Hello 180 Proof,

On the contrary, I "ground" ethics and epistemology and ... "in rationality" (i.e. adaptive inferential-discourse). Maybe this divergence is why we're talking past each other.

Probably. Can you firstly define what you mean by “rationality” and, secondly, explain how and why you ground ethics in it?

Bob: that is, such facts oblige rational agents to posit hypothetical imperatives – normative practices – which are adaptive with respect to those facts as constraints.

Are you saying that the moral facts obliges us to posit hypothetical imperatives? If so, then what are those facts? And how are they facts (as opposed to hypothetical imperatives themselves)?

In terms of my position, I have already outlined it here.

Hello Judaka,

Before responding to your whole post, I wanted to get some clarification first.

I think I may have identified our confusion with each other: are you trying to convey that "rationality" includes the consideration of one's morals and values, as opposed to 'rationality' entailing any sort of particular ethical theory?

If you are just trying to convey that one needs to be consistent with their own values, whatever they may be, then I agree and do not see how my definition precludes that. If you mean that 'to be rational' includes someone adhering to a particular ethical theory, then I disagree and say "rationality precludes ethics" (in that sense).

I think that it is rational to consider one's values stems from the fact (i.e., that it agrees with reality for me to say that) that one must use their values inevitably to perform any actions; and so it would be irrational to contradict or put no effort into deciphering one's values. However, there is no consideration of any ethical theory in what it means to 'be rational', as it would be very odd indeed to say that someone is irrational for merely disagreeing with one's normative ethical theory (or what not) even in the case that they are being logically consistent, coherent, etc.

And to respond to your clarification request:

Clarify something for me, are you trying to use the word "rationality" as though you invented it? To give it your own definition and understand it in your own way. Or are you treating it as a public term where I need to justify my understanding of rationality?

I am not sure if I fully followed this question, but I would say that I am treating it as a term that is open to refurbishment as problems arise with its current definition.

If by “public term” you are referring to colloquial speech, then I would say that I am not aware of any reputable dictionary that defines “rationality” with any ethical consideration (as it usually just means vaguely "to abide by reason"); and, furthermore, people (at least from my experience) tend to have a notion of rationality that precludes ethical considerations in the sense of what is or is not ethical to do.

For example, if someone disagrees with another person’s normative ethical theory (e.g., someone disagrees with you that what is morally good is what is best for the group) and their theory was highly thought-out, logically consistent, coherent, has some good points, etc., then most people would say that the person (that disagrees with their theory) is being rational but that they simply disagree. In your definition, I think it lacks this key aspect of how people use it in colloquial speech if you are claiming that what is wrong or right is relevant to 'being rational' as opposed to 'one must be coherent and consistent in whatever they think is right or wrong'. Hopefully that makes sense.

In terms of a technical definition, which I am much more interested in than colloquial notions of it, I think that my definition is a sharpened form of the colloquial notion.

For now, I would like to start here so as hopefully we can progress the conversation and hone-in better on what each other mean.

Bob

I recommend that if you intend to keep it no matter what, you shouldn't respond to this comment, it will be a waste of your time.

I never intend to retain my views at all costs, as that is intellectually ingenuine and does not further the conversation. If I am convinced by anything you say, then I am more than happy to concede on whatever point you are making; and I expect the same from anyone else.

Yes, I'm unwilling to work with you while you use that definition, it's dishonest to an extreme, but like I said, keep it as is your right.

These kinds of straw mans do not help us further the conversation: why do you think, in addition to me being wrong, that I am being dishonest?

What do you think makes something part of rationality?

I already gave the definition and elaborated on it in detail to you: see the OP.

Is something only part of rationality when we agree with it?

Not at all, and I never suggested that. Someone is being rational if however they are acting sufficiently seems to be agreeing with reality.

What makes an understanding of the concept "correct" or "incorrect"?

This is just a question about epistemology in general, and I would say that it is based off of many factors; such as the one’s I had in the OP. E.g., parsimony, explanatory power, intuitions, reliability, credence, logical consistency, coherence, empirical adequacy, etc. Of course, we develop more fine-tuned principles depending on the goals of the particular study, but I would say the aforementioned are the basics.

You say you disagree with the ethical dimension of rationality, but is it even valid for you to disagree?

I think so. I don’t think you have demonstrated why “rationality” would include ethical considerations, and I think I have demonstrated that excluding ethics actually fits experience better (such as in the case of a rational psychopath).

Who gets to decide what is or isn't part of rationality, and on what basis?

Epistemological speaking, on evidence, intuitions, explanatory power, coherence, etc…

I am not saying that everyone should use the term in the manner I defined it: there are literally millions of contexts and there may be some where it is better to use a different definition; and, of course, if one wants to discuss with a particular group of people who use it in a specific manner, then it is probably best to use it in there sense of the word (even if one disagrees).

It just depends; but I think that my definition gives the best account of the crux of what it means to be rational.

Rationality just is what it is, I explained my understanding of what it is, and if you provide a very good problem with it, then I won't just say "Ah, that's not part of rationality then", I'll instead say, "You've pointed out a good problem with the concept"

I agree, but this has not happened in our conversation. You have not provided, by my lights, a very good problem with my definition. If you did (and I recognize it), then I would gladly concede on that point.

You've set up rationality as "good", you've literally defined it as "good practice", and thus, rationality can never be a problem, and I think that's asinine.

It can never be an epistemic problem, but it can surely be a pragmatic or moral problem! You keep conflating the different types of “goodness” I have outlined with some sort of generic one, which doesn’t work.

Also, I have not crafted “rationality”, by definition, in a way that fits my goals (i.e., as good); but, rather, it is epistemically good because of the inherent hypothetical that a person commits themselves to when engaging in epistemology. You keep overlooking this point I keep making.

Can't you see how stupid that is? If rationality is best practice, then it's self-evident that it's the best, so why would we need a thread validating it?

This is stupid because you are arguing against your own straw man of my position. I never said rationality is “the best practice”: practice of what? I, likewise, am not even claiming it is inherently, in-itself, the “best practice” of epistemology: I am saying that the inherent hypothetical imperative to epistemology favors rationality as the best means of achieving it.

I said it was possible for a serial killer's actions to be considered rational

Let me clarify. If you accept that a serial killer can be rational and it is morally wrong to be a serial killer, then rationality precludes morality. Now, please tell me which antecedent you disagree with, so we can further this discusion.

It sounds like your response is that it is possible because morality is about what is best for the group: now you are just importing your specific normative ethical theory into this, of which, in this case, I disagree with; but I do not see how it is relevant for us to now argue about our different ethical theories. First, I want to know what benefit there is to including moral considerations in the term “rationality”, and then we can dive into ethical theories if we want to.

It's not unbiased, it's not fair, and the concept is rigged against the serial killer - though mind you, most people are fine with that.

As I have defined it (which has no moral considerations), it isn’t rigged; so the crux between our positions is that you seem to think it needs to include moral considerations, and I don’t. Why do you think it needs moral considerations?

If you wanted to know what instrumental rationality is, how about, GOOGLING it? What the heck... I'm not the first person to bring it up to you.

I don’t want to know (right now): it isn’t relevant. I want you to engage with what I am saying, and not whatever instrumentalist rationalism says.

Ah, is that so? You said yourself that nobody can be 100% perfectly rational, which should invalidate it as a binary, does it not?

Not at all. I said nothing that denies the law of noncontradiction.

Rationality is just an idea, it can have flaws, well, at least if you define it reasonably, which you haven't.

I never said my definition is flawless.

I would also like to mention that the primary focus of the OP is not the definition rationality: you have just hyper-focused on it: the argument is that there are objective epistemic norms.

Hello Judaka,

Based off of your response, I do not think this discussion is going to be productive. I think I put in the effort to address all of your points and, instead of reciprocating that effort, you resorted to primarily re-voicing your distaste for my definition (with no real substantive response).

