First, the definition is for the science of morality, not morality itself. Is it circular? No.
Ask the most philosophically ignorant person you can find “what is right and wrong”. They will cheerfully tell you what is right and wrong by their moral sense and cultural moral norms. No more of a ‘definition’ of morality is required. My definition generates no “circularity” issues.
Further, defining morality beyond what is “right and wrong”
for example as Kant’s categorical imperatives, would make the definition nonsense. You could have the scientific study of cultural Kantian norms or Kantian sense motivations - incoherent nonsense.
What is your basis for claiming that what descriptively moral behavior ‘is’ has zero relevance for what morality imperatively ‘ought’ to be?
Any proposed imperative moral system that is not harmonious with the principles encoded into our moral sense will be rejected as “not what morality is about”.
Also, remember there is no agreement and there may never be agreement on what morality imperatively ought to be.
Do you have a better suggestion for moral guidance?
“The science of morality studies the psychological, neurological, and cultural foundations of moral judgment and behavior”.
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No, it is not circular. What our “moral sense” is and “cultural moral norms” are is established in all societies independent of how anyone defines or does not define morality.
Would saying “The science of morality studies why descriptively moral behaviors exist” help clarify why there is no consideration for what morally ought to be done?
One could argue “The study of descriptively moral behaviors has nothing to do with ethics”. However, arguing that “our moral sense and cultural moral norms have nothing to do with morality” would require some truly tortured definitions.
Bob, Thanks for taking the time to comment.
I see Sam Harris as an embarrassment to the Science of Morality field. His science is minimal...
Are you interpreting the “Science of Morality” to refer to something like the “Science of Ethics”?
My goal in this post is to argue for defining the Science of Morality as firmly within science’s domain. I have said nothing about what arguments should or should not be part of ethics. I advocate removing moral ought claims only from science, not from ethics. A clear boundary between the scientific and moral philosophy domains would benefit both.
“The study of why our moral sense and cultural moral norms exist".
By including moral ought claims, Wikipedia’s definition of the Science of Morality either removes the field from the domain of science or proposes that moral ought claims are a part of science. Neither seems sensible. It is a poorly thought-out definition.
Right, I have described how understanding why our moral sense and cultural moral norms exist can be culturally useful in terms of instrumental oughts for achieving goals. How is that a facade?
Hi Bob, sorry for the delay on this reply. I've started a new job and been much busier lately. Lets go ahead and wrap this one up as I think we're nearing the end. Feel free to take the last reply.
From my view a syllogism is a tool to formalize an argument, but it is not the argument itself, especially on an informal philosophy board. The argument is what I'm addressing.
I'm not claiming you need an infinite set of validation. I've noted your argument is not complete enough for me to understand the logic that you're undertaking, and I'm not trying to needle in on any gotchas.
But from my point, what I do see is subjective to me, and I'm not seeing clear arguments that show otherwise.
If it is spoken about objectively, yes. If we would say, "Hate feels like this objectively," it would be wrong. If we say, "Hate is intense feeling of wanting to destroy something without remorse," then it can be seen as objective. We aren't describing the personal intensity or feeling of experiencing hate, but describing hate in terms of actions that a person will take.
The "nature" of a thing is a bit outdated of a term, and again, something I would want fully detailed in a good conversation.
. How you define value is through other people's emotional evaluation of something.
Stating, "Value is an indefinable concept, we just know it innately" means its a subjectively defined word.
True, but to get to flourishing you first need the steps of defining value, then intrinsic value, and showing how we can objectively determine it
What you are reading are the leftovers, the failures. They are fantastic references to see where humanity has already explored and found to be a dead end
You've seen this as well in your past posts. You reference one part of an older philosopher's work, and suddenly everyone has their opinion of that philosopher's end work, when you just want to talk about the part.
Not explicitly telling people that these are often old, outdated, and ultimately philosophies that could not take the step to science, is in my opinion, philosophies' greatest failure as a study.
