Are you talking about a series or a sequence? What is a bounded infinity? — jgill

I'm talking about a sequence. For a bounded infinity, you can configure a linear equation that extends between zero and one but never reaches either boundary.

On the other hand, if you change the scale of the same linear equation, it extends beyond both boundaries.

In both cases, the linear equation is configured to function within the realm of analysis, which is to say the plotting of the linear equation covers distance with time-positive. It is this role of time-positive that makes analysis possible.

Within the realm of dimension, distance is time-zero. You and I experience our navigation of the world as a whole person moving through distance time-positive. We don't say the infinite points, lines, and areas (that math articulates as the parts making up our native 3D extension) assemble and re-assemble as we move about. We move about as one whole person, not as our math-measurable parts continuously assembling and disassembling.

A crucially important question within math-physics is how time-positive and time-zero manage the realm of analysis and the realm of dimension.

Within an infinite series, you can keep changing the scale of your numerical progression so that you'll never exit a bounded infinity. Enlarge the scale and you immediately exit the bounded infinity. Might this be the way out of Zeno's Paradox?

In the calculus of the measurement of the area under the curve, however, the approach, by design, never scales up and beyond the bounded infinity. Irrational Pi tells us our math-controllable analysis never arrives at the circle. There are no circles outside of the mind, but spheres abound within our natural world. We can understand them only mentally as an infinite series of circles rotating around an axis; we can only observe spheres without understanding them existentially.

To the extent I understand you, your helpful cosmology primer on the math and physics of spacetime of the past three centuries or so, acting as a guide, enables me to see that my atomistic approach to dimensional expansion - in the mode of Zeno - in your view, employs the wrong mode going in the wrong direction.

The cosmos is not an accretion built up from infinitesimals. Instead, there are holistic cosmic symmetries that the transformations of topology "breaks" for analysis, then reassembles towards the general relativism of nodes of material existence.

My central global objective within my thesis is clarification of the relationship between analysis, i.e., science, and existence, i.e., being. At the center of my focus is the calculus, an analytic methodology of the infinitesimal as an approach to the curvilinear. When the n-gon parallelogram magically becomes the circle, we see what science makes a close approach to, but cannot attain to: dimensionally extended material things. You can smash up a thing towards understanding that its parts have a logical continuity, but you can't understand analytically the brute fact of the existence of dimensionally extended material things.

This gap separating analysis from existence, by my understanding, separates the series from the dimension. Algebraic geometry, topology, like all algebras, seeks to find the missing part via math operators governing the inter-relations of numbers. Well, dimensionally extended material things can be measured in accordance with the shuffling around of parts towards diagramming and memorizing the design for assemblage of the parts into a whole. However, the whole thing assembled dimensionally gestalts away from analysis to brute fact observable only. What science observes axiomatically, it cannot understand holistically.

Yes, math converts dimensionally extended wholes into logics and designs mathematically controllable. Once returned to its whole state of being, the dimensionally extended whole exerts its brute presence and science returns to its axiomatic observation without understanding.

Distance, the experience of logic and design, occupies the transcendental idealism of the mind as its own physics internalized as mind, per Kant.

We have a mental understanding of ourselves whilst not existentially understanding ourselves because 3-Space dimensional extension plus time is our native state as dimensionally extended beings. When I enter a room, I don't perceive myself penetrating an infinite series of planes as I traverse the cubic space of the room because parallelograms are a cognitive reality within the transcendental idealism of the mind.

The minds are not made of anything else — MoK

Mind, substance and stuff are made of strings? Strings are the foundation of all material things, right?

If it's not locally real (what does "real" mean in this sense?) — Harry Hindu

"Real" in this sense, as I understand it, refers to the classical view that says objects are only influenced by their surrounding environment. QM says quantum effects connect positions with material extensions across distances that go beyond local interactions.

What was the world like before sentients existed? — Harry Hindu

I imagine the world, then as now, was governed by both Newtonian and QM physics.

If there was a creator, it seems to me that it would require much less space than we have, and it is the mind-numbing expanse of space and time that is evidence that we are outcomes of purposeless processes, not a purposeful one. — Harry Hindu

Okay. You're not a fan of intelligent design.

I don't see how confusion could be useful, other than informing you that you don't have something quite right about your interpretation of reality, and to keep trying. — Harry Hindu

I should've used "simulation" instead of "confusion." Our memories, acting as simulations of originally empirical experiences, allow us to have personal histories.

The question is how much of the digital object is a mental construct and how much is a representation of the signal before being digitized. — Harry Hindu

Shannon info theory might have some answers to your question.

What defined the boundaries between sentient minds? What makes your mind "other" than mine? — Harry Hindu

The variance of environments makes for different mindsets around the globe.

Well, the pianist is just another part. If we know the history of the pianist and what they know how to play and what they like to play, and what they have played most often, you don't really need to count the keys on the piano, do you? — Harry Hindu

Here you might be flirting with determinism, but I don't think you're completely serious about it.

Are substance, stuff and matter all made of atoms and molecules?

What about mind? What’s it made of?

The Mind is a substance with the ability to experience and cause the stuff. — MoK

What's the relationship between substance, stuff and matter?

n other words, it is only a paradox from a certain constrained view of ignorance. — Harry Hindu

I'm in no hurry to conclude undecidable super-position and its conjectured role as signpost pointing to higher dimensional extension is a type of cognitive illusion. It may be that to some extent, but we're looking at realist physics-and-matter-compliant phenomena exampling non-locality; the 2022 Nobel Prize in physics went to three researchers with something to say about the universe not being locally real. I understand this means, at least in part, that the reality immediately before us is not discretely mind-independent. That it appears to be, as explained by some researchers, stands due to the fact the environment, which includes sentients, measures material systems, thus cancelling their quantum effects. From this viewpoint, I can say that discrete mind-independence results “from a certain constrained view of ignorance.”

How does information get out if it is shielded? How are the states of the processors known if not by some interaction? What about: — Harry Hindu

Nothing exists in pure solitude — Alonsoaceves

Most situations have variable conditions depending on the goals of sentients. In the case of quantum computing, trans-real calculations in a box are sought after by isolating critical computation components from environmental interference that cancel quantum phase relations. This is appropriate per the goal; it doesn't, however, cancel interactions necessary to info exchanges, i.e. shared quantum phase relations.

In other words, an environment (space-time) has to exist for decoherence to occur. One might say it is the medium in which decoherence occurs. — Harry Hindu

Spacetime is also the medium supporting coherence.

The fact that we are even able to get information about sub-atomic particles being in a state of superposition means that information went in and came out in some way, and that superposition is simply one kind of state and "off" and "on" are other states. — Harry Hindu

Yes, the third state affords an exponential increase in info processing. Regarding improbabilities, earth being friendly to carbon-based life forms might be an example of an extreme statistical bias towards emergence of consciousness.

Are we confusing the map with the territory? — Harry Hindu

I think the radicalism of QM is rooted in its intentional focus upon the strategic and useful confusion of the map with the territory. Were this confusion not useful, the memory lobes of your brain would not keep you connected to your childhood.

So you don't agree that there is a distinction between the clear boundaries invented by humans and their language as opposed to "boundaries" that preceded human's and their languages existence? — Harry Hindu

Before sentience, there were no boundaries. Dimensional extension defining the physics and materiality of things is rooted in cognition. Absent brain_mind, matter and its physics are a jumbled outpouring of potential states possibilities. Have you ever seen a computer monitor try to display the graphics of a program that requires a higher info-processing video card than the one installed in the computer? The screen shows a technicolor morass of jumbled, overlapping distortions unintelligible. This is my conjecture about the physics of the world independent of the organizing principles of cognition.

What are you referring to when using scribbles - more scribbles (a solipsist answer) or something in the world that is not more scribbles, and might not even be visible from your perspective - hence the use of language to inform others of things that they were not already aware of (mind-independent) (a realist answer)? — Harry Hindu

Yes, my perception of the world is an approximation of same. The tricky thing that QM has taught us, is that the interpreting_approximating is bi-directional. The supposedly mind-independent world is not hardened into discrete system states, just as my ability to perceive and understand mind-independent world is not hardened into discrete system states. There is a dance between observed and observer. The adventure of living lies in the fact that while there are constraints upon what the dance steps can be, how they are attacked supports many, perhaps infinite variations. An example paralleling this is the keyboard of a piano. The number of notes provided by the keyboard are limited, but that number nonetheless supports many variations. We don't know exactly what the pianist will play.

You say paradox = misuse of language. If I understand misuse in our context here as some type of violation, then I can ask, "What is being violated by language that expresses paradox?" For example, "Does paradoxical language violate the rules of inference?" If so, how so? — ucarr

It appears to violate the rules of semantics - what in the world is the paradox about? Using your example of inference, what observable evidence proves the paradox points to any real aspect of reality?...Where do we observe the paradox in nature independent of the relationship between some scribbles on a computer screen or sheet of paper? You've mentioned QM... — Harry Hindu

Speculation: Math paradox the result of calculations points toward a higher dimensional object that resolves the paradox with an additional existential extension, i.e., with another dimension. Looking in the reverse direction, the paradox is the higher dimension in collapsed state. Example: If the statement, "If the set of all sets not containing themselves doesn't contain itself and thus does contain itself and thus..." oscillates between two contradictory states made equivalent, then this undecidable state of the system is hunting for a higher dimensional matrix in which to unfold itself.

The basic explanation for the quantum leap upward in computing power is the superposition of one qubit in two positions simultaneously. — ucarr

I don't deny that we have descriptions of nature that work. In what state is the quantum computer when not looking at it? — Harry Hindu

The pertinent question pertains to the existence of mitigation strategies for quantum error correction. Yes, (QECC) is employed with quantum computing; also, quantum processors are kept in vacuum chambers and shielded from electromagnetic interference.

...how did the first decoherence event happen? — Harry Hindu

.

There has been no first decoherence event because QM laws underlie the natural world. QM systems and Newtonian systems aren't isolated from each other. A quantum system loses its quantum phase relations (decoherence) through entanglement with it's surrounding environment. Isolation of a quantum system enables quantum coherence. Although quantum system phase relations have always been possible, only recently has humanity been able to perceive and then detect QM systems in isolation through math and super-colliders.

We tend to perceive the world in discrete states, even black and white sometimes, when the world is a process, and it is the relative frequency of change of the external world processes relative to the processing speed of our sensory-brain system that seems to have an effect on which processes we perceive as discrete, stable, solid objects as opposed to other processes with no discrete boundaries. — Harry Hindu

So, the particle/wave duality is more effect of the processing limitations of human cognition than ontic state of physical systems? And yet, nevertheless, discrete objects are more at realism than at solipsism?

To say that something is neither this or that seems to mean that it is something else, which is logically possible and empirically provable. — Harry Hindu

This statement is generally compatible with my speculation paradox as collapsed higher dimensional extension is a marker pointing upwards toward a higher dimensional matrix. The this-or-thatness of a collapsed higher dimension examples a logic-governed cognition spinning its wheels due to the lack of available info within a system too dimensionally restricted to accommodate the full expansion of the higher-dimensional object.

As you add up the parts of the university towards a sum of the whole of the university, is there a discrete boundary line marking a division between the region housing an accumulating sum to a whole and the region where the whole resides?

If we suppose there's no such boundary line, must we admit there's no verifiably whole university, but instead only a forever-accumulating collection of parts? — ucarr

Sure, call a surveyor and they will tell you what the boundary is. There seems to be a distinction between artificial/arbitrary boundaries defined by human beings as opposed to natural boundaries where they seem more vague. — Harry Hindu

Since you seem unable to locate the whole university beyond the vaguely axiomatic language you've been using, you attack the messenger instead of the message by implying math is a human invention containing fabrications and distortions?

My mind is part of the world. I experience it as it is. I am a realist (not a direct or indirect realist, as I see them as a false dichotomy) so I believe that my mind informs me of the way the world is via causation. Effects inform us of the causes and allow use to make accurate predictions of future effects. — Harry Hindu

Should there be ambiguity of causation, would you understand it as another instance of contrived uncertainty rooted in the misuse of language?

