Non-existent is a concept. — Mark Nyquist

Agree

It does exist as brain state, — Mark Nyquist

Agree

Brain; (a concept) — Mark Nyquist

Agree

Brain; (a non-existent entity) — Mark Nyquist

Disagree, unless I distort your intended meaning

Also brains activate muscles so and concept can take affect physical matter. Like the result of a math problem.

That's the only way an abstraction, concept, mathematical construct can affect physical reality. — Mark Nyquist

Agree

The effect comes from the cause (by definition), so the effect includes the cause. — LFranc

Premise: "If the effect hasn't happened yet, its not there." -- Philosophim ⟹ Effects only propagate in time.

Counter Premise: A priori deduction ≠ a posteriori deduction along the measurement axis of time.

• If A causes B, then necessarily along a timeline it was A which caused B to happen.

OR

• If A causes B, then necessarily along a timeline it was A which caused B to happen.

NOT

If A causes B, then necessarily along a timeline it was A which caused B to happen.

So,

Question A: Deduction can lead to knowledge only by empirical observation in time?

Question B: Deduction can lead to knowledge both by observation in time and by abstract reasoning?

Interpretation: A = F; B = T

So, by the conjunction logical operator: F & T = F and T & F = F. With this interpretation, the conjunction logical operator shows us that the two propositions cannot both be true.

The effect comes from the cause (by definition), so the effect includes the cause. — LFranc

Since the above statement is true by definition, we know that we can arrive at knowledge a priori (by reasoning alone) when we apply a definition to a body of information that fulfills the definition.

Conclusion:

Proposition A:

The effect comes from the cause (by definition), so the effect includes the cause. — LFranc

Proposition B:

If the effect hasn't happened yet, its not there. — Philosophim

Regarding the two above propositions: A = T and B = F .

Is mathematics non-existent? Some might say yes. It's certainly non-physical. — jgill

Show me how you will determine the calculation of input values and a binary operator after you die; show me how the universe will determine the calculation of input values and a binary operator after all sentients die.

...non-existent... — Mark Nyquist

Non-existence is an abstract concept which has an empty content.

...logic says non-existent and non-physical things don't have any cause and effect relation. — Mark Nyquist

Non-physical things abstract things have cause and effect relations via the support of the brain: the brain's memory functions allow sentients to recapitulate empirical experiences and then organize them sequentially and thematically ⟹ logic and sets.

It means the effect already lies in the cause — LFranc

What does this even mean? — Michael

The existence of the cause implies the contemporaneous existence of the effect.

Example: Clouds saturated with water cause rain.

I think you are sincerely trying to grasp an Idealistic worldview*1 that is radically different from your own Materialistic worldview*2 — Gnomon

*2. Materialism :
Materialism is a form of philosophical monism which holds that matter is the fundamental substance in nature, and that all things, including mental states and consciousness, are results of material interactions of material things.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Materialism — Gnomon

Handshakes across the aisle.

On p.1 of this thread back in 2022 (if you've missed it), I had posted very brief logical and physical objections to the OP's incoherent claim of "logical necessity of the first cause" (i.e. there was/is no "first cause"). FWIW, here"s the link to my post (further supplimented on the next few pages of this thread) containing two other links to short posts: — 180 Proof

I'm taking serious note of these links to additional thinking on some implications of the thesis.

In my acknowledgment above, I'm only addressing the error in my reasoning you brought to my attention: In attacking: There's no limit on what a first cause can be, I made the mistake of applying my accusation of paradox to There's no limit on what a first cause can be as if it said: There's no limit on that a first cause can be. This is not something Philosphim has claimed, so the attack -- at least in its present form -- has no bearing on the correctness of the thesis.

Through my acknowledgement I don't intend to imply I now think Philosophim's thesis correct. I'm just clearing away the debris of my erroneous attack.

If you've already assumed the gist of this clarification, please forgive my superfluity.

...prior to the inception of a first cause, "It could be anything." — Philosophim

Yesterday, I attacked this claim thus:

Since logical necessity is a strict limitation, by your main argument -- There're are no limitations on what a first cause can be -- a first cause cannot be logically necessary. The necessity of its existence precludes its existence. Why is this not a Russell's Paradox type of contradiction that negates the truth value of your thesis? — ucarr

After writing this, I thought it a pretty good argument. However, proceeding with caution, I decided to ask 180 Proof to examine the argument for flaws. He got back to me quickly with this:

It seems to me your argument misses a significant distinction: 'that there is first cause' & 'what the first cause is'; "there is no limitation on what the first cause is', not in reference to 'that there was a first cause'. — 180 Proof

Correct.

I'm now expressing big gratitude to 180 Proof. He's done a superb job fulfilling my request. I now believe his statement above detects a fatal flaw in my argument. Philosophim has claimed there is no limitation on what a first cause can be. At the opposite end of the spectrum, he has claimed there is a conclusive limitation on that a first cause can be: logical necessity.

If it's true that: "before first cause, nothing," then a justification of this premise with a supporting premise that employs the material things of our everyday world as an example of first cause inception -- a rolling die with numbers on six sides -- cannot be a pertinent and probative example of first cause from nothing. For this reason, I evaluate the supporting premise as false.

From here it follows that if this supporting premise is false, and therefore not all of your premises are true, then your conclusion might still be true, but it's not a certainty.

I further underscore this point with sentential logic:

Consider: x = the (all of)-existence-is-necessary premise (this is logically antecedent to a first cause is necessary) (T) and y = your roll of the die supporting premise (F)

The binary logical operator takes two input values -- x and y -- and converts them into a truth-content value: with x = all of existence is necessary (T) and y = a roll of a die examples inception of first cause (F), we get

(x ⟹ y) ⟹ (T ⟹ F) ⟹ F

So, truth does not imply falsity.

