@Philosophim

Also, I would then be interested to what you refurbished definition of distinctive knowledge would be: is it simply discrete experiences and memories? If so, then I think this completely shifts the claims your essays are making and, subsequently, my critiques. But I won't get into that until after you respond (if applicable).
Bob

@Philosophim
I think that we are in agreement if you are removing the idea of awareness from discrete knowledge. However, I am still slightly confused, as here is your definition in your essay:

I will label the awareness of discrete experiences as “distinctive knowledge”. To clarify, distinctive knowledge is simply the awareness of one’s discrete experiences.

This explicitly defines distinctive knowledge as the awareness of discrete experiences. But now you seem to be in agreement with me that it can't have anything to do (within the context of your essays) with awareness. I would then propose you change the definition because, as of now, it specifically differentiates discrete experiences from distinctive knowledge solely based off of the term "awareness". I think that your essays are addressing what can be known based off of the analysis of the products of the processes and in relation to other discrete experiencers (where their awareness of such is irrelevant to the subject at hand, only that they also discretely experience). Is that fair to say? If so, then am I making any sense (hitherto) about why this is starting at mile 30? Maybe I am not explaining it well enough (it is entirely possible as I am not very good at explaining things). Are you ok with your essays starting their endeavor at mile 30, as opposed to mile 0? Or do you think it is starting at 0?
Bob

Hello @Philosophim,

I had to laugh at this one, as I've never had senses defined in such a way as sensing thoughts. We have two definitions here, so let me point out the definition the paper was trying to convey. The intention of the senses in this case is any outside input into the body. Some call them the five senses, but I wasn't necessarily stating it had to be five. Anything outside of the body is something we sense. The thing which takes the senses and interprets it into concepts, or discrete experiences, is the discrete experiencer. For the purposes here, I have noted the ability to discretely experience is one thing you can know about your "self".

Although I understand what you are trying to say, this is factually false (even if we remove my claim that thoughts are sensed). Senses are not restricted to external stimuli (like the five senses, for example): there are quite a lot of senses (some up for debate amongst science circles). Some that would be pertinent (that aren't up for debate) to this discussion would be those that are internally based: Equilibrioception (sense of balance, which is not a sense of external stimuli but, rather, internal ear fluid), Nociception (the sensation of internal pain), Proprioception (sense of body parts without external input), and Chemoreception (sense of hunger, thirst, vomiting, etc). I could go on, but I think you probably understand what I mean now: you have plenty of sensations that are deployed and received exclusively within your body. With regards to my claim that "thoughts are not absent of all senses", I do believe this to be true, but I think this isn't relevant to this discussion yet (if at all), so disregard that comment for now.

Could you go into detail as to what you mean? I'm not stating you are wrong. Depending on how you define senses, you could be right. But I can't see how that counters the subdivision I've made either. If I ignore my senses, meaning outputs entering into the body, then what is left is "thoughts".

I think this would digress our conversation even more, so I am going to leave this for a later date. Long story short, I think that just like how you can feel your heart beat pumping (which doesn't require external stimuli) you can also sense thoughts with seemingly conclusory thoughts (which are emotionally based convincements). Again, this isn't as pertinent to our conversation as I initially thought and I understand that it doesn't directly negate your idea that, apart from external stimuli, there is "thoughts". However, to say it is apart from all senses I think it is wrong.

No. I hesitate to go into animals, because its just a side issue I threw in for an example, with the assumption that the core premises were understood. Arguing over animal knowledge is missing the point. If you accept the premises of the argument, then we can ask how we could apply these definitions to animal knowledge. If you don't accept the premises of the argument, then applying it to animals is a step too far. This is not intended to dodge a point you've made. This is intended to point out we can't go out this far without understanding the fundamanets. My apologies for jumping out here too soon! Instead, I'm going to jump to other people, which is in the paper.

I understand your point that discussing animals is a step too far, but my critique also applies to humans.

You would not be able to read without the ability to discretely experience. This was implicit but perhaps should be made explicit. If you can read the letters on the page, you can discretely experience. If you can then communicate me with those letters back in kind, then you understand that they are a form of language. If you can do this, you can read my paper, and you can enter the same context as myself if you so choose. You can realize you are a discrete experiencer, and apply the test to reality.

I completely agree. However, I am not disputing whether you can determine me to be a discrete experiencer: I am disputing whether you can reasonably claim (within what is written in your essays) that you know that I have any sort of knowledge. By your essays' definition, distinctive knowledge is the awareness of discrete experiences: this is a separate claim from whether I have discrete experiences. In other words, you are right in stating that you have sufficient justification to say I am a discrete experiencer, but then you have to take it a step further and prove that I am aware of my discrete experiences. In your essays, both instances of knowledge that you define (distinctive and applicable) are a separate claims pertaining to the subject beyond the claim that they are discrete experiencers.

In your essays, they do not define "discrete experiences" as a form of knowledge (correct if I am wrong here), but they define two forms of knowledge: the awareness of discrete experiences (distinctive knowledge) and, after there is distinctive knowledge, the application of beliefs (applicable knowledge). Since applicable knowledge is contingent on distinctive knowledge and distinctive knowledge is, in turn, contingent on awareness, therefore proving that I, as the reader, have discrete experiences does not in any way prove that I have any forms of knowledge as defined in your essays.

You cannot do that without being a discrete experiencer like me

To that end, it doesn't matter if you're "conscious". It doesn't matter if you're spaced out, in a weird mental state, etc. You're a discrete experiencer like me.

True, but I could be a discrete experiencer without having any knowledge as defined by your essays (namely, without any distinctive or applicable knowledge).

So the rest follows that what you discretely experience, is what you distinctely know.

This is exactly what I have been trying to demonstrate: the first half of the above quote does not imply in any way the second half (for other "Is"). You define distinctive knowledge with the explicit contingency on awareness, not simply that you discretely experience. I am arguing that you can discretely experience without being aware of it. I think this is basically my biggest issue with your essays summed into one sentence (although I don't want to oversimplify your argument): you wrongly assume that you proving something is a "discrete experiencer" therefore proves that they have distinctive and applicable knowledge but, most importantly, you haven't demonstrated that that something is aware of any of it and, consequently, you haven't proven they have either form of knowledge.

Do you deny that you deductively think?

Yes. I inductively think my way into a deductive belief. I have a string of thoughts (inductively witnessed) that form a seemingly conclusory thought (which can most definitely be a deductive belief). My thoughts do not start, or initialize so to speak, with deduction.

So that is good enough for the purposes that I need to continue the paper into resolving how two discrete experiencers can come to discrete and applicable knowledge between them

Again, I think that you are wrongly assuming that proving that an individual discretely experiences directly implies that they have distinctive or applicable knowledge: you defined distinctive knowledge specifically to be contingent on awareness, which I don't think has anything to do with what you defined as "discrete experiences".

They can fundamentally disagree with me by distinctive knowledge. They cannot fundamentally disagree with me by application, unless they've shown my application was not deduced

I agree that, in the event that they begin partaking in their analysis of the products of those processes, they will apply them the same way as you. However, it doesn't begin with a deduction: you have to induce your way to a deduction that you can then apply. If that is what you mean when you say that it begins with deduction (that it is a induced deductive belief) then I agree with you on this.

The sheep examples are all intended to show we can invent whatever distinctive knowledge we want, but the only way it has use in the world, is to attempt to apply it without contradiction.

I agree with you here, but I don't think you are starting your writing endeavor (in terms of the essays) at the basis, you are starting at mile 30 in a 500 mile race. Once we agree up to 30, then I (generally speaking) agree with you up to 500 (or maybe 450 (: ) and I think you do a great job at assessing it from mile 30 all the way to 500. However, I think it is important to first discuss the first 30 miles, otherwise we are building our epistemology on axioms.

What I'm trying to communicate, is that there is no third party arbiter out there deciding what "I" should mean, or what any word should mean. We invent the terms and words that we use. The question is whether we can create a process out of this that is a useful tool to help us understand and make reasonable decisions about the world.

I understand and this is a fair statement. However, my biggest quarrel is that I believe you to be starting at mile 30 when you should be starting at mile 0. If you want to base your epistemology on something that doesn't address all the fundamentals, but more generally (with the help of axioms) addresses the issue in a way most people will understand, then that is fine. I personally don't agree that we should start at mile 30 and then loop back around later to discuss miles 0-29. It must start at 0 for me.

Is it incorrect that an individual can invent any words or internal knowledge that they use to apply to the world? Is it incorrect, that if I apply my distinctive knowledge to the world and the world does not contradict my application, that I can call that another form of knowledge, applicable knowledge?

This is absolutely correct. But I am not disputing this.

If you enter into the context of the words I have used, does the logic follow?

No it does not. Proving a being to be a discrete experiencer doesn't prove awareness of such. Therefore, by your definitions of knowledge, I don't understand how your essays prove others to have any forms of knowledge (distinctive or applicable). If you start at mile 30, and I start at mile 30, then I think that your logic (without commenting on the induction hierarchy yet, so just essays 1-3) is sound. But, again, that's assuming a lot to get to mile 30.

It is not a problem for me at all if someone introduces a ternerary distinction. The same process applies. They will create their distinctive knowledge. Then, they must apply that to reality without contradiction. If they cannot apply it to reality without contradiction, then they have invented terms that are not able to be applicably known.

I agree. But, again, this is starting at mile 30, not mile 0. You skip over the deeper questions here and generally start from the analysis of the products of the processes: this is not the base. If you don't want to start from the base, then that is totally fine (I just disagree). If you think that you are starting from the base, then I would interested to know if you think that the binary distinction is the base.

I don't doubt this is a problem for a reader, so thank you for pointing this out. Your feedback tells me I need to explicitly point out how if you are reading this, you are by the definitions I stated, an "I" as well.

Again, this only proves that you know that I, as the reader, am a discrete experiencer. Now you have to prove that I have distinctive and, thereafter, applicable knowledge. Distinctive knowledge was defined as the awareness of discrete experiences, not merely the discrete experiences themselves. Therefore, I don't think your "I" is being extended equivocally to other "Is" in your essays: your "I" is a discrete experiencer that is aware of it and, thereby, has both accounts of knowledge, whereas the other "Is" merely are proven to be a discrete experiencer (no elaboration or proof on whether they are aware of such). I get that, for me, I know I am aware, but to apply your logic to other people, it does not hold that I know that they are aware due to their discrete experiences. Therefore, when your essays start discussing context, it is wrongly assuming that the previous contents of the subsequent essays covered a proof of some sort that other "Is" are aware of their discrete experiences.

Yes, this is a more accurate assessment of what I am doing. I am inventing knowledge as a tool that can be used.

My critique here (that I am trying to portray) is that this tool is starting out at mile 30, not 0.

I hope I wasn't too reiterative, but I think this is a vital problem with your essays. But, ironically, it isn't a problem if you wish to start at mile 30, and if that is the case then I will simply grant it (for the sake of conversation) and continue the conversation to whatever lies after it. I personally don't think it is a good basis for epistemology because it isn't a true basis: it utilizes axioms.
Bob

Hello @Philosophim,
Thank you for your clarifications of your terminology: I understand it better now! I see now where our disagreements lie. For now, I am going to grant your use of "discrete experiencer" in a broader sense as you put it. However, this still does not remove my issue with your papers and, quite frankly, it is simply my lack of ability to communicate it clearly that is creating this confusion. So, therefore, I am going to take a different approach: I re-read your essays 1-3 (I left 4 out because it something which will be addressed after we hash this out) and I have gathered a few quotes from each of them with questions that I would like to get your answer to (and some are just elaborative). Hopefully this will elaborate a bit on my issue. Otherwise, feel free to correct me.

