Heidegger is not doing metaphysics

dude, metaphysics and epistemology both suck.

Existence exists and nonexistence does not exist. — daniel j lavender

Is existence a being? Only beings exist. Being is not a being however so being cannot exist.

In other words only entities exist and because being is not itself an entity it cannot be said to exist without an ontological confusion occurring.

Perhaps you're equivocating?

Did you know that Heidegger thought the exact opposite? His Being and Time argues for the thesis that being is finite. He uses 'existence' to articulate a specific mode of being. The way you use 'existence' falls into his category of the 'present at hand' which is a derivative mode of being in his view. His concept of existence is more primordial and less derivative. Just fyi.

Do you think everyone poor and bourgeois is free? How about people with serious illnesses, mental retardation, mental illness, inbreeding, slaves, etc? Are there degrees of existential freedom?

If you are interested in an antidote to Sartre's radical freedom, research Heidegger's concept of "thrownness".

Well in his early philosophy he doesn't explicitly discuss morality. Rightly or wrongly I think he thinks morality is basically inauthentic conformism. In his later philosophy which I haven't delved into yet, he apparently talks about dwelling. And interestingly there have been a number of other philosophers who have tried to derive an ethics of some sort from his discussions of dwelling. Having said that, there is a sense in which early Heidegger's authentic dasein (in Being and Time) is an ontological ideal in a similar sense to which Aristotle's virtue of practical wisdom, the highest virtue, is an ethical ideal. They are obviously not saying the same thing however. Hubert Dreyfus often discusses these similarities in his commentaries on Heidegger.

For me it's been a long time since I read Sartre, but I recall something about the Kantian categorical imperative... From memory he is basically ripping off Kant's idea whilst talking about existentialism, which was the "fashion" of the day.

No Heidegger was simply saying something different, something that couldn't be reduced to Kantian/Husserlian "present-at-hand" ontology. Heidegger does not muddy present-at-hand ontology with existential concepts. You must understand this before you argue against him. His existential concepts have absolutely NOTHING to do with Kantian/Husserlian ontology!

big difference between being in the world and an object's specific state of being. The latter can inform the former, but Heidegger views the two as interchangeable imo. Again, I haven't read Being and Time but have viewed multiple lectures on it. — VMF

I take you to mean by "an object's specific state of being" to be referring to an ontology of some kind. Being in the world has its ontology also, but a different kind, an existential ontology rather than an objective ontology. Heidegger is not reducing the latter to the former or the former to the latter. They are distinct.

How?

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If philosophy aims to be "love of wisdom" does this not necessarily entail knowing what wisdom is? — Janus

Reading that made me think of this haha

FYI here's a quote from intro 2 that you might find interesting regarding hermeneutics:

The phenomenology of Dasein is a hermeneutic in the primordial signification of this word, where it designates this business of interpreting. But to the extent that by uncovering the meaning of Being
and the basic structures of Dasein in general we may exhibit the horizon for any further ontological study of those entities which do not have the character ofDasein, this hermeneutic also becomes a 'hermeneutic' in the sense of working out the conditions on which the possibility of any ontological
investigation depends. And finally, to the extent that Dasein, as an entity with the possibility of existence, has ontological priority over every other entity, "hermeneutic", as an interpretation ofDasein's Being,
has the third and specific sense of an analytic of the existentiality of existence; and this is the sense which is philosophically primary. Then so far as this hermeneutic works out Dasein's historicality ontologically as the ontical condition for the possibility of historiology, it contains the roots of what can be called 'hermeneutic' only in a derivative sense: the methodology of those humane sciences which are historiological in character.

I’ve yet to find anyone who can provide a concise definition of “dasein” given by Heidegger. If anything the whole work of “Being and Time” is merely a pondering of what “dasein” means to Heidegger. — I like sushi

What would qualify as a concise definition on your arbitrary standards and why do you feel he needs give one? Your second sentence is half correct, it should read: If anything the whole (published) work of “Being and Time” is a hermeneutic of dasein.

For me "formal indication" really stood out in reading this passage. Do you know of anywhere that Heidegger explicitly discusses his methodology of formal indication?

Interesting comment as always!

I tried reading that book a while ago but found at the time that I didn't feel comfortable with his reduction of being to meaning. Thanks for your comment I'll head to the library and have another read of it soon. I think Sheenan is on to it, and very clear as you said.

Morality is ontologically groundless. Anyone who thinks otherwise is deceiving themselves.

ha I found this thread amusing to read :lol:

Why are either the mind or the body substances? Im no genius but to me "substance" seems to belong to scientific language games. Surely substance has no place in a properly philosophical language game.

Can either of you please suggest a good book in the secondary literature as an introduction to Wittgenstein?