If you want to arrive at a conclusion that is certainly true, you must develop pertinent, probative premises, all of which are true.

You have said: "... before first cause, nothing."

How do your descriptions of the inception of first cause have anything to work with other than nothing?

Consider -- In a valid argument, when all the premises are true, the conclusion must also be true.

Imagine a die with all possibilities. Now the die is rolled. Whatever lands is what is. If someone claims, "Its a six", we should be able to prove that it did roll a six. Once it is rolled we are out of the realm of possibility and in the realm of actuality. — Philosophim

Do you think your above premise -- rooted in something instead of in nothing -- avoids being evaluated as false and thus avoids casting doubt on the conclusion being true?

If you do, can you explain the avoidance?

Consider: x = the (all of) existence is necessary premise (this is logically antecedent to a first cause is necessary) (T) and y = your roll of the die premise (F)

We see in the conditional operator truth table that when

x ⟹ y, with x = T and y = F, the statement evaluates as F

Do you think your above premise -- demonstrably false -- avoids plugging into the x ⟹ y implication such that the statement evaluates as False?

If you do, can you explain the avoidance?

You've previously stated there're no limitations on what a first cause can be. Are you now presenting an elaboration that rejects the notion "there're no limitations on what a first cause can be and "anything that can exist might be a first cause"? are logically equivalent? — ucarr

No. Please explain how you came to this conclusion from what I wrote. — Philosophim

Here are the pertinent things you wrote:

I'm saying I'm not claiming any one PARTICULAR thing is a first cause. — Philosophim

So, you're saying anything that can exist might be a first cause? — ucarr

We're having a language barrier issue here. :) Think of it as a variable set Ucarr. I'm noting the variable of 'a first cause' is logically necessary. What's in that actual set, one or many more, is irrelevant. What actual first causes have happened over the lifetime in the universe is up for other people to prove. I am not saying that anything which exists can be a first cause. — Philosophim

In the first statement above in bold -- yours -- you ask for an explanation of my question:

... Are you now presenting an elaboration that rejects the notion "there're no limitations on what a first cause can be and "anything that can exist might be a first cause"? are logically equivalent? — ucarr

Your first quote above -- I'm saying I'm not claiming any one PARTICULAR thing is a first cause. -- is a logical descendent of: "There're no limitations on what a first cause can be."

My question was motivated by your second statement above in bold: "I am not saying that anything which exists can be a first cause."

Why is it not a contradiction of: "There're no limitations on what a first cause can be"?

The question is important because it's an essential supporting argument for your thesis.

On the same note: "A first cause is logically necessary." is the central focus of your thesis. Considering this, consider: Since logical necessity is a strict limitation, by your main argument -- There're are no limitations on what a first cause can be -- a first cause cannot be logically necessary. The necessity of its existence precludes its existence. Why is this not a Russell's Paradox type of contradiction that negates the truth value of your thesis?

...we weren’t discussing brain activity. — Mww

You think thought and communication are divorced from brain activity?

That the self is impossible without the brain is given, but is at the same time far to general a proposition to be of any explanatory help. — Mww

Have you read the book linked below?

Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter

It is actually the self finding fault with an act a posteriori, as effect, but not necessarily with its antecedent judgement by which the act is determined a priori, as cause. — Mww

How do you reconcile your above with your below?

The assertion, then, reduces to either the conveyance, not of the content, but of the thought itself, to the self that has the thought, a contradiction, or, there is nothing whatsoever conveyed to the self regarding thought and its content, that doesn’t already reside therein, such that, ipso facto, thought is possible. — Mww

I, on the other hand, hold the self is reducible to a unitary, or singular, rational identity. — Mww

So at twenty years a memory-bearing person is just the same as that memory-bearing person at five years?

I’m familiar with arguments in which the self is both subject and object. This happens only in expositions of it, wherein what the self is in itself as object, is confounded with the manifestations of the self’s doings as subject. In other words, the self is necessarily reified when attempting to explain itself. Which gives rise to the inevitable absurdity of the self reifying itself. Still, conceptions, intuitions, morals, thoughts, subjects and objects and whatnot, are all required pursuant to expressions of the human kind of intelligence, but the self doesn’t use any of them to do what it does, except to manifest itself as subject. — Mww

How is your propositional content within your above paragraph possible -- especially through the noumenal section -- without your intentional and thoroughly functional reification?

So, yes, I submit the self not only isn’t aware of itself objectively, but is absurd to suppose it needs to be. In fact, I reject the notion that the self is aware of itself subjectively, hence the redundancy, while merely granting the availability of some mechanism by which it seems to be the case. — Mww

Reflexivity and redundancy are not synonymous.

Since you're a brain in a vat -- self-cognitively speaking -- spending the rest of your days in solitary confinement within a white room would be for you a matter of indifference.

I commend you on your durable patience with me.

Are we looking at a concept of causation with an unlimited number of possible and independent first causes? — ucarr

My intention here is to understand that a first of all first causes, if it happens, holds no special status because first causes are independent.

The start of each chain is separate and independent — Philosophim

I've been striving to understand that the gist of your claim is to say each causal chain must have a first cause. In so stating, I understand you take no particular position on the ontic identity of a first cause and its following chain.

I'm noting the variable of 'a first cause' is logically necessary. What's in that actual set, one or many more, is irrelevant. — Philosophim

You've previously stated there're no limitations on what a first cause can be. Are you now presenting an elaboration that rejects the notion "there're no limitations on what a first cause can be and "anything that can exist might be a first cause"? are logically equivalent?

By immaterial existence I mean an abstract concept — ucarr

I don't care whether they're immaterial or not. Are they real? Yes. — Philosophim

Are you allowing that "real" names a comprehensive set of things that funds first causes and that whether or not this set includes both material and immaterial things is irrelevant to your work in this conversation? Do you agree your indifference in this situation leaves open the door for inferring that logical necessity of first causes is amenable to both material and immaterial causes? I ask this question because the ontic identity of first causes is not normally a matter of indifference within examinations of causation.