Physical cannot be the cause of its own change...the mind is needed for change. So, the mind cannot be a byproduct of physical. — MoK

So, you deny mind emergent from brain?

There's a mind somewhere making hydrogen and oxygen combine to form water?

:up: :100:

Your sentence in bold makes a declaration about a phenomenon pertaining to language usage: paradox. This usage happens, it's real, it exists. This fact gives us reason to believe paradoxical language exists and therefore should be included in a collection of everything. — ucarr

Here you seem to be making a distinction between what "everything" refers to and what "paradox" refers to. Yes, paradoxes exist. Paradoxes are a misuse of language. Misuses of language are real events. They are part of everything, but everything is not part of everything. — Harry Hindu

You say paradox = misuse of language. If I understand misuse in our context here as some type of violation, then I can ask, "What is being violated by language that expresses paradox?" For example, "Does paradoxical language violate the rules of inference?" If so, how so?

QM reveals paradoxes in our descriptions and understanding of the universe, and is not representative of a fundamental nature of reality, but is representative of our ignorance. QM does not fit into our everyday experience of the world. The paradox just means that we haven't been able to reconcile classical physics with QM... — Harry Hindu

It is said that the qubits of quantum computing possess categorically higher computing capacity vis-à-vis the bits of classical computing. The basic explanation for the quantum leap upward in computing power is the superposition of one qubit in two positions simultaneously. These qubits are physical entities, not abstractions resulting from twisting verbiage into language games resulting in paradoxes. How do you reconcile your denial of the reality of quantum physics with quantum computers?

Just because you followed the rules of some language does not necessarily mean you have actually said anything about the world. Just ask lawyers and computer programmers. They understand that words mean things and is why they try to be exact (non-paradoxical) in their use of language. Logic is only useful when it can be applied to the world and not merely a focus on the relationship between some scribbles. — Harry Hindu

From the above I understand you to believe that words used accurately are signs for the real things of mind-independent reality, and that paradox results from some type of language misuse that has it describing things not real and not a part of mind-independent reality. Can you show how a paradoxical statement such as, "This sentence is false." examples invalid logic? How is a veridical statement about its contradiction logically invalid?

Let's suppose you don't think such a statement is invalid, but then go on to say such a statement doesn't refer to anything within mind-independent reality. What do you say is the ontic status of such a statement?

Do you think the principle of non-contradiction is the security checkpoint blocking the entry of paradoxes into the realm of mind-independent reality?

Your whole self is not part of your self. It IS your self - that is what "whole" means. Your whole self is not part of itself. It is part of a society and species. — Harry Hindu

Above you describe some details of the part/whole relationship. I take from it your belief the whole self is a gestalt emergence from its parts and, as such, it’s partially distinct from the parts and thus not completely local to said parts. This, again, is a non-local but attached whole that is a part and yet not entirely a part of itself. Note how you say, “Your whole self is not part of itself.” in a context wherein the reader notices the repetition of “self.” If my whole self is not part of itself, how is it a self?

Do you think gestalt psychology is another language game disconnected from mind-independent reality?

What is a university if not the aggregation of buildings, professors and students? — Harry Hindu

As you add up the parts of the university towards a sum of the whole of the university, is there a discrete boundary line marking a division between the region housing an accumulating sum to a whole and the region where the whole resides?

If we suppose there's no such boundary line, must we admit there's no verifiably whole university, but instead only a forever-accumulating collection of parts?

...our understanding of the world is not the same as the world as it is. — Harry Hindu

Have you seen the world "as it is" in distinction from having seen the world?

It wouldn't be. This is why solipsism ultimately resolves down to there being no mind - only a reality where "reasons" that lead to "conclusions" would be the only type of cause and effect. There would be no external causes that lead to the effect of the mind and the mind would not be a cause of changes in the external world. — Harry Hindu

I think you internalize external world within isolated mind in order to give it the power of reasoning to conclusions. How could such internalization occur if world and mind have no connection? Also, you seem to be assuming both mind and external world, with both independent. Isn't this how you've been defining mind-independent reality?

Everything is all things and would be illogical to include everything as part of itself. — Harry Hindu

By saying this you imply everything is not part of itself and thus you imply everything is not everything; this is a replication of Russell's Paradox. — ucarr

This is not what I'm implying when I use those words, and I don't know anyone that does imply that when using the term, "everything". It is only a misuse of language that allows one to create the paradox. — Harry Hindu

Your sentence in bold makes a declaration about a phenomenon pertaining to language usage: paradox. This usage happens, it's real, it exists. This fact gives us reason to believe paradoxical language exists and therefore should be included in a collection of everything. The more important question pertains to whether or not paradoxical language refers to anything external to language. Some evidence that paradoxical physics is real beyond the scope of language is provided by QM, but some thinkers reject existence of superposition beyond Schrödinger's equation because we never see it in nature. If the math works as a description of nature, why should its existential veracity be rejected?

QM has a high rate of verification in nature, so the question of paradoxical physics is unresolved.

Logicians saw nothing wrong with unrestricted comprehension for set theory until Russell's Paradox. To me this indicates pre-Russell logicians believing a set containing itself permissible in nature at the level of abstract thought.

Our general question here pertains to how a thing is related to itself. This relationship is a fundamental part of consciousness because it's rooted in self-awareness. In my being aware of myself, am I not wholly aware of my whole self? If my whole self is not a part of myself, my thinking to the contrary seems to example Ryle's category error: I'm walking around on the university campus looking for the university which, wholly speaking, is not a part of the campus. I'm duped by my own fallacy of putting the university into the wrong category, itself. Let's see now, there's a physics building that's part of the university; to that I can add the biology building, and then the English department; when does the growing aggregate of parts reach the point where the calculus segregates the parts from the whole of the university? If my whole self is not part of itself, then that's a non-local distribution of the whole self beyond itself, and thus necessarily the self cannot be complete and self-contained, and thus we're back to the superposition of one thing two places at once. QM tantalizes us with the moot possibility of the reality of self-contradiction and thus identity fundamentally non-local.

I know your commitment to the misuse of language argument stands firm against my ruminations here.

Regarding the possibility of mind-independence, picture yourself placing a phone call to a close friend. You hope the friend will answer, thus making a conversation you deem important immediately possible. If solipsism is real, and thus no mind-independence, then why doesn't your mind know whether or not your friend will answer at a given moment in time? If the phone conversation is but a product of your mind, shouldn't your mind know when to call for an answer? Beyond that, why doesn't your mind, all-powerful in creating what you perceive as real, create everything exactly as it wishes? Why should your mind ever tolerate any degree of uncertainty?

If, by these arguments, we lean towards belief in mind-independent reality, then how does the mind of the observer of the what undermine the brute fact and independence of the what?

On the flip side, if the self of the mind is one with its context of reality, and no subject/object separation is possible, how is consciousness possible?

Suppose I argue that you know the what you perceive exists beyond your perception because you question whether or not it might exist in independence? Isn't your ability to question the what's independence contingent upon your general uncertainty about many things? If your mind projects all of reality, how could it ever want for anything it has capacity to conceive of?

But isn't all this a "how" of the "what"? — Harry Hindu

Yes. Like the inter-relationship between the waveform and the particle, the what and the how do not comprise a hard binary isolating one from the other. A writer can easily write a narrative of the how of the what, or the what of the how. The link between the objective and the subjective is bi-directional.

The issue is in the instinctive, axiomatic nature of explaining the "what" in the first place. — Harry Hindu

By realism, I mean the idea that there is a mind-independent world - a "how" to the "what". In other words, "the what stands before the you" is a statement made only after one has provided a type of "how" to the "what". The "you" would also be a "how" in trying to make sense of the "what". Another type of "how" would be solipsism. If solipsism were the case, there would be no you with a what standing before it. You and the what would be one and the same if solipsism were the case. — Harry Hindu

If I parallel how and what with means and goal, then I read your above statement as an example of the use of mind-independent world to argue for a state of a system which assumes that state of a system. You're arguing for what you already assume to be the case. You distinguish realism from solipsism by assuming mind-independence. If this distinction is re-assigned to moot status, then neither mind-independence nor solipsim are known to exist.

In your elaboration of solipsism, your argue against a distinct self by means of a concept of absolute self. Solipsism and self-awareness-zero seem to me to be mutually exclusive.

Whether the "what" is a mind (solipsism) or a world (realism) is all laid out by the "how". So talking about awareness and sentience already assumes that the "what" is a mind. — Harry Hindu

I think your separation of mind and world is far too binary; the distinction is too discrete. Since the brain is a switching system that assembles cognition-aggregates from various sources, it can only be subsumed into what status, i.e., goal status in a state of unconsciousness. But, consciousness is the brain's function, so brain as a brute existential fact without separation from same into emergent mind is an unnatural and manipulated state of the system for the sake of making an argument for

reality itself with the only continuity being the loop of causation within itself — Harry Hindu

Everything is all things and would be illogical to include everything as part of itself. — Harry Hindu

By saying this you imply everything is not part of itself and thus you imply everything is not everything; this is a replication of Russell's Paradox. If it's true one can't refute Russell's Paradox with respect to everything conceptualized as a unity, then there's evidence the paradox is insuperable. If the paradox is insuperable, that implies the system cannot be closed because, by definition, anything closed has an exterior and is thus superable.

If this is a language entanglement, then common sense supports taking recourse to the understanding language doesn’t completely represent the existential (existence is insuperable and therefore not closed), and perhaps in part that’s because the existential is incomplete.

What is the "you" in this explanation, and what is the relation of "stands before it" - spatial, temporal, etc.? — Harry Hindu

The "you" is a sentient being with an enduring point of view evolving as a personal history and a capacity for abstract thought preserved in memory.

The “you” and the “what” both occupy spacetime in a relationship allowing the “you” to have an empirical experience perceiving the “what.”

If you are describing a view doesn't that mean realism is the case? — Harry Hindu

By "realism" I understand you to refer to an aspect of empirical experience that I define thus: If you know what a thing is (you know the measurements of its dimensions) and where it is (you know where a thing is positioned by measuring the relationship of its spatial dimensions to the spatial dimensions of things around it), then you know the reality of the thing.

If solipsism is the case, then it would not be proper to call it a view, but reality itself with the only continuity being the loop of causation within itself. — Harry Hindu

I hold the view that in the instance of sentience -- one of my assumptions fundamental to my claims herein -- self-awareness makes the self an object of its sentience; this is the personal history extending from the "I experience things, and I know I experience things." phenomenon. Since solipsism assumes sentience, and therefore self-awareness and its attendant self-objectification, then the sentient maintains a view of itself. I think your, "...reality itself with the only continuity being the loop of causation within itself." excludes sentience and therefore precludes solipsism. This state of reality reads like Kant's noumenal realm, a realm that strikes me as the set of axiomatically real things, i.e., brute existential facts.

Continuity would be complete if solipsism is the case. — Harry Hindu

Within Kant's noumenal realm of things in themselves, I think continuity is a phenomenon more precisely labeled circularity: "I'm a chair because I'm a chair because..."

If solipsism is the case, then why does the "what" appear as the view of an external world if it isn't? — Harry Hindu

Again, I think sentients view themselves objectively towards building a personal history.

It appears that way axiomatically. I respond to the "what" instinctively in a way that treats it as an external world. The instincts become part of the "what". The instinctive analysis and logic (integrating the "what" with another part of the "what" (memories (retained "whats")) (why do similar "whats" axiomatically integrate with similar memories) is part of the "what" as well. — Harry Hindu

I understand you to be saying the "what" is configured in solipsism such that,

...it would not be proper to call it a view, but reality itself with the only continuity being the loop of causation within itself. Continuity would be complete if solipsism is the case. — Harry Hindu

If brute existential facts are circular, as I suppose, then continuity would not be an issue in the absence of sentience, and moreover, subjectivity (which thrives upon continuity) would be a non-starter in the absence of the possibility of solipsism.

