I appreciate that you want to have the abortion debate, but that was not the point of
@Ciceronianus’ post or my engaging with you regarding the shortfalls of Roe’s reasoning. If you want to read about Roe and the conceptual problems with the viability standard (later affirmed by the Casey court), you can do so. If you want to debate Roe, we can always do that in a different thread, but many articles have already done a better job than you and I will at hashing out viability (as a Constitutional, scientific, or philosophical matter).
Your initial participation in the thread regarding Roe
I invite any and all to read Roe v. Wade and to present here what they think are any failures in that law so far as reason shows - unreason disallowed. I think it's a pretty good law. And if any think they have better, let them present it, and absent which, let them be silent and comply. — tim wood
invoked my response because Roe is an unworkable standard from the perspective of anyone advocating for reproductive freedom. The Casey court acknowledge that it was a moving goal post and that as soon as viability is reached (based upon current medical technology), the state has an interest in protecting the potential person. Ciceronianus made the following comment
I think this decision is craven--it's a cowardly abdication of responsibility in these circumstances. I think it should be characterized as craven by anyone, regardless of their feelings on abortion. And, given the composition of the court, that such decisions are likely to be repeated whenever a law that is constitutionally questionable but politically or socially agreeable to the Justices is before them. — Ciceronianus
While I certainly agree with him about the realpolitik of the Texas decision, I am not so sure that Roe, Casey, and many other cases don’t follow a similar path. To simply hold up prior SC decisions as if they are some great accomplishment of human reason which engages in line drawing in some unquestionable fashion is naive at best.
Abortion has historically brought about suspect judicial behavior in service of a greater practical goal. The Texas decision is more reprehensible in-so-far as it permits the undoing of SC precedent by way of the shadow docket and the frustration of final adjudication while people are being intentionally denied their ability to exercise a constitutional right (the undue burden standard of Casey).
Whenever someone confuses the method of the SC in a brazen expansion of Constitutional rights of people with the goal of the SC, an error has been made. The viability standard, as unworkable as it is, is what the SC is stuck with if it hopes to maintain any sense of legitimacy in the public’s eye when upholding the Roe/Casey line of cases. The opponents to abortion know this and they can, therefore, fight the battle on at least three fronts with a straight face:
1) the SC was wrong in Roe regarding a fundamental right,
2) the SC’s viability standard is the most that can be supported under the Constitution and the period of time where a woman has an unfettered right to abortion is reduced each time medical technology improves while the state’s ability to regulate abortion in all instances (except for health and welfare of the mother) is increased, and
3) the regulation of medical practice or other necessary supports for obtaining an abortion (indirect obstacles/burdens) combined with directly frustrating a woman seeking an abortion by increasing the time, inconvenience, expense, etc. of getting the abortion (direct obstacles/burdens) up until the line that the SC deems such burdens “undue”.
What is novel about the Texas case is that it was designed specifically to go outside of the traditional context of discussion by allowing a private right of action against people other than woman seeking an abortion. As intimated by the court’s discussion of who the injunction would be enforceable against in the event it was issued, the due process clause is a restriction on governmental action, not private action. Even if Roe/Casey said that the government can’t restrict women in getting an abortion (a direct burden), maybe there is enough of a hole in the due process clause that a private person (under a new grant of right) can limit third person’s from assisting a woman in getting an abortion. This move is close to terrifying in that it privatizes behavior that the government could not get away with if engaged in directly.
A few excerpts from the dissents in Texas:
. . . Texas’s law delegates to private indi- viduals the power to prevent a woman from obtaining an abortion during the first stage of pregnancy. But a woman has a federal constitutional right to obtain an abortion dur- ing that first stage. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U. S. 833, 846 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 164 (1973). And a “State cannot delegate . . . a veto power [over the right to obtain an abortion] which the state itself is absolutely and totally prohibited from exercis- ing during the first trimester of pregnancy.” Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52, 69 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, we have made clear that “since the State cannot regulate or pro- scribe abortion during the first stage . . . the State cannot delegate authority to any particular person . . . to prevent abortion during that same period.” Ibid. . .
. . .I recognize that Texas’s law delegates the State’s power to prevent abortions not to one person (such as a district attorney) or to a few persons (such as a group of government officials or private citizens) but to any person. But I do not see why that fact should make a critical legal difference. That delegation still threatens to invade a constitutional right, and the coming into effect of that delegation still threatens imminent harm. — “Breyer”
The Legislature fashioned this scheme because federal constitutional challenges to state laws ordinarily are brought against state officers who are in charge of enforcing the law. See, e.g., Virginia Office for Protection and Advo- cacy v. Stewart, 563 U. S. 247, 254 (2011) (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908)). By prohibiting state officers from enforcing the Act directly and relying instead on citi- zen bounty hunters, the Legislature sought to make it more complicated for federal courts to enjoin the Act on a statewide basis.“ — “Sotomayor”
A somewhat lengthy quote from a SC case dealing with the reach of the 14th amendment protections (prefaced by Roe’s invocation of the 14th Amendement for the right to privacy):
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.