Essay 1:

I noted discrete experiences in regards to the senses, but what about discrete experience absent those senses?  Closing off my senses such as shutting my eyes reveals I produce discrete experiences I will call “thoughts.”  If I “think” on a thought that would contradict the discrete experience of “thoughts” I again run into a contradiction.  As such, I can deductively believe I have thoughts absent the senses as well.

I think what you meant (and correct me if I am wrong here) is the five senses, not all senses. If you had no senses, you wouldn't have thoughts because you would not be aware of them. There are many senses to the body and it is always evolving, so I would argue that the awareness of thoughts is a sense (but is most definitely different than the five senses). I think your argument here would be that you are talking specifically senses that pertain to the bodies contact with external stimuli and that is fine. But thoughts are not absent of all senses. I think this arises due to your essays' lack of addressing the issue of the ternary distinction. This will hopefully make more sense as I move on to the next quotes.

Essay 2:

I will label the awareness of discrete experiences as “distinctive knowledge”.  To clarify, distinctive knowledge is simply the awareness of one’s discrete experiences.

I agree. Your advocating here (as I understand it) that in the absence of awareness, you have no distinctive knowledge and, thereby, no applicable knowledge and, therefore, no knowledge at all. You are directly implying that even if you can determine another animal to be a discrete experiencer, you still have no reason to think that they have any distinctive knowledge because that doesn’t directly prove that they are aware of their discrete experiences. Am I correct in this? Therefore, the “I” for you as a discrete experiencer, at this point, has one extra property that cannot be demonstrated (yet) to be in another animals “I”: awareness of those discrete experiences. Therefore, both uses of the term “I” are not being used completely synonymously (equivocally).

Essay 3:

I have written words down, and if another being, which would be you, is reading the words right now then you too are an “I”.

As of now, the “I” defined for you has another property that you haven’t proven to exist in the other “I”s: awareness of discrete experiences—distinctive knowledge as you defined it. Just like how I can park my car with a complete lack of awareness of how I got there, I could also be reading your papers without any awareness of it. So, with that in mind, I would ask: are you asserting that this is not the case? That you have sufficiently proven that, not only are other animals an “I” in the sense that they are discrete experiencers, they also have distinctive knowledge? To say "I" and your "I" both exist, in my head, is to directly imply that I am using "I" equivocally: I don't think your essays do that. Your essays, thereby, seem to assume that you have used the term "I" equivocally and immediately starts compared one "I"s knowledge to another "I"s knowledge: but, again, you haven't demonstrated that anyone besides your self has distinctive knowledge, only discrete experiences.

If I come across you reading these words and understanding these words,, and you are not correlative with my will, then you are an “I” separate from myself.

Only in the sense that “I” is used to denote a discrete experiencer and not distinctive knowledge. Therefore, your essays don't actually determine anyone else to know anything, only that they discretely experience. Am I incorrect here?

If other people exist as other “I’s” like myself, then they too can have deductive beliefs.

I agree. But at this point in your essay we have no reason to believe that they are aware of them, which would be required for “I” to be used equivocally. In saying "other "I's" like myself", you are implying (to me) that you think that you have proven other "I's" to have distinctive knowledge (or knowledge in any sense), but I don't think you have.

A person's genetics or past experiences may incline them to discretely experience properties different from others when experiencing the same stimulus.

This is why, I would argue, not everyone who reads your paper is going to fundamentally agree with you with respect to your sheep example. They will attempt to gather knowledge starting from the subject, just like you, but they may not view it as a binary distinction. If it is initialized with a ternary distinction, then, as you hinted earlier, solipsism becomes a problem much quicker and, therefore, your ease of derivation (in terms of a binary distinction) will not be obtained by them. For example, for a person that starts their subjective endeavor with a ternary distinction, it is entirely possible that they must address the issue of “where are these processes coming from?” and “am I justified in assuming they are true?” way before they can get to any kind of induction hierarchy that resides within the production of those processes. So I would like to ask: do you think that the barrier between the “I” and the processes feeding it, and thereby the previous questions, is not more fundamental, and therefore must be addressed first, before the subject can continue their derivation with respect to your essays? My problem is that you skip ahead straight to the sheep example, which is an analysis of the products of the processes, when you haven’t addressed the more fundamental problem of whether those very processes are accurate or not (you just seem to imply that it should be taken on an axiom of some sort). Or if we even can know if they are accurate or not. Or if it really matters if they are or not. Don’t get me wrong, I have no problem with your derivation (for the most part) with respect to your analysis of the products of those processes, but your writings imply axioms that are not properly addressed.

To sum it up, your essays, in an effort to conclude induction hierarchies, completely skip over the justification for why one should even start analyzing the products of those processes in a serious manner, to assuming they are true, in the way that you did. If we are to derive a basis for knowledge, then we must assume nothing, starting from the subject, which includes doubting the assumption that we have any reasonably grounds to assume the "I" should utilize the discrete experiences that get thrown at it. Now you could say, and I think this may be what your essays imply, that, look, we have these processes that are throwing stuff at the "I", of which it is aware of, such as perception and thought, and here's what we can do with it. If that's what your essays are trying to get at, then that is fine. But that doesn't start with the most basic derivation of the subject: you are skipping addressing the problem of whether knowledge can even be based off of these products of the processes. In other words, if your essays are simply dealing with what we can "know" in the sense that all we care about is having knowledge pertaining to the product of these processes and, therefore, it doesn't matter if those processes are utterly false, then I think we are in agreement. But I would add that you aren't addressing this at all in the essays and that's why I can't personally use it, as it is now, to base knowledge. Hopefully that makes a bit more sense. If not, please let me know!
Bob

Hello @Philosophim,

Thank you for the wait Bob. I wanted to make sure I answered you fully and fairly.

Absolutely no problem! I would much rather wait for a detailed, thought-provoking response than a quick, malformed (so to speak) one! I thoroughly enjoy reading your replies, so take as much time as you need!

After reading your response, I think your forbiddence of my terminology is fair enough! So I will do my best to utilize your terminology from now on (so, in advance, I apologize if I misuse them--and please correct me when I do). However, I think there is a still, in the absence of my terminology, a fundamental problem with your essays and so I will try to elaborate hereafter in your terminology as best I can.

It is fine if you believe this is too basic, but that is because I must start basic to build fundamentals. At this point in the argument, I am a person who knows of no other yet.

I understand that the intuitive thing to do is the start off with "I" vs "everything else" for most people, and I have no problem with that, but it seems to me, as your essays progress, they retain this position which I, as far as I understand your argument hitherto, believe to be false (and not in terms of later applicable knowledge nor a priori, but in the immediate experiential knowledge that you begin your derivation from). Intuitiveness is not synonymous with immediateness, and I think this is a vital distinction for your proposition. For example, the intuitive thing to do is the separate as you did, the "I" and "everything else", for most people but that is not the most immediately known thing to the subject. For example, if, in your sheep example, you were an individual with depersonalization disorder, the disassociation of the "I", the process of discretely perceiving the sheep, and the discrete manifestations of "everything else" (including the sheep) would be incredibly self-apparent and discrete--although, to a person where their brain associates these concepts very tightly it would be the subjects first and most fundamental mistake to assume it is really the "I" discretely perceiving and the discrete manifestations of "everything else". This is why, although I have to invoke some applicable knowledge (that, although you or I may have never had such a disassociation like depersonalization disorder), for a person with such a disassociation, your essay would entirely miss its mark (in my opinion) because they do not share such a basic fundamental distinction as you. However, I would argue that you both actually share a much much more fundamental basic than the binary distinction your proposition invokes: the "I", the process of discretely perceiving the sheep, and all discrete manifestations--a ternary distinction.

This is where I may need some clarification, because I might have misinterpreted what your proposition was. You see, I thought that "I am a discrete experiencer" was a broadened sense of stating "I am a discrete perceiver, thinker, etc". I read your essays as directly implying (by examples such as the sheep) that a specific instance of "I am a discrete experiencer" was "I am a discrete perceiver and thinker"--and I believe this to be false (if that is not what you are implying, then please correct me). This is not the most fundamental basic separation for the subject. Now I understand that a lot of people may initially be in the same boat as you (in that binary distinction) and then derive the ternary distinction I make, but, most importantly, not all (and it would be a false claim). I totally agree with you that we shouldn't utilize an a priori or applicable knowledge yet, just the discrete experiences as you put it, but "I am a discrete experiencer", based off of such discrete experiences (which can be more self-apparent to people with psychological disorders), is a false basis for knowledge. Again, I do think their is a lot of applicable knowledge that we could both discuss about this ternary distinction I am making, but for your argument I would not need to invoke any as discrete experiences is enough. So, I would argue, either the essays need to begin with a more fundamental basis for knowledge (ternary distinction) or, as the essays progress, they need to morph into a ternary distinction. With that being said, I totally understand (in hindsight) that a lot of my first post was irrelevant to specifically your proposal (I apologize), but I don't agree in deriving the different levels, so to speak, of induction with a basis that isn't the most immediate. Is this me being to technical? Would it overly complicate your proposition? Possibly. This is why I understand if you would like to keep it broad in your proposition, but, in that case, I would temporarily agree with you in this sense; moreover, more importantly, I wouldn't use it as a basis of knowledge because the most fundamental aspect of your epistemology I think to be false. Hopefully that made some sense.

I think this is a fine assessment. We can make whatever definitions and concepts we want. That is our own personal knowledge. I am looking at a blade of grass, while you are creating two other identities within the blade of grass. There is nothing wrong with either of us creating these identities. The question is, can we apply them to reality without contradiction? What can be discretely known is not up for debate. What can be applicably known is.

Again, I completely agree that we can derive a prior (and applicable) knowledge that we could both dispute heavily against one another, but I am not trying to utilize any of such: I am disputing what can be discretely known. I am debating on whether your proposition is right in its assessment of what is discretely known. I am debating whether your proposition is right in persisting such a binary distinction all the way to its last conclusion. As another example, psychedelic drugs (that produce extreme disassociations) can also, along with psychological disorders, demonstrate that an individual within your sheep example, in your very shoes, would not base their derivations on a binary distinction. Again, I understand that, although I said I wouldn't invoke applicable knowledge, I just did (in the case that I do not have depersonalization disorder): but for that subject, in your example, your basis would simply be factually incorrect and if the use of such applicable knowledge is not satisfactory for you, then you could (although I am not advocating you to) produce this disassociation and try the sheep example in real life. Now, I am not trying to be condescending here at all, I am deadly serious and, therefore, I apologize if it seemed a bit condescending--I think this is an important problem, fundamentally, with your derivation in the essays. I could be misunderstanding you completely, and if that is the case then please correct me!

This is a great example of when two people with different contexts share their discrete knowledge. I go over that in part 3 if you want a quick review. We have several options. We could accept, amend, reinterpret, or reject each other's definitions. I point this out for the purposes of understanding the theory, because I will be using the theory, to prove the theory.

I think that this is the issue with your derivation: it only works if the individual reading it shares your intuitive binary distinction. I agree generally with your assessment of how to deal with competing discrete experiences, but to say "I am a discrete experiencer" is only correct if you are meaning "experiencer" in the sense that you are witnessing such processes, not in the sense that "I am a discrete perceiver". I think this is a matter of definitions, but an important matter, that I would need your clarification on. In both bases, ternary and binary, it may happen that both conclude the same thing, but the latter would be deriving it from a false premise that can be determined to be false by what is immediately known (regardless of whether it is intuitive or not).

You want to discuss the concept of the square root of four, while I want to first focus on the number 2.

