Because there is no prior cause for a first cause, there is no limitation on what a first cause could be. — Philosophim

Regarding no limitation, what about the selfhood of the first cause? If selfhood establishes a boundary between self and other, and the first cause is a self, then: a) it's limited by the boundaries of its selfhood; b) the necessary network of self/other, upon which first cause depends for its existence as a self, prevents the solitary, temporal primacy of that said self.

The key to being a first cause is that it is not caused by something prior. — Philosophim

That does not mean that other things prior to a first cause cannot exist like other first causes. — Philosophim

The photon did not cause the big bang; they are both first causes of their respective causality chains. — Philosophim

You're saying a particular first cause can have a non-causal relationship with other things prior to it?

Moreover, you're saying the attribute of first cause generally allows for a multiplicity of independent first causes temporally sequenced across a positive interval of time?

Does this not imply that a particular first cause has a bounded domain of first causal influence upon a sub-set of the totality of existing things?

For example, a photon appears with no prior causality here. Five minutes later and thousands of miles away, a big bang appears uncaused as well. The photon did not cause the big bang; they are both first causes of their respective causality chains. — Philosophim

Your above quote answers my question directly above it in the affirmative.

Is this not a description of everyday causes such as: a) a virus causes pneumonia; b) a cloud saturated with water causes rain?

Why is it not the case your argument now is merely a description of causation in the everyday world replete with many causes not casually linked to each other? You advance your argument by lopping off "first" and thereby turning first cause into everyday cause.

Am I mistaken in my understanding of your purpose as being an examination of the first cause of all existing things, including existence itself?

...a) no existing thing exists in isolation; b) every existing thing is a roadmap to other existing things (i.e. quantum entanglement); c) an existing thing, if divisible, cannot pre-exist that thing's sub-components necessary to its existence. — ucarr

I don't believe so if my point has been clarified.

a. No existing thing exists in isolation

To clarify, there's a reason I call it a first cause. Because immediately after its existence it enters into causality. Meaning one time tick after, its has its own reference at a prior time tick to explain why it state of existence is as it is at the second tick of time. Further, there is nothing that forbids one thing existing in isolation in theory. Nothing I'm noting is negating the universe as it is today, and we clearly have a lot of things. :) — Philosophim

If first cause passes through time from its first tick to its second tick, time is co-equal with it.

Further, there is nothing that forbids one thing existing in isolation in theory. — Philosophim

I'm inclined to think the conservation laws forbid the total isolation of a thing. A truly isolated thing means all of mass_energy, being a singularity, negates equilibrium. If our universe defaults toward equilibrium, as the conservation laws confirm, then absolute singularity is an infinite value never reached.

b) every existing thing is a roadmap to other existing things (i.e. quantum entanglement)

Once a first cause exists, it is within causality within its own temporal changes, or if there are other resulting chains of causal existence from other first causes. — Philosophim

Is self-causation is meaningful, its an attribute shared by all existing things.

c) an existing thing, if divisible, cannot pre-exist that thing's sub-components necessary to its existence. True. Though as you mentioned earlier, " when you categorize the variety of existing things as being unified as one collective thing: a) atom; b) universe, they're all equal (by your own argument above) with respect to temporal primacy of existence." — Philosophim

That takes us back to saying all of existence is its own first cause which is like saying "everything is everything," trivial.

The first cause is only in the first time tick. — Philosophim

From this I conclude you're grounding the primacy of first cause within temporal sequence. So, the first cause is first in time before all other things existing in time.

The universe cannot always have existed co-temporally as a first cause. The first cause is only in the first time tick. — Philosophim

Let's revisit something you said earlier:

Lets imagine that we first spy a hydrogen atom that forms with apparently no prior cause. Any time tick before this, the atom is not there. — Philosophim

Sidebar 1 - Notice I've made "forms" bold. If there's a "forms" before the first time tick of existence of the hydrogen atom, then this preceding "forms" (i.e. physical processes) exists before the first time tick of the hydrogen atom.

Sidebar 2 - Notice I've made "there" bold. If there's a "there" before the first time tick of existence of the hydrogen atom, then this preceding "there" (i.e. spacetime) exists before the first time tick of the hydrogen atom.

Main focus:

Once it is there, we know an atom is composed of particular parts. Lets pretend, for simplicities sake, that protons, neutrons, and electrons are fundamental particles. We say, "What causes this atom to exist?" We note the protons, neutrons, and electrons in a particular order. But this is not a prior cause, just the inner causal make up of the atom in general. — Philosophim

If you can posit theoretically the popping into existence of an atom as first cause, why cannot you posit theoretically the popping into existence of a universe as first cause?

In either case, when you categorize the variety of existing things as being unified as one collective thing: a) atom; b) universe, they're all equal (by your own argument above) with respect to temporal primacy of existence.

If there's no reason to partition atom and universe with respect to which collective can be first cause temporally, then first cause in terms of temporal sequencing is meaningless. In other words, existence in general, being first cause, makes the notion of a first cause in terms of temporal sequencing meaningless. Everything that can and does exist popped into existence at the same time.

If, on the other hand, you posit an innate temporal sequence of existing things, with some things not existing in any conceivable way prior to a specific point in one-directional time, then you must ask yourself if positing any first existing thing generates an infinite regress of prior existing things because: a) no existing thing exists in isolation; b) every existing thing is a roadmap to other existing things (i.e. quantum entanglement); c) an existing thing, if divisible, cannot pre-exist that thing's sub-components necessary to its existence. In sum, all of this draws a circle back to saying temporal primacy of existence is meaningless.

"What causes this atom to exist?" We note the protons, neutrons, and electrons in a particular order. But this is not a prior cause, just the inner causal make up of the atom in general. — Philosophim

This is a common sense answer. Let's consider details. A proton is not an atom. Likewise, a neutron is not an atom and, etc. Also, we know that elementary particles combine, split apart into other particles, change orbital shells and, etc. Furthermore, we know atoms combine to form compounds and they combine to form radicals and, etc. All of these phenomena are differentiable. Pretty soon, you've got the entire phenomenal universe as you and I know it today popping into existence as the first cause. But the phenomenal processes I've been describing happen in time. If you remove the time element for an atom, or for a universe, either way the primacy of being first becomes meaningless.

Let's suppose the entire universe is the first cause. If everything has always existed co-temporally, then first cause is meaningless.