I can tell you that nothing has changed from our conversation in which I spoke to you Ucarr. So its best not to confuse yourself by trying to follow it [Philosphim's dialogue with Gnomon]. — Philosophim

You presume incorrectly my questions are darts aimed at your previous statements. I like to think I'm slowly improving my understanding of the intentions behind your words.

Are you advising me to stop undertaking my own independent inferential thinking because you think it [sometimes] erroneous?

In a concomitant action, are you trying to restrict the range of actions, techniques and approaches I can use in my interactions with you?

If you think you're repeating yourself in your responses, name the topic, tell me I'm repeating my questions thereof and I'll agree not to ask additional repeat questions on the topic.

First, if you remember a first cause cannot cause another first cause. — Philosophim

My mistake. I should've written: So, you're saying that even though a first cause is logically necessary, that doesn't necessarily imply the necessity of a first cause of all first causes?

Second, its possible that there was a first cause that happened, then other first causes happened later. Or it could be that two or more first causes happened simultaneously. — Philosophim

Are we looking at a concept of causation with an unlimited number of possible and independent first causes?

I'm saying I'm not claiming any one PARTICULAR thing is a first cause. — Philosophim

So, you're saying anything that can exist might be a first cause?

I don't even know what immaterial existence is. — Philosophim

By immaterial existence I mean an abstract concept -- or some such entity -- that inhabits the mind apart from matter. Have you not agreed with Gnomon (below) that concepts are immaterial and real?

That's simply a philosophical/mathematical concept, as contrasted with a physical/material object. — Gnomon

Also correct! — Philosophim

Its completely irrelevant whether there is immaterial existence or not. — Philosophim

Have you not agreed with Gnomon (above) that immaterial yet real concepts -- as distinguished from matter -- are useful for correctly understanding your thesis, and therefore pertinent to it?

This is not a claim of any 'one thing' being a first cause. Its just a logical note that there must be a first cause, and that first cause has nothing prior that limits or influences what it should be. — Philosophim

So, you're saying that even though a first cause is logically necessary, that doesn't necessarily imply the necessity of a first cause of all first causes?

Are we looking at a concept of causation with potentially unlimited number of first causes and yet no first cause for the set of first causes?

Is immaterial existence even a thing? I don't know. If it exists, then its a thing. If not, then its not. — Philosophim

You've said you're not making a claim that a thing -- such as a God, or the Big Bang -- acts as the first cause. Also, you've clarified that your thesis only posits the logical necessity of a first cause. Now you say you don't know if immaterial existence is a thing. Is it pertinent to the content and intentions of your thesis to suppose you take no definitive position on the materiality or immateriality of the logically necessary first cause?

Okay: You're saying:

First Cause is necessary to chain of causation it's outside of and affecting. — Gnomon

Okay: You're saying:

My understanding of a logically necessary First Cause is a philosophical conjecture, not a scientific observation. So there is no "whereness" to specify. — Gnomon

So, First Cause is an abstract entity that inhabits the realm of mind.

Okay: You're saying:

...but like all fundamental Principles, the Prime Cause is a theoretical Concept, an Idea with "no material physicality". However, the referent is not an anthro-morphic deity located in space-time, — Gnomon

So, Prime Cause has a referent.

Okay: You're saying:

Deism is known as the "God of the Philosophers". As I said in the previous post : "But one sticking point seems to be confusing a logical First Cause (of some resulting chain of events) with an objective Thing or God operating in space-time". — Gnomon

So, our world is a causal chain following from an abstract entity that inhabits the realm of mind.

Okay: You're saying:

The scientific Big Bang theory understandably avoided the philosophical question of where the Energy & Laws of Nature came from. That's because those logical necessities for a Chain of Causation are presumably Eternal & Everywhere. — Gnomon

So, our world is an eternal following-causal-chain in the sense that its origin, Prime Cause, is an eternal logical necessity.

...it’s [our dialogue] become too psychological for my interests, so, thanks for the alternative perspective. — Mww

You've let me know you won't dialogue with me further. Okay. I'm posting the following responses for the record; I try to always respond to counter-narratives.

There isn’t any space in a thought, and if the self just is that which has thoughts, one is temporally inseparable from the other. — Mww

I think brain activity occurs in spacetime. Also, when someone thinks, they know they're thinking. The knowing person is not identical to his/her thoughts being examined, otherwise the knowing person couldn't do the evaluation.

The self judges, so it can’t be that the self is judged. — Mww

Guilt is an everyday example of the self judging its own actions and finding fault with itself.

…..b) a judging self is self-aware in its acts of judgment….. — ucarr

Tautologically true, but congruent with every other aspect of what the subject does…. — Mww

When a person drives a car, he/she monitors his/her judgments about time and distance in order to begin breaking in order to avoid hitting the car in front. Knowing you're stopping the car in time to avoid a collision is not circular reasoning.

…..and self-awareness requires a separation of self (…) from self….. — ucarr

I find it a mischaracterization of self, in its irreducible sense. — Mww

The gist of my thesis is that the self is not reducible to a unitary person.

Self-awareness is redundant. Awareness presupposes self, and, self is necessarily that which is aware. — Mww

You seem to be implying self cannot be objectively aware of self. Have you never primped in front of a mirror before making a public address?

If self separates from self, what then becomes of self-awareness? — Mww

Consider an imaginary experience of internal conflict: both of your divorced parents invite you to Christmas dinner and you're torn between visiting one or the other household.