I think this analogy (although I could be mistaken) is implying that the binary distinction is what we all begin with and then can later derive a ternary distinction: I don't think that is always the case and, even when it is, it is a false one that only requires those discrete experiences to determine it. In other words, one who does begin with a binary distinction can by use of those very discrete experiences determine that there original assertion was wrong and, in fact, it is ternary. Even for a person who doesn't have extreme disassociation, the fact that these processes, that are indeed discrete, get served, so to speak, to the experiencer and not produced by them is enough to show that it is not a binary distinction. Again, I do understand that, for most, it is intuitive to start off with a binary distinction, but applicable and a priori knowledge is not required to realize that it is a false conclusion. I would agree that my assessment is more complicated, which is directly analogous to your analogy here. However, numbers (like the number 2) are first required to understand square roots, which is not analogous to what I am at least trying to say. Again, just as intuitive a binary distinction may be to you, so is a ternary distinction for a depersonalized disorder patient (or even some that have never had a disorder of any kind)--and they simply won't agree with you on this (and it is a dispute about the fundamental discrete experiences and not simply applicable knowledge).

But, because I know you're a great philosopher, for now, please accept the definitions I'm using, and the way I apply it. Please feel free to point out contradictions in my discrete knowledge, or misapplications of it. I promise this is not some lame attempt to avoid the discussion or your points. This is to make sure we are at the core of the theory.

Fair enough! I totally understand that I got ahead of myself with my first post. Hopefully I did a somewhat better job of directly addressing your OP. If not, please correct me!

To recap: An "I" is defined as a discrete experiencer. That is it. You can add more, that's fine.

Again, it depends entirely on what you mean by "experiencer" whether this is always true for the subject reading your papers. If you mean, in terms of a specific example, that the "I" encompasses the idea that it is a discrete perceiver; I think this is wrong and can be immediately known without a prior knowledge, regardless of whether I am personally in a state of mind that directs me towards an initial binary distinction.

And at risk of over repeating myself, the forbiddance of introducing new discrete knowlege at this point is not meant to avoid conversation, it is meant to discover fundamentals

Absolutely fair! However, hopefully I have demonstrated that I am disputing whether the binary distinction even is a fundamental or not.

Would an animal be an "I" under the primitive fundamental I've proposed and applicably know? If an "I" is a discrete experiencer, then I have to show an animal is a discrete experiencer without contradiction in reality. If an animal can discern between two separate things, then it is an "I" as well. Now I understand that doesn't match your definition for your "I". Which is fine. We could add in the defintion of "consciousness" as a later debate. The point is, I've created a defintion, and I've applied it to reality to applicably know it.

Firstly, and I am not trying to be too reiterative here, I am disputing the idea that it is a primitive fundamental: I think it is not. Yes, I see your point if you are trying to determine if the animal is a discrete experiencer in the sense that they perceive external stimuli (for example), but this gets ambiguous for me quite quickly. If that is what you mean, that you can demonstrate that they discretely experience as in they discretely perceive (and whatever else you could demonstrate), then that use of the term "experiencer" would not be the same as the "experiencer" in "I am a discrete experiencer", unless you are stating that "experience" is synonymous with the processes of perception, thought, etc. If you are stating that "experience" is synonymous with the processes that feed it, then you have eliminated "you" from the picture and, therefore, the "I" in "I am a discrete experiencer" is simply "The body is a discrete experiencer", which I don't think that would make any sense to either of us if we were to derive our knowledge from the body and not the "I" (again, I could be misunderstanding you here). In other words, although I understand that I am redefining terms, I do not think you can demonstrate that animals experience, only that they have processes similar to which feeds our experiences. What I am trying to say, and I'm probably not doing a very good job, is that you can't demonstrate an animal to experience equivocally to when you determined that you experience: the "I" (you) cannot determine that the animal, or anyone else for that matter, is an "I" in the sense that both of my uses of "I" are equivocal. Now this brings up a new issue of whether we could determine that other people, for example, have "I"s at all. I would say that we can, but it is later on: applicable knowledge in your terminology. To be clear, you would have discrete experiences that demonstrate that there are other entities that have processes required to experience, but any inferences after that are applicable knowledge claims. This is why it is ambiguous for me: when you say you can prove there are other "I"s like your "I", I think you are utilizing the term "I" in two different senses--the former is simply an entity that has the processes similar to what feeds your experiences (which can be derived from discrete experiences), while the latter is experience itself (which cannot be extended via discrete experiences to any other entities but, rather, can be inferred by applicable knowledge to be the case).

But for the single person without context, if they have defined "I" in this way, this is the only thing they could deduce in their application of that definition to reality.

Hopefully I did an adequate job of presented evidence that this is not true.

I think, for the sake of making this shorter, I will leave your further comments for later discussion, because I think that you are right in saying that we need to discuss the more fundamental aspects to your OP first. I think that the hallucinated dilemma is a discussion for after what I have stated here is hashed out.

Thank you for a such an elaborate response and I look forward to hearing back from you!
Bob

@Philosophim
Absolutely no worries! Take as much time as you need (no rush): I am looking forward to your response (:

Hello @Philosophim,

Firstly, great work! I enjoyed reading your collection of epistemological essays! Since it was a lot to unpack, I am going to simply address your epistemological proposition from an extremely broad sense (thereby only addressing the most vital quarrels I think I have with your proposition). I will leave it up to you to decide what you would like to discuss thereafter:

• Your proposition seems to be founded on the one-sided relationship between “reality” and beliefs; however, it is really two-sided: “reality” can influence a belief and a belief can influence “reality”. For example, placebo effect is a real psychological phenomenon which reveals the two-sidedness of the relationship. With that being said, I do agree with your proposition in the sense that beliefs should coincide with “reality” in some manner—but this does not necessarily mean that anything that isn’t directly factually true (such as a unicorn's existence) directly invalidates the belief in such: belief and knowledge are two distinct concepts. For example, the thorough refutation of libertarian free will does not in any way (I would argue) immediately refute the belief in such--as, even in the case that free will is an illusion (in a hard determinist worldview--which I am not advocating for but merely utilizing as an example), it does not follow that one is obliged to then completely disregard (without further examination) the proposition that the belief in free will is useful. Beliefs, completely separate from knowledge claims, can manifest (psychologically and sociologically speaking) real, empirical facts about "reality".
• Our epistemological worldviews deviate at a much more fundamental level than I expected, but, interestingly enough, we agree the broader we speak. For example, you stated (in, I believe, your first essay): “In recognizing a self,, I am able to create two “experiences”.  That is the self-recognized thinker, and everything else.” I think that this is the intuitive thing to do, but it is only an incredibly general description and, therefore, doesn’t go deep enough for me. There are three distinctions to be made, not simply “I” and “everything else”: the interpreter, the interpretations (representations), and self-consciousness. In your terms, it would translate (I think) into a discrete experiencer (self-consciousness and the interpreter joined into to one concept) and everything else (the interpretations/representations which are later divided into other “I”s and “everything else besides ‘I’ and other ‘I’s”). I would make it much more precise than that: “I am self-conscious, therefore something is”. I think Descartes biggest mistake was assuming “I” am the one “thinking”. Although you refurbish it into discrete experiences, I think this is still fundamentally assuming things we cannot. That is why I define an “experience” as a witnessing of immediate knowledge (the process of thinking, perception, and emotion) by means of rudimentary reason, and a “remembrance” (or memory as you put it in subsequent essays) as seemingly stored experiences. Notice that I am directly implying that I have no reason to believe that I am an active ingredient, so to speak, in any of those processes. I am not convinced that I am actively participating in the process of perception, emotion, or thought, but rather, I am “participating” insofar as I am a witness of such (I witness the process of rigorous thought and the feeling of convincement): I am self-consciousness. There is another aspect, or “force”, so to speak, that is distinctly separate from the “I” in a “discrete experiencer” (self-consciousness): the interpreter. The interpreter is a form of mediate knowledge (namely a prior knowledge) which is necessitated by the fact that the “I” doesn’t directly affect the processes associated with immediate forms of knowledge. In other words, both the interpreter and the “I” (self-consciousness) are apart of the subject (consciousness), but the “I” is only a particular aspect of it. This distinction, for me, between keeping it a binary distinction ("I" vs "everything else") and regressing it further (the subject into two categories) reveals some heavily impactful positions of mine (pertaining to epistemology). For example, if I wasn’t self-conscious of the process of thinking that is occurring in “my” brain, then, although this response would still get written and sent, "I" would have no knowledge of it. Likewise, if we all were not self-conscious of our process of thinking, perception, and emotion (i.e. immediate forms of knowledge), then there would be no knowledge at all. Interestingly enough, I think that the interpreter's processes would continue—as "we" (self-consciousness) are mere witnesses—but there would be no epistemological grounds for any sort of knowledge because neither of us would have any recollection of it. Think of it like the hypothetical scenario that you had a thought two seconds ago, of which you never experienced (you were not consciously aware of it—aka self-conscious of it) (or you do not and will never remember)--can any knowledge be derived therefrom? I would argue no! This is like your reference of a “discrete experiencer” in the sense that if you didn’t discretely experience then there is no knowledge, however that becomes very confusing to me as I don’t think your consciousness would completely stop. I think you would continue to do exactly what you are doing now (in terms that the interpreter, one aspect of the subject, would persist), except that “you” would have no knowledge of it. Your interpreter, so to speak, would continue to create interpretations (as far as I can tell), which are discrete representations, but those interpretations would not be experienced (in the sense that I defined it--a witnessing of immediate knowledge by means of rudimentary reason) because there would be no witness. It’s kind of like how some animals can’t even recognize themselves in a mirror: I would argue that they do not have any knowledge if (and its a big if in this case) they are not self-conscious. Yes they have knowledge in the sense that their body will react to external stimuli, but that isn’t really knowledge (in my opinion) as removing self-consciousness directly removes “me” (or “I”) from the equation and that is all that is relevant to "me" (as this fundamental epistemological question wouldn't have even been posed in any meaningful way to the subject if the second aspect of the subject--namely self-consciousness--was not present). As an example, let's take your sheep example: what if that entire concept that you derived a deductive principle from (namely tenants that constitute a sheep) were all apart of a hallucination. What if you really snorted a highly potent hallucinogen in the real world and it is so potent that you will never wake up in the real world but, rather, you will die in your hallucinated world once your body dies in the real one. Do you truly have knowledge of the sheep (in the hallucinated world) now, given that the world isn't real? What is "real"? I would argue, since the relevance directly ties to the witness (and not the interpreter) aspect of the subject, whatever corresponds best to what the witness experiences is exactly what is "real" and, therefore, the real world in my example here would be nothing except irrelevant. The knowledge, if knowledge is going to mean anything, of the sheep is just as valid in a real world as a "real" (potentially hallucinated and, thereby, "fake") one! Everything revolves around the subject for me, nay, specifically the witness (self-consciousness, one aspect of the subject). In other words, the validity (absolutely speaking) of the interpreter's interpretations has no direct effect on what one can or cannot constitute as knowledge.
• For now, the last aspect I will discuss here is the idea, which I consider to be your main point, that inductions can be classified by means of how close they are to deductive principles (i.e. your distinction between probability, possibility, plausibility, and irrational induction). There is a lot that can be said about this, but, in an effort to keep this relatively short, I will focus on one aspect: the fundamental problem with this logic. The most fundamental aspect of our lives (I would argue) is rudimentary reason, which is the most basic (rudimentary) method by which we can derive all other things. We reason our way into even knowing (in the first place) that we have any forms of immediate knowledge (perceptions, thoughts, and emotions): we induce by our witnessing (experiencing) the process of perception, emotion, and thought that that we indeed have such (by means of rudimentary reason--a witnessing of a series of thoughts that, in turn, create a seemingly conclusory thought of which we are, at least in that instant, thoroughly convinced of). Imagine that you never witnessed yourself conclude anything: you therefore would be no different, with respect to yourself, than a rock (now to someone who could conclude--aka has rudimentary reason to some extent--would be able to distinguish you from a rock, but you wouldn't be able to). To realize that you have thoughts is to make a conclusion, if that is absent then the interpreter associated with you as a subject would persist in such immediate processes but, most importantly, you would be completely unaware and, honestly, I don't' think "you" would exist anymore (self-consciousness cannot persist in the absence of conclusions): this is what I mean by rudimentary reason, that, although it doesn't have to be rational, you must be able to form conclusions which requires a rudimentary form of something (which I call rudimentary reason). You see, if one were to be committed to stating that the closer an induction is to a deductive principle the more likely it is correct, then the very means by which they induced those deductive principle would have no grounds to stand. My use of rudimentary reason to induce immediate and mediate knowledge, and thereby all deductive principles, would have no deductive principle at its base: it is a pure induction. Experience at its most fundamental level, namely immediate knowledge, is pure induction. Now, I think you are right in the sense that inductions that are based off of strong deductive principles are stronger than inductions that are chained together, but I don't tend to establish what is more knowable based off of this postulation because, as I previously stated, my most immediate forms of knowledge, and consequently my basis of everything one way or another, are induced. That is why I say that the closer (metaphorically and literally) the concept is to immediate knowledge, the more reasonably "real" it is (notice that I am not anchoring it down towards a deductive base).