Things don't pop up for no reason, in fact, that is an assertion that implies a cause(in this case, 'no reason')
Other primary causes which we deem incapable of being in any way answerable for their responsibility in having brought about a certain effect, we then deem fully unalterable via the (yet possible) administration of rewards or punishments—with tornadoes being one example of such latter types of causes. In this second generalized category of cause-types we then place all natural evils. Here, though the wind is responsible for the tree’s leaves movements, we neither blame nor praise the wind in an attempt to either alter or reinforce its doings (this because the wind as primary cause is incapable of in any way answering, or taking responsibility, for what it does). — javra
I think this may be a helpful way to reframe my debate with @Bob Ross.
For one example, while people will blame and praise their dog’s doings with the intention of altering (else reinforcing) their dog’s behaviors, tmk most will not blame or praise an AI’s doings in their interactions with the AI program with the intention of altering (else reinforcing) the AI program’s behaviors. The first is deemed an agent whereas the second is not. (If dogs are too controversial in terms of moral doings, then one can just as well replace their example with the example of fellow humans.)
Not sure if this is of significant benefit to the discussion, but to me at least it does serve to further illustrate the divide between moral evils and natural evils. — javra
Thanks - I think it is very relevant to the discussion I am having with @Bob Ross, and this distinction between agent-causes and non-agent-causes is central to the OP, because for the OP morality is bound up with agency.
I added a bit to my last post in an edit and I'm not sure if you saw it:
The reason we don't call natural evils immoral is because they are appreciably different from moral evils. Both natural evils and moral evils are evil or bad (and this is their common genus: evil or badness). So what makes them different? The difference lies in whether their cause is a responsible agent—something that can be held responsible for producing the evil effect.
A moral good is the meal cooked by your mother. A non-moral good is the rain that waters your crops
For example, "Grandma does not exist anymore." We talk about things losing and lacking being.
Yes, because if everything happened to be red then we wouldn't be capable of identifying or distinguishing red
What does the word "moral" in your term, "moral discourse," mean?
Does it mean something other than the two senses I already gave?
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(As in the OP, "acts" is shorthand, and is not meant to exclude other moral or immoral things, such as habits.)
We can talk all day about good trees, or good birds, or good sunsets, and no one will suppose that we are engaged in moral discourse.
If you think there is a morally ideal possible world EVEN WHEN there is no possible world in which agents exist; then you are admitting that morality is not dependent on, nor gets its core substance from, analyzing acts. — Bob Ross
Earlier in our conversation I already told you that I don't think this.
<The tornado is a "moral" "agent" "acting" "immorally">
"Being" involves analogical predication and degrees. For example, propositions exist in a different way than giraffes or colors. "Brk" is a univocal predication, as is your predication of "moral (agent)."
Oh, but you are saying it is a property. You think the tornado has the property of "moral agent," and this property applies to all things without exception.
For traditional language-users "moral" has only two basic meanings, and both are closely related: 1) capable of moral or immoral acts, and 2) moral or immoral
. The fact that you have a hard time communicating your thoughts with idiosyncratic language is no coincidence, for idiosyncratic language undermines the purpose of language itself.
It is moot insofar as it does not impact the formal soundness of your arguments. It is not moot insofar as it will prevent you from easily talking with other people and engaging in dialogical philosophy.
Only because "evil" in that sentence will be interpreted as, "evil (human) acts." If you ask the same person whether a devastating tornado is evil, and whether it is immoral, they will probably say yes/no.
And they are right, for immorality implies culpability. I showed you that SEP affirms this. We could also go to IEP and Wikipedia, but if you distrust SEP then I doubt these other sources will avail.
Are we perhaps at the end of our conversation? SEP says that we call something morally evil, morally bad, or immoral insofar as it "results from the intentions or negligence of moral agents." I agree with SEP; you disagree. You think entities incapable of intention can truly be called immoral, such as tornadoes. For me, this is the key takeaway.
Edit: I suppose I should raise the customary toast to the argument from vacuity. That if everything is "moral" then nothing at all is "moral."
• Jake: That tree is brk.
• Sue: What does 'brk' mean?
• Jake: Brk is a property of everything whatsoever.
• Sue: So nothing is non-brk?
• Jake: Nope, nothing.
• Sue: Well if there is nothing which is non-brk then it would seem that 'brk' means nothing at all.
