"One cannot move pawns backwards"

Is true within the context of the social practice of chess. Moreover, it is the social practice of chess that makes it true; without this practice, the truth of it loses its foundation.

Perhaps I am misunderstanding, but I would say it is true because once one understands that we are talking about the game of chess, there are certain rules in place. I guess, to be technical, the rules themselves are inter-subjective, not objective (if that is what you are trying to get at). They are like money.

That one cannot move pawns backwards in the game of chess is true independently of what anyone thinks because it is a fact, but the actually rule that prohibits the action of going backwards with a pawn is inter-subjective. By analogy, imagine that a loaf of bread is $10. It being $10 is inter-subjective (and thusly non-factual: non-objective), but it is a fact that it is currently inter-subjectively valued at $10. These are two entirely different propositions; and I think you may be conflating them.

So you are granting that if there was a moral statement true in, and because of, its social context, then this statement is a moral fact?

No. The moral (rule), like chess rules, are inter-subjective (at best); but if it is the case that we inter-subjectively agree on a moral rule, then it is a fact that we inter-subjectively agree on that moral rule: thusly, the moral rule is not a fact, but that we agree on it is—they two different propositions.

For what it is worth, I couldn't agree with you more on the free will debate article you shared: most scientists just assume there's no free will because the world is determined.

Your problem just may be the terminological usage you've confined yourself with. Are you using the terms "moral" and "facts" consistently? If so, exactly what counts as "moral" and "fact"?

By 'moral' language, I mean language which signifies 'what one ought to be doing'; and by 'fact' I mean 'a statement which corresponds to reality such that what it refers to about reality is there'.

:up:

Yes. The basic dichotomy I'm setting out and working from is moral and not.
…
The moral fact is such that one made a promise.

Ok, but, like I said before, someone being in the event of making moral judgments (“considering what counts as acceptable or unacceptable behavior”) is not a moral fact in any meaningful sense. Literally every moral anti-realist position agrees that there are people “considering what counts as acceptable or unacceptable behavior”--the disagreement is about whether those considerations are about mind(stance)-independently existing morals. Your view, I think, just completely sidesteps the actual metaethical discussion.

I get that you define ‘moral fact’ in a way such that a promise is one, being an event which has to do with “considering what counts as acceptable or unacceptable behavior”, but that, again, is just sidestepping the issue: is that promise, or that “considering what counts as acceptable or unacceptable behavior”, about something objective? It seems as though your use of ‘moral facticity’ just doesn’t find this question relevant, since someone can be “considering what counts as acceptable or unacceptable behavior” without unacceptable or acceptable behavior being itself objective.

By virtue of promising, one already obligates themselves to make the world match their words(keep their promise). That's the whole point of promise making. If one does not already obligate themselves to keep their word, then they do not intend to make the world match their words, and hence they've not made a promise at all, for they did not believe what they said. They've just plain lied. The moral obligation remains regardless. The moral fact is such that one made a promise. True statements about that moral fact will correspond to it.

I understand what you are saying here, and I don’t think I would be saying anything new about my position on it by addressing it. So I am going to agree to disagree on this one.

Hence, if today you promise to plant me a rose garden on Monday, then come Tuesday I ought to have one. That's true by virtue of corresponding to the relevant moral fact of the matter at hand.

If moral facts are just events where someone is considering what is acceptable/unacceptable to do, then it isn’t necessarily the case that their judgment (conclusion they make) about what is acceptable/unacceptable corresponds to what mind(stance)-independently exists. Hence, it is not necessarily the case that ‘moral facts’ exist in any metaethically meaningful sense of the term.

But isn't your claim tautological at that point? Obviously moral claims must be situated somewhere within "the totality of existence."

It is not tautological, because P1 is not “the totality of existence is reality”: it is “the way reality is does not entail how it ought to be”. The point is that the moral realist (presumably) needs to deny this claim in order to save moral facts, and I find P1 very plausible (so I am inclined to disagree with them.

No, I don't think that makes any sense. If it is not objectively wrong for others to torture babies then you should not get angry at them when they do. You get angry and intervene because you believe it is wrong for them to torture babies. Moral anti-realism is too often

You are importing the metaphysical framework of moral realism and trying to force-fit it into moral anti-realism, such that you end up committing a straw man fallacy.