Thought and judgement, because they are related to each other….communicate? — Mww

You're trying to persuade your significant other to join you at the resort lodge for skiing. At one point during your pitch, the other person frowns. In your mind's eye you think: "I pressed too hard on my point about them owing me for favors done on their behalf. I'd better back off a bit."

Given that there is no such thing as an empty thought, it follows necessarily that when a self has a thought, it must be that the content does not get conveyed to the self, but arises from the self in conjunction with the thought the self has. — Mww

Is there any differential in space and time separating the self and its thoughts? I ask this question for two reasons: a) a thought is about the judgment of the self in reaction to a perception of the world; judgement implies a separation of judge from judged; b) a judging self is self-aware in its acts of judgment and self-awareness requires a separation of self not only from world but also from self; if there is no separation of self from self, then there is no self-awareness and thus absent self-awareness absent self.

This structure of thought as being inherently self-referential raises an important question: can thought occur without communication? — ucarr

Are you denying a supposed self-referentiality of thought? This question is central to the gist of my thesis because it focuses upon the structure of thought as an interconnectivity with communication throughout the interconnectivity an essential attribute.

Since you say:

...it must be that the content does not get conveyed to the self, but arises from the self in conjunction with the thought the self has. — Mww

I say:

As to the structure of a thought as a judgment arisen from its content as the existential ground of the judgment, this inter-communitive relationship I posit as the central module of perception, thought, communication and language.

But one sticking point seems to be confusing a logical First Cause (of some resulting chain of events) with an objective Thing or God operating in space-time. — Gnomon

Correct. People seem to think I'm using this to claim the existence of some specific first cause like the Big Bang, God, etc. I am not... — Philosophim

That's simply a philosophical/mathematical concept, as contrasted with a physical/material object. — Gnomon

Also correct! — Philosophim

I just want to be clear that a first cause as proven here is not outside of our universe, but a necessary existent within our universe. — Philosophim

Are you saying: a) the logical first cause has no material physicality; b) the logical first cause that has no material physicality exists within our universe?

So, if we are assuming that the chain of causation applies everywhere in the interconnected universe, then your immanent Cause could be its own Effect. For example the Cue ball is on the table, and can be impacted by the 8 ball. That's why my unique First Cause, or Causal Principle, is assumed to be off the table, outside the system affected. — Gnomon

Are you saying: a) unique First Cause is outside the chain of causation it affected?

I prefer not to specify where the imaginary Poolshooter is standing, and just call him an abstract-but-necessary Principle. — Gnomon

Are you saying unique First Cause is necessary to chain of causation it's outside of and affecting?

Can you elaborate additional details about the unspecified whereness -- positionally speaking relative to the whole -- of abstract-but-necessary Principle?

"I promise to fetch water for you if you give me some of that haunch" — Banno

Lady Killer on the make.

Can the content only ever describe the thinker more-so than what it is intended to describe? — NOS4A2

Yes. Language and meaning are always distillations of content. For this reason, language and its circumambient meaning are well done when heavy laden with concrete imagery that shows more than tells.

Try to refine your question to a single, focussed point of discussion. — alan1000

The center of my focus looks at a concept of the structure of thought as a complex of multiple parts. The essential parts are content, language and meaning. Content lies within the noumenal realm of things-just-are. Language is the transport for the meaning of noumenal content. Meaning is the interpretive narrative that hovers about the things-just-are noumenal content. When meaning comes into the picture, we're looking at narratives about narratives.

The complex of thought includes the noumenal content perceived through the senses plus what we think about our perceptions, the interpretive meaning supplied by the work done by thinking.

If narratives about narratives is an essentially correct characterization of thought, then it's clear thought and communication are inseparable. This is the gist of my argument against complete acceptance of Chomsky's argument rooted in the separation of the two.

Another important part of my focus is the characterization of the self as an irreducible complex that perplexes unitary characterizations of selfhood. So, self as emergent property of material physicality leads to a characterization of self as a distributed complex of interwoven fields.

Consciousness is the spinner thrown into the mix of interwoven energy fields. With the advent of consciousness within a material physicality based universe, the logic_science matrix of not-now-but-forthcomingness introduces absential materialism. The principle agent of absential materialism is abstractionism.

Mr. Abstraction -- A principle agent of thought who takes perceived patterns of material_physical phenomena and cognizes them into linguistic generalizations amenable to logical representation and scientific examination. The complex dynamical evolution of self-organizing systems gives an appearance of parallel realities, one extended and one unextended, but it's actually a distributed complex of interwoven fields.

This hypothesis doesn't seem valid to me even on its face, due to the fact that the individual has no existence independent of the collective (species). — Pantagruel

If you're referencing Chomsky's preference of language for thought over language for communication, I agree with your assessment. If there's anything essentially inter-personal and essentially communicative, its language, isn't it? Also, I'm guessing the infant learns to hear words and repeat them (or see visual patterns and connect them with ends) before forming intentional thoughts within a linguistic medium, whether verbal or visual.

Quantum physicist Karen Barad has produced a model of interaffecting matter that was inspired by the double slit experiments.

Phenomena are ontologically primitive relations—relations without pre-existing relata. On the basis of the notion of intra-action, which represents a profound conceptual shift in our traditional understanding of causality, I argue that it is through specific agential intra-actions that the boundaries and properties of the ‘‘components'' of phenomena become determinate and that particular material articulations of the world become meaningful. A specific intra-action (involving a specific material configuration of the ‘‘apparatus'') enacts an agential cut (in contrast to the Cartesian cut—an inherent distinction—between subject and object), erecting a separation between ‘‘subject'' and ‘‘object.'' That is, the agential cut enacts a resolution within the phenomenon of the inherent ontological (and semantic) indeterminacy. In other words, relata do not preexist relations; rather, relata-within-phenomena emerge through specific intra-actions. (Meeting the Universe Halfway) — Joshs

Maybe you'll help me unpack the Barad definition:

• Classically measurable things are primatively real connections; they are connections without implications of supervenient principles.