Why do you not think the logical necessity of a first cause positions it as an antecedent to the first cause it necessitates?
— ucarr

Could you clarify this with an example? You definitely make good points ucarr, I'm just not quite getting it here. — Philosophim

In this example, logical necessity is, by definition, logically prior to the ontic status of the first cause it necessitates. It is the logical cause of the "first" cause. This is what you're implying with the wording of you OP title: "A First Cause Is Logically Necessary."

You yourself are doing exactly what you say below must not be done:

My point is that there is no way to predict when or how a first cause would form or exist. To say a first cause must form a particular way (e.g. via logical necessity) or is likely to form at a particular time would require a cause outside of itself. — Philosophim

Does any type of priority negate first cause? Is it only temporal priority that negates first cause?

Please give me a functional definition (what it does) and a real-world example (what it is) of the following terminology : a> "end oriented constraints" ; b> "absentially tied" ; c> "Physically compelled strategic constrainsts via design" ; d> "blockchain of nested dynamical systems". — Gnomon

An everyday example of an end-oriented constraint comes in the example of a woman who decides she'll eliminate dairy products from her meals. By constraining her eating behavior to exclude dairy products over an extensive interval of time she drops quite a few pounds, the end her constraint was forwardly directed towards. Weight loss is what it does causally. A non-dairy diet is what it is.

Absential binding is exampled by a controlled burn in a forest. During the spring season at a national park, park staffers do a controlled burn to eliminate dead leaves, tree limbs and debris. During the summer season, park visitors enjoy enhanced safety bound to what's absent, dangerous kindling strategically removed. Hazardous materials removal is what it does. Land clearance is what it is.

A physically compelled strategic constraint via design is exampled by encrypted data communications protecting online money transfers. Transmission of currency value signifiers (bits) via open/closed gate sequences astronomical in their possible permutations proceeds to receptors with matching open/closed gate sequences extremely resistant to random duplication (due to improbability). Biasing towards far from equilibrium probability statistics is what it does. Privatized monetary data is what it is.

Blockchaining of nested dynamical systems is exampled by human metabolism. Ingested food is
broken down from starches to sugars. This thermodynamically released energy in turn is aggregated from the cellular level to a morphodynamic distribution across a network of chemical complexes regulating the major organ systems. Next, the neuronal networks of the brain's hemispheres alert the individual to the slaking of hunger in the presence of a surplus of necessary nutritional supplies. Finally, the teleodynamically empowered feedback looping of the brain's memory modules informs the individual of his happy feeling while resting before going to bed. Vertical stacking of higher-orders of Shannon Information is what it does. A successfully prepared supper is what it is.

...a photon can appear without any velocity — Philosophim

Do you dispute that a photon with rest mass entails infinite quantities, and that equations describing practical situations break down upon approach to functions with infinite input/output values?

A first cause may be already in motion.. — Philosophim

Why is it not the case that if a first cause instantiates already in motion, then spacetime, mass_energy, velocity and a host of other physical fundamentals (spin, charge, up/down quarkiness, color, charm, etc.) co-exist with it, thus stripping it of being "first?"

More generally, how can something be first cause if its essential makeup entails differentiable constituent components co-equal in primary status?

Does this thought suggest to you a first cause as abstract concept must be a pure singularity and, as such, exists as a conceptual limit approachable only through mind via imagination?

Why do you not think the logical necessity of a first cause positions it as an antecedent to the first cause it necessitates?

...a first cause would be a Y with no other X entity as its cause for existence. — Philosophim

Why do you not say a first cause is Y & ~Y in superposition? I ask this particular question with the assumption that a first cause must instantiate motion.

If motion is essential to a first cause no less so than to its effects, then said first cause must be self-transcendent. If self-transcendence entails change of position, then first cause must paradoxically encompass itself and the negation of itself in a state of superposition placing the contradictions in two places at once. Superposition is then, by my argument here, the means by which a first cause (presumably a single) effects essential motion.

A question is whether a self-transcendent cause in superposition is paradoxically a first cause and not a first cause due to the bi-directional, paradoxical causation of the two iterations of a single self vis-a-vis itself.

Do you agree that causation is the natural form of shape-shifting within the our phenomenal world of material things?

In that moment, that duplicate, even if qualitatively identical to you, is numerically distinct. Therefore, that someone else gets to live your life is slim comfort in the face of the fact that you will be killed. — hypericin

Yes. It seems to me that duplication entails splitting.

No. Kirk wasn't also split. Kirk was split. Riker was not. Two entirely different scenarios.

Kirk was, indeed, split in two. His yin and yang halves were separated.

Riker was duplicated. — Patterner

Are you sure duplicating doesn't entail splitting?

If you duplicate a man without simultaneously splitting him, in the Newtonian scenario you have identical copies synchronized. Has any human seen this in 3D?

If you duplicate a man without simultaneously splitting him, in the QM scenario you have upwardly energized that man into superposition. In that situation, meeting one or the other duplicate means being in one or the other of two alternate realities. Moreover, these alternate realities, with respect to the duplicates (whatever that is) are indistinguishable. So, when one duplicate is met, the other duplicate collapses, and vice-versa. Now you have branching trajectories of multiple witnesses who are necessarily paradoxically lying about the simultaneous identical yet differential circumstances of meeting one or the other duplicates, both equally and identically yet differentially true.

If you duplicate the man and simultaneously split him, one man being in one place and moving about out of sync with the other man being in another place and also moving about out of sync with the first it's clear they are extremely similar in form and content but not duplicates. As they continue to be in different places having different experiences, even as the same man they, like twins, will continue to grow apart.

Furthermore, the observing mind-brain-body is physically entangled with the object of its observation — ucarr

I say that mind in philosophical thought exists emergent from brain-body. I think this position lies closer to the truth than the position claiming mind in philosophical thought exists independent from brain-body.

That's why I prefer to avoid getting tangled-up in materialistic physics, on a forum designed for discussion of meta-physics. The object of a physical experiment is a material Object, external to the Brain, but the object of mental "observation" is a Subject, internal to the Mind. — Gnomon

Your above quote expresses the crux of our disagreement about the correct approach to practicing philosophy. You say, "Do philosophy by avoiding materialistic physics." I say, "Do philosophy by embracing materialistic physics."