I think you should not torture babies, irregardless of whether you think you should not torture babies, and if that is true then I should be trying to stop you. Where’s the inconsistency or incoherence with that?

Let me offer another story. One fellow responded to my moral anger argument as follows. "Anger presupposes justice, but because moral realism is false justice does not exist. Therefore anger is irrational. Nevertheless, I myself do get angry with other people. This is only because I am irrational. If I ever succeed in becoming perfectly rational I will no longer get angry."

I won’t speak towards that person, but I completely disagree with them. I think moral realism sometimes paints the false narrative that, even under that metaethical theory, we cannot impose tastes on one another; but I can provide a parody argument, which equally applies to moral realism and anti-realism, which illustrates how false this notion really is.

Values are not morals: they are our subjective tastes of what we hold as worth something. I can value vanilla ice cream, and you not so much—irregardless of what the moral facts say. Now, imagine there’s a moral fact such that ‘one shouldn’t torture babies’ and you catch me in the act of torturing a baby: you cannot impose the moral fact without simultaneously imposing your taste that I should value moral facts. If you say “hey! You shouldn’t be doing that because it violates this moral fact!”, and I just say “why should I care about moral facts?”. What moral fact would you possibly try to cite to justify the value of moral facts themselves? None, of course! You would cite your valuing of them. But...wait a second...according to your moral realist view you shouldn’t ever impose tastes on another, which would include your taste about moral facts. Are you just going to stand there and let me continue torturing the baby because you can’t enforce the moral fact without shoving your values down my throat? Of course not! So why would it be any different with respect to morals under a moral anti-realist view? It wouldn’t.

That we are responsible for what we say and do is a fact of our position in the world and in relation to each other (even though we may not be held to it), which is real in the sense it has importance and power

But would you say that this ‘fact of our position in the world’ exists mind(stance)-independently and has ‘moral’ signification? I wouldn’t. Having importance or power doesn’t make something a fact.

Do you believe in social realities? I can guarantee you behave as if you do. After all, nation, money, property, family, company, are all social realities, and it would be a difficult life indeed that didn't acknowledge any of them. So even if morality were "only" a social reality, that would still perhaps be a more formidable reality than you are giving it credit for.

If I am understanding your concept of ‘social realities’ correctly, then I would say that I accept them but not as objective: they are inter-subjective. It is not a fact that ‘a 0.5-carat diamond should be worth $1500’, but it is a fact that ‘currently, the economy values a 0.5-carat diamond at $1500’.

And what if morality had a biological origin? Unlike say money, which is purely a social construct (yet can literally move mountains), what if morality is rooted in an elemental, biologically predisposed notion of justice (as it is, imho)? If so, would it count as "real"?

If moral judgments could be traced back to biological aspects of our species, then, prima facie, that would count as a moral realist position. I just don’t think they can: I think it is entirely possible that I should resist my biologically wiring.

Ultimately I think the whole "is it real" question is just too vague. You have to specify what kind of "real" you are looking for.

True. My ‘moral fact’ I am looking for a normative propositions or statements that inform us ‘what one ought to be doing’ which correspond to a state-of-affairs in reality (where ‘reality’ is the ‘totality of stance-independently, existent things’).

"One cannot move pawns backwards."

If a moral realist were to demonstrate that there was a moral fact which was analogous to the above proposition, such that I just needed to understand the context of the words (within the language) being used (e.g., ‘pawn’) and it would be true that (1) it is factual and (2) true; then I would accept it. My problem is that I don’t think there are any moral facts, period.

I do not recognize what I argued here
↪180 Proof
in your 'paraphrase' above, so my guess is that you're not on the right track.

The reason I am thinking that, in your view, concerns about species’ defects of natural beings is equivalent to morality due to them providing compelling reasons is because of this portion:

'defeasible reasons for moral statements about natural beings' (praxis). These 'moral reasons' are objective insofar as the functionalities or properties of natural beings to which they refer are objective

And:

(3) normativity that specifically concerns the species' defects (i.e. vulnerabilities to harm / suffering) of natural beings, however, is moral (i.e. obligates natural beings to care for one another) insofar as natural beings are cognizant (how can they not be?) of their species' defects as such; (4) and in the normative framework of moral naturalism, (our) species' defects function as moral facts¹ which provide reasons² (i.e. claims (e.g. "I do this³ because² 'not to do this' can/will harm¹ her")) for species-members (us) to care for³ – take care of³ – (our) species' defects as a rule we give ourselves.