I am going to briefly respond to your points, but if you are unwilling to engage with my previous response, then I think we may have to just agree to disagree.

Yes, well, as I said, you're describing instrumental rationality.

This is may be true, but I do not know what this “instrumental rationality” is that you are referring to; and, thusly, will not endorse it. I am saying what I am saying, and if it happens to coincide with some position I have never heard of, then that’s fine.

I didn't amend anything, I merely said it was unlikely and then gave some if statements.

You said:

It's unlikely that a psychopath's desire to kill would qualify as rational, though it's possible. If they understood their actions were wrong, considering that morality is of the highest importance, we couldn't say their actions aligned with their beliefs and values, which is a prerequisite to rationality.

Your justification for it not counting as rational, which is imperative for your position to work, is the hypothetical that they understood their actions were wrong; which was not a part of my example: that’s what you amended. If this was just a hypothetical side-note, then please respond with how the psychopath’s rational murdering is irrational. You seem to just be saying, by my lights, that it is immoral, but why would that have any affect on the rationality of it?

Your definition is so vague, that I'd be surprised if you couldn't fit whatever you wanted into it. Hence why I called it a form of "good".

You cannot fit anything into it: it is a very clear definition. If one is acting in agreement with reality, then they are fundamentally behaving in a rational manner. Any principles derived from this obligation or taste to ‘act in agreement with reality’ is likewise a part of ‘being rational’.

You're entitled to your opinion, but you'll get pushback from others.

That is fine, but I am wanting to know your push back.

This is just linguistics. You're behaving as though your definition was earned, given to the term rationality because it really deserves it. Have you forgotten that you just made it up...?

Logical, actual, and metaphysical necessity are not mere ‘linguistics’: they are modes of modality.

All definitions are ‘made up’, but that doesn’t mean they are whimsical or arbitrary.

What do you mean by ‘earned’? My definition is meant to best portray, at its root, what rationality is and I think it captures it quite well. I was never claiming to have provided every principle that can be derived therefrom.

There's zero ambiguity here, it's never good to fail to act in a manner that 'agrees with reality", there's no merit to it. Not epistemologically, morally, logically or in any other way.

Logic does not comment on the merit of arguments other than its form, so what do you mean by it has no merit to it if it abides by logical laws?

I already accepted that it is epistemically good; and any moral merit is just an irrelevant importation of you own ethical theory.

And you've decided these are the two options? Rationality or irrationality? Get a bit more creative.

I am not sure what you are implying here: either something is p or it is not p; so either something is rational or it is not rational.

Ahh... by the way, you won't be able to succeed in this if you keep your current definition of rationality. Perhaps just try to think about rationality through its tenants instead.

The tenants of rationality are not the same as its definition: they are examples of it. I gave the definition.

I appreciate your elaboration of your view! As I believe now that our views are not so apart as we originally thought.

I agree with a lot (although not all) of the tenants you voiced about “rationality”, as I would consider them coherently derived from my definition: let me explain.

Logical thinking - One should think logically, and avoid unhelpful emotional and psychological influences

Why does thinking logically entail being rational? Because, I would argue, it is means (an act) which agrees with reality when one is trying to derive something. In other words, if they want to derive something, then it is most rational to be logical because it agrees with reality; and, for example, why it is irrational to think in accordance with “if it is has the property of blueness, then it is true: if not, then it is false” is because it doesn’t agree with reality: blueness is not a property that determines, in reality, the truthity of a proposition.

Goal-driven thinking - One acts in accordance with their goals

Why is goal-driven thinking rational? Because, in reality, one has to start with their will when performing anything; so it agrees best with reality to understand what one’s goals really are (so that, for example, they don’t waste a bunch of time).

Logical Consistency - One acts in accordance with their values and beliefs

I don’t agree with this one for two reason:

1. Logical consistency is not “one” acting “in accordance with their values and beliefs”: it is to not hold any logical contradictions in one’s beliefs.

2. Acting in accordance with one’s values and beliefs, to me, is subsumed under “goal-driven thinking”.

Hierarchical Thinking - One follows 2) but prioritises goals and values in order of importance

Again: it is rational to do this because it agrees with reality. If prioritizing things was merely a reflection of whimsical imagination, then it would not be rational to do so when trying to perform actions, or actualize goals, in reality.

Reflection and Openmindedness - One aims to improve their thinking and decision-making

This is rational because, as you can anticipate, it provides the person with a better understanding of the world, which, in turn, is predicated on the goal to agree with reality. If one doesn’t care about agreeing with reality, then they may very well decide to be close-minded—to stick to whatever belief they like and stand ten toes down.

Ethical Considerations - Rational decision-making should take into account ethical principles and moral values.

No (: This is a hard no for me. Again, a psychopath can kill people in a highly rational (as in carefully planned, logically consistent, goal-oriented, coherent, effective, etc.). Which leads me to briefly respond to:

It's unlikely that a psychopath's desire to kill would qualify as rational, though it's possible. If they understood their actions were wrong, considering that morality is of the highest importance, we couldn't say their actions aligned with their beliefs and values, which is a prerequisite to rationality.

You have amended the originally example I gave in a manner that fundamentally changes it: you are positing that the psychopath themselves believe that they are doing something wrong. Of course, a person who does something they think is wrong (in its most primitive sense of the term) is being irrational because they are contradicting themselves.

However, my example made no such stipulation: a psychopath could believe it is perfectly right (or at least permissible) to do horrific things to other people; and they can do so in a highly rational manner. This is no different than anyone else who deploys principles of which they think highly agree with reality to achieve their goals.

Their actions have risks such as imprisonment or death, if one understands the risks of an action outweigh the potential rewards, then by definition, pressing ahead anyway would be irrational.

I agree that if the reward does not outweigh the risk, then it does seem (at least prima facie) to be irrational to do so. However, two things to note:

1. It is not self-apparent that the psychopath’s reward of thrill and gory action against countless victims does not outweigh the risk of being put in prison (from their perspective).

2. The reward is subjective in most scenarios; that is, how rewarding an action is is usually based heavily on one’s personality. So, for me, it may be that I don’t find the reward outweighing the risk, but someone else could and would be still rational.

Ok, back to your tenants:

7) Acknowledging Biases - One should aim to think objectively, be mindful of the potential for biased thinking and aim to focus on the facts

This is only rational because it is a principle which attempts to agree with reality: in this case, to try to know the world better by attempting to remove the bias lens of subjective interpretation.

Evidence-based Thinking - One should ensure their thinking has sufficient evidence to be justifiable

This is rational because it is the best way of agreeing with reality (in action). If I want to know something, then the best way to know (something about reality) is to evaluate the evidence. If this were not true, then this would not be rational to do.

In summary, I think that your tenants are derived from my over-arching definition of rationality.

Rationality has an important role in morality, because within philosophy, morality is overriding, it's of the highest priority

I am not denying that morality supervenes on epistemology but, rather, that what one ought to do to know the world is distinctly and completely different, in principle, from what one ought to do for the sake of being ethical. Thusly, to be rational is purely an epistemic consideration; but it may be that certain rational behaviors are banned for moral reasons.

Are you honestly saying that it's not epistemologically good to "act in a manner that agrees with reality"?

It is, but you weren’t claiming that before: you were claiming that it is “good”.

You've set up rationality as inherently good with your definition, have you not?

I wouldn’t say it is inherently good whatsoever; but I would say it is i]epistemically[/i] good and not (necessarily) morally good. This is because what I need to do to know the world may not coincide with what I need to do to behave ethically; and rationality is only epistemically good because it is the best means of achieving knowledge, and the definition itself does not entail an inherent goodness of any sort. It is good as a biproduct of what epistemology is set out to do: to know the world.

It's not conditionally good, it's necessarily good.

Rationality is conditioned to be epistemically good by what epistemology is set out to accomplish, which is to know. It is not logically, actually, nor metaphysically necessary that it is good.

