The freedom of identity a technically advanced consumer society facilitates (identity commodified / personal paralysis packaged as endless novelty) contains within it the anaesthetic that neutralizes a more valuable freedom, the freedom of resistance against an orientation towards the self that dictates that a self must consume even the self and in as many flavours as possible in order to fully experience itself. And is directed to do so through the conduits of mass media, celebrity culture, and social engineering technologies. — Baden
Consider, if you will, the one abiding thought that dominates my thinking: The world is phenomena. Once this is simply acknowledged, axiomatically so, then things fall into place. The brain is no longer the birth of phenomena, phenomena issue forth from phenomena, and what phenomena are is an open concept. Conscious open brain surgery shows a connection between brain and experiences, thoughts, emotions, memories, but does not show generative causality. Indeed, and this is an extraordinary point: If the brain were the generative source of experience, every occasion of witnessing a brain would be itself brain generated. This is the paradox of physicalism. What is being considered here, in your claim about gravity and its phenomenal universality (keeping in mind that gravity is not, of course, used in phenomenology's lexicon. But the attempt to bridge phenomenology with knowledge claims about the world of objects that are "out there" and "not me" is permitted {is it not?} to lend and borrow vocabularies with science. An interesting point to consider) is a "third perspective". Recall how Wittgenstein argued that we cannot discuss what logic is, for logic would be presupposed in the discussing. You would need some third perspective that would be removed from that which is being analyzed; but then, this itself would need the same, and so forth. This is the paradox of metaphysics, I guess you could call it, the endless positing of a knowledge perspective that itself, to be known, would require the same accounting as that which is being explained. An infinite regression.
But if you follow, in a qualified way, Husserl's basic claim that what we call appearances are really an ontology of intuition (though I don't recall he ever put it like this), whereby the givenness of the world IS the foundation we seek, the "third perspective" which is a stand alone, unassailable reality, then, while the "what is it?" remains indeterminate, for language just cannot "speak" this (see above), we can allow the scientific term "gravity" to be science's counterpart to the apparent need for an accounting of a transcendental ego in order to close the epistemic distance between objects and knowledge. — Constance
There is something here. but the language has to change. First, remove the science-speak, for you have stepped beyond this, for keep in mind that when consciousness and its epistemic reach is achieved by identifying object relations as gravitational in nature, and then placing the epistemic agency in this, as you call it, logos, you are redefining gravity as a universal, not law of attraction, but connectivity and identity, and I do remember thinking something like this was a way to account for knowledge relationships: identity. The distance is closed because there is no distance between objects that are not separated. And I mentioned that Husserl did hold something like this, but the "logos" was not scientific, it was a phenomenological nexus of intentionality. And since gravity is at this level of inquiry a strictly naturalistic term (to talk like Husserl), the description of what this unity is about has to go to a more fundamental order of thought, phenomenology. Gravity is now a phenomenon, an appearing presence. Ask a phenomenologist what a force is, what the curviture of space is, and you will first have see that these are conceived in theory and they are terms of contingency. One doesn't witness space or forces, but only effects from which forces are inferred and the names only serve to ground such things in a scientific vocabulary.
Not gravity, with its connotative baggage, but phenomena, for this is all that is ever witnessed, ever can be witnessed. If it is going to be a universal connectivity of all things, I do think you are right to note that there is this term gravity that abides in everything and binds everything. I would remove the term and realize this connectivity does not belong to a scientific logos. It must be a term that is inclusive of the consciousness in which the whole affair is conceived and the epistemic properties are intended to explain. And this consciousness is inherently affective, ethical, aesthetic, and so on. For the nexus that connects me to my lamp and intimates knowing-in-identity is always already one that cares, in interested, fascinated, repulsed, and so on. A connection of epistemology not only cannot be conceived apart from these, it must have then as their principle feature, because these are the most salient things in all of existence. — Constance
Of course, gravity sounds a lot like God, then. For God is, sans the troublesome history and narratives, a metaethical, meta aesthetic metavalue grounding of the world.