I don’t know how to interpret this any other way: could you please elaborate?

For example, you say ‘species' defects function as moral facts’: wouldn’t it be accurate to then say that concerns about species’ defects [of natural beings] are equivalent to morality?

I don't see this either, which is why I did not make such an argument. If you're interested, Bob, go back and re-read the second paragraph (4 points), and then the parenthetical note on 'following a rule', and lastly the Derek Parfit quotation.

I did re-read it, and found the same conclusion; so perhaps it would be useful if you could elaborate on what I am misinterpreting?

It seems as though you are saying that moral facts are equivalent, in function, to facts about species’ defects, but then saying that the obligation exists outside of those species’ defects.

No. I'm clearly delineating, not implying, that all facts are events(what happened or is happening) and that moral facts are distinct from all others in that they directly involve actively considering what counts as acceptable/unacceptable behaviour, whether that be our own or others'

So, correct me if I am wrong, a moral fact is an event such that there is someone in that event that is considering what counts as acceptable or unacceptable behavior? Am I on the right track? If not, then please elaborate on that portion (of the quote above).

Promising is voluntarily entering into an obligation to make the world match your words. Are you denying that much?

No, that’s fine; but I am only not going to break that obligation (when push comes to shove) if I have obligated myself to fulfilling my professed obligations (promises): are you denying that?

Okay. Good. Do you understand that I'm setting out the bit I bolded?

Here’s what was in bold:

it is strikingly hard to nail down with any accuracy just which claims count as moral and so are at issue in the debate....

What are you saying you are setting out to do? Setting out to denote how hard it is to nail down what counts as morally factual? Either way, you should be able to give a definition of what is a moral fact, no?

I was thinking of religious moralities, Kantian moralities, and conscience-based moralities. It seems to me that very many of these are not arguing from "how the world is," as if one could infer morality from the natural world.

By world, I was meaning it more generically than ‘natural world’: I meant ‘the totality of existence’. So when a religious person says, for example, ‘the moral facts come from God’s nature’, I think this falls prey to violating P1.

As an example, some years ago I was engaged in a rather superficial argument with an atheist who professed that there are no moral truths. As we conversed it became very obvious that she held the prohibition on slavery as an objective moral truth, and I was able to tease this out in a dozen different ways. Nevertheless, she never admitted it, and continued to hold to her position, construing, for example, the necessary freeing of slaves as an act of violence rather than justice

Interesting.

Folks who profess moral anti-realism tend to be engaged in a rhetorical tack, and it is primarily their actions that betray them.

I don’t think this is the case, but I will stick to myself: I don’t mean that there are no moral facts because of a rhetorical or sophistical tack.

Also, it common in my life that moral realists think that my actions betray my words; but I think most of the time they are importing their own moral framework instead of dealing with mine on its own terms. More on that in a minute...

For instance, creatures who don't believe in morality would never perceive injustice and never get angry. We get angry all the time.

This is something I get from moral realists all the time: if I truly care that someone is being immoral, then I am not a moral anti-realist. But this just presupposes that if something isn’t objectively immmoral, that it doesn’t matter. Obviously, I am going to deny that. So I can get as furious as I want about people torturing babies for fun and never once concede that it is a factually wrong thing to do.

I think there are plenty of forms of moral realism that do just fine without P2

I know you said you aren't starting new conversations, but could you provide some examples (so I can research them)?

What do you think about, as a moral realist, this argument:

P1: How the world is does not entail how the world should be.
P2: Moral facts are about how the world is such that it informs us how it should be.
C: Therefore, moral facts cannot exist.

I 100% agree, but @Banno thinks that moral facts do have a world-to-word direction of fit, and I am having a hard time getting them to explain (or perhaps I am just not grasping their explanation of) what that would even mean.

Let's do that again.

It's a question of taste if it only applies to you - Bob likes vanilla.
It's a question of morality if it applies to everyone - Everyone ought like vanilla.

This is a false dichotomy: I can have a taste such that everyone ought to like vanilla. Unless, are you agreeing that those are not exclusive options?