By you saying,

...why does the "what" appear as the view of an external world if it isn't? — Harry Hindu

I understand you to mean continuity, in the context of solipsism, being a solitary loop of causation within itself, cannot be external, and thus cannot be perceived. If, as I think, solipsism includes self-objectivity, then it’s either paradoxical, i.e., it objectifies and externalizes the solitary self – this because solipsism assumes sentience and, in turn, sentience assumes self-awareness – or it’s self-effacing and thus, by definition, cannot exist.

I respond to the "what" instinctively in a way that treats it as an external world. The instincts become part of the "what". The instinctive analysis and logic (integrating the "what" with another part of the "what" (memories (retained "whats")) (why do similar "whats" axiomatically integrate with similar memories) is part of the "what" as well. — Harry Hindu

These details, being one with,

...why does the "what" appear as the view of an external world if it isn't? — Harry Hindu

Firstly, I respond by repeating my argument directly above. Secondly, I respond by invoking Russell's Paradox. The upshot of this paradox is seeing that for set theory, the scope of comprehension cannot logically support itself without restriction. There is no set that contains everything. There can be no unification of everything into oneness. Perhaps you say the universe is not a set. Well, I too say it's not a set. I justify my claim by saying existence is incomplete. Moreover, I say existence, by its nature, preserves its incompleteness strategically. For these reasons, I claim there is no complete continuity. Were that possible, there could be unification of everything into oneness.

Let's look at Russell's Paradox in relation to solipsism. Consider the set of all sets not members of themselves. Well, if this set is not a member of itself, then it meets the criterion for being a member of itself, and thereby it meets the criterion for not being a member of itself. This time-zero logical pendulum swing between two contradictory states of being places the set within the realm of undefined. Well, undefined is a pretty good synonym for incomplete.

Any postulation of an all-inclusive oneness must, by definition, contain this undefined state as mandated by the paradoxicality of the unrestricted scope of comprehension, i.e., cosmic oneness. For these reasons, Russell's Paradox stands as the principle argument for a) strategic incompleteness of creation and for b) cosmic oneness impossible.

The Now, being an essential part of strategic incompleteness, herein needs to be defined. It's not the everlasting, but rather the ever-present with a stipulation: the ever-present is always here but never completely approachable. That's the heart of strategic incompletion. The world is a story always approaching The Now but never arriving, and that's a good thing.

How can one say that there is an incompleteness of continuity when one can predict which direction the causal continuity will go within one's own mind (perceiving, reasoning, etc. reasons precede and support conclusions) by using logic that can be applied to there being continuity beyond the mind that produces predictable "whats" in the same way that using logic to explain only the continuity of the mind will produce predictable results - conclusions will always follow reasons, etc.? — Harry Hindu

I respond to,

... by using logic that can be applied to there being continuity beyond the mind... — Harry Hindu

with

Physics without thought has no order... — ucarr

I respond to

How can one say that there is an incompleteness of continuity when one can predict which direction the causal continuity will go within one's own mind (perceiving, reasoning, etc. reasons precede and support conclusions)... — Harry Hindu

with

It is not just that, as Gödel asserted, each axiomatic system grounds itself within a more encompassing system ad infinitum, but that the changes over time in the stories and narratives we use to interpret experience aren’t logically derivable from each other. They dont fit one within the other in an infinite regress, but follow one another as a change of subject. — Joshs

If I fail to apply logic to only the continuity of the goings on within the "what" then I fail to achieve predictable results within the "what" itself. — Harry Hindu

As I read your "if_then" conjunction, I find that the continuity of the statement is broken by a non-sequitur in the "then" part.

Also, I note that you partition "what" into a phenomenal "what" followed by a noumenal "what." If by the partition you intend to distinguish thoughts of the mind from brute existential facts of the world, then I say you can't effect such a partition. We can only "enter" the noumenal realm through the lens of the mind.

I think this distinction between the what and the how is very important. It is what allows us to see that meaning is finite. It is not just that, as Gödel asserted, each axiomatic system grounds itself within a more encompassing system ad infinitum, but that the changes over time in the stories and narratives we use to interpret experience aren’t logically derivable from each other. They dont fit one within the other in an infinite regress, but follow one another as a change of subject. — Joshs

I think the more important distinction that needs to cleared up is the "you" and the "what stands before it". — Harry Hindu

I hope my comments here have done some clearing up of the "you" and the "what."

Two hundred years from now our sciences may no longer need the concepts of physics or the physical object, but they will still be about phenomenal objects. — Joshs

The "what" and the "how."

The "what," ultimately, is axiomatic. There it is before you. No analysis can justify it being there before you. Logic might justify how it came to be there before you, but the fact of its presence before you lies beyond the reach of continuity. So, Heisenberg and Gödel alert us to the incompleteness of continuity.

The "how" is a narrative that distributes the "what." Herein lies meaningful continuity. When we seek answers, we seek a story that supplies those answers. The greatness of a story lies within the "how," not within the "what." A great story about mediocre things is more momentous than a mediocre story about great things.

The mystery of narrative lies in the "now" not being eternal but rather incomplete.

The Now

Every story is a journey to the now; no story ever gets there.

So, the symmetry of mind and matter is such that we never get to the essence of a thing, and we never get to the end of a story. On graph paper this symmetry might look like two parabolas approaching but never touching.

...your equation for material reality, reminds me of Kant. Actually your schema generally reminds me of Kant... — Moliere

Only you do go a step further and equate basically everything with material reality, even the supervening mental correlates. — Moliere

And once naturalized you end back in the antinomies of freedom/causation, for instance -- the noumenal took care of the "beyond" in his system. How would you account for such an antinomy using your equation? — Moliere

I should let your feedback marinate in my memory for a few days, but I'm motivated to share right now my capsule thought that the apparent contradiction between symmetry_causation on the one side and change-of-form_conservation on the other, or, in a single word, truth, resembles a yin-yang interweave.

I say this to show I'm not a reductive materialist. I think material thing_abstract thought are a matched set, as in p→q. I'm endeavoring to think about the relationship being best expressed by a⟺b. There's an IFF about the two modes of being, but maybe there's something wrong with this characterization.

I see light from thinking thus: the subvenience of the brain grounds the supervenience of the mind, and vice versa. I fear this too is a faulty characterization, but I take my daily comfort from believing that the two modes are equally omnipresent and indispensable and they, along with consciousness, are at all times essential to existence.

From here I proceed to thinking all systems of existence are both physical and consciousness-bearing.

Physics without thought has no order; thought without physics has no meaning.

I doubt the hard work revolves around the either/or binary. I think it hovers around the interrelations connecting the two modes. Perhaps the fine details of these interrelations merge into Wittgenstein’s silence.

I see that my title is misleading; my assumption is that perception of material reality assumes abstract thought and, abstract thought assumes material reality.

I knew her as a major contributor to our TPF Fiction Competition. I'm shocked and saddened by our loss of her presence so soon.

The textbook example I referred to is the role of observation in quantum physics and the fact that the act of observation or registration precipitates a particular outcome from an indeterminate range of possibilities. — Wayfarer

Your reply here shows you making good sense of my question. You show that observable phenomena are the result of crosstalk in the sense of conversation between sentients; the object-subject dance; the organizational formatting of consciousness vis-á-vis the unmediated glut of possibility.

There are no discrete domains in that sense. — Wayfarer

Correct. Consciousness is always a blooming tangle of inter-weaving gravitations not strictly local.

In a more general sense, we are able to consider possibilities and find ways to realise them - make them real, in other words. — Wayfarer

Yes. You describe how a sentient like you brings the organizational formatting of consciousness to the unmanaged glut of the fundamentals.

And you seem always determined to argue that 'the physical is fundamental.' — Wayfarer

What's fundamental is the pairing of brain_mind. Given one means given the other. IFF.

I’m also making the point that this suggests that the domain of possibility exceeds and is different to the domain of actuality - again, something which recent history abundantly illustrates. — Wayfarer

Do you think that within the domain of possibility, there is a social reality such that P1 (possibility one) holds a conversation with P2 (possibility two)?

If we conclude social reality doesn't attach itself to possibility, must we also conclude possibility is emergent from human conversation?

You seem to acknowledge mind cannot be uncoupled from brain.

If you do make this acknowledgement, then consider the following transitive argument: If mind cannot be uncoupled from brain, then possibility cannot be uncoupled from brain.

Correct.

To the writer of this essay, if you have published some books, after your identity is revealed here on June 16th, please post a link to your books. When it comes to political analysis, and especially political analysis of the United States government and the culture that gives it a context, you stand on level ground with Alexis de Tocqueville.

Wittgenstein's hinges bear a remarkable resemblance to Gödel's incompleteness theorems, revealing unprovable mathematical statements. This resemblance points to deeper questions about how both domains handle foundational issues. Both Wittgenstein and Gödel uncover limits to internal justification, a connection I will examine. — Moliere

Does anyone suspect, as I do, that the linkage connecting Wittgenstein's hinges to Gödel's incompleteness theorems suggests some type of symmetry (and conservation of the possible scope of narrative elaboration (whether verbal or numerical) i.e., conservation of containable fundamentals within a system ) extending from verbal language to both numerical language and chains of reasoning?

An axiom is something you can’t deny without using it. You don’t prove it — proof relies on it. — Moliere

Sine qua non has a voice that denies the void

1. LIFE PERCEIVES — awareness helps life navigate.
2. LIFE BUILDS — structure helps life resist decay.
3. LIFE AFFIRMS — survival demands commitment to being. — Moliere

1.Illumination; 2.Order; 3.Esteem

LIFE - reflexive perpetual motion indivisible without beginning or ending

AFFIRMATION - esteem insuperable without beginning or ending

GOODNESS - uncontainable possibility hovering at the cusp of preservation of vitality

LIFE IS GOOD. — Moliere

The flesh of uncontainable possibility hovering at the cusp of preservation of vitality transcends corruption

What I’ve learned from our debate: a) still waters run deep regarding predication of non-existent things; b) I must open up my mind by a great volume regarding the material/immaterial debate.

Thank-you for your time and attention.

You make it sound like a number line is something that physical I move along. I don't buy that for a moment. — noAxioms

Body_brain_mind_numbers_material things_empirical measurements_memory-feedback-looping_internalization-of-motion-as-consciousness_abstract thought and_cyclical behavior populate a chain of physical connections.

Remove any one of these links in the chain and the purposeful life of a sentient being collapses into non-functional incoherence. This is why, in our solar system at least, life is rare. — ucarr

Not discussing purpose of life though. — noAxioms

Neither am I discussing the purpose of life. I'm arguing that physical you does move along a number line; it's called the timeline of your personal history, and that's a continuing sequence of positions you occupy physically.

Has anyone established the point of contact that proves the intersection of material and immaterial states of existence coherent and functional? — noAxioms

Dunno. Who posits such a point of contact? — noAxioms

You do.

I don't claim immaterial causes, nor do I claim material causes. Distance causes a rock to take longer to fall, so immaterial cause can have effect on material. — noAxioms

You're saying quantum fields are mind-dependent? — ucarr

A field has no location or bounds and is thus not the same category as an object. — noAxioms

Quantum fields are measured.

If it cannot be justified, then it's logically deemed axiomatic.. — ucarr

Wow, we think so differently. I find it unnecessary precisely because it cannot be justified. — noAxioms

I should've written, "If it's a necessary premise that cannot be justified - as with a first-order system - it's axiomatic. I think general existence, or the Standard Model, is a necessary first-order system for consciousness. In the presence of consciousness, existence is self-evidently true.

Your position sounds like rationalism. You pivot away from anything suggesting confinement of exploration, but your restless ideation seems rooted in the demand for reasoning to every belief to the exclusion of axioms. This puts you fundamentally at odds with science because all scientific theories are axiomatic to the extent that they cannot be proven. A theory is just a working hypothesis always subject to revision or replacement.