No soul under any circumstances would consider being called irrational praise, especially not with your definition.

This is just an reflection of the colloquial usage of “rationality”: of course, it is an insult in every day-to-day talk to be called irrational; but that doesn’t lend any weight to your argument that rationality as I defined it is inherently good.

How unfortunate, you're contrasting rationality against nonsense.

Irrationality is nonsense.

Or in other words, why do I need to act in a manner that agrees with reality to know the world?

Because in order to know the world one has to deploy principles which agree with it.

It's pretty much the other way around, I need to know the world to act in a manner that agrees with it.

This is a good point, and I think there are two things worthy of pointing out here:

1. You rightly point out that one cannot just inherently know how to agree with reality; but my point is that that is what people who are engaging in epistemology are trying to do! They are, in other words, attempting to agree with reality to know it; for one cannot come to know reality by using principles which do not hold for anything in reality: it is like using an instrument that doesn’t work. I would say that rationality is all about, at its core, agreeing with reality in this way; and that rational people are always taking in the world as input, processes it, and attempting to come up with principles which will help them better process the information.

2. No one, under my definition, is perfectly rational: not even if they did every tenant you can think of 100% of the time. This is because one can never absolutely know that their actions 100% agree with reality. That belief of agreement is pragmatic (i.e., evidence-based) reasoning. We can only ever strive to to be perfectly rational.

Make no mention of acts, logic or goals, limit your definition to knowledge if that's all you want to talk about.

Actions, logic, and goals are all pertinent to epistemology, and are not precluded nor excluded by the practice.

"normative" is "the normal way”

Normativity, as I understand it, is etymologically “the normal way” but means something which is a prescriptive statement (e.g., ‘ought’, ‘should’, ‘obligated to’, etc.) and not merely what is “normal” in society. Granted, sociologically people tend to use it in the “normal to society” manner.

As in, there are other ways of interpreting rationality besides the normal way. My only meaning is that l I'm saying your understanding isn't normal.

Fair enough!

Hello Judaka,

It seems as though we are thinking of “rationality” in completely different ways, which is fine! What would be the fun in us simply agreeing? (;

Although I am going to address your points as adequately as possible, I would like to ask you to define and elaborate on, likewise, what you think “rationality” is; that way, I can assess and compare our views more sufficiently.

Your definition can't be taken literally, as it wouldn't make sense

I am failing to see why it doesn’t make sense when taken literally: could you please elaborate on what wouldn’t make sense if taken literally?

You've said this isn't just "good", great, prove me wrong. I struggle to imagine you can come up with one because I can't understand why it would ever be good to not "act in a manner that agrees with reality". Could you give me an example of where it would be?
…
I hadn't intended "good" to refer to "moral goodness". Your "good" is unknown to me, it's just clear that your definition is a version of "good".

Firstly, I honestly don’t know to interpret a generic goodness. Although I don’t think this is what you are asking (because of the last section of the above quote), if you are asking how one could consider it morally bad to “act in a manner that agrees with reality”, then I would say that literally any position that one could hold that posits such would be an example. For example, it is perfectly compatible with my OP for one to also posit that it is morally abhorrent to be “rational” (in the sense I defined); or for a psychopath to systematically kill people in a highly rational manner.

In the sense of epistemic goodness, although I may have misspoke in a previous post, I would say that the “goodness” is the result of accepting the hypothetical imperative to “determine how to know”; and from this is where epistmology stems (and the epistemic norms therein and rationality).

In the sense of another category or type of goodness, I genuinely do not know what to make of it without further clarification. What exactly do you mean by this?

I've called your definition another way of saying "good" because I'm confident you think it's always "good" to act in a manner that agrees with reality.

What is “good”, if I were to allow myself to contemplate this generic goodness without fully understanding it yet, in its most trivial sense, is just what one thinks one ought to do; and if you think that you ought to act in a manner that agrees with reality, then, yes, it would be good. However, in this sense, “goodness” is trivial: I can say of any definition of any verb, for example, that it is “good” insofar as I think I ought to be performing that action—but the definition of the verb is not presuming that it is in-itself good as a matter of definition. I would say that being rational is an objective consequence of engaging in epistemology, and that the definition of it has nothing to do, in-itself, with it being good. In other words, being rational is good if one is engaging in epistemology (or committed themselves to some sort of moral imperative).

Meaning, you will not be willing to refer to anything that you thought wasn't good as "acting in a manner that agrees with reality"

Couple things that standout to me in this sentence:

1. Whether I think being rational is good (in any sense of the term) is irrelevant to its definition in the OP.

2. I could, as a hypothetical, claim that it is (morally) bad to be rational, or that one can be rationally evil because the definition is morally neutral itself.

Do you see my logic? Your definition almost certainly divides between good and bad, and that's seemingly the only thing it does.

I don’t see how it, by definition, divides between moral goodness vs. badness, and it being epistemically good is not the definition of it but, rather, a biproduct “rationality” being an essential element of epistemology.

How is the division between some good vs. bad “the only thing it does”?

Objectively better? Could you elaborate? Do you have any evidence to back up your claim?

There are objectively better norms for “knowing the world”; that is, there are better ways, independent of minds (i.e., of “opinions”, of “subjects”, etc.), to come to know reality.

An easy way to think of this is that if there weren’t any better ways to “know something”, then any explanation is valid. Thusly, I can say that I know that “this is green” because “a square circle told me”; that “cucumbers are on mars” because “I like the idea of that”; that you are wrong because “1+1=2” (and somehow that makes you wrong); etc.

Epistemology entails that one is engaging in intellectual investigation that tries to figure out what actually exists, and this implies that there are betters ways of knowing. These ways are not just subjectively better, it is objectively (epistemically) wrong to claim that “cucumbers are on mars” merely because “I like that idea” because it violates this attempt to know the world (as opposed to what we want the world to be).

you are definitely understanding rationality in your own way. I had been assuming much based on my understanding of normative rationality, but it's clear that doesn't apply to you.

We clearly do not think of rationality in the same way, and that is why I would appreciate it if you elaborated more on your view (so that I can better respond to your inquiries). For me, the only kind of rationality is normative, so when you say “normative rationality” it makes me anticipate that you may believe that there is a non-normative mode of being rational: is that true?

Hello Judaka,

Aren't (3) and (4) key components of rationality?

I would say that all four epistemic norms (I expounded) are key to being rational.

Your definition of rationality is terrible, "acting in a manner that agrees with reality". You're really going to refer to "agrees with reality" as being "objectively grounded"?

I am not entirely sure what you mean here: yes, acting in a manner that agrees with reality is the general definition I use. The epistemic principles which are used to do so are objectively better or worse then other epistemic principles one could use to try and do so; and so rationality, being grounded in those norms, is likewise grounded in objective norms.

The manner of acting that can be referred to as "agrees with reality" is just "good".

This is a semantic association that I did not want to use for the OP (because it isn’t necessary). Objective epistemic norms provide an epistemic “goodness” but not a moral goodness.

The act of agreeing with reality (i.e., being “rational”) is epistemically “good” because it is an objectively better means of “knowing the world”, which is a hypothetical imperative that one has committed themselves to the very moment they engage in epistemology.

That which is sensible, efficient, or appropriate, is what can be referred to as "agreeing with reality"

No. That which is “appropriate” or “sensible”, is going to depend on the person or society and I am not arguing that any sort of individual or collective agreement itself proves a principle to be objective (epistemically).

That which is “efficient” could be an aspect of being rational, if by that you mean parsimonious, coherent, logically consistent, etc.

So, it's objectively good to be things that by definition can only refer to things that are good?

Couple things:

1. I am not saying that one should be things that agree with reality: I am saying that one should act in a manner that agrees with reality.