A taste is just a judgment which stems from someone’s psychology, such as a desire. Are you saying it is impossible for someone to desire for everyone to desire to eat vanilla?

This amounts to: what should you believe? You should work that out for yourself. Indeed, in questions of ethics, you have no choice but to work it out for yourself.

This counts against you theory, because you are not providing any criteria to actual discern facts from non-facts, which implies to me that there is no reason to believe they are facts in the first place. I would rather default to them being purely psychological.

Moral facts are about how the world is such that the world should be. — Bob Ross
That just confuses direction of fit. Oh, well. I tried.

What would it mean for something to have a world-to-word direction of fit and be about a state-of-affairs. It seems to me that you are only a moral realist because you are a moral cognitivist.
You have no means of discerning what is a moral fact and what isn’t, and all you affirm is that there are normative propositions that are true.

:up:

I have no problems with that SEP article: I think it is a good outline of the landscape.

No. I said, facts, on my view, are not truth apt. They are not the sorts of things that can be true/false. Rather, they are part of what makes it possible in order for truth apt things to be so. Facts are events(as compared/contrasted to true statements, propositions, and the like). What has happened and/or is happening are matters of fact. Moral facts are distinct from all others in that they directly involve actively considering what counts as acceptable/unacceptable behaviour, whether that be our own or others'.

Yes, but it seems like you are trying to imply that there are moral facts simply because there are people engaging in morally signified events—e.g., I think I ought to help a poor person and I do, that’s an event, that’s therefore a fact (under you view), and since it is an event about a moral act it is a moral fact. I am trying to explicate that this is no way implies that moral realism: a moral subjectivists 100% can agree with my example above.

Another way of thinking about it, perhaps, is that the act of being obligated subjectively to help a poor person is an event, but it is not a moral event because it stemmed from that person’s psychology.

I never said that that was even the sort of thing than can be a fact, of any kind. You seem to be consistently arguing against an imaginary opponent here

I apologize if that is the case: I must be misunderstanding you.

Utterances of ought are judgments, not facts. They can be true/sound. Facts cannot.

Ok, so what is the moral fact-of-the-matter then (under your view)? Is it just an event that has moral signification (such as my example of helping the poor)? What would it mean for an event to be ‘moral’ under your view?

A question...

Do you have an obligation to do X after you've made the promise?

No. I only have an obligation to do X upon promising X if I am equally obligated to fulfill my promises.

I don't see how this is a form of moral realism, which I think you may be agreeing with me here. Facts about psychology do not entail the existence of moral facts. I think you described a form of moral subjectivism or perhaps a moral realist position called moral relativism (but I simply disagree with the latter).

One truth that is no fact are the logical truths, I think. There's no fact that makes "A = A" true. It's not a state of affairs

I disagree: logical and mathematical truths are about how we cognize, which are states-of-affairs in reality; so I reject the notion of directionless fit of facts.

Consider "If you ought bring an umbrella you ought to sing a song; You ought to bring an umbrella, and therefore..." : if we render this into a sentential logic then "ought" disappears and you have modus ponens with sentences which at least appear to have a world-to-word direction of fit

I don’t see it: can you elaborate? That’s just a hypothetical imperative being used to with modus ponens to derive the consequent. Or are you saying it is world-to-word direction of fit because it is hypothetical, since it is subjective? I could get on board with that, but I don’t see how there’s such a thing as a fact which has a world-to-word direction of fit. ‘You ought to bring an umbrella’ (P2) is non-factual (to me).

Hello 180 Proof!

I appreciate your elaborate response, and hopefully I can adequately respond!

It seems as though, and correct me if I am wrong, that you are advocating that “concerns ...[about] species’ defects … of natural beings” is equivalent to moral concern/judgment because such concerns (about species’ defects) provide compelling reasons (“independent of that rule” which was formulated from them) for doing or not doing specific actions: am I on the right track here?