In your examination of predication without existence, your supposition there's non-existence that supports predication means you are able to demonstrate a non-existent thing performing some action, or expressing some state of being. — ucarr

No, it doesn't mean I can demonstrate it any more than your premise can be demonstrated. — noAxioms

Here's my demonstration.

If it's true nothing can be asserted prior to existent mind (MPP), then refuting pre-existent mind with the predication of that selfsame mind (non-existent things - such as is minds - have predications (E2,E4,E5,E6)) is a refutation of EPP that examples a contradiction. — ucarr

Where is yours?

Go ahead and establish your non-existence while being something or doing something. — ucarr

But I do exist, by the usual reasoning, and it is even justified. It just isn't objective. That's the part that holds no water. — noAxioms

If you doubt the objectivity inferable from social interaction, then you've fallen into solipsism.

Partitioning existence into definitions that support or deny existence won't work because that would be simultaneous existence and non-existence, and we've agreed the two modes are mutually exclusive. — ucarr

We do not agree. I don't exist in Moscow, but I exist in some other town. No contradiction there. — noAxioms

You do exist in Moscow because your residence in ¬ Moscow, if true, is a fact in Moscow. This claim sounds like a stretcher that explodes reason, but it doesn't because general existence is the non-local part of every existing thing emergent as a temporal material thing. This means that all material things are tied in with the Standard Model basis for existential symmetries and their conservation laws. Nothing is created or destroyed; only the forms of material things change. General existence is everywhere at all times, and that's a part of your material existence as it is of mine.

QM has thrown open the shudders on omnipresent general existence, and subject-dependent measurement of material things is one of the symmetries of general existence. It's the mirror image of non-locality. Just as we're not completely local to our measurable position, the objects of our perception are not completely local to their perceived (by us) objectivity. This is QM entanglement.

I meant empty objective existence is quite different from the lack of objective existence. Lacking objective existence doesn't imply lack of other kinds (relational say) of existence. — noAxioms

We're either engulfed in solipsism or idealism, and there's no mind-independent realm of material things perceived indirectly, or there is a mind-independent realm of material things perceived indirectly, and we're using our empirical experience of same to generate cognition about reality ambiguously interior/exterior.

Of significant note, it says 'counted as real' which is support for my notion that existence might just be a concept without a thing in itself. — noAxioms

You suspect general existence has the ontological status of numbers.

The principle as given is mind-independent, but only applies to causal structures. So the states of Conway's game of life exist, but 14 does not. That game and our universe might supervene on numbers and mathematics, but it is a gray area as to whether such supervention constitutes participation in causal processes. — noAxioms

Why do you think position non-causal? Presence, always tied to location, dynamically consumes the material phenomena provided by physics. The symmetry of a dynamic presence drives the rotation and reflection of physics, chemistry and life. The groups supported by position and presence animate nature. This depth of functionality is deep causation.

With the number line collapsed to a theoretical point in space of zero dimensions, there is no distance between one number and any other number. You can't move along the linear space of the number line. — ucarr

You make it sound like a number line is something that physical I move along. I don't buy that for a moment. — noAxioms

Body_brain_mind_numbers_material things_empirical measurements_memory-feedback-looping_internalization-of-motion-as-consciousness_abstract thought and_cyclical behavior populate a chain of physical connections.

Remove any one of these links in the chain and the purposeful life of a sentient being collapses into non-functional incoherence. This is why, in our solar system at least, life is rare.

Has anyone established the point of contact that proves the intersection of material and immaterial states of existence coherent and functional?

Why do you claim the chemical bonding of elements (Na + Cl = NaCl (salt)) into a compound is not physical? — ucarr

It being an object (compound in this case) seems to be an ideal. Physics seems to have no mind-independent test for where an object is bounded, per the topic I linked. It is off topic for this ontology discussion. You posted to that other topic. Re-read if you're interested. — noAxioms

You're saying quantum fields are mind-dependent? You think NaCl results from minds performing alchemy?

Your body, as a point of reference (a location in space), determines your frame of reference, viz., your context. — ucarr

This contradicts your description of my going to the kitchen, which utilizes an abstract choice of frame different from the one determined by my body. — noAxioms

You might access memory to imagine yourself sitting in your study while you stand in the kitchen, but these two brain circuits are independent and your bedroom frame is virtual while your kitchen frame is empirical. Any higher sentient with memory supports a virtual frame portable simultaneous with an empirical frame. Where is the contradiction?

Yes, [existence is] axiomatic precisely because it cannot be justified. I have a strong aversion to assuming things for no reason.

So, you seek to contradict your own belief existence is axiomatic? — ucarr

It's axiomatic to others, not to me, per stated aversion to such axioms. — noAxioms

If it cannot be justified, then it's logically deemed axiomatic. Proof it's not axiomatic depends on your ability to develop a chain of reasoning that evaluates to you without you pre-existing your examination of your existence.

In your examination of predication without existence, your supposition there's non-existence that supports predication means you are able to demonstrate a non-existent thing performing some action, or expressing some state of being.

Go ahead and establish your non-existence while being something or doing something. Partitioning existence into definitions that support or deny existence won't work because that would be simultaneous existence and non-existence, and we've agreed the two modes are mutually exclusive.

How does thinking occur in the absence of body, brain and mind? — ucarr

An information processor need not be implemented by what is considered to be a biological body, brain or mind. The 'mind' word seems to reference the information processing itself rather than the hardware implementing the process. — noAxioms

You think binary computing machines are self-willed info processors?

How does thinking occur in the absence of egg, sperm and fertilized egg? — ucarr

I don't think sperms and eggs and such do a whole lot of thinking. Sure, people do thinking. I only fail to accept the necessity of any objective ontology to them. — noAxioms

You believe a man thinks without proactive support of his fertilized egg?

I assume all of these absences as part of independence from existence. This with independent defined as "not a part of. — ucarr

Even this assumes that there is such a thing as 'objective existence', perhaps completely empty as the nihilists suggest. But an empty existence is quite different from the lack of objective existence. — noAxioms

If lack of objective existence equals non-existence, then I agree.

Try to do a calculation with the number line collapsed to a theoretical point in space of zero dimensions. Whether on paper, or on the ground, can you do it? — ucarr

Effortless actually since I utilize a number line in almost no calculations. They're handy for graphs though. — noAxioms

You mis-understand the question. With the number line collapsed to a theoretical point in space of zero dimensions, there is no distance between one number and any other number. You can't move along the linear space of the number line. This reality translates to not being able to do the four big math operations: addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division. Numbers and their symbols have no meaning without movement through space which is physical. Saying numbers are not physical equals denying their foundational meaning as nodes for relationships between positions in space. Abstract thought doesn't establish independence from movement through space and time because it's supported by neuronal activity traveling through space and time.

When you count objects, you're counting objects with distinct positions in space. — ucarr

I could count the number of times the light blinks. 3 blinks, all in the same physical space. I don't conclude that 3 has a physical location from this. — noAxioms

In this example, 3 has a temporal motion.

When you count objects, you're counting objects with distinct positions in space. When two objects in space become one object in space, as in the case of chemical bonding, we say that’s one object in space, a compound. — ucarr

Two objects becoming one seems to be an ideal, not anything physical. I did a topic on it here. You seem to have commented on that topic. — noAxioms

Why do you claim the chemical bonding of elements (Na + Cl = NaCl (salt)) into a compound is not physical?

You imply your body holds no distinct position in space. Please explain your denial. — ucarr

My body has extension. It is physically present at events (events are physical) but the spatial location of those events varies from frame to frame, and frames are abstractions. So for instance you talked about me going to the kitchen, but maybe the kitchen goes to me when I need a drink. It changes location, not me, since I am at all times 'here' (also an abstraction). Anyway, I said I knew what you meant. — noAxioms

Your body, as a point of reference (a location in space), determines your frame of reference, viz., your context. Change of context implies change of position, which is motion. Where you are bodily is not an abstraction.

Something in total isolation (not possible) has no meaning. — ucarr

If we're talking about a symbol, then sure, a symbol in isolation is meaningless. But an encyclopedia in isolation does not seem meaningless, even in the absence of something that knows what the symbols mean. The meaning is there and can be gleaned. — noAxioms

A book, when read, is the extreme opposite of isolation. The words in the book are signs with referents that might be flung to the four corners and beyond. — ucarr

Yea, but I didn't say anything was reading it. It's in isolation we said. — noAxioms

In our context here, isolation and meaning are opposites. Isolation, as in the case of non-existence, has no connection to meaning, so written words in such theoretical isolation (which isolation is already noted as absurd) cannot have meaning because they cannot have referents. What you say is true if the isolation is really spatial and temporal separation from context, not discontinuity from context. A book is a portable point-of-view, viz., point of reference, for a spatially and temporally non-local context. This non-local context is made local by decoding of the word-signs, viz., by reading.

Existence has no explanation. It's axiomatic as the starting point for phenomena, observation, analysis and understanding. — ucarr

And here I am looking for one. Yes, it's axiomatic precisely because it cannot be justified. I have a strong aversion to assuming things for no reason. — noAxioms

So, you seek to contradict your own belief existence is axiomatic? So proving EPP strengthens your commitment to what you know to be axiomatic? So proving ¬EPP, with predication of non-existent things, gives license to your aversion to axioms? So proving ¬EPP vindicates your website name of noAxioms?

Can you stand independent of existence while you make your study of it? — ucarr

Sure. Just don't posit EPP. — noAxioms

If you're independent of existence, you can't posit EPP.

Your volition balks at the assumption, but your ability to balk establishes your existence.

I don't assume that. I said it in the OP. 'I think therefore I am' is a non-sequitur without EPP. But 'I think, therefore I decide Io posit that I am' seems to work far better. There is no fallacy to that, just as there is no fallacy in saying "'I balk, yet I decline Io posit that I am'. It becomes a personal choice instead of a logical conclusion. There is a pragmatic utility to making the first choice, but logic seems not to forbid the second choice. As you said, it's an axiom, an assumed thing, not something necessarily the case. — noAxioms

How does thinking occur in the absence of body, brain and mind? How does thinking occur in the absence of egg, sperm and fertilized egg? I assume all of these absences as part of independence from existence. This with independent defined as "not a part of."

Show me the number 14 doing something mathematical without reference to its distance in space from another number. — ucarr

I think there are entire math text books that never once reference 'distance in space'. The ones that do are probably using an example from physical space (like the length of a rod) rather than spatial separation of numbers.

My example was about counting objects, like nuts on one's hand. There's no 'space' between 13 and 14 when doing that. It's just the difference between one more nut being there or not. — noAxioms

Numbers derive their meaning from their representation of points in space. — ucarr

Numbers are independent of space. — noAxioms

You say, "There's no 'space' between 13 and 14... It's just the difference between one more nut being there or not." How do you tell one nut from another? They occupy different positions in space. How do you tell one number from another? They occupy different positions on the number line. Try to do a calculation with the number line collapsed to a theoretical point in space of zero dimensions. Whether on paper, or on the ground, can you do it? Some say at the singularity - a theoretical point in space of zero dimensions - the laws of physics break down. Those laws are a bunch of numbers.

Numbers (as concepts) probably came not from space, but from counting of objects... — noAxioms

When you count objects, you're counting objects with distinct positions in space. When two objects in space become one object in space, as in the case of chemical bonding, we say that’s one object in space, a compound.

Let's suppose you sit in a chair before your computer when you read my posts to you. Do you have a unique position within the space where you read my posts?

Actually no, but I know what you mean. You're describing physical space. — noAxioms

You imply your body holds no distinct position in space. Please explain your denial.

Something in total isolation (not possible) has no meaning. — ucarr

If we're talking about a symbol, then sure, a symbol in isolation is meaningless. But an encyclopedia in isolation does not seem meaningless, even in the absence of something that knows what the symbols mean. The meaning is there and can be gleaned. — noAxioms

A book, when read, is the extreme opposite of isolation. The words in the book are signs with referents that might be flung to the four corners and beyond.