The true word 'moral' has meaning because there are realities which are truly non-moral (or amoral)
Excellent, and it is the corollary that you seem to transgress at various points throughout the thread, "Amoral agents can only produce amoral acts." Or similarly, "Amoral agents cannot produce acts which are moral or immoral." Do you accede to this corollary?
But someone who holds that the suffering and death of 100 people are bad would just say that death and suffering are intrinsically bad (or evil)
You think it is immoral because you have idiosyncratically defined "immoral" to include natural evil, as I noted above (
↪Leontiskos
). You agree with SEP that it is a "bad state of affairs which did not result from the intentions or negligence of moral agents," but instead of using the common philosophical parlance of "natural evil" you call it "immoral." According to moral philosophy that which does not result from the intentions or negligence of moral agents is in no way moral or immoral.
You will never hear newscasters or other people speak about the immorality or wickedness of tornadoes
Arthritis is bad, but it's not immoral
Yes, but the only way this distinction makes sense (to me) is if this natural evil is still morally bad (being evil); — Bob Ross
If SEP is making a distinction between natural evil and moral evil, then it makes no sense for you to say, "Okay that distinction makes sense to me so long as natural evil is moral evil." To say such a thing is to fail to understand that any distinction is being made at all!
Morality is restricted to the realm of deliberate acts. As SEP demonstrates, this is not controversial.
But I still need to know what you mean by "amoral," as you continue to use this term. In the thread you have spoken about amoral agents and amoral acts. What are amoral agents and amoral acts?
"A natural evil is a bad state of affairs that does not result from the intentions or negligence of moral agents."
Suppose a tornado kills 100 people. The suffering and death of 100 people is evil; it is a bad state of affairs.
Therefore this evil is natural.
If we continue you may need to begin to shoulder more of the burden of proof, for your posts are becoming increasingly opaque to me.
"What do you suppose it means to be an amoral or non-moral reality?"
They are not. Someone who does something right is someone who is capable of moral acts. Similarly, someone who does something wrong (or immoral) is someone who is capable of moral acts.
At this point I'm getting impatient because you're not even reading my responses.
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Thus someone who does something right (and not wrong) is a moral agent who is in no way culpable, and therefore it is flatly false to claim that moral agents are necessarily culpable
If the dog is not a moral agent then it is not capable of committing immoral acts, such as rape.
Then it's high time you defined what you mean by an immoral act.
If you think evil just means immoral then you didn't read or understand the SEP articles, because they clearly distinguish moral evil from natural evil.
What is the breadth of the moral sphere? The common view is that some acts are moral, such as giving a starving man food or committing murder, and some acts are non-moral, such as taking one’s dog for a walk.1 You should immediately notice that by “moral” I do not mean morally good; by “moral” I am not talking about the opposite of immoral. Instead, when I use the term “moral act” I am referring to an act that belongs to the species of moral-and-immoral-acts; or an act that belongs to the species of good-and-bad-acts. More simply, I am referring to an act that is susceptible to (moral) scrutiny, evaluation, or judgment. A moral act is an act that can be legitimately (and, thus, morally) judged good or bad; a non-moral act is an act that cannot.
In order to understand why all human acts are moral acts we must understand the difference between applying scrutiny to an act and applying moral scrutiny to an act
What do you suppose it means to be an amoral or non-moral reality? You may as well say that non-colored realities can be red.
Given the way you use words like "culpable" and "immoral," I think what you are in need of is a dictionary.
At this point I'm getting impatient because you're not even reading my responses.
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Thus someone who does something right (and not wrong) is a moral agent who is in no way culpable, and therefore it is flatly false to claim that moral agents are necessarily culpable.
That's basically the definition of a moral agent: something that is capable of moral acts
This is incoherent. If the dog is not a moral agent that can be held responsible then it cannot commit immoral acts. You can't say that the dog is simultaneously non-moral and immoral. You are committing contradictions.
1. Non-moral (or "amoral") realities do not engage in moral or immoral acts.
2. A tornado is a non-moral reality
3. Therefore, a tornado does not engage in immoral acts.
Solve for X: 2X + 1 = 3
2x = 2
2x/2 = 2/2
Conclusion x = 1
1. An evil demon exists.
2. Evil demons always compel people to do wrong.
3. Therefore if people do wrong, it might be an evil demon.
As I noted with your argument earlier, this argument is incomplete. The first thing I would ask is, "What's an evil demon?"