I think you're ensnared within a self-defeating struggle in your efforts to straddle materialistic science and metaphysical philosophy. That's your actual approach to doing philosophy: inhabit the middle position, not avoidance. I cite the following as an example of the most recent evidence of this internal conflict:

The "Hard Problem" of consciousness is only made more complicated by including the entangled neurons in the definition of Mind. Unfortunately, the philosophy of Materialism does not allow us to make such categorical distinctions. — Gnomon

You want to make metaphysical discoveries about abstract thought while skipping over the discoveries of neuroscience? This attitude parallels an automotive engineer saying, "Hey, man. Those mechanics with their heads stuck under a hood can't tell me anything."

inferred Photons — Gnomon

or

infra-red Photons — Gnomon

...the photons, while moving at lightspeed are massless, and electrons are both non-local and massless while "flowing". — Gnomon

I see online that photons are paradoxical with regard to their wave/particle status. Speaking paradoxically, photons are matter without mass. As you know, they don't exist at rest.

Electrons have mass and they're only stationary at wavelength infinity, so under natural conditions electrons are matter with mass.

So, in its (photon) normal invisible & massless state, does it qualify as materially Absent"? — Gnomon

Photons and electrons, being particles, hold place as parts of presential materialism.

The strategic constraints of upwardly evolving dynamical processes, in contrast to photons and electrons, exemplify absential materialism.

The neuronal circuitry of the brain, acting as the platform for the mind, connects with the furture states of being of end-directed design through physically caused contraints on higher-order dynamics. These constraints are contra-grade forces impelling emergence of mind, a dynamical process substrated by but independent from brain.

Let me make a distinction between materially absent and materially absential. The difference is parallel to the difference between 2 - x versus 2i = 0 + 2i. In verbal grammar this is the difference between something simply distanced, as in the first example versus something distanced-yet-complexly-connected, as in the second example. — ucarr

The mind, like an imaginary number, has a distanced-yet-complexly-connected-with-its- base relationship: imaginary number to real number and mind to brain. In both instances, the distanced thing, because it has parameters that violate its substrate, seems therefore necessarily separate from it and thus the perplexing bifurcation of things implicitly connected. Understanding emergence as a phenomenon that imparts category transgression within the domain of inter-dependence between the transgressor and the transgressed lies at the heart of understanding absential materialism.

I'm gradually coming to realize that Materialism is an unprovable metaphysical Axiom (presumption), not an empirical scientific Theory (inference from facts). It's more of an attitude or belief than a fact. So, I guess I can't expect such beliefs to make sense in an objective manner. — Gnomon

So, you think materialism is objectively non-sensical.

Terrence Deacon said "Materialism, the view that there are only material things and their interactions in the world, seems impotent here" {my emphasis}. He also referred to “the antimaterialist claim” that “like meanings & purposes, consciousness may not be something there in any typical sense of being materially or energetically embodied, and yet may still be materially causally relevant” p7.{my bold} — Gnomon

Your concept of Absential Materialism may be related to the notion of “materially relevant”. :smile: — Gnomon

Since we both agree on the material relevance of thought, again I say we're not far apart in our beliefs. I further think thought absentially material whereas you hold fast at thinking thought materially relevant.

I can provisionally agree with the first part of your assertion above : "mental functions are dependent on material things" ; but not with the second part : "because they {mental functions} too are material things, albeit absentially". How can something "absential" be material? Isn't Presence an essential element of the definition of "material" — Gnomon

Consider the modulated EM-field that populates your tv screen with audio-visual phenomena. Does the EM-field have presence within your den? How about when the tv set is off. Does the EM-field still have presence within your den? Now, let's take a step further from the foggy presence of a waveform energy field to the absential presence of an absence strategically constrained by the design intent of a teleodynamic process compelling the strategic absence via its physicality. We have a physical system propagating through physical spacetime towards a desired future state of being.

Deacon's "absence" seems to be a commonsense reference to the philosophical concept of "potential". — Gnomon

potential | pəˈten(t)SH(ə)l |
adjective [attributive]
having or showing the capacity to become or develop into something in the future: a two-pronged campaign to woo potential customers. — Apple Dictionary

If my argument above your last quote has truth content, then it applies here also.

Life is a function of Causation in a material substrate. — Gnomon

But those Absential products are not made of Presential matter. So, my question is not about the walnut-shaped Vessel, but about the contents we call Mind : the "Substance" or "Essence" of subjective Ideas, as defined by Aristotle*3. — Gnomon

In a functional relationship, there's an operator that transforms input into output. For sentients with minds generating abstractions, they, no less than the other orders of life, function with the operator as the nested hierarchy of self-organizing dynamical processes articulated by Deacon. Furthermore, the observing mind-brain-body is physically entangled with the object of its observation. Still furthermore, the medium propagating the object/observer relationship is material-physical spacetime. Absential materialism, possessing both properties of waves and of particles, presents itself as a knot of complexity fostering the-glass-is-half-full-half-empty debates.

In what meaningful sense are Abstract Nouns*1, such as Absence, Function, and Causation, referring to material things, and not to ideas about things or processes? Of course, mental abstractions are dependent on a material Brain, but scientifically, their referents have no objective material substance, only subjective meaning. It's the material stuff that is Absent or Absential. — Gnomon

If end-oriented constraints compel self-organizing reciprocal processes, with constraint bottom-up and supervenience top-down, then the physical products of these nested processes of higher-order dynamics are absentially tied to these absent contraints because without them, these products wouldn't exist. Physically compelled strategic constrainsts via design constructs the bridge linking physical dynamics with physical things. This blockchain of interwoven dynamical causes examples absence, i.e., non-physicality causally linked to physicality.

This seeming break between mind and body is in reality absential materialism. Below is Deacon's blockchain of nested dynamical systems bi-directionally linked across space and time:

The dynamical reflexivity and constraint closure that characterizes a teleodynamic system, whether constituting intraneuronal processes or the global-signaling dynamics developing within an
entire brain, creates an internal/external self/other distinction that is determined by this dynamical closure. Its locus is ultimately something not materially present—a self-creating system of constraints with the capacity to do work to maintain its dynamical continuity—and yet it provides a precise dynamical boundedness.

