality, i.e. you shouldn't steal, you shouldn't swear, you shouldn't kill etc., but with a striking lack of gradation as if the interviewees were reeling off a shopping list of moral requirements without really engaging with them because their sense of morality was based much more on their understanding of the dictats of authority than any personal sense of sympathy with the victims of the stated transgressions.
And I think sympathy must be at the core of morality, sympathy tempered by reason. You can't rely on reasons for action alone because then you are not really inhabiting morality as
@StreetlightX suggested above. On the other hand of course, sympathy alone will not cut it because it may strip you of the moral courage to do the distasteful for greater ends (say in the case of a mother who has to strike her choking baby hard in order to dislodge a piece of food but can't bring herself to do it, or in more extreme cases where you might have to harm or even kill someone to save others).
So yes, I'm generally on board with the idea that morality is empty without recourse to particular contexts, but it's also empty unless grounded in a genuine engagement with the other at an emotional level.