• Intra-action -- action within as distinguished from action between -- represents a profound conceptual shift in our traditional understanding of causality...

• ...through agency-mediated intra-actions boundaries and characteristic expressions of parts of classically measurable things become defined and, likewise, natural material systems featuring jointed parts become describable.

• A specific intra-action (involving a specific material configuration of a complex, multi-part system) enacts an agency-mediated cut (in contrast to the Cartesian cut - an inherent distinction - between subject and object), erecting a separation between "subject" and "object."

• ...the agency-mediated cut enacts a resolution within the clasically measurable real and narratable indeterminancy.

• ...related things do not preexist their grammatical organizing principles; rather, natural, related things classically measurable cyclically foreground via phase shifts through specific actions within.

Conclusions: a) subject_object is an intra-active phase-shifting dynamical process; b) intra-action nuances abstractly conceptualizable grammar of relations as emergent-property-of-material-things-
cum-foregrounded-interiority.

...any category of existing entities derives its sense and intelligibility from a wider context of relevance. This wider context of relevance comes first, and the meaning of the list of beings is derived from it. — Joshs

Is it correct to characterize your statement thus: abstract rules of organization have conceptual influence (the conferring of sense and intelligibility) upon concrete things?

Is it correct to infer from the above that in a reverse direction, concrete things make it possible to discern abstract rules emergent from concrete things?

Is it correct to induce a bi-conditional operator linking concrete things and abstract rules within a causal identity: concrete things imply abstract rules if and only if abstract rules imply concrete things?

Is it possible QM exemplifies a networked reality: wave functions and particle functions are interwoven within a universe that supports superposition regulated by probability measurements?

This is not a physics forum so I don't see the philosophical relevance of the quote cited... — 180 Proof

You don't see the philosophical relevance attaching to physical phenomena raising fundamental questions about the nature of reality?

...and conflating the Schrödinger equation with the 'Schrödinger's Cat' gedankenexperiment proves my point. — 180 Proof

You see no connection between the equation and the thought experiment?

What is the thought experiment about Schrödinger's cat?

He imagined a box containing a radioactive atom, a vial of poison and a cat. Governed by quantum rules, the radioactive atom can either decay or not at any given moment. There's no telling when the moment will come, but when it does decay, it breaks the vial, releases the poison and kills the cat.

The Schrödinger Equation -- As the QM counterpart to Newton's 2nd law in classical mechanics, it gives the evolution over time of a wave function, the quantum-mechanical characterization of an isolated physical system. — Wikipedia

The isolated physical system in the thought experiment is "the atom," whose decay the Schrödinger Equation predicts quantum mechanically. The equation demonstrates mathematically the uncertainty of the time of the decay, thus causing the cat's death. This being uncertain, the cat holds superposition as both dead and alive until the measurement effect of observation of the cat collapses the superposition.

Fundamentally, the Schrödinger's cat experiment asks how long quantum superpositions last and when (or whether) they collapse. Different interpretations of the mathematics of quantum mechanics have been proposed that give different explanations for this process, but Schrödinger's cat remains an unsolved problem in physics. — Wikipedia

Although originally a critique on the Copenhagen interpretation, Schrödinger's seemingly paradoxical thought experiment became part of the foundation of quantum mechanics. — Wikipedia

You, 180 Proof -- a science-savvy commentator -- in seeking to distance TPF from science tells me I'm doing something right in my approach to the association of science and philosophy.

I understand him (Schrödinger) to be making reference to Schrödinger's equation for a superpositionally dead & alive cat. — ucarr

My quote is unfortunately misleading without the addendum: Schrödinger developed the narrative of the dead & alive cat in order to mock the artless embrace of superposition without acknowledging its collapse under measurement.

I understand him to be making reference to Schrödinger's equation for a superpositionally dead & alive cat. — ucarr

:roll: — 180 Proof

You hold Schrödinger's linear differential equation in contempt?

As the QM counterpart to Newton's 2nd law in classical mechanics, it gives the evolution over time of a wave function, the quantum-mechanical characterization of an isolated physical system. — Wikipedia

What's your take on this?

a kind of metaphysical POV [ ... ] affords us a metaphysics of practice — ucarr

I heve no idea what you mean, ucarr. — 180 Proof

The satellite is supposed to be a practical application of systemic overview, my characterization of metaphysics.

Deacon sounds like he's espousing what C. Rovelli aptly calls "quantum nonsense"... — 180 Proof

I understand him to be making reference to Schrödinger's equation for a superpositionally dead & alive cat.

...T. Deacon's thesis seems to be 'nonreductive physicalist scientism'... — 180 Proof

No. The long slog through the statistical bias towards equilibrium, i.e., entropy towards the far-from-equilibrium states required of life is illuminated in detail by the scientific work of Deacon in Incomplete Nature, a game-changer in the mind/body inquiry.

The slow-paced dogfight by natural materials engineering and natural fluid dynamics engineering towards the self-organizing dynamical systems that aggregate attractors that statistically mandate phase shifts from random resource elements and compounds into reciprocally reinforcing morphodyanics is the critically important continuum that bridges across simple matter to absentially material mind. The autogen is an early distillation of selfhood in the form of self-generation, self-repair and self-replication.

The end-directed aboutness functionality of telodynamics as the operating system of mind, emergent from yet rooted within material thermodyanmics is spatially distributed, time-mediated complex materialism.

Deacon closes his report on the supple interweave of the multiplex of matter that knows itself with:

If quantum physicists can learn to become comfortable with the material causal consequences of the superposition of alternate, as-yet-unrealized states of matter, it shouldn’t be too great a leap to begin to get comfortable with the superposition of the present and the absent in our functions, meanings,
experiences, and values.