It is when a plurality of creatures draw correlations between the same things that meaning is shared. It is when a creature draws correlations between things that meaning is attributed. — creativesoul

Seems that the duck has drawn a(some) correlation(s) between their own hunger, earthworms, rain, and/or the dirt. — creativesoul

Does meaning involve anything like a correlation or an attribution. Me don't think so. Meaning is not attributed, rather we are there and in the thick of it, so to speak. We don't draw correlations or attribute anything to the dirt; this seems like a very "philosophical" way of thinking about the world. Rather, the dirt is understood on the basis of our shared human practices, what might be called our background practices, including gardening. We don't have to be a gardener to find the dirt meaningful in this way since meaning is not a correlation but is the shared structure that we are in. In other words, it's not that the dirt lacks meaning and then we attribute it meaning through our gardening activity or some correlation, rather we can only ever garden on the basis of this 'meaning' thing. Thus prior to any attempt to attribute or correlate, meaning already is.

Ducks are indeed drawn to dig in the wet dirt for worms. But is this meaningful?

I can tell you the meaning of nihilism though: There is no objective morality/knowledge/value. It is the belief that an objective belief is impossible — khaled

I think I would qualify as a nihilist. I don't think it's necessary to use words like objective/subjective though. I'm never quite sure what people mean by "objective" anyway. In my view, to believe that morality/knowledge/value are culturally determined or socially constructed is different to saying that they are subjective and not objective. I believe in the former not the latter.

I Does nihilism have an objective meaning?

The world is meaning. Emphasis placed upon the is here. Without meaning there is no world.

you don't value truth

We don't shape meaning rather we are shaped by meaning. Meaning is not something anyone ever subjectively decides. This is delusional statement that completely misses what meaning is.

Everything has spacial start point(s). For example, a human you could choose head or feet
- Everything has a temporal start. This might be a window of time rather than a point. An example for a human would be birth. — Devans99

But you have not defined what you mean by space nor time. If you are using the scientific concept of each of these terms then how is this philosophy rather than scientific dogma? No offence intended.

Also, exist is ontologically ambiguous.

could we interpret Heidegger's Being and Time as process philosophy? Dasein is after all not a thing but rather an event of sense making. I guess if process philosophy is a metaphysical claim then that would automatically exclude Heidegger...

What is a process?

I disagree with every premise

Why am I me? — JohnLocke

Why is me I? What is the I? A philosophical fiction or a convenient designator?

After thinking about it I think the I is both a metaphysical fiction and a convenient way to use language. Problem solved!! :grin:

I contend that we do choose mattering. We choose to care. — schopenhauer1

I think this sums up the fundamental difference between Heidegger and Sartre. You're on the side of Sartre and radical freedom, and I don't think it's a good side to be on. :wink:

There are plenty of examples of fathers who chose not to play that role. — schopenhauer1

Because fathering does not matter to them. They are what we call bad fathers. Also, it's not merely a role, but a self-understanding, which is different to a role in that it is existential.

It may be culturally-derived. — schopenhauer1

Whether it is culturally derived or not is irrelevant as far as mattering is concerned. You never choose mattering. Think about it phenomenologically.

I think it's right to say that goals must be chosen. But i think it's wrong to suggest that goals accurately characterise the majority of human behaviour. A father might choose the occasional goal for himself and his kid, for example, but 99% of his fathering is not goal driven. 99% of the time he is just prereflectively coping in the meaningful space of being a father. He doesn't have a goal of being a father rather being a father matters to him which then makes it possible to choose goals. This mattering is basic and is not chosen.

I'm a nihilist. I believe nothing is intrinsically meaningful, that free will doesn't exist, that value is as malleable as air and that there is ultimately no point to doing anything ever. Yay — khaled

I don't think that your position as a nihilist is inconsistent with the idea that life is meaningful, that we dwell in the meaning and make life meaningful through our shared practices. Believing that nothing is intrinsically meaningful is different to believing that nothing is meaningful. The former seems like a common sense philosophical position, the latter sounds more like depression than a philosophical position, I think.

What is meaning? If there were no humans, would there be no meaning? Is it meaningful that life is meaningless? Is it meaningless that life is meaningful? Does what I wrote make sense? Yes it makes sense because we dwell in a meaningful space. I don't understand what people mean when they say life is meaningless? Are they doing metaphysics? Are they doing existentialism (anti-metaphysical)? Are they being scientific? I don't know?

interesting discussion. Just wondering how it is possible to choose preferences? I feel it is more accurate to articulate preferences as something we are thrown into by way of our moods and our self-understanding.

"What are discussions of free will really about?" — Bitter Crank

Are they, at their core, meager attempts to articulate what is distinctive about us as an entity?

Is happiness really a worthwhile motivational force or goal? — TheMadFool

What is happiness?

Should we give up on happiness and seek truth? — TheMadFool

What is truth?

I think morality is like language. Is language subjective? Is language objective? It is neither. You don't get to decide what words mean, yet you partake everyday in their meaningfulness.