2. It is not objectively morally good but, rather, epistemically good to be rational.

3. I don’t understand what you mean by “by definition can only refer to things that are good”: being “rational” is not itself what is “good” here but, rather, the epistemic norms provide the “good” and rationality is guided (or compelled to) that epistemic “goodness”.

Contrast rationality with a reasonable alternative.

What do you mean? A reasonable alternative definition?

Setting up rationality as "good" and then talking about how it's good to be good, that's pointless.

I never used the term “good” nor did I imply that rationality is just by definition "good": you are countering your own straw man of my argument.

Hello 180 Proof,

I assume, @Bob Ross, you will take issue with this paraphrase and so I look forward to you making explicit its problems or confusions.

I do, in fact, take issue with the “paraphrase” (:

Here’s my contentions:

1. It is a not a paraphrase of the OP but, rather, applies the OP to a specific metaethical & normative ethical position.

2. Specific metaethical or/and normative ethical positions are irrelevant to the OP’s argument, as, according thereto, there are objective epistemic norms simply due to the nature of epistemology.

3. A “hypothetical imperative (of reducing suffering…)” being a “presupposition of ethics” has no relevance to there being a hypothetical imperative of epistemology. There could be moral facts or no moral facts, and there would still be the hypothetical imperative of “one should determine how to know [the world]” which is implicitly accepted when engaging in epistemology.

4. Moral facts are useless. See here for details.

5. Moral facts could certainly impact how one engages in epistemology, but they wouldn’t themselves generate (by my lights) epistemic normative facts—they would only ever produce more moral facts (of which influence, at a deeper level, one’s epistemic commitments to some degree).

6. Although this is going to come down to what you mean by “rationality”, I would say that rationality is not deeply rooted in ethical principles. For example, a psychopath can systematically kill people in an extremely rational fashion.

It seems like, and correct me if I am wrong, you ground rationality purely in ethics and not epistemology (and I do the opposite).

I look forward to hearing your reply 180 Proof!

I appreciate your response! Everything you said I found to be fair enough!

I was not meaning to imply that the evidence against one's intuitions must come from beyond oneself; as I agree that one should be actively trying to "attack" their own intuitions. However, they will only be able to critique their intuitions, or even change their minds, by accepting new (or other) intuitions; and so intuitions, I would say, are still primary even in the case that one is critically thinking about them.

Heading into the bush for a few days; not sure of cell coverage, so…. forewarned.

Absolutely no worries, my friend!

Negative on both. Moral obligations begin with interest in a principle, and one SHALL, not merely SHOULD DESIRE to, abide by a categorical imperative the principle determines….in order to declare himself an moral agent that is worthy of his happiness.

Interesting! Couple questions:

1. How is "begin with interest in a principle" different from "moral obligations begin with tastes"? You contended the latter, but affirmed the former; and I am just having a hard time understanding how those are different claims.

2. What are you semantically distinguishing with "shall" vs. "should desire"?

I would say that "certainty", in the sense of absolute--beyond a doubt--confidence of the truth of a proposition, is only a derivative of uncertain reasoning, as it is defined by an inductive commitment to the principles of logic. Thusly, the truth of a proposition is said to be (absolutely) certain iff it is logically impossible for it to be false.

Therefore, only what is deduced from the inductively ascertained grounds of logic is said to be certain. Such as, for example, 'a = a'.

For me, consequently, absolute certainty only pertains to the form of an argument and never its content; and only certain principles of that form which I inductively commit myself to.

In the sense of some sort of absolute certainty, some absolute ground, from which one can begin their reasoning, I find it to be non-existent. One is only afforded degrees of confidence at the roots of their derivations.

Hello Alkis Piskas,

I think we may be reaching a semantic dead-end here, but let me try to adequately respond.

I am using the term “proposition” in these two senses that you provided:

Logic: A statement in which something is affirmed or denied, so that it can therefore be significantly characterized as either true or false.
…
A proposition in philosophy is the statement or conjecture which can be analyzed for its truth value.

This is exactly what I defined it as here:

Philosophically, a proposition is a statement that is truth-apt

Now, something important I wanted to clear up:

Both expressions "to be" and "can be" refer to a future action

To say that it “can be analyzed for its truth value” is just to say that it is truth-apt. This does not imply whatsoever that the proposition expresses a statement concerning the past or present, but, rather, that it expresses something that is either true or false (and not both).

"to be" refers to existence, which does not entail any particular tense, but I can agree that "can be" refers to something in the future in a practical sense.

In fact, these definitions are not much different than the what I discribed earlier.

It is incredibly different, you said:

A proposition is something that is suggested to be considered, accepted or done. It clearly refers to the future

Propositions do not exclusively express a truth-apt sentence about the future.

See, you don't make a proposition for the sake of the proposition itself, and just forget about it.

The point of a proposition, in philosophy (of logic), is to define a form of expression (i.e., a sentence) that expresses something which can be evaluated as true or false (i.e., truth-apt) in the sense that it depicts something that is either true or false (and not that a person has the physical or mental capabilities to evaluate it properly).

I was never suggesting that we create a proposition for the sake of itself, nor that we forget about them.

Can you fit this term in any of the descriptions of the term "proposition"?

Firstly, I am not saying that “fact” is synonymous with “proposition”, so I don’t have to fit it into any of the definitions.

Secondly, it “fits” insofar as I noted before:

a ‘fact’ is a proposition of which its content appropriately agrees/corresponds to reality

In other words, a ‘fact’ is a statement which is truth-apt, of which went evaluated agrees with reality with regards to what it claims about it.

Nothing of these is a proposition. They are just information about things that happened or happen are are going to happen. That is either facts (past and present) or expectations (future). There is nothing in them that proposes anything.

We may just have to agree to disagree, but I can assure you all of those are text-book examples of propositions in philosophy. See https://www.cs.odu.edu/~toida/nerzic/content/logic/prop_logic/proposition/proposition.html#:~:text=For%20example%2C%20%22Grass%20is%20green,and%20the%20second%20%22false%22.

We can't say, e.g. " I propose that Bob went to the store yesterday”, or "I propose that Bob is eating” or "I propose that Bob is going to eat”. They all sound ridiculous, don't they

Those aren’t propositions!

Firstly, saying “I propose...” is a proposal, not a proposition. Saying you propose something just means that you are hypothesizing or asserting something, and what you are asserting is the proposition. “Bob went to the store yesterday” is the proposition being proposed in the sentence “I propose that ...”. Not all sentences are propositions.

Secondly, you have to be careful with indexical statements, as they do not refer, if taken as a proposition, to what you seem to think: “I think that Bob went to the store yesterday” is not the same as “Bob went to the store yesterday”--the former pertains to whether or not the person-at-hand thinks that bob went, and the latter pertains to if bob actually went (and not to mention that the former’s truthity is relative to the subject being considered, so it could be true for me and false for you if I do think bob went and you don’t).

OK, we can go on forever if you keep trying to milk the bull.
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anyone would have the patience to do ... But my patience is over.

Absolutely no worries, my friend! I do not want you to be frustrated with me, and if I am convinced by your argumentation then I will gladly concede (as I am not trying to “milk it”); but, with all due respect, I don’t think you right about propositions at all. In philosophy, the term “proposition” means something very specific, it is not a proposal.

A proposition is something that is suggested to be considered, accepted or done.

Philosophically, a proposition is a statement that is truth-apt and not merely something “suggested to be considered, accepted, or done”.

It clearly refers to the future.

Not at all. A proposition can be about the past (e.g, “bob went to the store yesterday”), present (e.g., “bob is eating”), future (e.g., “bob is going to eat”), tenseless expressions (e.g., “bob went to the store on Friday, December 23rd, 2022 at 5:55 a.m.”), or atemporal expressions (e.g., “God is [eternally and timelessly] good”).

The only qualification for something being a proposition (in philosophy) is that it is truth-apt, which are statements.

A fact on the other hand refers to something that is present or in the past.