So, from Deacon we learn that mental abstractionism is a state that oscillates between an expansion/compression cycle within nature.

Consider a modern, telecommunications satellite, such as the one making our internet dialogs possible.

Launched from earth, it hovers above in the thermosphere_exosphere. It sees whole earth in overview, a kind of metaphysical POV. In this position, it's poised to connect the dots and understand events systemically. It affords us a metaphysics of practice with concrete value to the general public. No academic flights of fancy indulged.

Clear overview of complex systems has essential importance. It generates useful constraints in the form of boundaries known as rules. This necessary role of the referee notwithstanding, we don't say the orbital satellite looking down upon us created us. No. It emerged from us and remains tied to us in a delicate superposition of the present and the absent.

Deacon's report does not example science privileged above reflection. Instead, it does the hard work of elaborating the continuum linking reflection with its material foundation.

Hello, 180 Proof. I've been learning from you, and I very much appreciate your patient instruction. I'm very gratified to have some of your attention.

I think you stand on solid ground whenever you correctly ground your conjectures in science.

You can do yourself a favor by keeping away from metaphysics for now. Metaphysics is your enemy because it lulls you into complacecey about not being your better self.

Metaphysics is little more than the logical grammar undergirding the conceptual dimensions of science. It's neither beyond nor above science. It's something akin to an emergent property of science.

Some metaphysicians might tell you it's the other way around. Shrug them off before they lead you astray. Never doubt that metaphysics cannot breathe without science.*

I hope you'll start working toward longer intervals off the drug of metaphysics while slogging the trenches of philosophy's harsh mistress: science.

You show promise as a theoretician when you make observations such as the following: "The primary attribute of energy is causation." That's thinking like a scientist. Keep doing it.

*If you think logic a science, consider that philosophical ideas are vetted by logic. What does that tell you?

A first cause is an uncaused existence, that then enters into causality. — Philosophim

Is instantiation into existence instantaneous, or does the process necessitate elapsing of time?

I think that there are infinitely many possibilities (including the possibility of a Big Bang and a Small Whimper). You cannot assign any special probabilities to either the Big Bang or the Small Whimper. However small a number you assign to each probability, either it will be infinitely small or the total will be infinity. This makes your assignments meaningless. — Ludwig V

:up:

I haven't walked through my initial through process... so let me do so
now. — Philosophim

The through line of causal logic is crucial.

If anything is possible, then could some things be more possible than another? — Philosophim

Yes. You're invoking probability.

I realized I could imagine any situation with odds, and realize that all odds had the same chance of happening when anything can happen. — Philosophim

I'll sound a note of doubt about this on the premise all odds on all things having equal chance of occurrence assumes unlimited time.

True randomness' is uncaused. — Philosophim

This implies randomness can be contemporary with the first of all first causes, and thus prior to all first causes subsequent to the first of all first causes. The effect of randomness being uncaused is that there are no first causes.

Also, if true randomness uncaused, as you claim, supports the prediction of certain outcomes, then it is -- your denials notwithstanding -- logical.


Firstly, when you're propounding your conclusion -- that first cause is possible and logically necessary -- you demand it be understood: unexplainable nothing must be accepted prima facie. This is the before-there's-nothing/after-there's-something transformation. So far, your arguments beg the question: How is there not a chain of causation from nothing to something? You have corrected me on my understanding of it as a chain of causation. You haven't explained why it's not.

Secondly, when you proceed to your logical argument this is true, your thinking -- like than mine -- does not remove itself from immersion within a logical perception of what you're trying to exclude from logic.

Your narrative contains a crucial disjunction between your axiomatic declaration of first cause and your exegesis of first cause with telltale rational underpinnings. These telltale rational underpinnings covertly assist you in your assertions of first cause's reality.

The point of disjunction happens when the causal chain reaches its last position prior to the location of first cause and the location of first cause. The gap stands between first cause on one side of the disjunction and second cause on the other side of the disjunction. First cause is not connected to the causal chain you claim it causes. The gap separating the leader from its followers is the gap between no-physics and physics.

Since you're talking about first cause causing a causal chain following after it, you have to bridge across first cause to second cause that bridges across to third cause, etc. You can't start building your bridge if first cause inhabits a realm no other existing thing inhabits. For this reason, whenever you attempt to talk logically about first cause causing second cause and so on, you have to covertly bring in logical connectors linking first cause to second cause.

The central flaw in your thesis appears to be inconsistency (between the no-physics realm and the physics realm). In your attempt to assert a no-logic realm as the start of a logical realm, you encounter the gnarly problem of explaining logically the non-logical inception of logic. Its easy to claim a no-logic realm causes a logic realm if you keep the two realms separated in a dualistic reality. The problem with this option is that the claim of a causal link must be taken as an article of faith.

Your first cause thesis is plagued by the same inconsistency devil plaguing theism and the big bang.

:up:

True randomness is merely a description to grasp potential. — ucarr

Must you exclude potential from the neighborhood of first cause? — ucarr

I'm not sure what you meant by this, could you clarify please ucarr? — Philosophim

My general interpretation of your introduction of randomness as a state of things totally unpredictable had it positioned as the state preceding incept of first cause. Subsequent to that thinking, you've clarified that nothing -- including nothingness -- can have causal effect on a first cause. So, nothingness, and randomness join the list of excluded causal prior states. After your most recent clarification about randomness being an aide to understanding potential, I'm seeking clarification whether potential inhabits the list of the excluded. The simple answer is yes. However, your mentions of nothingness, randomness and now potential vaguely suggest they're subject to the gravitational pull of causal status due to our reasoning minds needing talking points to grasp nothing-then-something inception.

I know you've denied dualism, so, at the risk of repetition, clarify again how a real realm of acausal nothing-then-something is continuous with our universe of phenomena apparently obeying physical laws. Directly below is why I repeat the question.