So in this change of stance, things don't exist because they're material, but rather things are material because they exist, kind of destroying any distinction between the two words. Is material also matter? Are you asserting that 14 consists of atoms or something? Are larger numbers made of more material? What color is 14? Is a square square material but a round square is not, or are both material? — noAxioms

I notice that you did not answer this question, instead telling me about things that we both agree are physical. I don't think that the count of nuts in my hand is physically present at mostly to the far right of a police lineup, even if there is a reference to the number there.

The vast majority of numbers cannot have a physical representation since there are countable many ways to represent numbers, but the reals are not countable. — noAxioms

Existence has no explanation. It's axiomatic as the starting point for phenomena, observation, analysis and understanding.

Material and matter share some common ground as to their meaning.

Regarding 14 as a sign, it is material as in the example of ink on paper. Its referent, a position on the real number line, holds material as in the example of the neuronal circuits supporting your entertainment of the thought. Larger numbers are farther from zero, just as larger objects are farther from a zero measurement of dimensional extension. A given color of the visible light spectrum has a specific wavelength measurement. Given this, we can say, meaningfully, the color red, for example, has a number identity. The geometric configuration of material objects, when considered at the atomic scale, varies. Crystals have a different geometric structure than non-crystals.

The set of real numbers is uncountable, but its members, even its irrationals, are individually mappable to material things, as in the case of pi.

Don't bother with trying to answer the question, "Why existence?" It's a brute fact that can't be analyzed. This is another way of saying, "Existence is insuperable." Yet another way says, "Matter is neither created nor destroyed." — ucarr

Exactly. I've noticed that. I question it. Everybody else just assumes it, calling it 'brute fact' despite the lack of justification. The nature of it seems very different than what most assume. — noAxioms

Can you show a chain of reasoning that evaluates to existence independent of the existence making the effort possible? Can you stand independent of existence while you make your study of it?

There can be no mixing of the two modes because the attempt to do so annihilates non-existence — ucarr

Mixing it also seems to annihilate existence, leaving you in neither state. — noAxioms

This is why they don't mix: the presence of either state excludes the other.

Firstly, you present a segment of an infinite series, which is all anybody can do; this because an actual infinite series is a limit forever approached, never arrived at. Secondly, notice I say, "supposition" of an infinite series of negations of presence with neither beginning nor end. As I go on to explain in my paragraph above, existence is insuperable to sentients because consciousness assumes existence, and thus any intention to access non-existence is precluded by the intention. Thirdly, the progression of the negations is absurd because the act of negating (even without sentience) assumes existence across an infinite series. — ucarr

But I was supposing an infinite series. Clearly I cannot post each element since there is a posting limit on this forum. But the supposition is there. — noAxioms

If you suppose an infinite series of negations, then it never ends and thus the annihilation of existence is forever approached but never achieved.

As I go on to explain in my paragraph above, existence is insuperable to sentients because consciousness assumes existence — ucarr

Yours might. Mine is not making any such assumption. — noAxioms

Your volition balks at the assumption, but your ability to balk establishes your existence. Thinking about non-existence, because it examples consciousness and thus your existence as the thinker, forestalls any possibility of your transcendence of existence in pursuit of non-existence. It follows, therefore, that all of your examinations of non-existence are really a convoluted variety of examination of existence. By undertaking your cogitations on non-existence, you demonstrate another part of what it means to exist as a thinker.

Numbers derive their meaning from their representation of points in space. — ucarr

Numbers are independent of space. Number lines are an abstract way of visualizing them. Yes, it is a space of sorts, hence the x being greater than y sort of thing. Numbers (as concepts) probably came not from space, but from counting of objects, thus from roots of positive integers. The rest came later. — noAxioms

Show me the number 14 doing something mathematical without reference to its distance in space from another number.

Show me how to count objects without using numbers (and that includes without using a word other than a number-word that means the same thing).

When you say, "Numbers (as concepts) probably came...from roots of positive integers." does "roots" in your context mean something other than a mathematical root, such as 2 is the square root of 4?

Numbers derive their meaning from their representation of points in space. — ucarr

Numbers are independent of space. Number lines are an abstract way of visualizing them. Yes, it is a space of sorts, hence the x being greater than y sort of thing. Numbers (as concepts) probably came not from space, but from counting of objects, thus from roots of positive integers. The rest came later. — noAxioms

Show me the number 14 doing something mathematical without reference to its distance in space from another number.

Show me how to count objects without using numbers (and that includes without using a word other than a number-word that means the same thing, and without using a collection of objects defined numerically by their separation from each other in space).

When you say, "Numbers (as concepts) probably came...from roots of positive integers." does "roots" in your context mean something other than a mathematical root, such as 2 is the square root of 4? — ucarr

Without connection to a unique position,14 is merely two meaningless shapes juxtaposed... — ucarr

14 is never a shape. You're instead referencing a numeral (symbol), not a number (a quantity maybe). Don't confuse the two. — noAxioms

Yes, numeral is the symbol representing the unique position of a number on the real number line. Uncouple the numeral from the unique position of a number on the real number line named by a number-word and you have a random form without meaning.

Anyone with knowledge of basic math will know exactly where you stand on the real number line whenever 14 predicates you there. This physical reality is universally true. — ucarr

I disagree that either 14 or a number line is anything physical. — noAxioms

Let's suppose you sit in a chair before your computer when you read my posts to you. Do you have a unique position within the space where you read my posts? Does the computer have a unique position it occupies? Are you physically present in your unique position? Is the computer physically present in its unique position? When you leave your chair and walk to the kitchen for a glass of water, do you travel to a different unique position? Are you physically present in your new unique position? Is your entire life a sequence of you moving from one position to another? Have you been physically present in all of them? If someone were to attempt to remove you from your current position and moreover attempt to remove you from all possible future positions you might physically occupy, would you fight for your life? If so, would this fight be physical?

Existing things, being a part of general existence, an insuperable context, possess temporal material forms. These forms possess presence and meaning. Presence is the ability to hold a specific and measurable position materially. Meaning is the context of every position relating it to the real number line. — ucarr

The meaning of number 14 places it within a context which gives it 13 and 15 as its integer neighbors. — ucarr

Yes and No. Yes: a relation and a predicate. No: I am cautious about the distinction of 14 meaning something and being something. I would have chosen the latter. The numeral (as a symbol) means something. Again, thoughts, not assertions. — noAxioms

Something in total isolation (not possible) has no meaning. Meaning, being contextual, is inter-relational. Meaning radiates outward from inter-relational being. I think Heidegger writes about being residing within something "ready to hand," an inter-relational situation.

All of existence is grounded in material; matter is neither created nor destroyed, etc. 14 – placing you in a specific position in context of the real number line – is a material thing that articulates a predication of position, a material reality in the context of existence.
— ucarr

So in this change of stance, things don't exist because they're material, but rather things are material because they exist, kind of destroying any distinction between the two words.
Is material also matter? Are you asserting that 14 consists of atoms or something? Are larger numbers made of more material? What color is 14? Is a square square material but a round square is not, or are both material? — noAxioms

Imagine you're standing in a police lineup in the number 14 position. Are you physically present in that space? Are numbers 13 and 15 physically present on either side of you? Are the 15 total lineup positions inter-relationally meaningful? Are the positions meaningful to the witness trying to identify the perp?

Don't bother with trying to answer the question, "Why existence?" It's a brute fact that can't be analyzed. This is another way of saying, "Existence is insuperable." Yet another way says, "Matter is neither created nor destroyed."

I'm saying you consist of atoms along with myriad additional attributes supporting predications.

Larger numbers hold different positions from smaller numbers, just as being farther away from your computer holds different positions from those closer it. You don't get confused about these differences because you and they are both physically real. If numbers were not physically real, inter-relationally as positions in space, you could shuffle them around willy-nilly. That not being the case, when you're on the roof of a tall building, whether you're one foot inside the boundary of the roof, or one foot beyond the boundary of the roof matters (to you) greatly.

Non-existence – a supposition of an infinite series of negations of presence with neither beginning nor end — ucarr

Existence – an infinite series of affirmations of material presence with neither beginning nor end. — ucarr

About these, what about the case of a finite series of affirmations or negations of presence, or a mixed series, finite or not. Does the thing exist or not? It just seems like you left a lot of cases not covered by these two definitions which are supposed to handle any case. — noAxioms

From our position within insuperable existence, there is no actual non-existence, only an (absurd) approach to it. There can be no mixing of the two modes because the attempt to do so annihilates non-existence; this because conceiving such a project assumes existence which is insuperable.

For instance, I have an infinite series for all displacements from arbitrary origin X:
{...,
ucarr not present at X-13,
ucarr not present at X-12,
ucarr is present at X-11,
ucarr not present at X-10,
ucarr not present at X-9,
ucarr not present at X-8,
...}
That is an infinite series of negations of presence with neither beginning nor end, and one affirmation of material presence. Therefore you don't exist by your definitions above. — noAxioms

Firstly, you present a segment of an infinite series, which is all anybody can do; this because an actual infinite series is a limit forever approached, never arrived at. Secondly, notice I say, "supposition" of an infinite series of negations of presence with neither beginning nor end. As I go on to explain in my paragraph above, existence is insuperable to sentients because consciousness assumes existence, and thus any intention to access non-existence is precluded by the intention. Thirdly, the progression of the negations is absurd because the act of negating (even without sentience) assumes existence across an infinite series.

E4 Existence is part of the objective state of this universe

So it's a predicate then? States of something are predicates. 'apple is ripe', 'Santa is fat'. Universe is existing. — noAxioms

States of something support predications. For this reason, sentences have subjects. They're the states of being either performing actions or expressing states of being. If you merely say, "ripe," "fat," or "existing," your thought is incomplete and we don't precisely understand what you intend to communicate, although we easily infer you're probably making a predication about a subject.

The ontological status of numbers is a topic too complex and undecided to make it a good example in our context. For example, numbers represent points in space. This corresponds with material things in motion. Heisenberg Uncertainty is math-inferred physics about the possibility of the completeness of measurement of things in motion. The measurement problem, distinct from Heisenberg Uncertainty, remains unresolved. There's no easy evaluation to a definitive ontology of numbers. Claiming the number 14 causes EPP to fail is jumping to an unsupported conclusion. — ucarr

Numbers are part of what can be used to identify a point in space, but they do not themselves represent such points. Your wording makes it sound like all numbers constitutes spatial references. — noAxioms

Numbers derive their meaning from their representation of points in space. Every number is assigned a unique position on the real number line. Without connection to a unique position,14 is merely two meaningless shapes juxtaposed, with the juxtaposition likewise meaningless. With reference to its unique position, 14 is a number, a material thing. When 14 connects to you as a number, it predicates you to a specific and relative position on the real number line. Anyone with knowledge of basic math will know exactly where you stand on the real number line whenever 14 predicates you there. This physical reality is universally true.

Existing things, being a part of general existence, an insuperable context, possess temporal material forms. These forms possess presence and meaning. Presence is the ability to hold a specific and measurable position materially. Meaning is the context of every position relating it to the real number line.

The meaning of number 14 places it within a context which gives it 13 and 15 as its integer neighbors.

There's no easy evaluation to a definitive ontology of numbers. — ucarr

If ontology is nothing but an abstraction as I described just above, then the ontology of number is simply a matter of personal choice. The ongoing debate about say anti or pro-Platonic-existence of numbers is a debate simply between two different choices being made, with no actual fact to the matter either way. — noAxioms

I didn't say it causes EPP to fail. I said it causes EPP to fail given a definition of existence grounded in material. 14 is not a material thing, so it doesn't exist by that definition. But 14 is even, so it has predicates. Therefore EPP is wrong given E4. If you think that logic is invalid, you need to specifically point out where. EPP might hold given a different definition of existence, so I make no claim that 14 causes EPP to fail. — noAxioms

All of existence is grounded in material; matter is neither created nor destroyed, etc. 14 – placing you in a specific position in context of the real number line – is a material thing that articulates a predication of position, a material reality in the context of existence. 14 accepts the predicate “even.” This predicate names the set of numbers with the same relative position in context as 14. 14 is a particular instantiation of “even,” a set to which it belongs. EPP is not wrong by E4 because 14 is material, and thus it’s an example of a material thing existent with predication.