The sentience at each level is implicit in the capacity to do self-preservative work, as this constitutes the system’s sensitivity to non-self influences via an intrinsic tendency to generate a self-sustaining contragrade dynamics. This tendency to generate self-preserving work with respect to such influences is a spontaneous defining characteristic of such reciprocity of constraint creation. Closure and autonomy are thus the very essence of sentience. But they are also the reason that higher-order sentient teleogenic systems can be constituted of lower-order teleogenic systems, level upon level, and yet produce level-specific emergent forms of sentience that are both irreducible and unable to be entirely merged into larger conglomerates.2 It is teleogenic closure that produces sentience but also isolates it, creating the fundamental distinction between self and other, whether at a neuronal level or a mental level.

You seem to have been confused between your mind and the objects of your perception. — Corvus

A visual artist walks a country road early morning one day. Through the light, blue-gray fog he sees the dark-spotted, white "blanket" at the center flank of an Appaloosa. It's running circles around the paddock in a frolic with neighing.

Come evening, the artist finishes a charcoal sketch of the morning Appaloosa just as his wife comes into his studio with news of supper being ready. She praises his work by way of commenting upon the vitality of the captured image.

He smiles at her. "I have a sticky mind for pretty pictures, my dear. Especially for horses at daybreak. Something smells good. Roast beef?" He puts his arm around her as they stroll towards the kitchen. Glancing back to the studio, she smiles, looking at her charcoal portrait next to the Appaloosa. "Now that you've got me just right, and the horse just right, maybe we should go down to that ranch and buy that horse."

Hecuba, Hesperia’s mother, stands up from the gathering and the elder dares not deny her the floor.

“Please, grand dam, speak to us.”

“It’s clear to me the looking glass favors no one beyond the person it happens to reflect upon in the moment.” — ucarr

What you see and hear, the content of your perception is not your mind. — Corvus

At the dinner table, between mouthfuls of roast beef slathered with horseradish, he makes an admission to her. "You know, the grain of my charcoal pencil is too coarse. The appaloosa has a much finer coat. But there's no way to change the grain of my pencil, so I had to rough up the appaloosa." She comforts him. "Well now, that's not to worry about. Roughing up the appaloosa makes a pretty visual."

Observer Effect

...your incumbent job is to define what mind is. What does mind mean to you? Please define. — Corvus

The curious villager comes forward. "It's you duty to tell what you believe about mind."

"Narrative holds up a mirror to nature." -- Shakespeare

Chorus:

The speed of light is constant. It’s absolute in its velocity. All other velocities refer to it.

Photons have no rest mass. Light is the animation of the universe. All other animations refer to it.

The popular question is “What?” The mysterious question is “How?”
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The elder, after venturing across the lake to the far island of the mysterious, flashing lights, returns to his village. He carries a large, rectangular shape underneath a sackcloth.

After supper, the villagers gather round the elder for the unveiling of the gift from the far island, now held for hours of painful suspense underneath the sackcloth.

The elder calls on Glaucon, his favorite student, to come forth before the gathering inside the cave and remove the sackcloth.

Upon doing so, the villagers start gasping with excitement as they see images of themselves on the surface of the looking glass just unveiled.

Andrew, Glaucon’s friend, exclaims, “I see a man who moves just as I move.”

Hesperia, arriving just as the sun behind her is deepest gold, answers Andrew. “You are looking upon yourself.”

“I am in that shiny surface?”

“You are,” the elder explains.

Glaucon, suddenly jealous, shoves aside Andrew and now his image inhabits the shiny surface.

Before long, a gaggle of men fight amongst themselves for a place in the shiny surface.

Sebastian, clever and observant, exclaims “It is the lake, the deity that gives us our fishing, made solid. Have we not seen shadows moving just as we move in the daylight water?”

The elder spoke up. “Not shadows, but rather reflections, just like you see in the daylight water.”

Hesperia chimed in. “But this lake become solid doesn’t let us see through our doubles down to the lakebed below.”

“Listen to me, students. Our gift, from the dwellers on the island across the lake, has a name. They call it a looking glass. It has a special magic that lets you look backwards at yourself. When it looks at the sun, it makes you look backwards at the great source of life. The blinding lights from across the lake have us looking backwards at the sun.”

Hesperia laughs when Glaucon, turning around and facing her, exclaims, “I can’t see myself by looking backwards!”

When the elder beckons her to come to the front and stand beside him, she obliges him.

“Hesperia, gaze into our looking glass and tell us who it favors within itself.” The elder keeps his stern gaze upon her as she stands there suddenly affrighted.

“The cave grows quiet as she contemplates the reflection of herself for a long time.

Andrew can’t hold his peace any longer. “Hesperia, most beautiful maiden of all! The looking glass favors you!”

The elder next beckons Daphne, the cook still wearing her bloody apron, to come forward. She too gazes at her reflection for a long time.

Hecuba, Hesperia’s mother, stands up from the gathering and the elder dares not deny her the floor.

“Please, grand dam, speak to us.”

“It’s clear to me the looking glass favors no one beyond the person it happens to reflect upon in the moment.”

The elder, delighted, smiles, nodding his approval. “Yes, Lady Hecuba. You speak truth.”

After Hecuba seats herself, the elder makes his move. “Who can tell us something about the looking glass most memorable?”

Glaucon rises to the occasion. “The looking glass favors no one.”

“Anyone else care to speak?”

Hesperia rises. “The looking glass, if it has time enough, will favor everything in creation that might be looked upon.”

The elder is now very excited. “Who else can speak?”

Daphne’s voice suddenly starts intoning. “The looking glass wants to take a journey throughout all of creation! It wants to see everything.”

Hecuba rises. “A journey throughout all of creation? That’s a journey without an ending.”

Now the elder is ready to deliver the closer. “Consider a journey without an ending. It is constant, moving at the speed of possibility, and it never rests. It’s not primarily concerned with what to look at, but rather how to look at. And what does it tell us about how to look at?”

Glaucon has the last word. “Look at everything.”
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Chorus:

When looking glass looks at looking glass, not only is what they see not local, it’s not localizable.

...if you closed your eyes and blocked your ears, then you don't see, and you can't hear. Does it mean that you become a mindless when you closed your eyes and blocked your ears? — Corvus

Seeds for the crop were planted on the island. Shortly thereafter, the local volcano erupted, sending great spews of lava high into the air accompanied by boulders, rocks and volcanic ash. For months the atmosphere darkened the island, blotting out the sun. Villagers took to the caves with their animal skins and last season's stocks of grain and vegetables.