Let me give you an example of total randomness that you may not be realizing. It can be completely random that the universe has one first cause, the big bang, and never has one again. — Philosophim

Your underlined fragment suggests randomness in the role of the trigger of the singularity's rapid expansion. If that's not assignment of causal agency to randomness, its a talking point that flirts with such and the effect is the sending of a confusing and mixed communication. I now know that the purity of the randomness argues for no possible organization and no possible associated direction that in this context crosstalks with causation. Another thought -- I know you've already addressed it -- is that the pre-big bang of no physics is an utterly different state not only from our world today, but utterly different from the start of the shortest time interval possible post-big bang. I'm still in arrears of understanding how randomness-into-big band is not a partitioning of reality into two utterly distinct states populating a dual reality.

As I've already written, if randomness-into-big-bang not being a partitioning is an axiomatic presupposition, I can understand what's being conveyed while disagreeing with its possibility. But you argue that A ⟹ B ⟹ C... -- when you run it backwards -- loops around with logical necessity to a causeless inception point. I presume then, that what follows logically is another progression in a forward direction with endless circularity being the general state of things. I don't see any component of the argument that cancels the partitioning obvious to me. So, where does you argument cancel any notion of pre-big bang being a radically different reality than post-big bang, with expansion of the singularity inexplicably bridging across the utterly distinct realities?

You're saying "First causes simply are." is not a self-evident truth? — ucarr

No, they are a conclusion reasoned through by logic — Philosophim

So, where does you argument cancel any notion of pre-big bang being a radically different reality than post-big bang, with expansion of the singularity inexplicably bridging across the utterly distinct realities?

You're speculating about reality having no boundary? — ucarr

I'm just saying that the word 'reality' is really a word that represents all of 'what is'. — Philosophim

You're not answering my question, please do so. I'm pressing this point because saying all of what exists equals reality allows for the logical inference reality so defined has no boundary. Well, a reality with no boundary means the no-physics realm of nothing-then-something inhabits the same continuum inhabited by our everyday reality. This bilateral grounding of no-physics and physics compels you to explain logically how our universe contains a no-physics section and also a physics section without it being a dualist universe.

Ask as long as you have questions that need answering, its not a problem. — Philosophim

As you see above, I'm doing just that.

The wording about physics is a little to vague for me — Philosophim

You've been saying a principal first cause, although it can incept as anything, cannot violate the physical laws of the thing it incepts as, right? If I'm correct in thinking this, it seems to me also correct a principal first cause is constrained by the definition of the particular things it incepts as.

If you chafe at constraint applied to a principal first cause, that gives me an opening to point out mereological issues and question whether you need to address them.

Again, lets change this to be a little more to the point. "However, if it is found logically that all instantiations of causation entail externals, logical antecedents and contemporaries, then its a correct inference there are no first causes."

This is a logical argument, so of course is there is a logical counter it fails. — Philosophim

Do you agree making this determination is the heart and soul of our work in this discussion?

Is this interpretation correct: The above claim ignores mereological issues associated with the work of defining a first cause. — ucarr

Too vague. What do you specifically mean by mereological. — Philosophim

Mereological essentialism
In philosophy, mereological essentialism is a mereological thesis about the relationship between wholes, their parts, and the conditions of their persistence. According to mereological essentialism, objects have their parts necessarily. If an object were to lose or gain a part, it would cease to exist; it would no longer be the original object but a new and different one.

Wikipedia - Mereological essentialism

The last two sentences of the definition are especially important. If a first cause is a system, as is the case in your example of a first-cause hydrogen atom, then, as you've been saying, it cannot be a hydrogen atom if one of its necessary parts is missing.

Next comes the issue whether the necessary part is a thing-in-themself apart from the hydrogen atom. The answer is yes because we know electrons are parts of many elements and compounds, not just hydrogen atoms. So, if an electron is a thing-in-itself and its a necessary part of a hydrogen atom, then a hydrogen atom, even the first one, in order to exist, must contain an electron, another thing-in-itself like the hydrogen atom. Therefore, logically, we must conclude the electron is a contemporary of the hydrogen atom it inhabits, and thus the hydrogen atom cannot be itself and at the same time be a first cause.

First causes inhabit the phenomenal universe and create consequential phenomena in the form of causal chains, and yet the examination of causation as a whole comes to a dead end at its phenomenal starting point. — ucarr

Add, "It is possible" to the start of the above sentence and its good. — Philosophim

I understand you want to leave open the possibility the something-from-nothing origins of first causes are not permanently partitioned off from examination of causation as a whole by science, but your something-from-nothing just-iziming of first causes are, by your definition, beyond scientific reach.

The implication is that either within or beyond the phenomenal universe lies something extant but unexplainable.* Is this a case of finding the boundary of scientific investigation, or is it a case of halting scientific investigation and philosophical rumination by decree. — ucarr

A logical boundary of scientific investigation. In no way should we stop science or philosophy. — Philosophim

How is claiming logical necessity of things unexplainable refutable?

The notion of total randomness causing something-from-nothing-creations suggests a partitioned and dual reality. The attribution of dualism to this concept rests upon the premise that total randomness cannot share space with an ordered universe without fatally infecting it. — ucarr

No dualism. Dualism implies the presence of two separate things. There is not a separate thing. There is simply a first cause's inception. Let me give you an example of total randomness that you may not be realizing. It can be completely random that the universe has one first cause, the big bang, and never has one again. There are an infinite number of possible universes where there is only one first cause. There are an infinite number of universes with 2 first causes. And so on. — Philosophim

I've underlined the sentence where you might be hiding a cryptic dualism: If total randomness spawned our universe, one inference that can be drawn is that there is a continuum from total randomness to order. The possible duality is the transition point from total randomness (while still within total randomness) to order, or even to proto-order. If this transition point is really an unexplained jump from zero order to extant order, then that's your hidden dualism.