My assumptions here say objective reality is material and supposedly mind-independent.

Presence – the ability to hold a relative position in context materially.

Meaning – the ability to articulate into jointed extensions connecting to other presences; this articulation supports holism. Meaning is supported by the Standard Model, which reduces to the singularity.

Non-existence – a supposition of an infinite series of negations of presence with neither beginning nor end.

Existence – an infinite series of affirmations of material presence with neither beginning nor end.


E4 Existence is part of the objective state of this universe (existence inhabits a domain) (existence is one of the parts of many parts of objective reality)

“Therefore EPP is wrong given E4. If you think that logic is invalid, you need to specifically point out where.”

E = General Existence; Given the symmetries and their conservation laws, viz., “Matter is neither created nor destroyed; it only changes forms,” E ≡∞. Moreover, E is supported by the Standard Model, which reduces to the singularity, where no laws of physics exist. This tells us E cannot be parsed, so ∄ E {n+∞, n-∞, n x ∞, n/∞}.

E4 is an invalid definition of E because E ≡ ∞ means it cannot be parsed by the four basic math operations: add, subtract, multiply or divide. E4 tries to contain E as ∈E4={A,B,C,D,E…}, but that’s a subtraction from the unbounded scope of E. The axiom of choice doesn’t apply here because E cannot be constrained as a bounded infinite series amenable to the building of an infinite subset not equal to its unbound set. This leads to E being a proper subset of itself, something forbidden.

If this reasoning is sound, then it vacates E2, E3, E4, E5, E6. Only E1 is valid.

Another important clarification: mind does precede expression of existence as an abstract idea. — ucarr

Social consensus is still a form of mind-dependency. Material is what's real only because human infer it in that manner. But the inference is a starting point, and one hopes that one can infer more than just what is immediately seen. All of this is still a restricted relational existence, nothing objective about it despite it frequently being asserted that way. — noAxioms

The whole of cognition - which includes social consensus - is a form of mind-dependency.

Inference beyond empirical experience, or pure reason, is the most extreme form of mind-dependency.

Nothing in existence, as it is rendered to the understanding, lies outside of the inter-relatedness linking all material and material-based existences. This is the general meaning of symmetry, the conservation laws and the Standard Model. Why do you think the pursuit of super-symmetry is called the theory of everything?

Below we have one of your quotes. It talks about the impact of subjectivity upon the QM state of super-position (inferred from Schrödinger's Equation). — ucarr

...measurement (not mind-specific) defines presence and therefore precedes it. This is pretty consistent with quantum mechanics where measurement is what collapses a wave function and makes some system state in the past exist where it didn't exist before the measurement. — noAxioms

No mention of subjectivity (except the phrase 'not mind-specific) appeared anywhere in my statement you quoted. I explicitly state that mind/subjectivity plays no role. — noAxioms

Since the wave function is measured and thus it is the subject of an action upon it (measurement), how can the action be prior to it?

The observer interacts with QM super-position and collapses it to a definite outcome. — ucarr

No. 'obsersver' carries a connotation of human subjectivity, and QM does not give humans any special role. We're just piles of atoms, just like any other system. Use a different word than 'observer'. — noAxioms

When you say, "...measurement is what collapses a wave function..." you're talking about an observer doing a measurement, such as an experimenter calculating with Schrödinger's Equation. This unless you think calculating with Schrödinger's Equation can be done without an entity doing the calculation.

My definition of existence implicitly refutes E2 and E6. By equating existence with the quintet, the idealism of E2 is refuted and, likewise, the limitation of the scope of existence of E6 is refuted. — ucarr

There is the commonly held principle... that existence is conceptually prior to predication, prior to it having any property at all. — noAxioms

Whether the pronoun refers to existence, or to predication, either way, per your characterization of EPP, property must pre-exist. Property before existence is illogical; property after predication posits predication as the idealism of objective reality by verbal utterance. — ucarr

I'm not in any way talking about verbal utterances. None of my definitions (not even E2) mentioned that. — noAxioms

Predication is verbal.

I can reword your definition to fit E6, so this is wrong. Your definition very much limits scope to a very restricted domain (of material), so illustrated, not refuted. — noAxioms

My definition of existence says, "Existence has two parts: a) the local and temporal material forms emergent from the quintet; b) the non-local part (the quintet) that funds the local part.

Existence has no location, so it cannot be used as an origin for a coordinate system. The assignment of an origin event is arbitrary. Coordinate systems are frame dependent, origin dependent, and are very much abstractions. Events on the other hand, as well as intervals, are frame independent and physical. — noAxioms

Gauge Theory establishes the symmetries of the quantum fields of the Standard Model. The Standard Model elementary particles fund the physics of nature and the presumed mind-independent things. What is known (the cognition/materialism relationship un-clarified) and what is math-restricted in scope (equation symmetry un-clarified) sums to a pair of artificially parsed definitions of limited existence inconsistent with my two-part definition describing existence as an all-encompassing context both local and non-local.

The unedited version of my quote above makes it clear I think the Standard Model the material ground of existence. — ucarr

Sure, but so many of your other quotes make it quite clear that you consider perception to be the mental ground for existence. So you regularly switch between two primary definitions of E2 or E4. If E4, then cognition has nothing to do with it. If E2, then material emerges from mind, not the other way around. — noAxioms

Maybe it's now clear the big difference between our points of view. If, as it appears to me from what you say above, you make a hard separation between cognition (acquiring knowledge and understanding by reasoning from sensory input), and the physics of objective reality, then that puts a big difference between your view of reality and mine. I don't believe there exists such a hard separation between the two. In my view, E2 and E4 are not polar opposites. Considering this, my oscillations between E2 and E4 are not contradictory. My simple explanation says, "cognition is a mental activity emergent from the elementary particles that make up the physics of the brain. If one holds this view, then there's nothing perplexing about claiming, "All temporal things material and emergent from the Standard Model - such as the human brain - are only known about and understood by means of the abstract and reasoning mind." Regarding E2 and material emerging from the mind, I say the opposite, "mind emerges from the physics of the elementary particles making neuronal circuits of the brain possible."

Now E2 & E4 are just definitions, and being definitions and not theories, they're not things that are metaphysically true or not, but just different usages of a word in different contexts. It is valid to use both E2 and E4 without contradictions, but in doing so, they lose all metaphysical existence. — noAxioms

There's a strong link between definitions and theories. Can you cite an example of a definition and a theory both viable and contradictory?

Metaphysics is merely the conclusions of reasoning at the scope of broad generality within a given discipline. In this conversation you endeavor to examine metaphysical claims about mind-independent reality and its inhabitants. You think general existence an empty predication suggesting the need for its de facto abandonment. I think mind-independent reality a second-order emergence of abstract reasoning, itself an emergent property of brain activity. This chain link of connections confines mind-independent reality within the mental architecture of cognition. We can theorize about what it might be like, but our closest approach to it finds us still standing firmly within our physics-dependent cognition grounded within the Standard Model.

MPP is no article of faith because articles of faith and rational beliefs alike are mind-dependent. If this is true, then clearly all notions of mind-independence are thoroughly mind-dependent.

If MPP is dependent on EPP, then E2 and E3 are based upon clear-eyed reasoning, not upon blind trust. E2, E4, E5 and E6 are rationalistic partitions of EPP. If so, it follows they can't exist without EPP. My views herein follow Sartre's, "Existence precedes essence," an early expression of mind emergent from matter.

Apparently you think abstractions immaterial — ucarr

Not sure where you get this. Human abstraction (a human process) is material since a human consists of material. Something immaterial doing its own abstracting would be an example of immaterial abstraction, so I can conclude that abstraction is not necessarily material, but my own abstracting seems to be a material process. — noAxioms

Regarding your method of ontological perception, you seem inclined to hedge every boundary you encounter, thinking it keeps your options at maximum. That you think abstraction not necessarily material is my impression of you based upon some of the evidence quoted below:

I agree that existence, being the largest of all possible contexts (environments), does not reside within a larger, encompassing context. The Standard Model, with its symmetries and conservation laws, grounds existence, the largest of all contexts. — ucarr

OK, but you defined existence as cognition, which is emergent from the larger context of material (still a very restricted context), so you seem to contradict yourself. The bit about 'largest of all possible contexts' seems to be E1, but all your discussion and assertions revolve around using E2 as your definition, and the two mean very different things. — noAxioms

The bit about 'largest of all possible contexts' seems to be E1, but all your discussion and assertions revolve around using E2 as your definition, and the two mean very different things. — noAxioms

You allow yourself to flow between opposites while charging me with self-contradiction for doing same. I think your view of the partitioning of opposites harder than mine, viz., I navigate the grayscale between polarities more than you do. Why is it okay for you to use both E1 and E2 and not for me?

This is your main interpretation of what I have to say on the topic of defending EPP, my purpose in our dialogue. It is wrong. You are confusing MPP, viz., Mind Precedes Predication with EPP. Simple reasoning makes it clear that if cognition is emergent from objective reality, then mind is emergent from objective reality. Given this chain of reasoning, it follows that mind doesn't precede objective reality. — ucarr

I am not since nowhere am I discussing mind. I keep batting away all your comments talking about concepts instead of the thing itself. — noAxioms

This is part of our trench warfare; herein we're slugging it out. In response to your batting away, I keep batting away your supposition we can do otherwise than talk about concepts of things.

So above you confine existence to material things. 14 has been my example of an immaterial thing (it's an integer, not a material object subject to supposed conservation laws), and it has a predicate (among thousands of them) of being even. Thus EPP fails. No mention of mind appears anywhere in that example. — noAxioms

Saying I confine existence to material things is a simplification. I ground existence in material things, a complex interweave of physics and its emergent properties.

The ontological status of numbers is a topic too complex and undecided to make it a good example in our context. For example, numbers represent points in space. This corresponds with material things in motion. Heisenberg Uncertainty is math-inferred physics about the possibility of the completeness of measurement of things in motion. The measurement problem, distinct from Heisenberg Uncertainty, remains unresolved. There's no easy evaluation to a definitive ontology of numbers. Claiming the number 14 causes EPP to fail is jumping to an unsupported conclusion.

Simple reasoning makes it clear that if cognition is emergent from objective reality, then mind is emergent from objective reality. Given this chain of reasoning, it follows that mind doesn't precede objective reality. — ucarr

That doesn't follow from that chain of reasoning due to the bolded word above. The first statement is trivially true since the two words are essentially synonyms. What follows from that statement is "if cognition is emergent from objective reality, then mind doesn't precede objective reality", but you said something else, something that doesn't follow at all. — noAxioms

You think cognition and objective reality equal? By asserting their equality, you endorse my side of our central argument: mind-independent reality is wholly contained within mind-dependent cognition. My declaration assumes mind-independent reality coincides with objective reality.

My statement about objective reality and mind follows the form of Objective Reality → Mind. Mind → Cognition. In consequence, the mind's cognition, examining objective reality, sees its dependence upon the environment of nature, which is objective reality.

Have you considered the insuperability of your mind as the reason? Its prior to all of your predications. — ucarr

Doesn't seem to be. — noAxioms

You had a mind in the womb. Did you make predications in the womb?

E5 Y exists IFF Y is part of the causal history of X

X (Causal History) ↔︎ Y
Y exists relative to X .... This doesn't mean that Y exists. Existence is a realation, and a 1-way relation, not 2-way like you drew it. — noAxioms

You don't use IFF unless you mean bi-conditional relationship which is X ↔︎ Y.