Eventually, mid-season for planting, strong ocean currents carried off the volcanic ash blighting the islands growing season. Turned up soil revealed dead seeds succumbed to the lack of the sun's regulation of soil temperature. Crops already growing prior to the eruption, unsupported for weeks in their photo-synthetic production of sugar by direct sunlight, withered and paled, providing but meager food. These were the minority of stalwart growths; most had died.

The high priests were busy with offerings to the sun gods accompanied by loud chantings and throbbing drum beats. Inspired by the efforts of the holy, farmers planted pale, withered seeds into the warming soil, looking skywards with hope.

Dahlbach, the village outcast, given to rantings about the unreliable gods and their wanton inclinations, launched into daily rants about the need to banish the gods and replace them with his solution to the problem of crops: farming inside of caves, where termperature control is easier. The villagers, sympathetic to the misfortunes caused by madness, made sure he ate his meager rations along with everyone else. Dahlbach, risen to his imaginary bully pulpit of woven palm fronds, his belly full of donated grain, bellyached in loud voice: "I banish your false gods! In this cave I will bring fertile soil and plant seed. With torches I'll keep the soil warm, because a seed can't sprout without the sun, and the torch will be the sun. You say the sun is not here in the cave? No, it's not. I shall pretend it is here in the cave with my torches. You say the sun is unapproachable. You remind me of the fate of Icarus, whose wax wings melted during his flight towards the sun, sending him to his death below. I shall approach the sun in the cave. No, I shall not find the sun. Who can find the sun without finding death first? Instead, I shall chase the sun with my torches, pretending to be the sun I can never find."

Here's Robert Lawrence Kuhn interviewing David Chalmers on Closer To Truth. The Australian mathematician, physicist, philosopher runs through a list of materialisms examining why none of them work with respect to consciousness. If I'm not mistaken, he concludes with a theory of consciousness that sounds similar to what Penrose and Hameroff are working on: within each active neuron there's a moment when its QM waveform collapses; that's when subjectivity makes its appearance at the micro-scale within the human brain.

...I assumed that we had something in common, besides accepting the dependence of mental functions on material mechanisms. — Gnomon

Mental functions are dependent on material things because they too are material things, albeit absentially.

Idealism can only be defended with metaphors and rational arguments, but no appeals to the authority of empirical Science. That's because Ideas (per se) are materially Absent, and cannot be explained by any traditional physical mechanism. — Gnomon

Let me make a distinction between materially absent and materially absential. The difference is parallel to the difference between 2 - x versus 2i = 0 + 2i. In verbal grammar this is the difference between something simply distanced, as in the first example versus something
distanced-yet-complexly-connected, as in the second example.

Emergent functions from material processes cannot be observed empirically, but must be inferred theoretically. — Gnomon

This is true when the emergent functions are themselves material, albeit absentially.

I know you're not all in on Idealism, but you seem to be invested in the immaterial status of philosophical ideas, especially those considered metaphysical.

Our disagreement boils down to whether you can show how ideas, beyond occupying the thinking space of philosophers, have causal impact upon material things. There's no problem if you, like me, acknowledge ideas are, ultimately, connected to physical_material things via self-organizing dynamical systems. There's only a problem is you insist on understanding ideas in terms of:

Idealism can only be defended with metaphors and rational arguments, but no appeals to the authority of empirical Science. That's because Ideas (per se) are materially Absent, and cannot be explained by any traditional physical mechanism. — Gnomon

If you repeat your argument about energetic, potential enformaction en route to becoming enformation with the power of Wheeler's it from bit, I'll acknowledge that's your bridge from idea to material whereas I see it as physical_material across the entire spectrum.

So, the only important difference between us is that you see ideas are materially absent whereas I see that ideas are materially absential.

When you say "the mind", it must have a referent that "the mind" is referring to. — Corvus

You say the mind must have a referent it is referring to? And if it doesn't?

But if you say the stories that your hear, and the world you see is "the mind itself", it just doesn't make sense. Because when you closed your eyes or bloked your ears, you lose all your mind. You don't see or hear anything. You become a mindless. Do you? Really? — Corvus

You say when you are blocked off from the world you are mindless? You say when you are blocked off from the world and mindless you don't see or hear anything? When you do see and hear things, it's because you have a mind in contact with the world?

Someone light a Roman Candle! Make the black sky bright with light! Corvus is starting to get me.

Ok, let's suppose that is the case. How does it explain your mind and the body problems? — Corvus

"...the mind", it must have a referent that "the mind" is referring to. — Corvus

...when you closed your eyes or bloked your ears, you lose all your mind. You don't see or hear anything. You become a mindless. Do you? Really? — Corvus

You've already answered your question in your own words.

It seems to be your futile tactics to revert back to some poetic nonsense, when you have no idea what you were even asking about. — Corvus

What do they have anything to do with the knowledge of your mind? — Corvus

The boy returned to the old man. He was always sitting under the baobab tree. It was during the highest heat of the day when young Jabari would go to him, perplexed and angry with questions he couldn’t answer. “Why won’t old man Davu give me direct answers when I ask him questions?” he wondered, thoroughly vexed. Now, instead of going away puzzled and furious, he would confront him. “Why don’t you just tell me directly what I want to know?” Davu, calm and unperturbed by Jabari’s vehemence, took a long time to respond, saying finally, “It’s no good my talking to you directly. That is my mind. You have your own mind. When it sees the world directly, or sees the world through a story, you must learn to listen when you hear it talking to itself.”

So, if you are watching TV comedy show, then is the TV comedy show your mind? — Corvus

If it walks like a duck and squawks like a duck it must be a duck.

If you close your eyes, then you see nothing but darkness. Is the darkness your mind? — Corvus

The new born pup lost its bitch getting born, but the little girl took the dying whelp to her bed and her warm stomach. Next morning the pup squealed from under the covers vivid with life and a new, two-legged mother.

Are you claiming, then a blind man has no mind? — Corvus

The blind flower girl touched the little tramp’s face carefully, telling him his day would be a good one. She knew this she explained by telling him she could see his smile. Puzzled, he asked her, “How do you know I’m smiling? You’ve never seen a smile.” Smiling, she said, “Here at the flower stand I see smiles because I perceive with eyes forever closed.”

Are you claiming, then a blind man has no mind? — Corvus

You’re driving in your car. You suddenly stop at a green lit intersection where you see a blind man in dark glasses slowly making his way through the crosswalk. Do you conclude the blind man has no mind?