Well, I think that is enough for now (although there is much to discuss!) as your essays covered a lot of ground. Again, great work! I look forward to hearing back from you on your thoughts.
Bob

Hello @Philosophim,

Is a cause and effect always an explanation? Is an explanation always a cause and effect?
The first question seems true, but the second leaves doubts. I believe an explanation can be translated into a cause and effect, though it may not be the simplest, clearest, or most direct way of communicating that explanation. But, there is a stable defined means of communicating that explanation.

I see your dilemma now, and, therefore, exactly why you are utilizing causality instead of explanation. Although I think that utilizing it in terms of explanations would "open more doors", so to speak, in your OP, I understand that it may introduce a new level of (possibly) unnecessary complexity and, so, I respect you decision to refrain from semantic refurbishment.

While I do agree there are formula's that assume space and time, many formula's do not. For example, a formula may extend for infinity, but infinity may not exist. An electron is considered to have zero mass for many formula's, though the reality is that it does have mass once you use formula's that have a meaningful digit small enough for them to matter at that scale. That being said, your criticism would apply to them as well, and you are correct.

I apologize, I think I misunderstood what you were previously saying. As I understand it now, you seem to be pointing out (quite correctly) that potential infinities may not truly exist (and actual infinities). There is a limit to how many numbers I can fathom within my time constrained lifetime and, therefore, I can't possibly verify that all numbers (within no bounds) actually work for P(n) (and some may not even represent actual quantities in the universe). Even if I continually mentally incremented a number (any number, no matter how big) for my entire life, non-stop, from here onward, I would, nevertheless, never be able to verify them all. With respect to that I agree with you! However, I think there is a fundamental difference between utilizing a P(n) function that is induced to work for an actual or potential infinite, and attempting to utilize it beyond space and time. For example, for me, all that mathematical induction means (in terms of meaningfulness for the subject) is that any number I can fathom in my lifetime is reasonably induced to work in P(n) . But, more importantly, I would never attempt to (somehow) extend it past space and time and infer that some quantity (let's just say X) that exists (somehow) beyond space/time will give reliable results when past through P(n). In other words, any use of P(n) (although technically it could be relating to numbers that don't have any true quantifiable existences in reality) is a use of P(n) specifically tailored for this space/time rabric that I wouldn't say can be reasonably extended past thereof. Anyways, I think you understand what I am trying to say so I will leave it at that.

This to me, a first cause is something outside of space and time. There is no space or time which forces a first cause to exist, it simply does.

I understand your point here, but think this is exactly why using the term "explanation", contrary to "causation", helps your argument, because I don't think explanation in terms of causation can occur "outside" of space and time. However, I do understand what you mean by "outside", I think that we both don't know what that truly means in terms of the context of "outside of space and time" and I think that is my main point here--that, I would say, neither of us can truly separate our thinking beyond space/time in terms of causation (and that's why I would argue that there is no meaningful usage of "cause" and "effect" "outside" of space and time). But, again, I see where you are coming from and I get that our terminology is quite limited with respect to your OP.

Once it exists, it is within the realm of space and time. But prior to that? I cannot say. Perhaps there is something beyond space and time which creates that first cause. But it is meaningless to speak on it. And if something outside of space and time could create something within space and time? The question would still exist, "What caused THAT?" :)

I think this exposes exactly my issue with your OP, which is that your OP seems to require the use of causality beyond space and time to make its case, but yet then it concedes that any causality past space/time is meaningless to discuss (which I would agree with). You see, I could then argue that space/time is eternal (although I'm not actually trying to argue that), which I would say your OP would be the claim that the fact that it is eternal is the "first cause". But the fact that it is eternal is not a cause (I agree with you that this is epistemological in nature), it is beyond causation (because it is beyond space/time, it is metaphysical in a sense--this fact doesn't "cause" any "effect", it, by definition, explains itself): it is an explanation completely beyond causation (and, therefore, I would argue that, even though it is a complicated topic, explanation and causation are not synonymous). Now, as you pointed out, the explanation could end up being Causation (note the captial C), which would be meaningless for us to discuss because that Causation would be "outside" of our causation (which is restrained to space/time). You see, if you agree with me in that, for all intents and purposes, Causation doesn't exist (in terms that we can't discuss it), then your causal argument gets cut off at space/time, but your explanatory argument proceeds just fine! In other words, although I get where you are coming from on this, there seems (to me) to be a necessary distinction between explanations and causations. The fact that an actual infinite goes on forever is not explained by that very fact being its own cause but, rather, it lies in the fact that, somehow, it, by definition, explains the necessity of it continuing on forever (which could be a result of Causation or something entirely else, but necessarily not causation).

I understand your specific use of "sans" time and space within language, and respect it. I think its largely semantics at this point, and we're essentially saying the same underlying meaning.

I agree with you here: it is semantics and that's why I don't quarrel with people over the usages because, quite frankly, we both are talking about the same thing. However, I think that the fact that we can't truly discuss these matters properly, which (I would say) is directly due to the fact that we can't separate from certain fundamental aspects of our existence, is incredibly telling that we may (but not necessarily are) over-extending our logic into Logic. Personally, the fact that we can't quite accurately pose the question makes me wonder what authority we truly have to ask it in the first place! That's why I do my best to try to conceive of a proper way of semantically putting it, because, in this case, I don't see how I can truly answer the question if I can't even truly verify whether my question is valid or not.

Here again I think we have a semantics difference. I don't believe I'm abandoning the PSR, I'm refining it to fix a hole.

That makes sense, I recant my previous statement that you are abandoning it! As you noted thereafter, I do still think it is an arbitrary fix.

Is the proposal that there can be no first explanation the unicorn, or the proposal that there must be a first explanation the unicorn?

Although I understand what you are portraying here, I am going to have to disagree with you here in favor of your own OP! You see, your OP is quite strong in the sense of your question here, because to take the position that there can be no first explanation (and, therefore, that the contrary is the unicorn) is to concede the OP! This is because it is paradoxical: the fact that there is not first explanation is, in itself, the first explanation. I think this is exactly why I would argue our logic breaks down (which leads me to describe it as explanatory-collapsibility). You see, there is another option here: although the framework in which we live our lives compells us to make this distinction (that either there is no first explanation or there is one) it doesn't apply if we were to claim that our framework doesn't persist to the level at which we are posing the distinction! I think that whatever kind of framework may exist past space and time is most definitely some sort of framwork completely separate from our own and that is my explanation for why all of these questions we could posit (that seem like binary questions) will inevitably collapse on themselves! In other words, to take the position that there is no first explanation, inevitably collapses into the position that there is one. And to take the position that there is a first explanation, is to presume that there is a possibility that there isn't one, which collapses on itself because, again, if there isn't one then it will, in turn, collapse again into the position that there is a first explanation and, you guessed it, that collapses yet again into the idea that there is an alterative (this infinitely collapses, but, wait, we could then extend your OP to pose that these infinite collapses is the first explanation--which I think you see where I am going with this).

Because despite my best efforts at using cause and effect to represent an explanation, it always boils down to epistemology in the end.

I 100% agree. However, I respect your efforts to keep it comprehensible (by using terms pertaining to causation).

To your point, I believe practically every criticism you mentioned has merit, and you have successfully defended your view point logically within the framework of thought that we have. On the flip side, I believe I have also defended my line of reasoning as well.

I think you did a marvelous job at arguing your position! I also think that your OP has much merit!

It is the fact that both of our conclusions necessarily rely on inductions about the nature of reality, and that we have no means within our framework of concluding if one induction is more viable than the other, that we can both make our choices without contradiction. And, if I cannot argue beyond an appeal that my induction is more viable than the opposite induction, I cannot argue that a first cause is logically necessary. If we had a viable framework which allowed us to logically determine which inductions are more reasonable to hold, perhaps my claim of logical necessity would be true. But without that framework, I cannot claim it. Well done!

I agree! However, (although I may be mistaken here), I am starting to think that you may be misunderstanding I position slightly (as in very slightly): if you think that I am arguing that there is no first explanation and, thereby, that there being a first explanation is the unicorn, then I would say that that is not my position. I am arguing that both of those propositions collapse on one another (in terms of explanations) and that is why, although I don't think I have elaborated much further beyond this criticism, I would conclude that no matter how one contemplates it, it will inevitably collapse. Therefore, I think it isn't useful to attempt to uncover some logical reasoning behind it (in terms of causal derivation) but, rather, I would argue that whatever overlying metaphysics necessitates our representations is, in part, completely unobtainable by human reason. If I could reasonably (without producing an explanatory-collapse) extend causal derivation beyond space/time, then I would, at the very least, accept it as just as valid as mathematical induction, but I don't think it is possible to do so. Hopefully that made sense.

Agreed! It is a joy to discuss with someone who puts the theory through its paces! I hope my response was adequate to your points and critique. You are a fantastic philosopher, and I looked forward to every response you made. Thank you as well!

Your responses were more than adequate! I hope I am not reiterating myself on some of my points I am making in this post, but i still think they are relevant to the discussion. You are also a fantastic philosopher!

Bob

Hello @Philosophim,
First of all, I would like to thank you for such a splendid, thought-provoking conversation! Moreover, I also think that we are narrowing down to the roots of the OP.