E3 Existence has predicates

E → Phenomena — ucarr

No, E3 says X exists if X has predicates. It doesn't say any thing about existence itself (whatever that means) having predicates. — noAxioms

Temporal predicates imply the S-MPP (Standard Model Prior to Predicates). Nothing is prior to the standard model as the fundamental particles and their forces are neither created nor destroyed.

Arrow potnkints the wrong way, but yes, this is a definition that directly leverages EPP. Any predication implies existence, hence I think therefore I am. — noAxioms

Any predication implies existence of mind; MPP → EPP.

E4 Existence is part of the objective state of this universe (existence inhabits a domain)

E ∈ Objective Reality = {A,B,C,D,E...} — ucarr

Existence, like other abstractions, localizes in the temporal forms of emergent material things. — ucarr

No idea what those words mean, but perhaps you can tell me Earth's location relative to existence. Can't do that? Case in point. — noAxioms

The earth is emergent from the singularity.

Can you demonstrate direct knowledge of mind-independent things apart from perception and its predications? — ucarr

You define direct knowledge as that learned through perception, so here you seem to be asking me to demonstrate perception apart from perception, which would be a contradiction. — noAxioms

You make my point. Your talk of mind-independent things is a contradiction because it assumes perception while denying it by definition.

E4 Existence is part of the objective state of this universe (existence inhabits a domain) — ucarr

If it is 'of this universe', it is part of a limited domain, a relation, not an objective existence. So E4 is 'part of this universe', and there's no 'objective' about that. The word 'this' is a reference to humanity, making it anthropocentric if not outright mind dependent. — noAxioms

No idea what those words mean, but perhaps you can tell me Earth's location relative to existence. Can't do that? Case in point. — noAxioms

You make an argument against my interpretation of E4. In making this argument, you assume existence doesn't exist because you assume its lack of a measurable position. If you're right and existence lacks a measurable position, then your argument fails because it must assume an attribute (lack of measurable position) establishing its existence. If you're wrong and existence possesses a measurable position, then your argument succeeds with the proviso existence exists.

EPP in the context of E1 is neither true nor false, but EPP in the context of E4 does not hold? Does this tell us we can specify that EPP does not hold by restricting the domain of existence? — ucarr

I think so. — noAxioms

I'm referring to our conversation about existence independent of perception. Our only option is to examine mind independence with mind. — ucarr

Agree, but by definition, the ontology of the independent thing doesn't depend on it being thus examined. — noAxioms

If the ontology of the independent thing doesn't depend on it being thus examined by mind, and you know that by definition, and thus you know it by mind, then claiming its independence from mind is a contradiction.

There's no perception nor even audience for a mind independent predication. — noAxioms

How are you able to state facts about things independent of your mind? — ucarr

This seems to be a mis-statement. The perception is possible but not mandatory for predication and separately for existence. Some mind-independent things nevertheless have an audience. — noAxioms

Possibility of perception by an audience destroys mind independence because you can't know this about a mind-independent thing. Generalizing from here, we know the possibility of mind independent things is impossible because the conceptualization of such a possibility is mind-dependent. Truly mind-independent things cannot be conceived of.

When you declare, "Pegasus can't count his own wings because you personally don't perceive them." you likewise don't perceive them except through actions completely internal to you.

Not talking about the concept of Pegasus. — noAxioms

You can only state things about the concept of Pegasus. Barring that, we're back to:

How are you able to state facts about things independent of your mind? — ucarr

Consider your posted definition of metaphysics, "...the branch of philosophy that deals with the first principles of things, including abstract concepts such as being, knowing, substance, cause, identity, time, and space."

You're claiming principles and abstract concepts have no relationship with cognition? — ucarr

Not claiming that, nor is the quoted definition. — noAxioms

Metaphysics is nowhere defined as any kind of cognition or grammar. Please use a definition that is at least slightly close to "the branch of philosophy that deals with the first principles of things, including abstract concepts such as being, knowing, substance, cause, identity, time, and space" — noAxioms

Explain how your quote denying any connection between metaphysics and cognition, holds consistent with:

"...the branch of philosophy that deals with the first principles of things, including abstract concepts..." — noAxioms

Consider that your inability to access directly mind independence is due to the existence of your mind.

No, not that at all. It's due to my mind being involved in the act of abstracting, preventing by some definitions the direct (causal?) access to this mind-independent thing. — noAxioms

Explain how you can have direct experience of a mind-independent thing (or of anything) without a mind?

Its existence precedes your knowledge of its existence. — ucarr

It's existence is unknown (definition dependent again) — noAxioms

No. We know the newborn has a brain before it knows that. We know the newborn uses its brain to live before it knows it's using its brain. This is social-consensus verification of objective reality not affected by a theoretician's definitions. Theoretical exploration in definitions is language play and, as you say, "...the rules of language do not in any way dictate how 'reality' (whatever that entails) works."

There is the commonly held principle (does it have a name? "EPP" if not) that existence is conceptually prior to predication, prior to it having any property at all. So an apple is red only if the apple exists Santa is not meaningfully fat.

Meinong rejects this principle, allowing properties to be assigned to nonexistent things such as Santa. My topic concerns two things: Arguments for/against this position, and implications of it.

So what are the arguments against? Without begging the principle being questioned, what contradiction results from its rejection? — noAxioms

Consider that your inability to access directly mind independence is due to the existence of your mind. Its existence precedes your knowledge of its existence (The newborn cries out in response to the doctor slapping his bottom. The newborn doesn't know he has a mind.) If we generalize from here, we see that pre-existent mind makes all thoughts - including mind independence - possible. If it's true nothing can be thought prior to existent mind, then refuting pre-existent mind with the predication of that selfsame mind is a refutation of EPP that examples a contradiction.

Here I present an argument that evaluates to a contradiction resulting from the rejection of EPP. It’s the rejection of MPP that necessarily concludes in a contradiction. Since MPP is dependent upon EPP, rejection of MPP implies rejection of EPP.

I am not concerned about how a mind works, and how it develops in an infant. Off topic. — noAxioms

If this is your response to my delivery of a refutation of EPP necessitating a contradiction without begging the question, then I’ve reasoned to your own conclusion to the effect of saying:

I don't think EPP can be refuted, but perhaps my motivation for seeking its justification and not finding it. — noAxioms

and thus predication without the priority of EPP and MPP is impossible.

Is Pegasus independent of all human minds — ucarr

So now human minds are special? If that's true, then Pegasus probably doesn't exist. — noAxioms

My question aims at perceiving whether Pegasus is mind-independent. Pegasus exists as a mind-dependent entity. Put another way, Pegasus (the natural horse) has never been directly detected by a pair of eyes. Only the mind's eye of the imaginative person has seen Pegasus.

I have no trouble defining existence sans perception, but it's still not an objective reality, only a relational one. So I am similarly encumbered by my inability to find objective existence meaningful in any logical way. — noAxioms

Your quoted statement, ”I have no trouble defining existence sans perception…” can be read as: a) I can define existence without (using my) perception; b) I can define a type of existence that lacks perception. In response to the latter definition, nearly anyone might say, “Oh, yeah. I know whatcha mean. Take for example a rock.” In response to the former definition, "I have no trouble defining existence sans perception, but it's still not an objective reality, only a relational one. So I am similarly encumbered by my inability to find objective existence meaningful in any logical way." we see that it, when compared with "Language is very much used to prove or give evidence for things, but the rules of language do not in any way dictate how 'reality' (whatever that entails) works." reveals serious conflict between the two statements.

Your main purpose in this conversation is to examine mind-independent reality with an eye towards using this examination to establish that EPP cannot be eliminated without creating a contradiction. Doing this would establish the necessity of EPP.

You first say you can't find objective existence logically meaningful. Next you say the rules of language do not in anyway influence the workings of mind-independent reality. If the latter is true, then you know that mind-independent reality has rules not governed by rules of language. You can't make this claim without inferring logical rules in application to objective existence. This claim is incompatible with your other claim you can't find objective existence meaningful in any logical way. Some of your language implies you believe in EPP.

Your language statement, a realist position, undermines catastrophically your exam of EPP concerning the establishment of predication without existence. If, as you imply, mind-independent reality has rules (metaphysics) not influenced by language, then it produces material things predication, a linguistic entity, cannot impact. This is existence prior to (and isolated from) predication. Therefore, elimination of EPP leads to predications about things isolated from predication. Such predications are tantamount to empty sets. Predication without existence doesn’t undermine EPP because an empty set ≠ a set containing paradoxes called “non-existent things with predications.”

Santa is not non-existent — ucarr

Definition dependent, and definition not specified. Santa being nonexistent is different than there not being an existing Santa. Santa being anything is a predication. — noAxioms

Santa does not exist. E1=T, E2=F, E3=T, E4=F, E5=T, E6=T

Santa is non-existent. E1=T, E2=F, E3=T, E4=F, E5=T, E6=T

If it's true the two statements have the same evaluation for E1-E6, then they're not different by force of "Santa being anything is a predication." So “Santa is there-not-being-an-existing-Santa.” equals “Santa is non-existent.”

Can you explain how abstracting to 14 isn't an example of rendering 14 as an abstraction?

I cannot. Best to ask whoever asserts that. — noAxioms

I don't restrict my scope to material things. 14 has been one of my frequent examples and it isn't a material thing, nor is it an abstraction, although abstracting is necessary to think about it.[/quote]

Define the domain that lies between material thing and abstraction.

I see we both place our main focus on E1 WRT to EPP. I seek to defend EPP and, as you say, you're examining its status. An important difference separating us is my thinking subject-object entangled and your thinking them isolated. — ucarr

[/quote]

I don't see this since your focus is always on E2, occasionally E4 which is still mind-dependent. — noAxioms

Your declarations about mind-independence have kept much of my focus upon MPP.

An important difference separating us is my thinking subject-object entangled and your thinking them isolated. — ucarr

It is important, because your insistence on approaching it from subjectivity prevents any analysis of E1. — noAxioms

Can you develop a chain of reasoning from non-existent subject to analysis?

Can you explain how it is that, "but the rules of language do not in any way dictate how 'reality' (whatever that entails) works" doesn't make a definitive statement about the independence of the ontological from the epistemological towards aligning you with realism? I see that you attempt to keep the meaning of reality vague, however, if the word has meaning in your statement, then it means what the dictionary says it means:

reality | rēˈalədē |
noun
2 the state or quality of having existence or substance.
•Philosophy existence that is absolute, self-sufficient, or objective, and not subject to human decisions or conventions. - The Apple Dictionary — ucarr

I think your statement above in bold aligns you closely with E1. I, too, am closely aligned with E1. The difference between us is that, in context, I ascribe foundational importance to E2 in the examination of EPP.

The dictionary definitions you quoted do not specify which usage of 'exists' it is referencing. OK, the realism definition says 'absolute' and not 'objective as opposed to subjective', but it's reference to abstractions also suggests the latter meaning.

The 'absolute' reference suggests R1. Definitions from other dictionaries vary. — noAxioms

Regardless of the spectrum of definitions of existence in context, your statement in bold aligns you with the Standard Model regarding existence. You frequently pivot away from E1 to the others, but allegiance to E1 aligns you with me on the relationship between the Standard Model and existence.

I agree that existence, being the largest of all possible contexts (environments), does not reside within a larger, encompassing context. The Standard Model, with its symmetries and conservation laws, grounds existence, the largest of all contexts. — ucarr

OK, but you defined existence as cognition, which is emergent from the larger context of material (still a very restricted context), so you seem to contradict yourself. The bit about 'largest of all possible contexts' seems to be E1, but all your discussion and assertions revolve around using E2 as your definition, and the two mean very different things. — noAxioms

The unedited version of my quote above makes it clear I think the Standard Model the material ground of existence, and moreover, the material ground of the elementary particles is not a very restricted context. Apparently you think abstractions immaterial whereas I don't. We agree that cognition is an emergent property of the elementary particles. If this is correct so far, then you're the one holding inconsistent beliefs as, per my view, emergent cognition that supports abstract thought demonstrates abstract thought, like cognition, being grounded in elementary particles, and thus not immaterial.