If I am, then let me expound some of my prima facie concerns. Firstly, I can see how species’ defects can provide compelling reasons to perform specific actions, and thusly help inform us of what we ought to be doing, but I am failing to see how those obligations are factual. For example, imagine you are explaining all the relevant defects of a specific human being (relative to the species) to someone else: once you get done, what moral fact has been exposed? You explain to me that this person has a disability, and I in no way can infer that I ought to help them from that (in and of itself): I must import some non-factual moral judgment that informs me how that I should help them (perhaps: be kind to others? Etc.). To me, I see species’ defects as certainly relevant to my moral consideration, but they seem to me to be non-moral facts that supplement the moral judgments—e.g., I say one should not smoke because it is unhealthy and one ought to be healthy, and ‘it is unhealthy’ does not, in itself, inform me that I shouldn’t do it.

Perhaps this is a difference in our views of ‘facticity’ and ‘morality’: I would say that ‘moral’ language signifies ‘what one ought to be doing’ and ‘facticity’ is about ‘statements which correspond properly to reality [such that what it references about reality agrees with reality with respect to it]’. What would you say?

In short: I am not seeing how natural analysis about species’ defects contains within it any statements which indicate ‘what one ought to be doing’ and ‘correspond to reality [such that...]’.

Which leads me to my second worry:

These 'moral reasons' are objective insofar as the functionalities or properties of natural beings to which they refer are objective.

To me, you have explicated quite clearly here my worry that moral facts (i.e., ‘moral reasons’) are only objective insofar as their properties are about natural beings: but isn’t there a gap between the way an organism may be (in relation to a standard organism within their species) and a normative judgment about how we ought to treat that organism? If there isn’t, then I am not seeing it.

Alas, my final worry pertains to:

No doubt just as one can use mathematics or chemistry subjectively, one can also use 'moral statements about natural beings' subjectively; however, such unwarranted subjectivization (or relativization) tends to be incoherent and vacuous.

It seems as though, and correct me if I am misunderstanding, you consider mathematical facts (and similar areas of study) to be analogous to moral facts, such that if a moral ‘reason’ isn’t factual then neither is a mathematical ‘reason’: I think there is a difference between ‘using mathematics subjectively’ and ‘mathematics being subjective’. Math has facts because the propositions correspond accurately to states-of-affairs in reality (of which I would ground it in our faculties of cognition); whereas, I don’t see how that is the case with morality (especially if the moral facts are essentially only factual insofar as they are dependent on non-moral facts about species/organisms).

Let me know what you think!

Moral facts are distinct from all others in that they directly involve considering what counts as acceptable/unacceptable behaviour whether that be our own or others'. Hence facts that do not involve contemplating acceptable/unacceptable behaviour are amoral facts.

When one promises to do X, it is not a hypothetical imperative. It is the act of giving another the added additional assurance that one will keep their word(to make the world match their words).

So are you saying that the moral facts are events which are of acceptable or unacceptable behavior, but that acceptable vs. unacceptable behavior is non-factual? Because, then I think we may just be semantically disagreeing and (I would say) you are a moral anti-realist for the sake of the contemporary discussion of metaethics (although I could be misunderstanding).

With respect to promises, a promise is a subjective obligation that one sets out to do, which can be transcribed into a hypothetical imperative—because it is not categorical. I don’t have an obligation, prior to promising X, to do X—its not a moral fact that I ought to do X. Instead, I can say “if I ought to help my neighbor, then I should make promises to do X in situation Y” (or something like that) and then affirm the antecedent. If there are no moral facts (in at least the sense that I described), then every obligation is hypothetical.

Likewise, the obligation to fulfill the promise, if you are agreeing that the promise itself is not a moral fact, is also a hypothetical imperative. If I ought to fulfill my promises, then I must do X because I promised X. If I promise X but reject the antecedent of the former hypothetical, then I can rationally and legitimately promise X and not be obliged to do X. Without grounding it in a normative fact-of-the-matter, this is what is left (I would say).

Well, that one's easy. Bob prefers Vanilla - that's a question of taste, and might lead to Bob only eating Vanilla ice cream. "Bob prefers Vanilla" and "Bob only eats Vanilla ice cream" are a statement of taste.

But if Bob and his army were to insist that everyone ought eat only vanilla, and that chocolate was evil and the work of the devil, that would be about morals.

But what distinguishes Bob’s taste that everyone ought to eat only vanilla from the moral fact that everyone ought to eat only vanilla?