You may not agree with the above, but for me, I think you are on to something. Gravity, I will repeat, never really was "gravity", for this is a term of contingency, See Rorty's Contingency, Irony and Solidarity for a nice account of this. When the matter goes to some grand foundation of connectivity, are we not in metaphysics? Or on its threshold? — Constance
that's not what you said I said. You said:
Your statement implies the belief commonplace subjective experiences should be easily accessible to the objectivist methodologies of science. It also implies the subjective/objective distinction is a trivial matter and should therefore be no problem for science.
— ucarr
I didn't say or imply either of those things. — T Clark
...As far as I can see, there's no reason to think that consciousness can't be understood in terms of principles we already are aware of. I don't see any hard problem. — T Clark
...it was an insult. — T Clark
The fact you don't recognize the difference tells me everything I need to know about whether or not to take you seriously. — T Clark
No, I've never thought of it. Tell me briefly how a "surface semi-symmetrical in its continuity" would do what needs to be done here. — Constance
Your statement implies the belief commonplace subjective experiences should be easily accessible to the objectivist methodologies of science. It also implies the subjective/objective distinction is a trivial matter and should therefore be no problem for science.
— ucarr
Neither of these statements is true. — T Clark
Antonio Damasio is a neuroscientist who studies the biological foundations of mental processes, including consciousness. The book I have is "The Feeling of What Happens." — T Clark
In the same way, mental processes, including consciousness, are not nothing but biology. But they are bound by biology in the same way that recorded music is bound by a CD or MP3 reader or radio — T Clark
If it can't be known by science, how can it be known. How do you know it?... You don't. — T Clark
As far as I can see, there's no reason to think that consciousness can't be understood in terms of principles we already are aware of. I don't see any hard problem. — T Clark
the fact that many people cannot conceive that consciousness might have a physical basis is not evidence that it doesn't. — T Clark
You haven't provided any evidence that "Scientists examining "the hard problem" indicate how, regarding this question, the division between subjective/objective is deep and treacherous." — T Clark
The really hard problem of consciousness is the problem of experience. When we think and perceive, there is a whir of information-processing, but there is also a subjective aspect. As Nagel (1974) has put it, there is something it is like to be a conscious organism. This subjective aspect is experience. When we see, for example, we experience visual sensations: the felt quality of redness, the experience of dark and light, the quality of depth in a visual field. Other experiences go along with perception in different modalities: the sound of a clarinet, the smell of mothballs. Then there are bodily sensations, from pains to orgasms; mental images that are conjured up internally; the felt quality of emotion, and the experience of a stream of conscious thought. What unites all of these states is that there is something it is like to be in them. All of them are states of experience.
— David Chalmers, Facing Up to the Hard Problem — Wayfarer
You're kind of a dick. — T Clark
You're claiming the objectivism of science does not handicap its examination of subjective mind?
— ucarr
Your above observations do not answer my question. Are you unwilling to answer it? — ucarr
Again, how does this span the epistemic distance? — Constance
Subjective experience is not something magical or exotic. We all sit here in the whirling swirl of it all day every day. Why would something so common and familiar be different from all the other aspects of the world? — T Clark
You're claiming the objectivism of science does not handicap its examination of subjective mind? — ucarr
Any attempt to describe epistemic connectivity would encounter the same problem it attempts to solve, for whatever the metaphor might be put in play, one would still have to explain how epistemic transmission is possible. — Constance
The only thing I can imagine that would bridge the distance is identity, that is, one's knowing-self itself receives direct intimation of the presence of an object. — Constance
All one witnesses is phenomena. My couch is a phenomenal event and its "out thereness" is clearly evident, but how does its existence get into mine? — Constance
I'm nor sure what this gives us — Tom Storm
I think at this point in history there are a few key issues left to people who wish to find support for higher consciousness/idealism/theism worldviews - — Tom Storm
No evasion. I don't see it as relevant. — T Clark
I am not a historian, scientist or philosopher. I was simply reflecting on the key issues which today separate the physicalist from the higher consciousness/idealism schools.