In practical life, I agree; but this depends on one’s theory of time. If one considers the future to not exist yet, then, yes, facts must pertain to the present or past. However, if one considers the future to exist equally as much as the present and the past, then there are “currently” facts about the future. Also, if one believes in atemporal entities, then those would be facts which do not pertain to the present or past. Either way, I don’t think it matters for this discussion, as I am saying that if these “moral principles” exist (mind-independently), then that qualifies them as facts.

I'm afraid that you must choose a term/concept other than "fact" for your posit. It will be much better than altering its meaning to fit your posit. Don't you think?

I don’t think I am altering the philosophical senses of the terms at all here.

From what I could understand from your description, maybe the term/concept of "thought" will do ....

I am not arguing that morals are concepts of thought, I am generically discussing the metaethical debate about moral facts (i.e., moral realism) vs. non-facts (i.e., moral anti-realism) and noting that even if the former is right it is so insignificant that it doesn’t matter.

Sorry, I must have misunderstood what you were originally trying to convey; as I thought you were contesting my OP with the use of categorical norms. Are you agreeing that moral obligations begin with tastes, but that one should desire to abide by some set of categorical imperatives?

Hello Alkis Piskas,

A fact cannot be moral or immoral. Not for the reasons you are stating but by definition.
A fact is something known to exist or having occured.

Interesting point! Yes, you are correct that my OP presupposes that facts can be of the ‘moral’ type. I would say that a ‘fact’ is a proposition of which its content appropriately agrees/corresponds to reality. In other words, it is a thought that corresponds to something which exists (or occurred, as you put) and not just something which exists. In light of that definition, I would say that a ‘moral fact’ would be an obligation, asserted in thought, that correponds to something in reality. This would entail, I would say, that there exists an obligation mind-independently; that is, it is not contingent on any will. As an example, this could be a platonic form.

Even in terms of your definition (i.e.,, “a fact is something known to exist or having occured”), I still think there is a possibility for a moral type of fact because nothing about that definition negates the idea of an obligation which is mind-independent (e.g., it doesn’t rule out that there could be a ‘fact’, in this sense, that is a platonic form of goodness).

Hello Mww,

Ok, but why are desires not simply synonymous with tastes?

They are; and I apologize if I suggested otherwise.

Moral obligation: that interest of will, by which the worthiness of being happy is justified.

I think the crux of this definition rests on “worthiness of being happy”: how does one define what is worthy of happiness without appealling to values (fundamentally)?

Hello Tom Storm,

How do you establish the truth of the correspondence theory of truth?

One does not, under any theory of truth, establish truth of the theory of truth without any circular logic. I only claim that the evidence is stacked in favor of truth itself as being equivalent with this theory, which, of course, entails that I will interpret the truthity of a proposition via the lens of this theory. This is no different than epistemology: how does one know what it means to know, without divulging in circular logic? They don’t.

I take a correspondence theory of truth, so I would say that truth is a relationship between subject (viz., mind-dependence) and object (viz., mind-independence) such that truth is the uncovering of what is.

As Aristotle put it, to say that which is is or that which is not is not, is true; and to say that which is not is or that which is is not, is false.

Truth, according to this view, is neither purely objective nor subjective, but is absolute.

I agree with the proposition that moral obligations do not begin with desires.

I see, and what do you mean by a "moral" obligation, as opposed to a mere obligation?

I would say the contrary, that moral obligations are rooted in tastes. In other words, "morals" is rooted in "values", not vice versa.

All good, nevertheless my only objection is here: fundamental obligation is categorical, represented as a command of reason, re: shall, whereas hypotheticals are mere ought’s.

Do you believe, then, that obligations do not begin with a desire?

My point is that even if there are categorical imperatives, we only are obliged to them if we desire them; and that is the hypothetical imperative that stands morally deeper than the categorical imperative; and, as such, is one's fundamental obligation. If one's obligation to the categorical norm is hypothetical and one has committed themselves to the antecedent, then the most rational thing to do is to simply commit oneself to whatever is objectively implied by that hypothetical commitment and to do so irregardless of what the categorical imperatives are.

Why not take up…..? Mostly because it’s all-too-often very much easier not to.

Well, I am not disputing that people tend to take the easiest way out; but that is not the purpose of this OP. I am arguing for the de-valuing of moral facts (as useless in moral discourse).

Hello Plaque Flag,

In order to further the conversation, I would appreciate it if you could define (generally) what you mean by "rationality"; because your position seems to be that what is rational is ethical. So far you still have not provided a definition but, instead, are providing examples of rational discourse--but that just begs the question!

To reciprocate what I am asking of you, here is my definition of rationality: "to be, in all matters of assessment, closely married to reality to the best of one's ability, and, consequently, to deploy principles which best achieve such". That which irrational, is that which, in matters of assessment, deviate from what reasonably gathered about reality. Of course, what one thinks is is reasonably gathered about reality is dependent on one's core epistemic principles (so there is a subjective aspect to it in that sense), but the epistemic principles that are best suited for being closely married to reality is certainly objective. Rationality, put another way, is to commit oneself to the hypothetical imperative of being as closely married to reality as possible. Now, what is your definition?

Hello Ciceronianus,

I take it you don't mean what one should want. If that's the case, though, I'm not sure how helpful "moral discourse" would be.

In the sense that I cannot say they are objectively wrong for what they want, or even if I can appeal to a moral fact it would be useless, you are correct; but I don’t find anything talking in terms of “you should want...” because it is a colloquial expression of trying to convince somehow either (1) of what one suspects they will agree with given proper contemplation or (2) something that one believes is worthy of imposement on the other. Sometimes people argue that moral anti-realism, and positions similar to what I argued for in the OP, explode into #2; but I find that #1 is still largely intact, as most people agree on fundamental obligations (they just don’t agree on how to achieve it) (and of course there are exceptions).

Hello Schopenhauer1,

For we can never get out of our physical, cultural, and social choices that were already laid out for us. Every birth is a political move. This world is supposed to mean something. Otherwise, why would you bring more people into it? Can you imagine if people brought people into a world and thought it a useless endeavor?

I guess I am just not following how this ties to the OP, as I would say that the meaning that actually matters is one’s fundamental obligations (which are tastes), and that is why people are begotten by other people. Are you claiming that it requires an objective meaning to actually matter?

Hello Plaque Flag,

I have not been able to penetrate into what you mean by “rationality”, as it seems to be some sort of logos, so please give me clear and concise definition (so that I can assess). — Bob Ross

...a participant in a genuine argument is at the same time a member of a counterfactual, ideal communication community that is in principle equally open to all speakers and that excludes all force except the force of the better argument. Any claim to intersubjectively valid knowledge (scientific or moral-practical) implicitly acknowledges this ideal communication community as a metainstitution of rational argumentation, to be its ultimate source of justification

It's not so unlike a demystified version of logos in the sense that science and philosophy dialectically and autonomously determine / reveal / establish / revise the conceptual aspect of our shared reality.

You didn’t provide a definition of “rationality” here. The paragraph you shared uses the term without defining it. So let me ask again: what do you mean by the term “rationality”? Saying there is an “ideal communication community” that is a “metainstitution of rational argumentation” tells me nothing of what you mean by the term “rational” itself.

If it's only a private logic in which you prove the unreality of norms, your 'conclusion' is a personal 'superstition,'

It’s not private logic: logic is logic. I am not saying that we make up the laws of logic, I am saying that what one uses to determine that there are laws of logic is subjective. You seem to be under the impression that using hypothetical norms as one’s fundamental obligations results in everything becoming subjective, which is not true.

an opinion that doesn't aspire to any 'justification' beyond effective sophistry.

It’s about conversing to ‘convince’ people of one’s position (and not to scam them or maliciously argue with them), where by ‘convince’ I mean get the person to see that they themselves already agree with it in the depths of their psychology. Most people share the same fundamental obligations or very similar ones without necessarily realizing it.