Again, I'm not pretending to present you with a handbook to what you ought to do

Fair enough; but I want to clarify that I am not asking you to do that. I am asking “How do you know that any given moral judgment is factual (as opposed to being a taste: non-factual)?”. Saying that a moral fact is a true proposition doesn’t inform me how you come to know that it is true.

What we have done over the course of this thread is examine in some detail the grammar around moral language

It would help me understand, if you could give me an example and demonstrate how you discerned that is was a fact as opposed to a taste.

Do you think that, though folk can doubt the chair in which they sit, that there is some ethical doctrin that will convince them all?

This just seems like a non-sequitur: ethics doesn’t prove the existence or non-existence of non-moral entities, such as standard, ordinary objects.

Now, if you are just noting that we only gain knowledge of the moral facts through trial and error, then that’s fine...but how do you know through trial and error what is more or less a moral fact and what is an error? When we say that we gain scientific knowledge through trial and error, we still note that we are weeding out the errors by empirical tests that either verify or invalidate our hypothesis—how does your moral realism work with this regard?

The common feature is that "fact" is truth functionally equivalent to "true sentence", and this is how I mostly use the word

A true sentence is a statement that corresponds to reality: that’s a word-to-world direction of fit, not world-to-word. I am asking you what world-to-word definition of fact, which you are deploying as a critique to P5, did you have in mind?

As has ben explained previously, problems occur when folk say "facts are only about physical things" but conclude "therefore there are no moral facts", as if this were an argument and not a tautology.

This has nothing to do with the word-to-world direction of fit we were talking about. My definition of a fact (i.e., a statement which corresponds to reality) is not equivalent to “facts are only about physical things”. Afterall, 1+1=2 is not about physical things, but is nevertheless a fact (by my books).

This question begging is the generic form of the error in your OP and a few subsequent arguments.

Here’s a modified version of the previous argument that takes into consideration your objections:

P1: How the world is does not entail how the world should be.
P2: Moral facts are about how the world is such that the world should be.
C: Therefore, moral facts cannot exist.

The idea is that the moral realist has to deny P1, which I find (and I think most people find) really intuitive. The only potential way out of it is to deny word-to-world direction of fit, but I as of yet to hear a fully fleshed out concept of a fact with world-to-word direction of fit. Let me know what you think.

As I understand it, "moral realism" --I don't like and never use this term-- is basically about making a list of what things are right and what are wrong.

I would say that moral realism is a three pronged thesis:

1. Moral judgments are propositional [moral cognitivism].
2. Moral judgments are expressing something objective.
3. There are at least some (or one) true moral judgment.

Making a list of things that are right and wrong is compatible with anti-realism as well (I would say).

So, can such a moral(ity) system be applied to life as a whole and with all its versatility and multifacetedness?

Of course not.

I agree in the sense that a lot of common moral realist positions tend to be too deontological simply because they are not fully thought-out; but I don’t think your critique actually targets moral realists (in general): there are plenty of moral realist that agree that:

An moral (I prefer the term "ethical") system must be founded on a basic principle, based on which other principles can be formed and ethical behavior and acts can be determined, allowing also for judgment to take place, based on rational thinking and facts, i.e. considering the conditions under which acts take place.

I think with most Neoplatonism, the divine intellect (of which the human intellect is supposed to be a reflection) is associated with goodness. Evil is just separation or distance from the Nous, sinking into matter. Goodness and truth are essentially the same thing, with evil being a kind of illusion. So you're right that in Neoplatonism one intuits the Good by virtue of the intellect.

Agreed. But, also, there are new strands of neoplatonism, such as atheistic platonism, that get rid of the Nous. In those kinds of views, we just intuit the good, and not because it corresponds with a higher intellect.

But morality is often defined as some sort of code of behavior. It's rules. The Christian take on Neoplatonism isn't about rules. It's about love. "Love and do what you will" as Augustine said.

I am not sure what you mean here. But a lot of Christian philosophers (like William lane craig) will reject platonism because the moral law is impersonal, which I don't really get the big deal with that.

I understand: you are arguing that either moral realism is true or error theory is true. However, as I noted before, although intuiting what language is trying to express is important, you just bluntly presuppose that moral statements express objective facts at the outset (#1), which insufficiently precludes moral subjectivism.

I have to note that, because I am a moral subjectivist--so when my view is just subtly excluded from consideration, it makes me unimpressed with the argument (simply because it didn't address all available options).