That sounds like your visual perception. Are you sure it is the existence of your mind itself? — Corvus

Apart from my mind, where is my… perception?

So, you are claiming that you can perceive the mind.
What is the shape and colour of your mind? — Corvus

When I awoke this morning, looking up through my concave skylight, I saw a palette of swirling, subtle grays hovering like thought-balloons with glowing, white cracks of lightning.

As I leaned over the side of the bed and looked down I saw my black leather slippers with roasted- cashew feet slipping into them.

Since mind is different substance from matter, you can say, you simply have no mental capacity to perceive the mind itself. — Corvus

You’re claiming the mind cannot perceive itself?

Must I conclude you’ve never examined your own thoughts?

If you counter by saying, “I’m talking about the mind that’s doing the perceiving, not the thoughts it perceives.” then you can’t make any claims about the mind being material, immaterial, etc.

So, if the mind can perceive its thoughts but not itself, then you also can’t make any claims about thoughts being material, immaterial, etc.

Alas, if you don’t know the nature of a cause, then you don’t know the nature of its effect.

If a mind can know neither itself nor its thoughts, how can you call it a mind?

This claim begs the question: Do abstract concepts exist independent of minds contemplating them? — ucarr

No. Why do you ask? Are you trying to determine if I am a Platonic Idealist, like Kastrup? He makes some good arguments for Idealism as prior to Real, but I'm not so sure. The term "to exist" has multiple meanings. — Gnomon

Since you agree concepts do not exist independent of the minds contemplating them, I now know we agree on something important to both of us. My use of “exist” simply means “dwell in a real state of being” public, measurable and repeatable.

The only thing we know for sure is our own ideas (solipsism paradox). But we can infer, and collectively agree as a convention, that there is a reality out there conforming to our individual imaginary concepts. — Gnomon

Perhaps I’m mis-reading your answer to my question up top. I thought you were agreeing that “out there” for concepts is the mind contemplating them. If you think your own ideas get their confirmation from inference and social convention, and if you think concepts are mental constructs only credible from suppositions they have independent referents outside the mind contemplating them, then I ask you to name the extra-mental, supposed loci for your concepts.

My concept of Causation applies only to Philosophy. I don't do Chemistry or Physics. — Gnomon

Chemistry and physics are a part of life in general. How does you philosophy have value without application to life in general?

Your questions indicate that you still don't understand what Enformationism is all about. It's a philosophical model of reality, not a scientific description of materiality. — Gnomon

Newton's Principia Mathematica refers to ideal abstractions, not to agents or material things. — Gnomon

The above quotes show the extreme difference between your work and Newton’s. Newton’s mathematical abstractions notwithstanding, his corpus of work in physics has many useful applications to the everyday world of life in general. Can you say the same about your work? I ask this question because philosophy, in order to be useful, guides applied science with grammatical precepts that inform the objectives and methodologies of applied science. For example, Cartesian substance dualism by circuitous route lead to the Turing test which, in turn, guided the computational approach to both solid state computing and neuro-science mapping of brain functions.

You continue to blockade and avoid the hard work of rigorous scientific scholarship and practice by artificially partitioning philosophy from the sciences. Legitimate philosophy doesn’t hold itself aloof from science.

I know you disagree with my assessment and believe your voluminous quotations from scientific ideas and concepts prove me wrong. I know you won’t change your method of procedure.

I’m writing these words as instruction to myself. Do my philosophical claims participate in the work of science? Do they show any promise as guides to scientific practice? Well, I know the interaction of two gravitational fields can be measured scientifically. I also know Penrose and Hammerof are exploring the collapse of the wave function within neuronal cells and surmising this collapse is the inflection point wherein subjectivity emerges. Does the graviton participate in the wave function and thus also in its collapse? Quantum gravity might have something instructive to say in response to this question. I, in distancing myself from your method of procedure, must not artificially partition my work from the work of scientists. I must not claim the status of metaphysical inquiries as cover to protect me from scientific facts that seem to contradict my claims.

…the notion of "Causality" or "Causation" is more of a general philosophical concept than a specific physical phenomenon, in that it implies both Agency (executive) and Efficacy (ability). — Gnomon

Do you think causation as a concept separable from interactions between physical and material things?

Do you make your claim of causation being primarily philosophical in application to: a) chemistry; b) elementary particle physics?

I consider the equation of "Information" (power to inform) and "Causation" (energy) to be more philosophically insightful. — Gnomon

I understand this sentence as a reference to Wheeler’s “It from bit.” Do you think information: a) an agent of material things; b) a material aspect of material things?

How do you think the Pythagorean Theorem was discovered/ confirmed if not by observation and measurement? — Janus

:up: :smile:

Do abstract concepts exist independent of minds contemplating them? — ucarr

I would turn the question around, and ask if 'the law of the excluded middle' or 'the Pythagorean theorem' came into existence when humans first grasped them. It seems to me the answer is 'obviously not', that they would be discovered by rational sentient beings in other worlds, were they to have evolved. Yet they are the kinds of primitive concepts which constitute the basic furniture of reason.

Albert Einstein said
I cannot prove scientifically that Truth must be conceived as a Truth that is valid independent of humanity; but I believe it firmly. I believe, for instance, that the Pythagorean theorem in geometry states something that is approximately true, independent of the existence of man.

I think that is true, but that it's also true that while the theorem might exist independently of man, it can only be understood by humans. So it's mind-independent, on one hand, but only perceptible to a mind, on the other. — Wayfarer

Here’s how I turn the question around and then pair it with the first form of the question:

Do minds contemplating abstract concepts exist independent of their objects of contemplation?
AND
Do abstract concepts exist independent of minds contemplating them?

Now we have a real doozy of an obverse couplet. My answer to the question observed in both configurations is no. The two are never independent of each other. Deacon’s central theme is the spacetimatical connection linking consciousness with its subjects and vice versa.

Imagine the race of Numerians exist a billion years before advent of humans. The Numerians become aware of the Pythagorean Theorem and then eventually go extinct. Does the Pythagorean Theorem exist before the advent of the Numerians? Depends. If another, still more antecedent race pre-dating the Numerians exists, then yes. If not, meaning no minds in existence anywhere, then no. After extinction of the Numerians, does the Pythagorean Theorem exist? Depends. If another conscious race intermediary to the Numerians and human exists, then yes. If not, meaning no minds in existence anywhere, then no. I trust you see the logical pattern I’m expressing here. It’s the bi-conditional, logical operator.