— “Roe vs Wade”
Foremost among these limitations is the time-honored principle that the Fourteenth Amendment, by its very terms, prohibits only state action. "[T]he principle has become firmly embedded in our constitutional law that the action inhibited by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment is only such action as may fairly be said to be that of the States. That Amendment erects no shield against merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful." Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1, 13, and n. 12 (1948).
Shortly after the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, we decided two cases interpreting the Amendment's provisions, United States v. Harris, 106 U. S. 629 (1883), and the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3 (1883). In Harris, the Court considered a challenge to § 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. That section sought to punish "private persons" for "conspiring to deprive anyone of the equal protection of the laws enacted by the State." 106 U. S., at 639. We concluded that this law exceeded Congress' § 5 power because the law was "directed exclusively against the action of private persons, without reference to the laws of the State, or their administration by her officers." Id., at 640. In so doing, we reemphasized our statement from Virginia v. Rives, 100 U. S. 313, 318 (1880), that "'these provisions of the fourteenth amendment have reference to State action exclusively, and not to any action of private individuals.'" Harris, supra, at 639 (misquotation in Harris).
We reached a similar conclusion in the Civil Rights Cases.
In those consolidated cases, we held that the public accommodation provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which applied to purely private conduct, were beyond the scope of the § 5 enforcement power. 109 U. S., at 11 ("Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of the [Fourteenth] [A]mendment"). See also, e. g., Romer v.
622
Evans, 517 U. S. 620, 628 (1996) ("t was settled early that the Fourteenth Amendment did not give Congress a general power to prohibit discrimination in public accommodations"); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U. S. 922, 936 (1982) ("Careful adherence to the 'state action' requirement preserves an area of individual freedom by limiting the reach of federal law and federal judicial power"); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U. S. 991, 1002 (1982); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U. S. 163, 172 (1972); Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U. S. 144, 147, n. 2 (1970); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, 554 (1876) ("The fourteenth amendment prohibits a state from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; but this adds nothing to the rights of one citizen as against another. It simply furnishes an additional guaranty against any encroachment by the States upon the fundamental rights which belong to every citizen as a member of society").
The force of the doctrine of stare decisis behind these decisions stems not only from the length of time they have been on the books, but also from the insight attributable to the Members of the Court at that time. Every Member had been appointed by President Lincoln, Grant, Hayes, Garfield, or Arthur-and each of their judicial appointees obviously had intimate knowledge and familiarity with the events surrounding the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Petitioners contend that two more recent decisions have in effect overruled this longstanding limitation on Congress' § 5 authority. They rely on United States v. Guest, 383 U. S. 745 (1966), for the proposition that the rule laid down in the Civil Rights Cases is no longer good law. In Guest, the Court reversed the construction of an indictment under 18 U. S. C. § 241, saying in the course of its opinion that "we deal here with issues of statutory construction, not with issues of constitutional power." 383 U. S., at 749. Three Members of the Court, in a separate opinion by Justice Brennan, expressed the view that the Civil Rights Cases
623
were wrongly decided, and that Congress could under § 5 prohibit actions by private individuals. 383 U. S., at 774 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part). Three other Members of the Court, who joined the opinion of the Court, joined a separate opinion by Justice Clark which in two or three sentences stated the conclusion that Congress could "punis[h] all conspiracies-with or without state action-that interfere with Fourteenth Amendment rights." Id., at 762 (concurring opinion). Justice Harlan, in another separate opinion, commented with respect to the statement by these Justices:
"The action of three of the Justices who joined the Court's opinion in nonetheless cursorily pronouncing themselves on the far-reaching constitutional questions deliberately not reached in Part II seems to me, to say the very least, extraordinary." Id., at 762, n. 1 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Though these three Justices saw fit to opine on matters not before the Court in Guest, the Court had no occasion to revisit the Civil Rights Cases and Harris, having determined "the indictment [charging private individuals with conspiring to deprive blacks of equal access to state facilities] in fact contain[ed] an express allegation of state involvement." 383 U. S., at 756. The Court concluded that the implicit allegation of "active connivance by agents of the State" eliminated any need to decide "the threshold level that state action must attain in order to create rights under the Equal Protection Clause." Ibid. All of this Justice Clark explicitly acknowledged. See id., at 762 (concurring opinion) ("The Court's interpretation of the indictment clearly avoids the question whether Congress, by appropriate legislation, has the power to punish private conspiracies that interfere with Fourteenth Amendment rights, such as the right to utilize public facilities").
624
To accept petitioners' argument, moreover, one must add to the three Justices joining Justice Brennan's reasoned explanation for his belief that the Civil Rights Cases were wrongly decided, the three Justices joining Justice Clark's opinion who gave no explanation whatever for their similar view. This is simply not the way that reasoned constitutional adjudication proceeds. We accordingly have no hesitation in saying that it would take more than the naked dicta contained in Justice Clark's opinion, when added to Justice Brennan's opinion, to cast any doubt upon the enduring vitality of the Civil Rights Cases and Harris.
— “US vs. Morrison”
US vs. Morrison