Upon further reflection, I have realized something that I believe to be of great importance that I overlooked this whole time and, quite frankly, I think is the source of a lot of the confusion in the other responses to your OP (or at least the ones I briefly read over). You see, I’ve noticed a general pattern amongst the other responses (although I do not mean to overgeneralize their counter arguments), namely that they were all addressing the issues with the use of causality in the argument (whether that be a counter-argument directed towards causality and effect being the two sides of the same coin, quantum physics producing seemingly truly random effects, or that causality is strictly a priori). To be honest with you, I think that some of these counter-arguments were perfectly valid, yet didn’t pose any threat to the true essence of your OP. The only reason I am able to state that previous sentence without contradiction is because there is a fundamental distinction (that I overlooked this whole time) between causality and explanation. First and foremost, causality (cause and effect) are two sides of the same coin: we semantically (and intuitively) label event, A, a cause if it seemed to be in direct correlation to event, B (with chronological precedence); However, event A is actually an effect, not a true cause, that was “caused” by a previous event, C, that produced A which, in turn, produced B (both A and B are effects). You could do this infinitely. For example, after initiating a chain of dominoes (one falling by the previous domino’s fall), we intuitively consider the “cause” of any particular domino falling as the previous domino—but actually, in fact, the whole chain of dominoes are simply effects sparked by, for instance, me flicking the first domino. So in a sense, the first domino is not only the “first cause”, but actually the “only cause”: this is also wrong. As you already can probably anticipate, if I “zoom out further”, so to speak, I would realize that the first domino was an effect of me flicking it and, therefore, is not a cause either. Doing this ad infitum demonstrates that we have no examples of any actual causes: just effects which we label a “cause” within a relative scope to bring meaning to the world around us (i.e. the first domino, with the scope of dominoes, is the cause of the chain of dominoes falling, but not in an absolute sense). This directly entails that we have no experiences of any sort of true cause, which means we have no reasonable grounds to induce anything (as induction requires experiences). I think a lot of people were quarreling with you on this (although I may be mistaken) and I think that it is perfectly valid, but let me repeat: it poses no threat to the true essence of your OP. As you are already well aware, even if it is an infinite chain of effects with no causes, we are still stuck in the same dilemma that your OP addresses: the actual infinite of effects would be the self-explained “first cause”. Now here’s the issue I would like to propose to you that would resolve this conflict (even in the case of the quantum arguments): your OP is directed NOT at causation, but explanation. In other words, you can’t logically utilize causation to induce a “first cause” (because you have no experiences of a “cause”, just a chain of effects and induction requires experiences as we previously discussed—therefore your “first cause” would be the only example of a cause we would have), but you can logically (in terms of your argument) induce a “first explanation”. You see, explanations are not restricted to causation whatsoever! Sure, we can’t actually, in an absolute sense, determine that this particular domino caused all the others to fall, but we do know that each event (each effect in the continuum of effects) has a sufficient reason (yay we are back at the PSR!). That leads me to my other point: PSR doesn’t require causation nor does it directly utilize it! Rather, it uses explanations. This is why I think, and agree with you, that pointing out that particular aspects of the quantum realm have no causes doesn’t affect your OP because you aren’t arguing (I would say) for a “first cause”, you are arguing for a “first explanation”. Therefore, the “first explanation” would be those quantum aspects that have no previous causes—notice that you would no longer be claiming that those quantum aspects are a cause, but rather, an explanation that is its own explanation. In other words, I think that your reliance on causation (although useful in an everyday sense) manifests most of the counter arguments I have read and the refurbishing of “first cause” to “first explanation” would suffice in resolving this conflict.

Last thing I will state about the previous statements is that, I think that the refurbishing of your OP into an explanatory (rather than causal) argument accurately shifts (thereby strengthening) your argument into what I would consider the true essence of it: PSR, left to its own, causes absurdities which you attempt to resolve by means of claiming that somewhere along the line of explanations (not necessarily causes) there must be a “first explanation”, which is, therefore, outside of the scope, so to speak, of PSR.

Now what I have stated hitherto doesn’t address our conversation too much because I was inadvertently thinking of your argument in terms of explanation and not causation (although I just realized that I was conflating the two terms). So now I will start addressing some of your points directed towards me, but I wanted to propose that refurbishment of your OP: its obviously up to you whether you refurbish it or not (just food for thought).

To this, I would translate and state, "Just because we can create a system of infinite numbers in our mind, it does not mean there actually exists an infinite amount of numbers in reality. If this is what you are implying, then yes, we are in complete agreement.

That isn’t quite what I meant, although I would agree with your statement. I was implying that the function P(n) only operates within a space/time fabric. It does not attempt to induce any “numbers” outside of that framework: that is why it isn’t an inductive over-extension. In other words, any n run through the function P(n), is a number within space/time fabric. To use causation to assert, for instance, that any given location some 5000 billion light years away is operating under the concept of causation (that we would expect causation to occur there as well) is induction extended beyond experience (which I agree with you on that), but what I was trying to say is that anticipating (via induction) causality 5000 billion light years away is analogous to mathematical induction. However, mathematical induction is dis-analogous to causation past space/time fabric: it would be, on the contrary, analogous to considering “numbers” in a P(n) function that exist sans space/time. I would consider both extensions of P(n) and causality past space/time fabric to be over-extensions of induction for the aforementioned reasons. However, with that said, I think that a “first explanation” would not be affected by my critique here because explanations (PSR) could possibly exist sans space/time (potentially).

But isn't the idea of something being outside of space and time an induction that cannot be confirmed by experience? If so, in your case it shouldn't be a consideration

Yes, this is my whole point! To say it is “outside of space and time” is to make a contradictio in adjectio! The question itself is flawed, because “outside” linguistically refers to a spatial framework! Same goes for asking “what came before space and time”, as “before” linguistically refers to a temporal framework! That is why I would posit a very well known refurbishment to the question: “what is sans space and time?”. Now I still have problems with it (as I don’t think one can completely linguistically detach from space and time), but the use of sans is much better!

If I compare the two theories, that there may be situations that do not have space or time, versus the reality of space and time that is also logically confirmed, I'm going to take the more viable induction that uses space and time.

I am not quite following what you mean by this. The dilemma I was trying to put forth is that one cannot fundamentally utilize a “before” or “outside” when contemplating something sans space/time fabric. The same issue is true, I would say, of causality (it doesn’t extend past space and time) and if causality did, then it would be a different causality altogether (which existed in a space and time framework sans our space and time framework)! I don’t think we really have any good evidence to conclude anything beyond space and time.

What I show is if you take the idea that everything must have a prior cause for its existence, it cannot withstand its own logical conclusion when examined fully.

I agree. As I previously stated above: causality is really just a bunch of effects (or randomness in terms of quantum mechanics)(and it simply doesn’t make sense sans space and time). I think you are fundamentally arguing (and correct if I am wrong) for a “first explanation” (in terms of a solution to the problem of the derivation of PSR, not necessarily causation).

The principle of sufficient reason in other words, has a glaring flaw, and logically, cannot be true. The POSR is an induction as well correct?

I would agree (mostly). PSR does have a glaring flaw (two actually: it’s infinite derivation makes no sense and it doesn’t require of itself a sufficient reason—it is an axiomatic metaphysical principle). I would say it can be true in a relative sense, but not true in an absolute sense (because, for me, explanations collapse when extended into an absolute sense). PSR is meaningful (and I think you would agree with me on this) in a relative sense but completely useless in an absolute sense. The difference, fundamentally, between me and you (I would say) is the fact that, for the very same reason you are abandoning PSR, I would abandon an arbitrary stopping of PSR somewhere along the line of derivation. I think it makes equally as little sense to say that PSR can be fixed, so to speak, by allowing an explanation, somewhere down the line, to explain itself (that isn’t really PSR, although you are more than in your own rights to redefine it that way if you so choose). Although, yes, your definition of PSR is correct, there is no explanatory power (and thereby no true reasons derived therefrom) by saying something explained itself.

But can you point to a situation in reality in which there is literally no space between anything? At this point, that is and induction, but not observed reality. In all cases in which we have observed reality, we have found space between objects, and also in between the smaller objects we discover. So for my case, I believe it is much more reasonable to conclude that there is "nothing" between things. This is not an affirmation that I am correct. I am just trying to point out my induction is not less reasonable then the idea that "nothingness" doesn't exist.

Although I don’t entirely understand why you think there’s “nothing” between things (and I would be genuinely interested as to know why), but I do agree with you in the sense that people aren’t giving your OP enough credit: but I think that is partially (nay, primarily) due to the use of causation in your OP instead of explanation (which I think you could easily swap the terminology out and your argument—as I understood it—wouldn’t change, it would only eliminate a lot of the confusion). Anyways, I am curious as to what you think of my refurbishment proposal (hopefully I explained it adequately enough).

I do not believe anyone else has grasped the argument to your extent, nor provided such detailed and insightful criticism such as yourself. I think we are reaching a conclusion with the points I made about the POSR.

To be honest with you, in hind-sight, I think that I understood it better than the rest simply because I have unintentionally thinking in terms of explanations and not distinguishing it from causation. That’s why I think your argument is much stronger in terms of explanation and not causation.


To rap this up, I wanted to, again, thank you for such a wonderful conversation (and I look forward to your response)! I think that our fundamental difference is that I consider the derivation of explanations (aka PSR) to be an explanatory-collapse regardless of which derived concept one derives it back to (but you definitely go me thinking about first explanations for sure!).
Bob

Hello @Philosophim,

In short, I find it impossible to function without induction. The only thing we can do is figure out which inductions are more reasonable than others. The paper ends up declaring that. Regardless, if you do find it an unreasonable induction, I would ask a more reasonable alternative be provided. Doubt for its own sake doesn't lead anywhere.

Firstly, I would concur that it is, indeed, impractical to completely disband from induction. However, I don’t really agree with what you stated thereafter. It seems as though that you are implying that we should assess our options and pick the best one: I do not think this is the case. For example, if all of the options are absurd, and we hypothetically could not think of an alternative that isn’t absurd, I would not advocate to utilize the least absurd of them all (which I think ties directly to your argument being a self-proclaimed argumentum ad absurdium). On the contrary, I would argue that we suspend judgment until an adequate alternative is produced (in other words: I am perfectly fine stating that I simply do not know enough to make a meaningful conclusion). I do no think that someone needs to provide a reasonable alternative in order for an unreasonably derived inductive argument to be disbanded: one simply needs to prove that it is unreasonable (I would say). Now that’s not to say that one shouldn’t attempt to provide a better alternative, but picking the least unreasonable option (as opposed to simply recognizing our ignorance on the topic) isn’t something I would advocate for. Moreover, to your remark about doubt being useless without it being coupled with a better alternative, I take de omnibus dubitandum est (all things must be doubted) to heart. Although gathering reasonable alternatives to unreasonable positions is essential, the removal of unreasonable positions is vital even in the absence of an alternative option (and, I would argue, the best means of doing so it by skepticism, which, in turn, requires doubt). Now, with that being said, I understand that a posteriori knowledge is induction at work and we typically assume they are correct (in the manner you are describing—in that there isn’t a more meaningful alternative to them), but I think there is a distinction to be made from what I call immediate forms of knowledge (for all intents and purposes let’s just say it is synonymous with a posteriori) and mediate forms of knowledge (which would encompass a priori knowledge as an example thereof). To keep this brief, consider the process of perception, which I would argue one witnesses: I would argue one utilizes their built in “rudimentary reason”, which is essentially the most basic derived faculty of their existence, to “induce”, technically speaking, that they are indeed perceiving. However (and, again, I am keeping this extremely brief), this is very distinct from your OP, which I would characterize as mediate knowledge: the use of immediate knowledge that is extended (in this case via induction) to derive a principle from which to deduce. You see, if one were to remove a mediate form of knowledge, there immediate forms stay intact (left unaffected) because (I would argue) mediate forms of knowledge should never be prioritized above the immediate forms. Therefore, if all the options regarding a topic (that, most importantly, pertains to mediate knowledge claims) are unreasonable, then they should be removed even in the case that there is no alternative provided. Anyways, I can’t expect you to know what I mean by “immediate” and “mediate” (although I would reckon you get a basic idea), it is relevant to the above quote and so, naturally, I felt obligated to at least slightly address it. If you would like to know more, feel free to ask questions about it!

Basically think proving formulas. If A is true, and B is true, C will always be true. But we will never be able to actively prove C is true by experience, because we cannot possibly test all C's in existence. C is logically necessary, but is ultimately an induction based on the idea that the truth of A and B will always hold no matter the situation.