A <> B, with A = Mind and B = Pythagorean Theorem. A if and only if B (and vice versa).

Abstract truth as language is an emergent property of conscious minds. It’s the grammar of the structure of existence for conscious minds. As a structural overview, it holds logical priority over material things, albeit a logical priority constrained by the existential fact of the existence of said material things.

Abstract truth and material things are co-eternal, temporally speaking.

Is Potential temporally prior to Actual, or is Potential timeless and Actual time-bound?* — Gnomon

However, philosophical principles are imaginary concepts, and not subject to the ravages of Time. — Gnomon

This claim begs the question: Do abstract concepts exist independent of minds contemplating them?

As I’ve suggestd already, I think metaphysics (as existential grammar) and nature are co-eternal. When a metaphysical description of a physical phenomenon frames it within a general structure, such as your claim energy has for its chief property causation, its an articulation of a conscious mind drawing upon what’s evidentially implied through the action of the phenomenon.

When science frames natural phenomena scientifically, viz. affords experimental statistics coupled with description of phenomena measurable, repeatable and public, it puts on a demonstration of abstractable principles co-temporal with the phenomena. Trying to claim abstract principles have independent existence from their grounding phenomena ignores the fact minds doing the abstracting are likewise grounded in brain phenomena.

I’m not charging you with making this erroneous claim of mental independence from brain because it’s not yet clear to me from your language whether you think that or not. Your staunch allegiance to shape-shifting between modes physical/non-physical, with the complication of in-betweenness distanced from both polarities, makes for a difficult stew of isms.

*Do you think time separable from phenomena?

Energy's primary property is Causation. — Gnomon

Can you elaborate further your insightful characterization of energy as causation?

Mass-energy changing form under conservation - definitely a physical phenomenon - expresses as a transformation dynamo. What can you tell us about the QM version of causation?

Sidebar - Perhaps a particular analysis of this characterization can empower us to use $e = mc^2$ as a guide for building instead of destroying. Visualizing blockchains of causal sequences as a waveform with probability attached and statistically analyzable reads like global economics.

…when I talk about a metaphysical Causal Principle (e.g. Energy) producing changes in Matter, I place it in a philosophical category more like metaphysical Essence (identity ; meaning). That's because Potential/Energy/Essence has no material properties : mass, hardness, plasticity. Energy's primary property is Causation. So, I'm making a philosophical distinction, not a scientific classification. — Gnomon

Does Deacon teach us that metaphysical principles are logically but not temporally prior to the natural world? Should we understand that spirit and nature are co-eternal?

Under Deacon’s influence I’ve learned to speculate temporal direction in application to the mind/body problem might be significant rather than trivial. You talk of metaphysical principles being causal. Might it be more correct to say metaphysical principles describe causation?

When an elementary particle decays into two of its constituent particles, physicists don’t typically characterize this event as being metaphysics in action. No, this transformation is unambiguous as a physical process. On the other hand, sound reasoning within philosophy of science may very well describe particle decay in terms of a general structure governing all forms of particle decay. That would be a description of a type of patterned particle decay. If philosophy of science thinkers, digging deeper, discover that patterned particle decay bespeaks the essential nature of science across all of its disciplines, then perhaps that would be a metaphysical description of foundational scientific truth. To say metaphysical statements, in of themselves, cause physical processes mischaracterizes metaphysics. It’s a blurry confusion of language and its meaning with physical processes.

That self-organizing processes working through nested tiers of upwardly evolving dynamics lead a trail of interconnection from it to bit seems to me, per the brilliant analysis of Deacon, foundational truth.

The revelation is that physical processes and their grammar of existence I.e., metaphysics, are all of one piece temporally speaking. The metaphysical description of physical processes has no causal force whatsoever. Instead, physical processes transpire, brains and minds emerge and, eventually, grammatical descriptions of the physical processes instantiate as language.

Metaphysical understandings of physical truths are logically prior to physical processes as interpretive overviews of types of physical processes and their interrelations.

I am more in the direction of a dualist. A dualist accepts both mind and matter as different substance, like from Descartes. Hence I acknowledge matter exists as material substance, and mind exists as mental substance. — Corvus

If I read you correctly, you say you’re in the direction of a Cartesian substance dualist; you say matter exists as material substance and mind exists as mental substance. Moreover, as I read your implication, you’re implying with your attacks upon absential materialism that, regarding material substance and mental substance, never the twain shall meet.

If I’m correctly reading the core of your counter to my thesis, you’re arguing that interweaving material substance with mental substance towards a non-local materialism that situates cognition and rational designs within material substance and yet with mental substance as an emergent, radically quasi-independent property is a stillborn thesis.

You have made an important declaration that establishes your stance in this conversation:

Please bear in mind that all meanings are mental, logical and conceptual, viz NON MATERIAL and NON PHYSICAL even if they are the product of the physical brain. — Corvus

Now I juxtapose your stance with your below declaration:

No I don't think I was going on sentiment at all. I was just letting the OP know why he was confused when he posts an addlepated questions like "
If your brain were removed from your cranium, would you be using your hands to type messages to me?
— ucarr
, when I have never denied the existence of brain for the precondition of mind. — Corvus

I assert the last part of your declaration (in bold) shows your substance dualism at the point where the rubber meets the road and complexity enters the situation. I further assert that with advent of this complexity, you make a close approach to acknowledgement of the truth of Deacon’s core belief that mind emerged from matter.

The core issue of this conversation is articulation of the structure of connection linking mind with matter in the mode of Deacon’s theme: that mind emerged from matter. This clause declares the interweave connecting matter and mind.

In your stance, you declare a hard boundary between material substance and mental substance. Your job now is to articulate with maximum precision of detail the structure wherein brain, albeit being a precondition of mind, nonetheless inhabits a structure featuring a hard partitioning of brain from mind. Per your stance as a hard-boundary dualist, you must explain a structure wherein the hard-partitioning (like parallellism) of brain/mind at the same time features brain as a precondition for mind.