Fair enough. Within your view, please define 'fact'. For me, it definitely is a 'statement which refers to a stance-independently existing thing'. What world-to-word fit-style definition do you have for fact?

It would be a surprise if analytic considerations, or philosophical considerations generally, could tell us which statements about the physical world are true and which false
…
No grand moral programs; just a path.

I see. The problem is that I don’t see you actually describing, even in principle, where or what the moral facts subsist in—so how do you even know they exist nor how to come to know them? Nothing you said actually explains how you can discern a moral fact from a taste. Performing an ‘ethical’ action presupposes that you know it is ethical—but I am failing to see how you would know this in your view. It seems like moral facts are sui generis under your view, perhaps like in moral non-naturalism, and I just fail to see how you would ever know them.

Simply asked, how do you discern that what you are doing is actually moral as opposed to a strongly held taste that you have?

Ethical intuitionism is a form of moral non-naturalism, and says that we intuit the moral facts. Its main argument for moral realism is that:

1. One ought to trust their intuitions (intellectual seemings) unless there are good reasons to doubt them (phenomenal conservatism).

2. It intellectually seems as though there are moral facts and there are no good reasons to doubt those intuitions.

3. Therefore, there are moral facts.

I just disagree with the second part of #2. But this view is compatible with platonism: we intuit the moral facts which are platonic forms.

I outlined it in that post, which part did you disagree with?

My example argument is that non-cognitivists and subjectivists misunderstand the meaning of moral statements: "you ought not murder" just doesn't mean either "don't murder" or "I disapprove of murder". When we claim something like "one ought not murder" we are trying to describe an objective feature of the world. As such, if there are such features then realism is true and if there aren't such features then error theory is true.

If you are saying moral subjectivists are misunderstanding the meaning of 'moral' language, then please let me know which part of my analysis of the terms is incorrect.

Normative facts are statements referring to stance-independently existing prescriptions; and moral facts are subject-referencing normative facts.

I think those 'meanings' are perfectly aligned with what you are trying to argue for with moral realism; but I don't see how linguistics is helping your case. Just because it seems as though there are moral facts because we colloquially express our norms in a moral realist kind of manner does not entail they exist whatsoever: it's a non-sequitur.

That is true, P5 should have been "Moral facts are about states-of-affairs".

@Banno @Moliere

Moliere's exposition of directional fitness has got me thinking. Perhaps there is an argument to be formulated in favor of moral anti-realism (or a hybrid kind of view) here:

P1: How the world is does not entail how the world should be.
P2: States-of-affairs are about how the world is.
P3: Normative judgments are about how the world should be.
P4: Moral judgments are normative judgments.
C1: Therefore, states-of-affairs do not entail any moral judgments.

P5: Moral facts are states-of-affairs.
P6: States-of-affairs do not entail any moral judgments [C1].
C2: Therefore, moral facts do not entail any moral judgments.

I think, Banno, you will have to reject P5. But if this argument holds, then we get a weird severing between the moral facts and the moral judgments we make, such that we cannot infer how to morally judge from whatever moral facts are presented to us. Let me know what you think.

Like what?

Ethical intuitionism & neo-platonism.

If you look closely at anyone who strongly believes in moral realism, you'll find a bit of a misanthropist. They're stuck on the realism side because their psyche is full of hatred and condemnation. The compulsion to condemn is so strong that they can't tolerate any notion of relativity. Or so it seems to me. :razz:

Interesting. I could see saying moral realists tend to be quicker to judge, but I think this may becoming a bit of an ad hominem on moral realists out there...

I wasn't playing devil's advocate. I was just saying that religion is the only legit moral realism. I think what you're saying is that religion doesn't provide for moral realism either. My point was that it does if it's your worldview.

Interesting, I would say various religious views contain within them moral realist positions (not in the sense that I agree with them but rather that they purport to lay claim to moral facts); but there are non-theistic views (albeit probably still religious) which equally purport such claims and (I would say) with equal (if not more) plausibility.

A moral anti-realist says Neanderthals aren't evil. Let's see if we can understand why they became cannibals. Was it climate change? Was it encroachment by those Homo Sapiens? What happened? And this is the grand payoff for moral anti-realism. It gives you space to understand. Moral realism gives you no such space. Understanding is the beginning of mercy and compassion, both of which are anathema to moral realism.