I think what I say is accurate... — Tom Storm
The question simply makes no sense. What could an answer possibly be? "It feels like...?" What words could possibly fill the blank? — Isaac
I think at this point in history there are a few key issues left to people who wish to find support for higher consciousness/idealism/theism worldviews - the nature of consciousness, and the mysteries of QM, being the most commonly referenced. — Tom Storm
...it has become a 'god of the gaps' style argument, a kind of prophylactic against naturalism and a putative limitation on science and rationalism — Tom Storm
I don't want to get into a long discussion about how science has to proceed. — T Clark
I will say that there is no reason the mind would not be among entities amenable for study by science. — T Clark
One radical solution is to say S and P are bound in identity: In some describable way, P is part of S's identity, and the brain/object separation has to be dismissed. — Constance
I think you're focusing more on the philosophy of propositions? — frank
I actually suspect that the brain does not produce conscious experience, but rather conditions it. — Constance
Experience exceeds the physical delimitations of the physical object, the brain. Call it spirit?? — Constance
I don't see any "blanks" in what I wrote that need to be filled. — 180 Proof
Context matters. — 180 Proof
Solipsism excludes community.
Solipsism is not concerned with extraterrestrials.
There is no such thing as interstellar solipsism. — god must be atheist
"Atheism Equals Cosmic Solipsism" As far as I know, solipsism is a philosophical thought that proposes that only the self exists, and its experiences such as himself, his place in the world and his perception of the world are either imagined, or else directed illusions.
How does its being cosmic affect this? There is no cosmos in solipsism.
And why would atheism equal solipsism, cosmic or otherwise? There is no reason to believe that. Atheism is a belief there is no god, there are no gods. This is a far cry from solipsism. Solipsism can exist in the philosophy of a theist and equally in the philosophy of an atheist. Cosmic (?) or otherwise. — god must be atheist
As I understand philosophy, "metaphysics" does not consist of factual truth-claims; it's not theoretical and its expressions are not propositional – like poetry – but rather, metaphysics consists of categorical inquiries into reality, insofar as reality both constitutes and encompasses all of our hypothetical inquiries (e.g. formal natural & historical sciences and arts), in order to rationally make sense of – make whole – 'human existence'. The resulting categories, paradigms, criteria, methods, interpretations constitute reflective ways of 'being in the world' (or world-making) but are not themselves demonstrable truth-claims about the world. Thus, for me at least, ucarr, "metaphysical claims", as Witty says, is nonsense. — 180 Proof
I don't see any "blanks" in what I wrote that need to be filled. — 180 Proof
"metaphysics" does not consist of factual truth-claims... — 180 Proof
it's not theoretical and its expressions are not propositional — 180 Proof
metaphysics consists of categorical inquiries into reality, — 180 Proof
reality both constitutes and encompasses all of our hypothetical inquiries — 180 Proof
The resulting categories, paradigms, criteria, methods, interpretations constitute reflective ways of 'being in the world' — 180 Proof
(...categories, paradigms, criteria, methods, interpretations...) are not themselves demonstrable truth-claims about the world. — 180 Proof
"metaphysical claims... is nonsense. — 180 Proof
Atheism is a 2nd order statement about theism which is a 1st order statement about "god"; the latter is metaphysics (i.e. onto-theology) and the former epistemology / logic. — 180 Proof
I suppose you need to reformulate what I've written because it's easier for you to knock down strawmen rather than substantively engage my stated positions — 180 Proof
atheism is disbelief in theistic deities (& stories) If the material universe was "created", then an atheist only states "I disbelieve stories of 'the universe created by a theistic deity'" — 180 Proof
“God did not create the material universe.” — ucarr
“ Theistic God did not create the material universe.” — ucarr
“ Deistic God did create the material universe.” — ucarr
My issue with religion is that it unfortunately offers an opportunity to separate people by drawing firm lines in the sand as to what is demanded of one another in terms of belief and custom. — Hanover
A secular protestant...