To a certain extent, I agree with you: we do have to utilize induction to, for example, assume that the future will resemble the past. However, mathematical induction (as far I as I understand it) attempts to induce that P(n) will be true for all natural numbers, which therefore is perfectly within its own scope and not over-extending, but it does not, most importantly, attempt to say that P(n) fundamentally works outside of a space/time fabric. This would be, I think, my biggest quarrel with such a line of thinking, one can’t assume that causality would be behave (even if they had extraordinary inductive evidence of causality’s uniformity in our universe) even remotely similar outside of the very two (conjoined) concepts: space and time. In fact, I would argue that causality (in terms of everything I could possibly conceive) cannot exist sans space/time fabric. The only way I can (in my own head) reconcile this with your OP is that the self-explained first cause must be space/time fabric (or potentially what caused it). But then I think we would be asserting that the PSR stops at space/time fabric: I don’t think we are warranted in saying that space/time (or potentially what caused it) is exempt from requiring a sufficient reason. And even if we were to produce an actual infinite of sufficient explanations, we would be lacking the sufficient explanation for that actual infinite (but, as we’ve previously discussed, we could arbitrarily circumvent this issue if we semantically define an actual infinite to be its own explanation—or requiring no further explanation). I think that this is exactly why I think that no matter how one derives the physical world, one is always going to be left with an absurdity (aka: explanatory-collapsibility).

If you can point out where I do, please do. I am interested in getting to the truth of the matter, and only other people can point out my blind spots.

I think that my main issue, with respect to inductive extensions, in your OP is as follows. I think that your OP is inclined to disband any notion of the use of causal induction beyond space/time fabric (due to causality having no basis sans space/time), and, therefore, you would have to establish the self-explained first cause as either space/time itself or entangled with space/time (somehow). If it is space/time, then I would ask for a sufficient reason (not cause) for why space/time came about, so to speak, as a self-explained first cause. Now, this gets contradictory (on my part) very quickly because of my next issue: the seemingly semantic basis for this OP—that to ask for a sufficient reason for a self-explained first cause makes no sense! But then I would ask for a sufficient reason as to why we ought to semantically define it as so in the first place: I don’t find it evident why I should (I would argue, arbitrarily) stop issuing the principle of sufficient reason on any kind of seemingly first cause out of nothing (or self-explained in some other manner). On the other hand, if the self-explained first cause is somehow entangled with space/time fabric, then anything part of this first cause that is sans space/time would be irrelevant to your OP (because, again, I would argue that any notion of our causality sans space/time is an over-extension of induction with respect to causality), and, therefore, the only relevant parts would be that which is mixed in with space/time fabric. This would imply, to me, that any part of the first cause that is mixed in with space/time is simply just apart of space/time’s causality and, therefore, there is no actual distinction (that I can think of) between the first cause and space/time itself. In other words, I would ask you: what is the sufficient reason for space/time fabric? If any notion of causality (which only exists within a spatial and temporal framework) is utilized in the sufficient reason, then I would argue that you are over-extending induction (although I could be wrong of course!). Hopefully that made at least a bit of sense.

Is that space also filled with other smaller things?

If space was made up of smaller things, then those things would be space. Unless you are referring to something metaphysically explaining the physical space, which I don't see how we would have any pertinent knowledge on that.

I do not deny that it may be impossible for true nothingness to exist, but I find it also impossible to deny that it might. The fact that we can doubt one, does not eliminate the possibility of the other.

I 100% agree here, but to be able to doubt something is distinctly different from doubting something on reasonable grounds. I am not advocating that we should disband notions because it is possible (or room to) doubt it, but, rather, it should be disbanded if the doubt introduces reasonable justification to disband it.

I have heard this from a few posters. How exactly does the quantum world not have cause and effect? If it does not have cause and effect, then is it not simply an alpha? In which case, it seems the OP still stands.I have heard this from a few posters. How exactly does the quantum world not have cause and effect? If it does not have cause and effect, then is it not simply an alpha? In which case, it seems the OP still stands.

I apologize: now that I understand your argument better the idea that physical causality may be broken at the quantum level has no effect on your argument. So I would agree with you here.

Correct. Something cannot cause itself, because then we are left right back to the question, "What caused it to cause itself?" So I find ascribing self-cause results in a contradiction, so should not be used.

This is exactly what I meant by a “semantic distinction”. You seem to be defining it in a way where it, by definition, doesn’t require the PSR anymore, which I don’t think is justified.

I hope I addressed it. If not, please point it out!

You have done a marvelous job at addressing my questions! And thank you for that! But I would say that I am still having a hard time understanding how a “self-explained first cause” isn’t solely a semantical distinction? And even if I were to grant that it is perfectly valid to simply define PSR out of the concept, I would still have to confess that PSR (having such a strong will to live, metaphorically speaking) will wiggle itself back into existence! For I could then ask for a sufficient reason for why PSR is defined out of the concept. Hopefully you see my confusion.

And according to the conclusion of the OP, there must be a point in which the chain of causality ends.

I would ask: does PSR not apply to that conclusion? Besides semantically defining it to not require PSR, shouldn’t we have to provide a sufficient reason for why causality has to end? And how does causality exist beyond space/time?

It would be because if an self-explained entity was divisible, the reason for its existence would be the combination of those divisible parts.

I see where you are coming from on this, but I would (in an effort to provide some exposition on my confusion) ask: what is the sufficient reason for it being indivisible? To say that a self-explained entity cannot be divisible because those smaller parts would be, logically, the self-explained entity instead, would seem to me to be simply (and solely) a semantical distinction. We could then say that this thing A is not a self-explained entity because it is made up of B and C. But B and C also aren’t self-explained because they are made up of D and E. We could do this infinitely. Then we could postulate that the very reason for why everything is seemingly infinitely not a self-explained cause must be the self-explained first cause. But then, I would say, why stop there? Why not postulate that the explanation for the actual infinite regression is actually made up of smaller explanations, and those made up of smaller, and so on ad infitum. So now we are attempting to explain an actual infinite regression that has an actual infinite regression of explanations for it. As you can probably see, we could keep elevating, so to speak, to the next necessary explanation above each infinite regression forever (and thereby never logically deriving a self-explained first cause). Now this isn’t to say that your OP isn’t true, but just that we could (theoretically) create an infinite amount of infinite explanations of infinite explanations of infinite explanations, etc. This demonstrates, to me, the absurdity of the argument (no offense meant).

Hopefully that all made sense. I think that we are more similar than I originally realized: what you would deem a self-explained first cause, I deem an explanatory-collapse. It seems as though this is your origin of things, mine fundamentally (due to the explanatory-collapsibility) cannot be derived therefrom.

As always, I hope this finds you well!
Bob

Hello @Philosophim,
Before I address your most recent reply, I wanted to apologize for a such a late response! With that out of the way, I will now begin my remarks.

I much appreciate the discussion Bob

I must also confess that I am very much appreciated our conversation as well! I enjoy civil philosophical dialogue, whereas I find (too often than I would hope) most people simply insulting each other (typically in more complex diction and prose) and I am not too fond of it.

I wrote another paper here which examines knowledge using basic principles. I've used that basis of knowledge for years now in my own life and philosophy, but of course you would not know that!

That sounds like a splendid read! I will definitely read them and get back to you on my thoughts (if you would like, of course). For now, I will respond in light of my ignorance on your papers (and, therefore, forgive me if my ignorance shows).

I can't seem to get anyone to have a good discussion with over it, and it bothers me that I haven't had anyone to properly discuss a theory which is a potential solution to the problem of induction.

Although, again, I haven’t read your work, if it is as you describe, then it will, indeed, be an enjoyable read (to say the least).

I am assuming a consistency in laws, and assuming things that may or may not exist. Where I think the deduction comes from is if these inductions were to be true, what would logically have to follow.

I think a proper response will require me to address this after I read your work(s), but I will still briefly address these two sentences. With respect to the first sentence, I would like to ask: what laws are you referring to? Newtonian laws? With respect to the second sentence, I now understand what you were meaning by deduction and, therefore, I was mistaken. You seem to be inducing a basic principle from which to deduce, which makes perfect sense (however I don’t quite agree with doing so, but that will have to wait until after I read your works).

There are a few theories in math that also work this way. They make claims about number patterns that in theory should be logically true, but cannot be confirmed due to the fact there are infinite numbers. I think this is a fundamental of philosophy.

I genuinely would like to know to what theories are you referring? Are you simply referring to the idea that we assume any number will “behave”, so to speak, like any other (i.e. addition will operate the same on 1 as it will with any colossal number I can think of)? Or are you referring to imaginary numbers, which are speculative? Or are you referring to a particular theory you would wish to enlighten me on? Or, and this will be my last conjecture, are you referring to infinite series summations (and such)?

They are the conclusions of what we know today. Causality exists. So causality must either continue indefinitely, or definitely. Of course, maybe there's a third option we haven't thought of.

I agree: it is important to work with what we have; however, I think that, in terms of causality and its dependency on time/space fabric, there are ways in which the faculties of reason can be stretched too thin--thereby causing one to be convinced it is intuitive or logical, but in reality it is what I would call lowercase “logic” being extended to what I call uppercase “Logic”. “logic” is that which our faculties of reason utilize all the time and, in many senses, is perfectly valid and useful. However, this “logic” (I think) has its limits and I would say (briefly) that the extension of causality beyond space/time fabric is “logic” being extended to “Logic” (upper case logic). “Logic” is simply defined in terms of what it is not: “logic”; Just like how true nothingness is defined as what it is not: something. Just like how I deem it impossible to truly conceive of true nothingness, I would also (for the same reasons) deem it impossible to truly know “Logic”. In other words, I find causality arguments (and I am not trying to overly generalize your argument) to be an extension stretched too thin. To sum this section up, I will would say that, although you are totally right in utilizing the knowledge that we do know, I would say your statement “causality must either continue indefinitely, or definitely” to be, as you admit in the following sentence, to be only a given certainty in terms of what is closest to our lives (metaphorically and literally speaking). For example, to say that something is a circle or is not a circle is typically considered a pretty exhaustive proposition (and reasonably so). And we could (and arguably would) extend this principle (that a thing is either a circle or not a circle) to all the depths of the universe (assuming we don’t find contrary evidence). However, I would say that our certainty on this principle, in this case the principle of non-contradiction, no matter how ingrained into our reasoning or closely intertwined within our lives, is inversely proportional to how far away a thing is, metaphorically as well as literally, to our lives. In all academic honesty, I am not very certain that I have any true justification for thinking that the law of non-contradiction persists in the farthest away concepts to me (such as the quantum realm, where superpositioning is technically possible). However, I would still advocate to use it (as you said) because it is the best thing that we’ve got for navigating our lives (but I would advocate its use within bounds, and that boundary is something I am still contemplating). Furthermore, and most importantly, the extension of this principle, which is already on fragile grounds when extended into the quantum realm, to that which is beyond our basic understand of all things (namely space/time fabric) greatly increases my skepticism and uncertainty on the issue at hand. So much, in fact, that I am hesitant to grant the idea that it is even useful to derive any concepts from any sort of greatly extended forms of induction (at least, ontologically speaking).

But among the two options of absurdity, we find that even an infinite regression end up having to be self-explained.

I think that I am now starting to grasp (slowly more and more) your argument: there must be an initial cause, or causes, for any given thing and that cause (or those causes) could be a combination of any type of thing that is self-explained (which, thereby, includes actual infinities). If that is the case (and, as always, correct me if I am wrong here), then I find that your argument is tailored more towards semantics: any term that is defined in a way that fundamentally has no cause is fair game. The problem I have with this (or confusion at the least) is that you seem to be advocating to the logical, via the principle of sufficient reason, derivation of causation back to a first cause (or causes) but yet then decide that it (or they—not necessarily in an agency sense of the term, but merely plurality) are outside of the scope of the principle of sufficient reason. In other words, it seems as you are using the principle of sufficient reason to derive a thing of which is excluded from that very principle. To say that it is self-explanatory, in my opinion, also, by your line of causal logic, invokes a particular infinite regression—namely that one would still be required to give a sufficient reason for why it is self-explained. This is why I think that it either becomes a semantic dead end or an infinite regression of “this is self-explained, what is the sufficient reason for its self-explanation, it is self-explained by its own self-explanation, what is the sufficient reason for that, etc”--which this leads our conversation back to your previous statement of how it boils down to indefinite or definite (which, in turn, leads us back to my previous remarks about certainty and the extension of “logic” past its limits). Now, this is exactly why I consider explanations to fundamentally collapse on themselves (which I call explanatory-collapsibility) and, therefore, I take a very different approach to epistemology (but I won’t get into that now, it will have to wait until after I read your works).