The rational community is founded on (is structure by) communication norms

I don’t agree with that one bit, but, then again, I still don’t know what you mean by ‘rational’. For me, I mean, for simplicity’s sake, “being closely married with reality” (which entails using normative principles that are better suited for that). So, for me, rationality has absolutely not dependence on a community; however, it may be more rational to collaborate—but that “rationality” qualification there is just that one is “being closely married with reality to achieve their goals”. This is why I said a psychopath can be very rational, but nevertheless really unethical.

Claims are justified within a 'public' logic which members, as members, take for granted willingly [ autonomy ] as an authority.

This reminds me of Nietzschien ethics.

A 'mind-independent judgment' sounds like a judge-independent judgment --- indeed an absurdity

Just like how there can be laws without an author, I find no reason to believe that there cannot be a law (judgment) of morals without a judge (author).

The same style of argument reveals 'mind-independent reality' to be absurd in the same way, since the world, so far as we know from experience, is only given to subjects [who are themselves within this same world that is given to them, a strange loop.]

I disagree. Just because everything we gather about the world is via the filter of our minds, does not in any way entail that the world itself is mind-dependent. As a matter of fact, there must be something which is mind-independent, even in the case that the world is fundamentally mind-dependent (in the sense of what eternally exists is a Universal Mind), for the brute fact (or facts) of reality would be necessarily mind-independent.

Taken at face value, the claim that Nigel has a moral obligation to keep his promise, like the claim that Nyx is a black cat, purports to report a fact and is true if things are as the claim purports. Moral realists are those who think that, in these respects, things should be taken at face value—moral claims do purport to report facts and are true if they get the facts right.
...
While moral realists are united in their cognitivism and in their rejection of error theories, they disagree among themselves not only about which moral claims are actually true but about what it is about the world that makes those claims true.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-realism/

Notice the lack of mention of mind-independence.

Facticity is mind-independent existence. Moral realism is the idea that there are objective moral judgments, according to standard definitions, like the one you quoted, whereof ‘objective’ is mind-independent (sometimes called stance-independent) existence. Another simple reference is Wiki:

Moral realism (also ethical realism) is the position that ethical sentences express propositions that refer to objective features of the world (that is, features independent of subjective opinion)

Irregardless of definitions, it wouldn’t make sense to say something is objective if it is dependent on one’s mind, for that is exactly what subjectivity means. What is real is that which is mind-independent, which includes mind operations insofar as the operations it is true that those operations occurred independent of any mind current operations; that is, in other words, that something contingent on a will, being itself subjective, is objective insofar as it is a fact that it happened (and no one can change that): it is a part of existence, which is mind-independent itself.

The point is just that those logical norms themselves must be real in order for you to appeal to them as authoritative, therefore making your own conclusions significant

I don’t think this is true: this presupposes that what is objective is only worthy of any moral force, which just begs the question (as I am literally arguing against that). I am saying that subjective norms are significant, and that objective norms are the insignificant ones (truly).

Hello Frank,

I think your point is that moral realism is associated with a conundrum: it assumes that we don't know right from wrong innately, so we need an external set of rules. But how do we know which rules to embrace if we're morally vacuous to begin with?

This is also a good point, but not the point I am trying to make. Instead of questioning how reliably a person could obtain knowledge of the moral facts, I am questioning why anyone should care about the moral facts (regardless of how easy or difficult it is to know).

I was looking at the cultural roots of the conundrum, as opposed to trying to resolve it. I don't think it has a resolution. :razz:

I see!

Hello Frank,

I'm sure neither of us wants to dissect Christianity

I am more than happy to discuss Christianity if you find it relevant to the OP: can you tie it back to the OP so I understand where we are headed with this?

Hello Plaque Flag,

Sure. But I already did. Maybe you missed it ? I gave a nice, long quotation above.

I have not been able to penetrate into what you mean by “rationality”, as it seems to be some sort of logos, so please give me clear and concise definition (so that I can assess).

If they aren't fundamental, your own claims about them lack leverage or 'force.' It's like going before the court to argue that argument itself is not to be trusted.

I never said that they aren’t fundamental nor that they cannot be trusted: I said that they are tastes. Some tastes are better for acquiring truth and some are better for survival.

But the problem is the status of that claim itself. It suits you (it's pleases your taste) to believe that it's all just taste

In the underlined sentence, please expound what is incoherent or logically inconsistent with it—as I am not seeing it. You are absolutely correct that I am saying that we use norms as the bedrock to what we do, which includes epistemology, and that, yes, my assessment of norms is contingent on what norms I used to assess them: I don’t see any logical contradiction nor internal/external incoherency with that position. If you disagree, then please elaborate on where the contradiction or incoherence is.

I think you are imagining a kind of logic that is untainted by normativity

No. I am agreeing that the use of logical principles is contingent on one’s tastes; but I am not saying that those tastes are untrustworthy (in virtue of being tastes) nor that they are not fundamental (to one’s derivations of reasoning).

so that you can get logical leverage on normativity itself

You can assess normativity, as a concept, while using normativity as a necessary but incomplete analysis: what is wrong with that? This is no different than analyzing ‘being’ as ‘substance’.

Just because one must use norms to perform logic does make those norms objective.

Only 'ethical' rationality (the essence of science) can do this.

How does science give us a viewpoint of normativity beyond that normativity? I don’t think it does.

The philosopher as such can't earnestly question the reality of normativity.

Anyone can question the reality, in the sense of being mind-independent, of normativity; they just can’t question normativity (independent of consideration of its mind dependence/independence). With all due respect, I think you are confusing the analysis of normativity in general with its objectivity (or lack thereof).

Like I said, respectfully, magic stones in a hidden dimension, assumed to be cognitively inaccessible from the very beginning

I’ve already clarified this, so I am confused why you are still straw manning moral realism: the idea is that there are true mind-independent moral judgments, which do not necessarily have to be tangible.

It's (nonobviously) mystic talk about a round square.

Then demonstrate to me the incoherence (just like the “round square”, which is an incoherence in terms) of talking of mind-independent moral judgments.

What does the world look like from no perspective at all ?

Just because no one has directly come to know the world-in-itself does not imply that mind-independent morals, just like objects, are incoherent like a “round square”.

Hello Janus,

I'm not committed to the laws of nature: I'm saying that regularities are observed everywhere; if you want to study things and try to understand how they work, what alternative is there to observation?

Where I am confused then, is why you said:

There do seem to be laws of nature; there are constantly observed regularities, and very little, or perhaps even no, transgression of those laws

Saying “there do seem to be laws of nature”, by my lights, is admitting that you believe in laws of nature, am I misunderstanding? Irregardless, if you are saying that you don’t believe in laws of nature, then I am asking you: do you agree with me, by your own terms, that believing in laws of nature is on faith?

To me, it seems like you are denying this as well, am I wrong?

Are you saying that logical consistency coupled without observation is all that we can know? That would exclude all laws of logic except for the law of noncontradiction (which, to me, seems like special pleading), the laws of nature, and literally any other metaphysical claim. Why? — Bob Ross

Why can you not carry on a discussion with me without distorting what I've said?

Janus, how can I distort what you have said (in any meaningful sense), if I am asking you questions? What you quoted is me asking for clarification! I am not saying you said that, I am asking if that is what you are saying.
To try and be as fair as I possibly can, to demonstrate to you that I am genuinely trying to understand you, I will layout the core of the issue here. You just said this to clarify “my distortions”:

I've said that what we can know via observation, logic and mathematics is all we can know.

But also said (a while back):

And faith-based beleifs cannot be argued for, because there is no publicly available evidence for them.

There is not publicly available evidence of the laws of logic nor the principles that guide mathematics; therefore, under you view, they are faith-based. No?

To me, it seems like you are special pleading that somehow only faith-based logic and math is acceptable as knowledge, but all other metaphysics is out the window. Why? There literally can’t be observable proof of logic, as it is presupposed in any observation!