The bit about 'largest of all possible contexts' seems to be E1, but all your discussion and assertions revolve around using E2 as your definition, and the two mean very different things. — noAxioms

This is your main interpretation of what I have to say on the topic of defending EPP, my purpose in our dialogue. It is wrong. You are confusing MPP, viz., Mind Precedes Predication with EPP. Simple reasoning makes it clear that if cognition is emergent from objective reality, then mind is emergent from objective reality. Given this chain of reasoning, it follows that mind doesn't precede objective reality.
Another important clarification: mind does precede expression of existence as an abstract idea. The mind-independent reality of objective reality is something we can only infer from social consensus, a premise I've discussed repeatedly.

I think it likely your E1-E6 do not cover all facets of my definition of existence. For example, E2, your only statement about subjectivity, nevertheless says nothing about QM entanglement and its subject-object complex. — ucarr

That's because QM says nothing about the role of subjectivity in any of its predictions. — noAxioms

Below we have one of your quotes. It talks about the impact of subjectivity upon the QM state of super-position (inferred from Schrödinger's Equation).

...measurement (not mind-specific) defines presence and therefore precedes it. This is pretty consistent with quantum mechanics where measurement is what collapses a wave function and makes some system state in the past exist where it didn't exist before the measurement. — noAxioms

The observer interacts with QM super-position and collapses it to a definite outcome.

There is the commonly held principle (does it have a name? "EPP" if not) that existence is conceptually prior to predication, prior to it having any property at all. So an apple is red only if the apple exists Santa is not meaningfully fat. — noAxioms

I want to modify your characterization of general existence [within the context of EPP]. I think it incorrect to say it has no properties. Like white light within the visible light spectrum, which contains RGB, viz., all of the colors, general existence contains The Quintet (mass_energy_force-motion_space_time), viz., all of the properties. Temporal forms of material things are emergent forms whose properties are funded by The Quintet. I don't expect any modern physicist to deny any property is connected to the Standard Model. In effect, assertion of predication sans existence is a claim that properties exist apart from the Standard Model. As an example, this is tantamount to saying the color red of an apple has nothing to do with the electromagnetism of the elementary charged particles inhabiting the visible light spectrum. — ucarr

All that is your characterization of existence, not in any way a modification of any of mine (any one of the six). It seems to be existence relative to a model, and a model is an abstraction of something else. So this is closest to my E2. The standard model makes no mention of apples, so apparently apples don't exist by this definition. You've provided more definitions than I have probably, but all of them mind dependent. — noAxioms

No. Given your stated definition of existence within the context of EPP:

There is the commonly held principle... that existence is conceptually prior to predication, prior to it having any property at all. — noAxioms

Whether the pronoun refers to existence, or to predication, either way, per your characterization of EPP, property must pre-exist. Property before existence is illogical; property after predication posits predication as the idealism of objective reality by verbal utterance.

My definition of existence implicitly refutes E2 and E6. By equating existence with the quintet, the idealism of E2 is refuted and, likewise, the limitation of the scope of existence of E6 is refuted.

We have options for predicating the Venn diagram relationship linking Columbus and Ohio. For example, "Columbus implies Ohio." By this statement we see Columbus is always a predicate of Ohio.

Not true. You can conclude ¬O → ¬C from that, but not O → C — noAxioms

You say, "¬O → ¬C." This means that because Columbus is encompassed by Ohio, Ohio, which includes all of Columbus plus more, necessarily implies Columbus and thus its negation implies Columbus' negation. This means Columbus is always included within the scope of Ohio. Given this, how is it not true that O → C? Perhaps you're arguing from the premise, "There are parts of Ohio not Columbus." This separation of territory cannot be inferred from O without the restriction O ≠ C. So O ≠ C = ¬(O → C).

I argue my statement doesn't assume EPP in route to proving it because of the statement, "Modifiers attach to their objects." This isn't a re-wording of EPP. It's a stipulation by definition pertaining to the application of "modify" WRT EPP. For example, an adjective changes the perceivable state of its object-noun by giving the reader more information about the attributes of the object-noun. I'm saying the modification of an adjective cannot be carried out in the absence of its object-noun. Since this is an argument for proper procedure in the application of EPP, specifically WRT predication, I don't see how it's an example of begging EPP. — ucarr

But there is a subject noun. The subject just doesn't necessarily meet some of the definitions of existence. You seem to be using a mind-dependent one here, which makes the whole comment pretty irrelevant to my experimental denial of mind-independent EPP. — noAxioms

In the case of predication, the subject noun is always the object of the predication. When we say, "The predication makes a claim about the subject regarding: a) the state of being of the subject; b) the actions of the subject." we're saying the subject is the object of the predication, and thus predication is a modifying function. Perhaps now you can see why predication about a non-existent subject evaluates to zero. The existence of the predication as a modifier depends upon the existence of its object, which is the subject.

Yes, my definition of existence here is mind-dependent. However, as explained above, I've been invoking MPP throughout our conversation. EPP is prior to MPP, so MPP applied to E2 also implies EPP applied to E2.

I'm saying the modification of an adjective cannot be carried out in the absence of its object-noun. Since this is an argument for proper procedure in the application of EPP, specifically WRT predication, I don't see how it's an example of begging EPP. — ucarr

Predication is not a procedure, except perhaps under your mental definitions. — noAxioms

Don't conflate the application of A with A. The former is about the use of A within a context. The latter is about what term is being applied within a context.

Perhaps you think because I say, "there are no modifiers because modification is attached to things that exist." that means I'm assuming existence instead of proving it. I'm not trying to prove existence. I'm trying to prove existence precedes modification. Given this fact, the predication of the existence of existence is allowed. — ucarr

You're directly saying that begging your conclusion is not fallacious. — noAxioms

Can you show me how EPP doesn't assume existence? Existence Precedes Predication is a statement, not a question. This means the existence of existence is presumed. The presumption of its existence is necessary to examining it relationship to something else, in this case, predication, right? The existential precedence of existence vis-á-vis predication is clearly something different from the brute fact of existence, right? Perhaps you think the proximity of "predication" with "existence" shows a mind-dependent declaration establishing "existence," the thing to be proven. The omnipresence of cognition within all human inquiries and exams supports MPP. Can you show yourself examining EPP, or anything else, without making use of your cognition?

Do you equate existence with metaphysics to the exclusion of identifying metaphysics with material things? — ucarr

What I equate 'existence' with is definition dependent. Most of them don't exclude material things. — noAxioms

I equate metaphysics with cognition of the mind-scape. — ucarr

Metaphysics is nowhere defined as any kind of cognition or grammar. Please use a definition that is at least slightly close to "the branch of philosophy that deals with the first principles of things, including abstract concepts such as being, knowing, substance, cause, identity, time, and space" — noAxioms

Consider your posted definition of metaphysics, "...the branch of philosophy that deals with the first principles of things, including abstract concepts such as being, knowing, substance, cause, identity, time, and space."

You're claiming principles and abstract concepts have no relationship with cognition? Consider the two definitions below.

principle | ˈprinsəp(ə)l |
noun
1 a fundamental truth or proposition that serves as the foundation for a system of belief or behavior or for a chain of reasoning: the basic principles of Christianity.
• (usually principles) a rule or belief governing one's personal behavior: struggling to be true to their own principles | she resigned over a matter of principle.
• morally correct behavior and attitudes: a man of principle.
2 a general scientific theorem or law that has numerous special applications across a wide field.
• a natural law forming the basis for the construction or working of a machine: these machines all operate on the same general principle.

cognition | ˌkäɡˈniSH(ə)n |
noun
the mental action or process of acquiring knowledge and understanding through thought, experience, and the senses: these infections can adversely affect cognition and educational achievement | a scientific study of human cognition.
• a perception, sensation, idea, or intuition resulting from the process of cognition: greater emphasis should be placed on examining cognitions of individual family members.

I think the Standard Model is the source of cognition and therefore of metaphysics. — ucarr

Cognition has been going on long before there was a standard model. — noAxioms

I'm referring to the Standard Model as a centerpiece of modern science that has referents within the scope of elementary particles. Of course the cognition of the scientists who established the Standard Model precedes its expression.

You're examining the grammar governing the ontics of material things. There are no discussions that aren't about mind-dependent perception somewhere down the line. Can you demonstrate direct knowledge of mind-independent things apart from perception and its predications? — ucarr

I don't know what you think 'direct knowledge' is.as distinct from knowledge that isn't direct. — noAxioms

IIn your mind's eye, you imagine Pegasus with wings. This is indirect observation because your eyes are not detecting something external to them. In fact, WRT Pegasus with wings, your eyes aren't detecting anything at all. Your brain is "seeing" Pegasus with wings by means of its ability to evaluate to an "image" of Pegasus with wings by means of your mind's manipulation of its memory circuits (of horses and wings respectively) toward the desired composite. — ucarr

Can you demonstrate direct knowledge of mind-independent things apart from perception and its predications? — ucarr

Sure. One counter example is plenty, and I provided several, so EPP does not hold for existence defined as any form of 'part of some limited domain', which covers E2,4,5,6. That proof is simple. Where proof isn't the point is where it cannot be shown. EPP cannot be proven true or false under E1 or E3, so barring such proof, and it being demonstrated false with other definitions, EPP is accepted on faith, never on rational reasoning. — noAxioms

E2 Existence is what is known; E4 Existence is part of the objective state of this universe (existence inhabits a domain)

EPP in the context of E1 is neither true nor false, but EPP in the context of E4 does not hold? Does this tell us we can specify that EPP does not hold by restricting the domain of existence?

This is about mind-independence. Perception plays zero role in that by definition. — noAxioms

[Since our conversation proceeds on the basis of perception, I don't see how we can apply our minds to both modes (mind-dependent/mind-independent). — ucarr

It does not. It is about existence independent of perception. — noAxioms

I'm referring to our conversation about existence independent of perception. Our only option is to examine mind independence with mind.

I say predication is a statement about the actions or state of being of a material thing. Predication modifies the subject in the perception of the predication's audience by giving it more information about the subject. — ucarr

There's no perception nor even audience for a mind independent predication. — noAxioms

This is why I say in our exchange immediately above that, "Our only option is to examine mind independence with mind."

I argue that when you suggest my talking about "...the whole apple and not just one of its states." you change your focus from the temporal state of a material object to the abstract — ucarr

Spacetime is 4D and that means that all 'objects' have temporal extension. It is not just an abstraction, it is the nature of the thing in itself. To assert otherwise as you are doing here is to deny the standard model and pretty much all of consensus physics. — noAxioms

The neuronal circuits supporting abstract concepts are temporal, but the logical relations posited are atemporal. For example, we can let x stand for any number, and this function is atemporal. We never talk about the rate at which a function outputs a y in place of x.

You claim I can't distinguish between a) and b). You argue to this claim by characterizing my practice of inference as being fundamentally flawed. The fundamental flaw, you say, is my insistence of mental perception in any consideration of mind independence.

Yes, I insist on considering mental perception in any consideration of mind independence. My justification for this insistence is simple and obvious. Our access to mind independence only occurs through mind. You acknowledge this limitation when you say, "I have no trouble defining existence sans perception, but it's still not an objective reality, only a relational one." — ucarr

It's not your practice of inference that I'm pointing out, it is the continuous practice of defining existence in a way that requires perception by you, counting by you, utterances by you, or in short in any way that requires you. Pegasus can't count his own wings because you personally don't perceive them. — noAxioms

Of course my definition of existence depends upon me, as yours depends upon you. When you declare, "Pegasus can't count his own wings because you personally don't perceive them." you likewise don't perceive them except through actions completely internal to you. Unless you're claiming to have seen a winged horse alongside a crowd of other human observers at a horse show, I know your description of Pegasus is based upon your mind's manipulation of its memory circuits (of horses and wings respectively) toward the desired composite.