Once a self cause is existent, anything that it causes is now a secondary cause from the primary formation.

That is totally fair! However, I would then (and correct me if I am wrong) presume that you are semantically deriving this concept of a first cause—as this idea (in the above quote) is purely (I would argue) semantics (and I am not trying to undermine your position). Fundamentally, as I take it, you are defining this first cause to be, well, the first cause! Which means, as you said, that the term ‘self-cause’ doesn’t really make any sense anymore (but that’s only, I would say, if one already pre-defines it to be so!). If we weren’t to define it in a way where the term ‘self-caused first cause’, semantically speaking, is a contradictio in adjecto (i.e. a square circle), then I think we would be logically inclined, by the lines of your causal argument, to provide a sufficient justification, at the very least, for why the first cause was a first cause. In other words, why was first cause A a first cause and not the first cause B? Why were both B and A not secondary causes of first cause C? We could logically, but only in terms of semantics, conclude that B and A are not secondary causes of C because, by definition, first causes cannot be such. However, as hopefully I am demonstrating, there is still a level of explanation that I don’t think you are entirely addressing. But yet again I could just be misunderstanding you, so correct me if I am wrong!

But thinking about it, I believe first causes by their nature or the base constitute parts of existence. Complex objects are really a combination of smaller objects. A complex object cannot be self-explained, but is explained by its interaction with other objects.

I believe I am following what you are saying, but I am still a tad bit confused: if complex objects are merely constructed of smaller objects, then wouldn’t that be their explanations? Why (and how) would the interaction explain the Complex objects? My hand, mereologically speaking, does not exist, but, rather, is a construction of smaller parts: I take it that this is what you are referring to by “complex objects” (but correct me if I am wrong). The explanation of my hand is (I would say) the smaller parts. But here’s where it gets complicated (really quickly): those smaller parts are actually made of smaller ones, so, in a sense, the smaller parts of my hand are actually complex objects compared to its smaller parts (and so on and so forth!). Hence, I would argue, we end up with explanatory-collapsibility. I would say that we arbitrarily, within a relative scope, defining my hand to exist with respect to its smaller parts (objects), but I can also shift the scope to be of my cells to its smaller parts (objects) and the cells would now become the complex object. As far as I can tell, if one zooms in or out (so to speak), the explanations begin to cave in on themselves (providing little explanatory power the closer or farther away one goes). But yet within a relative scope they can be powerful explanations!

That being the case, a self-explained entity would seem to be indivisible.

Not to reiterate, but, again, what is the sufficient reason for a self-explained entity (first cause) to be indivisible (other than the fact that semantically speaking it is pre-defined as such)? Again, I may simply be misunderstanding you, but I don’t see how that doesn’t require a reason.

This is all of my thoughts for now! I really appreciate your posts and I hope that this was at least somewhat useful. I will definitely take a look at your epistemological works!
Bob

Hello @Philosophim,
Thank you for your commentary and further elaborative thoughts on my response post! I really appreciate you taking your time to address my remarks one-by-one. With that being said, I would like to respond to your response and, hopefully thereby, spark further conversation.
Firstly, I would like to confess an apology: I see now that you are making an argument of abducto ad absurdum—which, in your response, you cleared that up quite nicely. Further, I am glad that we can agree about how it can be problematic to use induction as a means of proof (with respect to this discussion topic)! However, I would have a couple issues with the use of abducto ad absurdum as well (in the context of this topic). Before I continue, let me quickly quote you:

The OP is an argument of abducto ad absurdum. Meaning, I am not showing that a first cause is necessary by showing proof of a first cause, but instead showing that if we assume there is no first cause, there exists an absurdity, or contradiction. The argument shows that I simply cannot logically deduce a situation that does not have a first cause, even when I propose an infinite regress.

Although (I would say) there is a lot to discuss in the above quote, I will start with your statement “The argument shows that I simply cannot logically deduce a situation that does not have a first cause, even when I propose an infinite regress”. Now this may be me just being technical (and forgive me if that is the case), but your use of the term “deduce” leads me to believe that you are attempting, in your argument, to use deduction, on the contrary to induction, to derive (logically) a first cause. This may be a fundamental difference between you and I: I think deduction is actually less reliable than induction (with respect to the topic at hand) because it requires the use of a basic principle (or principles) that then can be “explored”, so to speak, to logically determine its consequences. For example, if I begin with the concept that a triangle has three sides, then I can logically deduce whether a given shape is a triangle or not (which is fine and dandy—solid proof). However, I don’t think the aforementioned example is analogous to the attempted derivation of the origin of the Universe—for what basic principle can one use in their process of deduction? In fact, I would argue, the use of deduction to derive thereof would necessarily require the use of some sort of axiom, which I think would defeat the whole purpose of the derivation in the first place. Now, again, I may be overthinking your use of “deduce”, but if I am correct thus far, then I would say it is a faulty line of logic (no offense). In other words, the derivation of the origin of the Universe is a bottom-to-top (or, more accurately, a subject-to-object) approach (induction or/and abduction) but never a top-to-bottom (object-to-subject) approach (deduction) because the overlying principle (which would have to be used in the process of deduction) would be the origin of the Universe. Anyways, on another note, I would like to push back a bit on your appeal to absurdity to prove a first cause: I do not see how a first cause, which would defy all laws and logic we have thus far (especially causality), is any less “absurd” than an actual infinite. To say something just infinitely regresses, or infinitely loops around, has just as little explanatory power (I would say) as saying it just is, or that it is its own cause in itself. Maybe we just don’t agree, but to put it another way, I think that refurbishing your statement “I simply cannot logically deduce a situation that does not have a first cause” to “I simply cannot logically induce (or abduce) a situation that does not have a cause” would suffice in demonstrating our differences on this topic (in an overly simplified sense).

Secondly, I love your enthusiasm and curiosity about the implications of a first cause! Although I am still not convinced that it is the case, given the idea, I also would have a vast array of questions.

Is multiverse theory actually a statistical certainty, and not merely a fun theory? Is the nature of reality essentially infinite time and possibility?

I am a bit confused with respect to both of these statements. I bet you can already guess my question pertaining to your first sentence (in the quote): are you open to the idea that the multiverse, if it is true, also has a sufficient cause? That it has a “first cause”, so to speak? Now, coupled with your second sentence (in the quote), I am now questioning whether you are arguing for a first cause that all things (and “thing” defined in the most ambiguous and generic sense possible) are derived therefrom, or are you merely attempting to prove that the Universe itself had a first cause (of which its first cause would also have a first cause—i.e. the multiverse example)? If the latter is the case, then I would wonder where and why you would draw the line? When is the “first cause” of something necessarily the very first cause of all other “things”? When you say that reality may be “infinite time and possibility”, are you asking if it may be infinite chain of causation? I reckon you aren’t, but then I would be curious as to how “infinite time and possibility” would be derived anywhere but from some sort of actual infinite?
Thirdly, I would like to address your remarks pertaining to the relationship between the first cause and space/time fabric:

Prior to its [first cause’s] existence, yes. But once it exists, is it not part of space and time? ...First causes within our universe would necessarily have to be part of the space and time that results from them. That is because, as you noted, causality happens both ways. For space and time to come from a first cause, it must also be able to encounter space and time.

Before I address the above quote, I would like to, first and foremost, to agree with you that I also think that your argument (as presented hitherto) is open to the idea of multiple first causes, which leads me to believe (given that you agree with me on that) that I may have originally misunderstood your argument: you seem to be arguing for a first cause of the Universe, but not necessarily elaborating on whether those causes were caused or not (which is an entirely different discussion, but, although I won’t elaborate here, I think they are intertwined—as they both bring forth heavy implications for the other). Again, correct me if I am wrong here. Now back to the quote: I am a bit confused because you seem to be asserting that a first cause must necessarily be “part of space and time that results from them”, which seems contradictory to causation. You see, the cause cannot be the effect (nor part of the effect). That would mean that an effect, or at least a part of an effect, could possibly be its own cause—which I don’t think is consistent with humanities knowledge of causation as we currently know it. In other words, the cause of space/time fabric must reside outside of space/time—otherwise, if there is a part of the cause that resides therein, then that part logically would not be part of the cause (paradoxically): it would be part of the effect. If one were to argue that part of the cause is the effect, then one is also arguing that part of the effect caused itself (which is, at a bare minimum, a partial self-manifestation). I also, thus far, haven’t brought up the fact that quantum physics (although I am no expert by any means) reveals to us that our “traditional” intuitions of causation do not work at the quantum level (which I am still exploring the literature on that as we speak). However, I think that may be for another conversation.

For the sake of making this less wordy, I am going to start quickly addressing your comments with less structure (I fear I am not being concise enough):

You are correct however. My only minor quibble would be self-causation, but that's technical and honestly irrelevant. I agree they all fit under the "first cause" definition.

To be honest, I am not sure what the difference would be between self-causation and self-manifestation: is it that the latter may require a will of some kind? If so, then I am perfectly happy using the term self-causation instead! That would make sense to me why you would prefer not to label it that way and, quite frankly, I think it to be a very relevant critique: thank you for bringing that up!

If something creates another thing, even if it is itself, that created thing is caused by the original thing, the first cause.

This may be me being to technical again, but I think this sentence is a contradiction. On one hand, you say “something creates If something creates another thing, even if it is itself, that created thing is caused by the original thing, the first cause. thing”, but then you say “even if it is itself”: the former, I would say, is a perfect representation of causation (as the term another thing can not refer to the original thing), whereas the latter is not. I cannot think of a single example of where an effect caused itself (traditionally speaking, although I would be willing to explore the implications of quantum physics). If that were the case, namely that effects could be there own causes, then there would be no semantic difference between the term “cause” and “effect”: I would argue there would be no meaningful distinction.

If you are implying that we could argue for any type of first cause, that is a conclusion of the argument. A first cause has no explanation for why it exists, therefore it is not constrained by prior rules as to why it should exist.

I think I slightly misunderstood your argument and, therefore, I apologize. But I am still a bit confused because an actual infinite would also not be “constrained by prior rules as to why it should exist” just as much, I would argue, as saying there is a first cause that either just is or is self-caused. That is what I meant by “they would be just as out of bounds of the principle of sufficient reason as anyone could (at least) argue for any type of “first cause””: namely that defining a cause as being self-caused, for instance, breaks the chain of the principle of sufficient reason (that everything has a sufficient reason for its existence) by exhausting that principle inward on itself (i.e. what’s its cause? Oh! It is its own cause! But what’s the cause of its own cause? Oh! It is the cause of that too! Etc...)--just like, on the other hand, an actual infinite would exhaust the principle of sufficient reason outward of itself (i.e. what’s its cause? Oh! That is its cause! What’s the cause of that? Oh! That is the cause of its cause! Etc..). You see, they both break the principle of sufficient reason (and I personally think this is one out of many reasons why our logic and reason is not reliable pertaining to anything beyond space/time, or anything postulated to be the cause of space/time but yet part of it in some way). I am saying this because I was under the impression that you were arguing against the idea of an infinite regression, but I would say that an actual infinite regression is just as valid, so to speak, on contrary to a potential infinite regression, as the idea of a first cause which is self-caused.