— ucarr
It's not always a vacuous culture war out there. — Tom Storm
A secular protestant, lying on his deathbed, in defiance of his own emotional past as a boy raised Catholic, exhorts his parents, wife and children, to their great anguish, not to hold any type of religious services at his funeral. — ucarr
I wasn't asking for definitions of statistical significance or Protestantism, I was asking you what exactly "practicing atheism as a kind of secular Protestantism" involves or consists of. What does this look like, in practice? — busycuttingcrap
Only a "theistic" origin of the universe is "excluded". — 180 Proof
...an atheist only states "I disbelieve stories of 'the universe created by a theistic deity'". This is an epistemological commitment and not a "metaphysical claim" (whatever that means). — 180 Proof
I suspect a statistically significant number (certainly not all) of atheists practice their atheism as a kind of secular Protestantism.
— ucarr
I'm curious what this means, exactly; can you say more? — busycuttingcrap
I do not understand atheism as an "ideology" or as derived from "axioms". One who claims, as I do, that theism is demonstrably not true and, therefore, disbelieves in every theistic deity, is an atheist. — 180 Proof
... atheism doesn't dictate any particular position on how (or whether) the universe began... only that whatever it is, God had nothing to do with it. — busycuttingcrap
We know from ourselves that our universe is a consciousness-bearing universe.
— ucarr
I don't dispute this, but others will, so I think that proving this should be your starting point. — RogueAI
↪RogueAI
We know from ourselves that our universe is a consciousness-bearing universe.
— ucarr
I took this as "I am conscious, and I came into being in the Universe, so therefore the Universe is capable of giving rise to something conscious." Which, as far as I know, can't really be proven, only experienced with an n=1. — tomatohorse
"I am conscious, and I came into being in the Universe, so therefore the Universe is capable of giving rise to something conscious." Which, as far as I know, can't really be proven, only experienced with an n=1.
— tomatohorse
That's actually a proof. It is not proven in an a priori way, but in an a posteriori or empirical way, but it's still a proof. — god must be atheist
Is QM's vector-cloud of probability and its collapse not part of the observer effect?
— ucarr
Wtf? — 180 Proof
If God was “co-created alongside of human”, what accounts for the dualistic split between the natural( the human as a physical and biological entity) and the spiritual? These two realms seem to be interacting from across an unbridgeable divide. — Joshs
What makes scientific naturalism ‘isolated and solipsistic’ if not as
one pole of a nature-spirit dialectic? In other words , don’t we first have to assume your nature-spirit co-creation , and then by subtracting away God arrive at a solipsistic physical nature? — Joshs
That is, if all there is is the natural , by comparison to what can we call it ‘isolated’? — Joshs
Kant made human conceptualization and empirical nature inseparably co-dependent, — Joshs
What's 4D logic? Just curious... — Shawn
Is Shroedinger's cat never super-positioned as a life/death ambiguity?
IIRC, the "live/dead cat" is only a construct within a thought-experiment that makes explicit some of the ways imeasurements of quantum phenomena are epistemically inconsistent with classical physics; the "live/dead cat" is not itself an actual phenomenon. — 180 Proof
But how do we know enough about consciousness to recognize it as a player in the universe in relationship to 'physical' components you refer to as accepted facts? — Paine
Anthromorphizing compositional fallacy at the very least. — 180 Proof
...without a clear conception of "consciousness" either in philosophy or science, the phrase "consciousness-bearing" is uninformative. — 180 Proof
We also know from QM there is crosstalk between observer and observed, thus establishing the essential sociability of both existence and consciousness. — ucarr
The rest of your post, trafficking as it does in pseudo-science / misinterpreting QM's 'observer effect', doesn't make much sense either except maybe as wishful thinking (i.e. "theology"). — 180 Proof
Lastly, I don't recognize the theisms of Abrahamic, Vedic, or any other pagan faiths in your account, ucarr, so on that point, again, I don't know what you mean by "theism" or, for that matter, "atheism". — 180 Proof
Theism claims God-Spirit dwells beyond the natural world and, moreover, causes its histories and experiences as physical events. — ucarr
Did you not introduce transcendence as what the 'physical' could not provide? — Paine
Life propagating spontaneously from a physical ground is transcendent holism. — ucarr
How do you know that a 'physical ground' is bereft of life? — Paine