If you think there is some other kind of knowledge which can actually be demonstrated to be such, as opposed to being merely speculation, then please offer up an example.

I think we know metaphysical things as well, with principles such as parsimony, logical consistency, coherence, reliability (of the data being used for justification), intuitions, and explanatory power.

I think we can know that every change has a cause, that objects have persistence, that there is a transcendent world (i.e., no solipsism), that there are other proper subjects than oneself, that there are laws of nature, that there are laws of logic, etc; all of which are apparently unwarranted faith-based reasoning since we haven’t observed it—unless we, for some reason, exempt logic from that rule.

More distortion!. That is not my view at all, and nothing I've said states or implies that it is. How will I know what you think if your argument is not coherent, consistent and does not contradict itself? This has nothing to do with faith, but with coherency and intelligibility

I will outline it again. You said:

And faith-based beleifs cannot be argued for, because there is no publicly available evidence for them.

Public evidence is things which are observed. The law of noncontradiction is not justified under any publicly available evidence; and since “faith-based beliefs” are ones which have “no publicly available evidence for them”, then it logically follows that the law of noncontradiction is faith-based (which is the basis of logical consistency). How is this a distortion of your view? It follows plainly from what you have said, and I quoted you to prove it.

I've said many times that all metaphysical positions, including materialism or physicalism, cannot be tested by observation, and so are faith-based, How does this refute the principle of logical consistency and what are the many other principles you claim it refutes?

The law of noncontradiction cannot be tested by observation, therefore it is faith-based (according to you terminology: not mine).

Hello Plaque flag,

I don't mean simple instrumental rationality.

Then what do you mean? Can you please define “rationality” for me (in the sense that you are using it)? For me, I was referring to rationality as (something along the lines of) being closely married to reality.

Respectfully, you are appealing to rational norms as you attack them.

That’s fine. I am appealing to epistemic norms, fundamentally, to demonstrate how those epistemic norms are either (1) not fundamental or (2) are tastes. What is wrong with that?

The alternative is that your are a cynical manipulator beyond good and evil, just trolling us. I of course think you are sincerely seeking truth here.

I appreciate that you believe that I am sincere, and I can attest that I am; however, I don’t see how this is the only alternative to what you said.

You seem to assume that norms are Real unless they exist like stones.

Not at all. I am saying that one’s fundamental obligation is always a taste (and not objective): it is mind dependent (and more specifically will dependent).

If semantics is even partially explained by inferentialism, you can't even think without real norms.

Sure, I can’t think properly without norms, but why are they objective? And why would it matter if they were? My point is that it wouldn’t matter, because one’s fundamental norms are always tastes, irregardless of whether there are factual norms or not.

You'd need the reality of those norms in order to intelligibly and paradoxically deny them.

Yes. Norms are “real” irregardless of whether they are objective or not; but that’s not what “real” means in the metaethical debate: it means something which exists mind-independently.

Any statement that can be understood is apriori false.

With all due respect, I was not able to make sense of this portion of you argument—as if this statement you claimed here is true, then it thereby false (and thusly leads to a paradox). I don’t see any benefit of holding this belief, which no different, in its structure, to saying that “all statements are false”.

This questioning itself is an expression of the autonomy norm that makes philosophy intelligible

What autonomy norm? Are you claiming it is objective?

Why should I regard @Bob Ross as more than a monkey using instrumental reason to try to get a banana

I like bananas (; . On a serious note, I am not more than a “monkey” in the sense that I am an ape; but how does this tie to the OP?

Because philosophy is founded on a deeper, ethical rationality

So you do think rationality somehow produces objective norms, correct?

Do we not apriori seek knowledge...justified true belief ?

Not everyone.

Hello Frank,

A moral realist says that people are dependent on external rules for guidance. There is benefit to seeing things this way because people are vile, and hard rules draw them toward something better. We should encourage people to ignore their instincts and follow the rules.

The thing is: somebody is picking those rules. That somebody is human. How did they pick the right rules if they were born vile and have no innate sense of rightness?

Yes, so it appears we do claim for humanity the ability to choose the right path, it's just that some people have this special talent and everybody else just needs to follow them.

This is a pretty fair summary. I would add that each person is actually determining the norm insofar as they are implicitly agreeing to it, and fundamentally, in the deepest depths of their pyschology, it is a reflection of sociological and physiological factors. We try to project morality onto something other than ourselves, but, by my lights, we end up just ignoring the fact that even when there are moral facts they are useless in any of our actual decision making (other than potentially a superficial ease-of-use tool that is guided by our fundamentally obligations).

The most fundamental Christian view, like from the gospels, is that Jesus says you do have an innate knowledge of right and wrong. You have the whole of the law in your heart, since the fundamental rule is to love others as you love yourself. As Augustine said, "Love, and do as you will." In heavily mythical language, Christianity says you were not born vile. You were born innocent.

Interesting. I agree that Christianity does advocate that we have the moral code written on our hearts, but I just don’t buy that: what about psychopaths (at the very least)? Also, I don’t think Christianity argues that we are innocent, as most Christians believe in innate sin.

De gustibus non est disputandum

I partially disagree: most people have false beliefs about their own tastes, so moral discourse is helpful for really honing in on what one truly wants.

My concern is that rationality itself is fundamentally ethical.

So, then, would it be ethical for me to murder someone if I abided by the most rational course of action to achieve it?

It seems to me that being rational can be utilized for good or evil; so it can't be fundamentally ethical.

...in which the claims implicit in the speech act are tested for their rational justifiability as true, correct or authentic.

Firstly, again, one can be incredibly rational in their justification of mass genocide; but that doesn't thereby make it morally permissible.

Secondly, "rationality" itself, I would argue, is normatively loaded; and is itself rooted, just like morals, in a taste (as its fundamentally obligation). For you cannot define what it means to be rational without importing what you fundamentally think one should be epistemically doing, which shifts the conversation back into the same normative issue I expounded in the OP with morality. For example, perhaps you think that what is rational is to be logically consistent, internally/externally coherent, to have intuitions which seem to correspond to reality, etc.: why should one be logically consistent, etc.?

Hello Janus,

There do seem to be laws of nature; there are constantly observed regularities, and very little, or perhaps even no, transgression of those laws

Do you agree that your commitment to the laws of nature is faith-based and not a publicly observed piece of data? Observed regularities not laws: these are two different things. One is the absolute principle which affects entities within its jurisdiction, and the other is simply something we have observed many times.

I have said that both what is publicly observable and the principle of consistency (validity) in logic are unarguably important in those domains of inquiry where knowledge is most determinable

Are you saying that logical consistency coupled without observation is all that we can know? That would exclude all laws of logic except for the law of noncontradiction (which, to me, seems like special pleading), the laws of nature, and literally any other metaphysical claim. Why?

Secondly, that one should be logically consistent, since it is not publicly observed, would be a matter of faith under your view as well. Again, either, I think, you will have to concede that we can know things without observation (and then open the door to metaphysics proper) or get rid of all principles which are beyond observation (including logical consistency).

They are pragmatically necessary if you want to have a coherent and consistent discussion about anything is all.

Correct. But it would be faith based on your view irregardless: you were arguing that metaphysics (such as idealist theories) are faith-based because they are not publicly observable evidence. My point is that this self-refutes many principles (such as logical consistency) under your own view: you are cutting your own head off (and this is why full-blown empiricism, which is just scientism, is self-defeating).

But they cannot determine what is true. This is a basic understanding in logic; that you can have valid arguments which are unsound, because although the conclusion(s) are consistent with the premises, the premises may be untrue, or even nonsensical.

Logical principles determines what is true insofar as they are the form of the argument; so I can say that an argument with a logical contradiction in it is false because it violates that logical law. Logic itself, as you noted, cannot invalidate nor validate arguments past their form. But, why does this matter for you claim? If you admit that using logic is not faith based, then I can equally claim that using occam’s razor is not faith based; and just use the argument from parsimony to argue for idealism, which you said was somehow faith based!