The point of addressing actual infinities was to eliminate the only other option to the idea of finite regression. If we cannot have a situation that does not always boil down to a first cause, there must inevitably exist a first cause.

Forgive me, but I am not entirely sure (in light of what I previously stated) how you eliminated actual infinities? I thought, and correct me if I am wrong, that you were arguing that an infinite regression would logically require a reason for why it infinitely regresses: but that’s only true, definitions wise, for potential infinities. By definition, an actual infinite is, in its own definition, necessitated to be truly infinite (there is nothing outside of it), just like how, by definition, a self-caused first cause, in its own definition, necessitates that it is truly its own cause (there is nothing beyond it). I am finding it hard to see how you concluded that one is invalid while inferring the other is perfectly valid.

You are also correct. But they are the only known options we have. I cannot bring logic into that which we have no knowledge of. As such, I am left with what I do know. If there was another option that came into light in the future, then the argument would be invalid. However, within the confines of what we do know, does the argument make sense? I think I've made a decent case.

Fair enough! And you have absolute made a decent case (if not more than that)! However, I don’t think that we can say that there is definitively a first cause given how little we understand the topic: it isn’t analogous, I would argue, to the study of cells, for instance, where we have ample knowledge on the topic. Sure, we could discover something entirely new about cells that rocks our previous understand at its core, but we have plenty of positive evidence for our claims, whereas you seem to be arguing by process of elimination (abducto ad absurdum), which is purely negative evidence. I find this problematic because negative evidence only tells me logically what can’t be, but rarely ever what can be (which requires positive evidence—with the exception of statements that are truly limited in scope, like whether the cat is or is not in the kitchen).
Hopefully my responses find you well and are at least somewhat substantive.
Bob

Hello @Philosophim,
I really enjoyed your post (regardless of the position I would take on the issue at hand) due its thorough and substantive nature. With that being said, I do have to confess that I do not share your view as described in your initial post and, therefore, I would like to provide you with some of my thoughts pertaining to the matter at hand (which you can naturally do what you like with). Furthermore, I will try to be chronological (as best I can) with my remarks, but I apologize in advance if it seems a bit all over the place.
My first remark pertains to the very concept of “causality”, which I think can be reasonably inferred as your basis of your argument (although please correct me if I am wrong here). To be quite frank, I am very skeptical, to say the least, of any form of causation beyond physical (material) causation which, I would profess, is confined to space-time fabric. To say some effect was caused by some cause implies, I would argue, that (1) the cause came before the effect (no matter how minute or minuscule of a duration of time) and that (2) some form of matter was “converted”, so to speak, into something spatially different (whether directly perceived or abstractly inferred) than it previously was (which is then defined as the effect and investigated to determine the cause—which, in turn, is derived from the principle of sufficient reason). I would like to emphasize the implications of the two aforementioned properties of causality: without a spatial-temporal framework, causality is something that is (assuming there is a kind of causality separable from space-time) completely out of the scope of my perceptions and thoughts—thereby potentially unobtainable in my current biological state. All notions of causation, that I at least can fathom, has some sort of ties (no matter how subtle) to the two aforementioned properties (namely the spatial and temporal implications)--kind of like how I can’t actually, in a literal sense, fathom true nothingness (and I don’t mean that in a scientific sense of the term). Just like how to think of true nothingness one must necessarily tie it (no matter how subtle) to the closest imaginable absence of all things (such as empty space-time fabric), so it is with causation (I would argue). Now, before I continue, I would like to bring forth a common counter argument I hear, which I thought you may be interested to hear along with my ideas as they have been thus far portrayed: there is an argument out there (and I would confess I have found it to be relatively common of one) to consider there to be simultaneous causation—that is, the effect and the cause occur simultaneously. An example of such would be (as Immanual Kant put it) a ball sitting on a cushion: the cause simultaneously, in its very act, conceives the depression in the cushion. Another example is the act of sitting down simultaneously creates a lap. Now, I do have to say that I do not consider any of these to be actually simultaneous, but for the sake of providing counter examples (as the best I can), I ought to include them. Just to very briefly discuss why I don’t consider them simultaneous, I think that the reason causation can be, at times, perceived as simultaneous is simply because without measuring tools that have incredible amounts of precision (unlike our immediate senses) it seems as though the ball simultaneously caused the depression in the cushion; however, no matter how convincing it may seem to the naked eye, I would argue that more precise measuring tools enable us to conclude that the ball, no matter how incredibly quickly applied, requires a certain amount of time to effect the cushion and, thereby, create the depression. In terms of the lap example, I would argue that sitting down and “creating a lap” are two defined concepts that represent the same physical thing and, therefore, do not represent two different effects (in other words, saying “the process of sitting created a lap” is synonymous with saying “the process of sitting caused you to sit in a particular style we call a ‘lap’ in our language”--there is still one physical cause causing one physical effect). Now the reason I bring up all this skepticism pertaining to causation is that I view causal arguments for a first cause to be, simply put (and I am not trying to undermine your argument), the process of induction being utilized to infer something that is well beyond that which any given experience could reasonably supply to induction itself. In other words: to infer a first cause one must utilize induction, induction is an inference (and, thereby, reasoning) derived from experiences, any given experience is necessitated from a spatial-temporal framework, but yet the conclusion pertains to something beyond a spatial-temporal framework. I would say that this kind of logic is exactly how your #1 premise is derived and, quite frankly, I would argue this is the logical basis of your whole argument (as I would say it is an argument of causality).
My second remark pertains to your a-c options (or possible explanations) pertaining to the derivation of our world. You see, I am also not entirely convinced that those are the only three options. I would say there are five (if one is going to use logic and its metalogical principles, which I won’t elaborate here, but I would be skeptical of this too): eternal existence, self-manifestation (causa sui), infinite regression, infinite loop, and arbitrary stopping point. Firstly, I think you may have too hastily lumped all causes that are defined as “not having a prior cause” into your “first cause” (c), when, in fact, I think there are at least (at a minimum) two distinct sectors: eternal existence and self-manifestation (causa sui); I would be personally unwilling to say that these two concepts are synonymous or analogous to one another—although I would concede that they both fit under your “first cause” (c) definition. Without going to deep into it, I would just like to briefly highlight the major difference between the two: one simply is while the other caused itself. To elaborate a bit further, I shall quote you:

If an Alpha exists, its own justification for existence, is itself.

. In light of the two aforementioned concepts (eternal existence and self-manifestation), I am not entirely certain as to if you are arguing for a “first cause” that created itself (which would constitute it being its own justification) or if it just is (which, I would argue, isn’t its own justification: it has no justification because, one method of argument would be that, it isn’t within the scope of the principle of sufficient reason). Secondly, I would like to point out that both forms of indefiniteness, as far as I could tell, in your 3 options (namely a and b) were references to actual infinities—contrary to potential infinities. A potential infinite is that which is infinite constrained within the boundaries of a finite (think of theoretically continually walking halfway towards a door, or getting smaller and smaller measurements within one meter on a ruler), which have been both mathematically and in practicality proven to be not only possible but true (as far as my knowledge goes). On the contrary, an actual infinite is that which is infinite and is not constrained within a finite, which (as far as I know) has not been proven to exist. The reason I am bringing this up is because of what you said here:

Infinitely prior, and infinitely looped causality, all have one final question of causality that needs answering. "Why would it be that there exists an infinite prior or infinitely looped causality in existence? These two terms will be combined into one, "Infinite causality.”

Although I would concede that actual infinities have not been proven to exist, if they do exist, then they would not be subject to your criticism here: they would be just as out of bounds of the principle of sufficient reason as anyone could (at least) argue for any type of “first cause”. Furthermore, I would argue that your critique actually pertains to potential infinities: that a infinite within a finite must have, well, a finite cause—which makes sense. Again, I merely trying to point out that there may be a completely different “infinite” of which I don’t think you addressed (at least, at a minimum, adequately) in your initial post.
I apologize for how long my reply is, but I have an inkling that you would rather have a too long response than one that is way too short. My final remark I will make pertains to your conclusion:

Because there are no other plausibilties to how causality functions, the only only conclusion is that a causal chain will always lead to an Alpha, or first cause.

I honestly don’t see how this follows. At best, I would say that your argument (as portrayed thus far) gets you to disproving a and b, but that doesn’t logically mean that c is automatically true. Now, I have heard counter arguments that it isn’t an appeal to ignorance fallacy if one has definitively proven that the options at hand are the only ones and, thereby, proving that process of elimination is a perfectly valid argument; however, with the consideration of what I have said henceforth, I do not see how one could possibly prove that a-c (or even if you were to accept my previously mentioned five possibilities) are literally the only options: I don’t think this situation is analogous to stating “the cat is either in the kitchen or it isn’t” which upon disproving one or the other would necessarily prove the contrary. Moreover, I think that scenarios like the previous cat statement are the only true scenarios where I would agree with proving one thing by disproving another. Another way I think about it is, to state that all options are truly exhaustive, one must necessarily know all the possibilites about the given subject: I certainly don’t think I could possibly ever reasonably determine that I know all the actual possibilities of how this world, as I know it, came about (in terms of derivation, however I could say it came about in terms of the big bang or evolution, but those aren’t absolute stopping points like a first cause).
Anyhow, in conclusion, I hope that this post found you well and hopefully I brought up some remarks that, although you may not agree with, sparks some sort of intellectual contemplation. If you have any questions, feel free to contact me.
Bob

@Edy
First and foremost, I really enjoyed your analogy Edy. However, I must say that I do not agree with it (on multiple different levels). Don't get me wrong, I found your analogy quite thought provoking, but I would like to elaborate on some of the areas I don't find very convincing. Firstly, I don't think the analogy (on the surface) truly holds because any video game you can reference does not involve some of the vital aspects of why we would consider your examples (such as murder, burning people alive, etc) immoral--such as life, consciousness, the ability to feel pain, etc. When the programmers test their program (by shooting a person in it, for example), they are not shooting a being that is conscious of the fact that they are shot nor can they feel the excruciating pain of the bullet as it rips through their body. I would reckon that if the aforementioned was actually the case, that they could feel the pain, then we would have laws attempting to prevent people from abusing virtual characters within video games. What I am trying to say is that your analogy only holds if shooting a person in a video is exactly analogous to shooting someone in real life--and I think there is a clear difference.


Secondly, I think your concept of morality (as best as I could infer) is that of a cognitivist--that is, it seems to me that you are attributing moral actions as truth claims that are seemingly discoverable in an absolute sense. For example, it seems as though you are implying that God he "coded in", so to speak, our absolute moral standards, but he is amoral in the sense that he doesn't need to abide by his created moral standards for us. As you may be already anticipating: I abide more towards non-cognitivism (in a general sense)--that is, I do not think there are moral truths (in an absolute sense). Morality is not based off of some baseline (some absolute) but, rather, it is relative to sentient beings. Therefore, I would conclude that whether God's actions (assuming he exists) are immoral or moral is utterly up to the sentient being's discretion. I for one, assuming we are discussing the abrahamic God, would consider His actions in the Old Testament immoral (but, more importantly, not in an absolute sense). I would appeal to perceived objective facts that I have obtained throughout my life to make a compelling argument (or at least I would consider it so) that mass genocide (regardless of whomever commits it) is immoral (if the term "immoral" is going to mean anything at all).

Thirdly, I would like to point out that amorality is (I would say) a non-cognitivist position because it is only possible to claim something is amoral if that thing resides in an "environment" that has no moral truths and, subsequently, no moral judgements. I would also like to point out that amorality is not the idea (as I best understand it) that something is out of bounds of morality (which I think this is what your analogy is aimed at, although I could be mistaken), but, rather, it is that there are no moral truths or judgements.

Hopefully this finds you well,
Bob Ross