Something-from-spontaneously-occurring-self-organization preserves the laws of physics; something from nothing seems to violate physical laws — ucarr

If a first cause can be anything, and it is found to be true, that would not violate physical laws, that would simply become part of them. — Philosophim

Maybe the question remains: Does a postulated realm of reality without physics and its laws violate the laws of physics?

You think it reasonable to characterize something-from-nothing as "... a small adjustment to physics..."? — ucarr

Yes because like Newton's laws to Einstein's relativity, most of the time Newton's laws is good enough. Most of the time in physics a first cause would never be considered as a case would have to factually present a case in which there could be no prior causality. That's a ridiculously high bar to clear. — Philosophim

You seem to be saying discovery of a first cause is unlikely. The unlikeliness of its discovery has no bearing on the radical impact of such a discovery.

...the impact to physics is irrelevant to the logical argument itself. — Philosophim

You're right, but in this case I'm not attacking your logical argument. I'm attacking your characterization of the advent of something-from-nothing as an event requiring a small adjustment to physics.

It's your job to explain logically how something-from-nothing happens. — ucarr

You think there's a cause that explains how it happens. There IS NO CAUSE ucarr. =D Do I need to type this 50 more times? I do say this with a smile on my face, but please, understand this basic point. — Philosophim

...there is nothing prior that is 'making' something. Its nothing, then something. Inception works much better. "nothing to something' will make me have to write 50 more responses to people explaining that no, nothing is not some thing that causes something. — Philosophim

Yes, with your clarification here I better understand what you've been describing.

Some might think I'm playing a language game when I reflect on a first cause that has no cause being illogical. I defend raising this question because the gist of your argument is that first causation is logically necessary. Now, my argumentative question says a thing partitioned from its identity is illogical along the line of paradox. First cause, by definition, possesses the identity of causation. By definition then, first cause is in identity with itself. (No, I haven't forgotten your denial that first cause can be a self. My simple response is to say non-sentient things like first causes nonetheless are things in themselves.) It's perhaps a weird argument, but I'm driving towards saying inception of first cause cancels definition of first cause as causeless. This in part is a denial that inception as a starting point can be causeless. General Relativity with light holding highest velocity excludes any physical processes -- such as inception -- from occurring instantaneously.

Its nothing, then something. — Philosophim

Trying to partition an interval of time to a nearly infinitesimally small duration such that there's a moment after inception wherein cause is first established doesn't work because in that short interval of time you're implying first cause is not really itself, a paradox. If that's not the case, then there can be no positive time interval during which incepted first cause isn't itself establishing causation. So, no temporal creation without causation.

This is a logical attack on your claim by implication first-cause inception is instantaneous. Since you're leading with the claim first cause (by instantaneous inception) is logically necessary, you must defend your claim with logic. Axiomatic talk about nothing-then-something without a logical argument excluding, for example, General Relativity's exclusion of your claim from reality, won't do.

Ha! But no. The logical argument has always been there ucarr. Try to show it to be wrong anytime. — Philosophim

You're referring to your alpha logic in your OP?

Please try to address the argument as I do specifically and counter what it and I have been saying, not what you believe I'm implying. — Philosophim

You're saying I should only draw inferences strictly adherent to the precise sense in which you word your statements?

True randomness is merely a description to grasp potential. — Philosophim

Must you exclude potential from the neighborhood of first cause?

Please take the argument I've presented for why a first cause is logically necessary and point out where it falls into ad absurdum reductio. — Philosophim

You're saying you have reason to doubt your alpha logic can be reduced to ad absurdum reductio and, given this doubt, you want me to demonstrate such a reduction?

"Are you saying that a first cause is self-evident?" Because my answer is "No". — Philosophim

You're saying "First causes simply are." is not a self-evident truth?

As to reality, if reality refers to everything, there isn't something that exists outside of that set. That's logical. — Philosophim

You're speculating about reality having no boundary?

And thank you for being very discerning and thinking about this at length. I don't want to come across as if I think you're not doing a fantastic job. You are. I'm enjoying the discussion. — Philosophim

I've made important gains in my general abilities pertinent to rational conversation through our dialogue up to this point. I'll be heeding your suggestions for keeping close to the senses in which you (and others) intend your communications in words, phrases, sentences and concepts.

As for my getting stuck at the outer boundary of causation and thereafter being unable to enter into examination of causeless things, I put my best spin on what I've been doing by thinking I've been running through my inventory of commitments to causation en route to deepening my understanding of what you're trying to communicate with respect to your posited causeless realm of first cause. I don't want to further aggravate your annoyance with fruitless repetitions. With that goal in mind, I'm ready to withdraw from our dialog in favor of study suggested by what I've been learning from it.

Suppose I succeed in stopping my internal dialogue, have I earned a nod from Walter White? — ucarr

I don't know whether you mean the actor or the civil rights activist. — Ludwig V

I mean Bryan Cranston as Walter White, the Grand Wizard of Speed in a speed-crazy global empire. In the end, he could but retire to the sterile silence of his solitude and die.

He didn't say there was any problem about asserting well-formed propositions, did he? — Ludwig V

Maybe a practical application of the language of silence consists of the axiomatic supposition supporting analysis: things exist.

Philosophim seems to be saying, things exist causally. That's a mixed bag containing holism and analysis. Well, if holism leaps across the void and supervenes on analysis, that's a very suggestive conception. Is today's establishment science wrong in its pragmatic decision to keep within its analytical physicalism, with the axiomatic established as the boundary?

The key question for Philosophim is whether s/he's another immaterialist propounding a dualist reality without explaining the handshake between two parallel realms.