I disagree. Both anti-realists and realists can attempt to understand why they became cannibals, and a moral anti-realist can condemn them as evil (if they want).

I reject 1.

Obviously if you reject the premise that ordinary language philosophy is correct then the argument will fail, but then what better theory of meaning do you have?

I am not quite sure what you mean by "theory of meaning" nor why I would need it for this discussion. Metaethics is about, among other things, whether there are moral facts--irregardless of what the signification of colloquial words mean. By moral fact, I mean a normative fact (and by 'normative fact' I mean a stance-independently existing prescription) that is subject-referencing.

Ok. Have you been following the discussion here about direction of fit? If not, have a read of
↪Moliere

I have not: thank you for the link!

To "discover" something, it has to already be there to be uncovered. So the direction of fit for making a discovery is that one produces sentences that set out what it is that has been discovered.

But this is not what we do when we talk of ethics. We reverse the process, setting out how the world ought to be, then hopefully implementing our words.

You asked:
So, for your view, how do we discover the moral facts? — Bob Ross
We don't discover them.
...how do we evaluate which moral propositions are actually true? — Bob Ross
There can be no algorithmic process here, that sets out which moral propositions are true and which are not.

I see. So, under your view, how do we know we are actually abiding by the moral facts then? Intuition? What vessel do we use to prescribe moral facts as opposed to non-facts?

My take on the post by @Moliere that you referenced was that the moral facts would be an ‘is’ that is an ‘ought’: they would be mind-independently existing prescriptions. It seems like you both disagree with that, and are in favor of some sort of neo-Humian Guillotine.

Yes, but, as I said, I don't think it is a strong argument when it depends on ordinary language. It doesn't actually negate moral subjectivism, it just states "ordinary language is used in accordance with moral realism, regardless of whether moral realism is true or not"--and the italicized is what is missing in premise 2. I can agree with the fact that ordinary language aligns with moral realist positions while refraining judgment or even negating that moral realism is true.

My point in what you quoted was just a general worry I have, not with premise 2 but with the whole argument. It depends on accepting as true whatever is implied by ordinary language, and it provides absolutely no clarification on what the moral facts subsist in or of nor how we discover them. It just basically states that 'it seems as though moral realism is true based off of ordinary language, therefore it is true'.

Are there personal desire facts? "I like to breathe." sort of thing?
To the same extent there can be moral facts. "Societies like truthful communication."

There are facts about our psychology, but those aren’t normative facts. Reducing “one ought to...” to “I believe one ought to...” does not produce a normative nor moral fact, because it is purely subjective.

I can see why you would say this if by ‘moral’ you are just talking about ‘obligatory behavior’ and then it seems to follow that societies have implemented obligatory behaviors and those are facts—but I would say that there is a fact that societies have certain norms, but that doesn’t entail the norm itself is a fact: those are two different things. I would say that societal norms are inter-subjective.

Humans need social nurturing as well as food and shelter. Parents need to love and nurture their children, and children need to be nurtured. Are you having any difficulty with the reality of these things I am saying?

So, I would say these are normative facts, but not moral facts; because these type of normative facts do not, in-themselves, reference the subject (as opposed to the body) and thusly do not dictate what one ought to be doing. My body can have an ingrained normative fact such that ‘my body must eat’, but that doesn’t tell me, as the subject, as a mind, what I ought to be doing—it is entirely possible that the morally evil thing to do, for the sake of the argument here, is to eat.

I appreciate your argument! Let me see if I can adequately respond.

I think I disagree with premise 2: just because "one ought..." is usually linguistically interpreted as a fact of the matter, it does not follow that they actually are. So I think moral subjectivism hasn't been adequately refuted, and its refutation is wholly contingent on that premise being true.

Likewise, the general problem I have with this sort of argument, which is really an intuition based off of ordinary language (that moral realism is true) is that it doesn't sufficiently explain what moral facts actually are nor where they subsist in or of. Without that, I think it is fairly simple to undercut this argument by noting that all of this linguistic moral realism can be reduced to moral subjectivism--viz., that it is just an illusion because there's no actual moral facts one can point to or even, in principle, explain how we would discover them.