For example, cars and fuel go hand in hand. All cars run on fuel, and therefore to talk about something that has no relation to fuel is not to talk about a car. Nevertheless, not all car talk is fuel talk. We can talk about things like steering, brakes, or tires without talking about fuel.
Note that the things I am stating are not in any way controversial, so you may need to brush up on moral philosophy.
No, I have never said such a thing. In fact the word "culpable" appears only once in my OP. I'm not sure how you are drawing all these conclusions from that one sentence. They certainly don't follow.
I don’t disagree that the only moral agents are those which can be held responsible for their actions (or some subset of them); but this in no way implies that amoral agents are not doing morally bad nor good things. — Bob Ross
Read the bolded part of that sentence back to yourself. You are positing that amoral agents can be moral
Are you saying that whatever type of premises we stick inside of a syllogism, are now objective because the structure of a syllogism is objective?
1. What's an example of an object that has intrinsic value? Not our emotional states. Most of your core examples seem to do with pain, awe, etc., or our personal emotions. I'm having a hard time seeing how you're not simply describing personal emotions demanding attention and action instead of the objects themselves.
2. You claim your value morality is objective. As you've noted, I've been giving both subjective and objective examples of arguments. Now its your turn. Write me an argument for your value morality that is subjective under your view. This will help me to see how you view subjectivity and objectivity beyond the abstract. There should be no barrier to this.
Yes, it is objectively true that the old man has never gotten cancer, but it is his conclusion that is subjective because it relies on the old mans' personal experience, or anecdote. Therefore the argument is a subjective argument, not an objective one
How do you specifically evaluate the intrinsic value of things without requiring subjective viewpoints?
How would a psychologist objectively conclude that X has intrinsic value?
Culpability talk is only one kind of moral talk.
So the claim is that if culpability does not, even in principle, pertain to tornadoes or reflex-kicks, then these are not moral realities.
If it is impossible to ever hold X responsible or culpable, then X is not a moral agent. Because of this "wrong" cannot be applied to tornadoes, for "wrong" is a moral predicate.
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That's basically it, but don't you think this also accounts for why a tornado is not a moral agent?
In moral philosophy a tornado is a natural evil, not a moral evil. Not all evil (i.e. bad things that happen) is moral
When I say that moral realities are not limited to acts, I am thinking about things like habits, intentions, societies, etc. I am not thinking about tornadoes. I hold the uncontroversial view that tornadoes are not moral realities.
OBJECTIVE arguments are often those that have to do with logos, that is, reason, evidence and logic, generally dealing with material questions (things that can be sensed or measured and have to do with the real outside world, outside of oneself).
I'm not intending to use the term truth, but arguments.
Objectivity is an approach to thinking that minds take to ensure that the subject of the self is not dependent for the argument
Do we have evidence of rays that emit from objects, interact with brains, and compel them to do things? Or do we have some people who really WANT that thing over there, therefore believe its not their fault, it must be compelling them? Do you see which argument is objective vs subjective?
An example I would give is, "The Grand Canyon". Such a feeling is usually described as 'awe'
I said, "Morality is therefore not only about what someone does or considers. It is also about what they fail to do or fail to take into consideration."
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If someone neglects to do something with invincible ignorance, then they are not culpable for their "negligence" because their omission is not in any way deliberate.
I agree that morality involves a study of goodness, but in the OP I am focusing on the question of the breadth of the moral sphere. The idea is that we determine how far the moral sphere extends by comparing the set of all acts to the set of moral acts.
Now, I did add Objection 5, and perhaps this is what you are concerned with?
• K1: If something is not a human act, then it is not a moral act
• K2: Only moral acts are moral or immoral, right or wrong
• K3: Therefore, if something is not a human act, then it is not moral or immoral, right or wrong
• K4: A reflex-kick at the doctor's office is not a human act
• K5: Therefore, a reflex-kick at the doctor's office is not moral or immoral, right or wrong
The effects of human acts are moral insofar as they touch on volition