Here he's expressing the idea that physics itself has undermined physicalism, insofar as this was conceived as being reliant on the existence of 'ultimate objects'. Instead, it suggests a process-oriented approach associated with "waves of probability" — Wayfarer

…how this can be described as materialism escapes me. — Wayfarer

You perceive kinship between spirit and probable particles neighboring about a cloud of positions? Does the nature of spirit insist it be not too hard of boundary nor too discrete in location?

Regarding how this can be materialism, you have an answer below with interacting dynamical processes that mutually constrain in the mode of a distributed waveform .

… anything that exists does so as a consequence of the adaption of bottom up processes to top-down constraints. — Terrence W. Deacon

The other subtle point is that constraints themselves, which are central to his model, are top-down by nature. Top-down constraints impose order and coherence within a system by providing a framework or set of rules that guide the behavior of its parts. They are essential for ensuring that the system functions in a coherent and organized manner. In his model, anything that exists does so as a consequence of the adaption of bottom up processes to top-down constraints. — Wayfarer

Does Deacon teach us that metaphysical principles are logically but not temporally prior to the natural world? Should we understand that spirit and nature are co-eternal?

I believe that only by working from the bottom up, tracing the ascent from thermodynamics to morphodynamics to teleodynamics and their recapitulation in the dynamics of brain function, will we be able to explain the place of our subjective experience (mind and its thoughts)* in this otherwise largely insentient universe. — Terrence W. Deacon

*Parenthetical clarification inserted by ucarr.

Deacon makes it clear beyond doubt he endorses bottom-up causation from the material to the absentially material i.e., towards mind and its intentions.

Reframing the concept of sentience in emergent dynamical terms will allow us to address questions that are not often considered to be subject to empirical neuroscientific analysis. Contrary to many of my neuroscience colleagues, I believe that these phenomena are entirely available to scientific investigation once we discover how they emerge from lower-level teleodynamic, morphodynamic, and thermodynamic processes. Even the so-called hard problem of consciousness will turn out to be reconceptualized in these terms. This is because what appeared to make it hard was our predisposition to frame it in mechanistic and computational terms, presuming that its intentional content must be embodied in some material or energetic substrate. As a result, the vast majority of descriptions of brain function tend to be framed in terms that not only fail to make the connection between the cellular-molecular processes at one extreme and the intentional features of mental experience at the other; they effectively pretend that making sense of this relationship is irrelevant to brain function. — Terrence W. Deacon

…I have never denied the existence of brain for the precondition of mind. — Corvus

As a favor to me, can you respond to this post by talking about the operations of mind as they relate to brain as a precondition of mind? Immediately below I’ve quoted Wayfarer in order to explain why I’m asking this favor of you.

The bottom-up account of such entities (minds and their thoughts) is that they are the product of lower-level processes, beginning at the level of physical and chemical interactions, which evolve in such a way as to give h. sapiens the ability to produce such ideas. This is the mainstream consensus.

Deacon is concerned with just this issue. How intentional acts can have physical consequences, even though intentionality itself is not accomodated by physicalist accounts. That is the explanatory gap he's wanting to bridge. — Wayfarer

Do thoughts exist outside of the minds thinking them?

Do minds exist outside of the brains substrating them? — ucarr

The bottom-up account of such entities is that they are the product of lower-level processes, beginning at the level of physical and chemical interactions…

Deacon is concerned with just this issue. How intentional acts can have physical consequences, even though intentionality itself is not accomodated by physicalist accounts. That is the explanatory gap he's wanting to bridge.

I'm more open to the platonist perspective on this question that Deacon says he is. — Wayfarer

I think you give an excellent summary of Deacon’s purpose in Incomplete Mind.

I disagree somewhat with your characterization of bottom-up, physicalist causation as a process that renders the mind and its thoughts as products. Deacon provides a detailed analysis of nested, self-organizing, dynamical processes that create upwardly evolving, strategic constraints towards mind and its end-directed intentions. As an emergent property of physical substrates, mind is something quite beyond an automatic product. It has materially grounded parameters that afford it an agency distinct from the automatic mechanization of the more strictly material dynamics supporting it. Cartesian freedom, albeit limited by physical parameters, holds place among real things.

Top-Down Causation

Is top-down causation from mind to brain a process that includes an inflection point where immaterial mind makes causal contact with material things?

We’re examining a question much deeper than personal preference between equivalent options. We’re looking at whether or not top-down causation from immaterial mind holds place among real things.

Established top-down causation from emergent mind is exampled by Deacon’s triumvirate of teleodynamics_morphodynamics_thermodynamics. This chain of dynamics, being bi-directional, also includes bottom-up causation going in the opposite direction.

Likewise, emergent mind can run top-down to brain, or the reverse, brain bottom-up to emergent mind.

In Wayfarer’sMind Created World, he argues for a mind-organized world. Since his scenario features raw data being processed, it’s obvious the data pre-dates this action of the mind and thus there is no mind-created world extant in this example.

Has it been established that formatting of raw data incoming through the senses is a top-down causation from mind to brain?

To the contrary, it’s established the brain organizes info processing autonomically, with various components and aspects of sensory data assigned to various parts of the brain. No one consciously decides which part of their brain will process which sub-component of the sensory data of the phenomenal world. Brain processing is autonomic with little or no control by conscious mind.

Moreover, the brain components, via bottom-up causation, assemble a perceptual composite that is a brain-created assemblage. As for the mind’s part in this process, wherein comprehension and learning, with ancillary features including interpolation, extrapolation, induction and deduction get utilized, it’s a case of bottom-up causation from brain to mind, not the reverse.

Likewise, machine processing of raw data is a material_physical, bottom-up dynamic of processing and assemblage into a coherent and logical composite.

A common example of bottom-up, material_physical organization of raw data into a coherent, logical whole is DOS running in the background organizing the Graphical User Interface seen and manipulated by the general public when they turn on and use their computers.

Emergent mind, as the current pinnacle of self-organizing, dynamical processing, appears to be an absentially material designer. As designer, mind holds power over the natural world.

Human mind and natural world co-exist within an ergonomical co-dependence.

Numbers, logical laws, principles, even scientific laws, are not existent as are chairs, tables, mountains, etc, but they are real as constituents of the meaning-world; perhaps they can be conceptualised as noumenal realities, as distinct from phenomenal existents. — Wayfarer

The main issue in this conversation is whether these ententionals have reality and meaning because they’re bound together with phenomenal existents as emergents.

Do thoughts exist outside of the minds thinking them?

Do minds exist outside of the brains substrating them?