Honestly, I just didn't know, way back when, what to use as my handle; so I just went with Bob Ross (after the painter you mentioned before). Of course, there is no connection between him and I ):

I can assure you that they are not referring to me, although that would be cool (;

Hello Darkneos,

But I am observing the number 1, right now.

Let’s take an example (of what I believe you are referring to here): there’s a red block on the table in front of me and I say “there’s one red block!”. Did I thereby experience the number 1? I would say: no! Why? Two reasons. Firstly, and the most common argument, is that the object is distinct from the number 1. There is an object which is 1 object, but that is not the number one: it has the form of one; so, what you experience is an concrete object, which is not the number one, with the form of one (i.e., unity: a whole) and never the abstract object of one (or the abstract concept, if you are nominalist, of one). Numbers are abstract, they aren’t concrete. In other words, you will never bump into the number 1, but you may bump into one (concrete) object.

Another, secondly, is because singling out an object within the sea of experience is not equivalent to experiencing a quantity of one. I can easily split the ‘red block’ into two red blocks without manipulating it whasoever by simply conceptually divvying the red block in half: no different than how I can single out 1 finger or 2 parts of that finger—it’s all just nominal.

Kinda sounds like a flaw in reason, I mean why should anyone take your word for it? What makes your reasoning better?

I don’t want anyone to blindly follow me: please see the above arguments—let’s start there.

Allegedly, I get by fine without reason.

You must use reason, in the sense that you cannot avoid it. You are using your faculty of reason to argue against me right now; and you use it in practical life every time you so much as think (implicitly or explicitly).

Hello Plaque Flag,

Note please that you are assuming your own framework -- talking of 'representations' of the world -- in the presentation of the 'problem.' For various reasons, I frame awareness on terms of the direct apprehension of the world --not representation but good old fashioned seeing and smelling and ..

So, under your view, the brain is not representing anything? ‘Seeing’ and ‘smelling’, by my lights, are senses: are you saying we have senses without perceptions (i.e., formulations of those sensations)?

He's feeling no pain, because they gave him morphine.

I am particularly interested in this one, as this demonstrates that ‘he’ is representing the world, and that is in the form of his conscious experience; for giving him morphine has inhibited his sensory receptors and cognitive functions and thusly he has lost his ability to represent pain (i.e., and lost his ability to have the sense of touch in general). How would you explain it if his body is not responsible for representing unpleasurable and unwanted damage to his body in the form of pain?

Pain and 2–√ are just entities in a 'flat' ontology inferentially related to other entities like Paris and protons

I read your OP on flat ontology, and I don’t understand it yet. Is it a form of quantitative monism?

Pain, as the qualitative sensation, is not in the world like, for mathematically realists, the square root of two is; so I don’t understand how it is ‘flat’ in that sense.

We 'scientific' ontologists in our demand for justifications are not on the outside looking in --that's a failure of self-consciousness, an 'alienated' failure to notice our own central role.

Science can’t afford ontology: it afford a map, not the territory. Ontology is metaphysics, not physics.

I don’t think anyone in contemporary metaphysics thinks that they are on the outside looking in: we are on the inside looking out.

I understand why you want to say that, but I think you are reifying the [ discursive, dramaturgical ] subject. Are we gremlins in the pineal gland ? Do you sit behind your eyes, looking out the windows ? But then the tiny actual you must also have eyes that a tinier man sits behind, ad infinitum.

No we are not gremlins in a pineal gland. No I do not sit behind my eyes. I am a collective organism that represents the world to itself via sensibility, receptivity, and the understanding. The eyes are what are used to see, and there is no reason to posit another set of ‘eyes’ within them, so no ad infinitum here (by my lights).

Or our we always already on the 'public stage' of the rational conversation ?

What do you mean by ‘public stage’? Rational conversation is of our representations. What else would it be?

Are you saying that our brains just let the data of experience 1 to 1 pass-through? — Bob Ross

Our linguistic-conceptuals selves are more like softwhere on the crowd than the lardwhere they run on.

I did not understand your answer to this question: could you elaborate? I am not asking about language nor concepts (in the sense of our faculty of reason taking in our perceptions as input and derive ideas/concepts of them in our native language)—I am talking about representations (i.e., our faculty of understanding producing a filtered representation of the world).

I don’t think beliefs can be justified or proven with reason.

You can only ever use reason: you have no choice. How else would you suggest that you can prove something or warrant a belief?

Reason is rooted in emotion fundamentally and even then we did make up the rules for it as well. So that sort of blows a few holes in its reliability.

It is true that reasoning is rooted in emotions; however, we do not makeup the rules of logic: we discover them; and we can certainly fumble our way through such a discovery.

I mean just look at flat earth and vaccine denialism.

It was not a flaw in reason that these were wrong, but, rather, in one's reasoning. Our faculty of reason is our deployment of logic, modality, etc.: it is not a particular chain of derivation.

Your example doesn’t show you know things beyond mere observation, it’s more just assertions like 1=1.

You will never observe the number 1, ever. Nor that 1 must equal itself.

Science was able to show us the holes in our reasoning through the myriad of unconscious biases we employ each day.

I think you are conflating our faculty of reason with the term 'reasoning'.

A sophisticated direct realism is more parsimonious still.

But it isn't: you can't account, by my lights, for the fact that our brains are representing the world to us. For example, how do you account for the fact that if your brain is damaged in a particular way, then you lose your ability to see red if you aren't experiencing a representation of the world?

This is exactly because nothing is higher than reason (for philosophers) AND because the rational discussion is primarily concerned with worldly public objects (the stuff in our world)

You are right that our faculty of reason is using one's perceptions as input, but in order to account for many of those perceptions (and their relation to one another) the brain (and, more generally, the body) is best posited as representing the world (i.e., experiencing it via a filtered result from the understanding). You are basically throwing away, by my lights, the vast majority of biological and neurological knowledge that we have gained in the past 2 centuries and saying that, somehow, we are actually not filtering the world but, rather, directly experiencing it. Are you saying that our brains just let the data of experience 1 to 1 pass-through?

Hello Janus,

I have never claimed that our understanding that every change has a cause is universally applicable, or that it tells us anything beyond how things seem.

You said:

”It is just as much of a 'faith-based' reasoning as PSR or that there laws (as opposed to mere observed regularities): do you reject those as "unprovable" as well?” – Bob Ross

What is observable can be confirmed by observation: no faith required

Either you (1) believe there are laws (which are inductively affirmed by science) and philosophical principles (which are presupposed in science) or (2) you don’t. Laws are not observed regularities: the latter is evidence of the former. If #1, then you are admitting that a significant portion of science is (1) based off of faith and (2) unprovable because it is not observed (as it is an intellectual inference we make inductively). If #2, then you have to reject science, as it cannot function if you reject PSR (at least of becoming: that every change does have a cause); but if you accept it then, according to you, it is based off of faith (because you never observe that every change has a cause). Janus, although you may not explicitly subscribe to it, scientism doesn’t work, which is what you seem to be expounding here.

To me, ‘beliefs’ can be justified and proven with reason, and observations supplement those arguments. I can know things beyond mere observation (e.g., 1 = 1, a = a, p → q, laws of nature, laws of logic, PSR [of becoming], etc.). According to your view, as I understand, we are forced to claim that anything not directly observed is epistemically unjustified (as so-called ‘non-public’ evidence).

What logically follows is what logically follows, no faith required unless we want to claim that what logically follows tells us something more than the premises, and their entailments, from which it logically follows.

This is incoherent with your belief that anything which is not directly observed (and thusly so-called ‘non-public evidence’) is not epistemically justified: laws of logic is not something you directly observe and would consequently be a ‘faith-based’ absurdity under your view.