Commodities are valuable things. They have value by definition. — Purple Pond

This is completely wrong, commodities don't have value by definition, but through the labour expended to produce them. Commodities have exchange-value through being brought and sold on the marketplace. And commodities have use-value through their use.

A useless commodity, however, does not have value even though labour was expended to produce it, and similarly has no exchange value as it is useless and cannot be exchanged. Value, exchange-value and use-value are thus dialectically tied together.

Money is the universal symbolic representation of this capitalist value system is it not? What gives money value? It gets value from what it represents, which is ultimately human labour.

What do you think? What makes paper bills valuable? — Purple Pond

Are paper bills ultimately a commodity, albeit a special commodity? If so, then rather than asking what makes paper bills valuable, perhaps we should first ask what makes commodities valuable?

Yes Daniel Quinn's Ishmael is where I read about natural selection and (totalitarian) agriculture. I'm no scientist but Daniel Quinn's arguments seemed plausible to me at the time. They still do actually. However I would like to learn more about evolution and how people think it is possible to evolve in an unnatural world.

But humans stopped evolving with the agricultural revolution. As a natural process there are certain natural conditions a species must be constrained by for "natural selection" to take place. Through agriculture, we have removed ourselves from these natural conditions. Therefore any talk of humans somehow evolving (post agriculture) can only be either stupid or metaphorical.

There is only one possibility on the horizon for our species, devolution.

What do you think, is it an oversight in Western philosophy, or just not what philosophy is about?
4d — ChatteringMonkey

I think that for Heidegger, emotions (broardly construed as affectivity or attunement) are really important. I'm not sure if we can include Heidegger in "western philosophy" however as he is essentially critiquing the western philosophical tradition in a way different to every other western philosopher before him who likewise also inherited that tradition.

It was sorry...

technology devalues

I take that back

Emotion has nothing to do with valuing anything

I think you need to make some distinctions. Values are not the same as emotions, values underlie emotions, and thoughts. For example, I can only be frustrated at you not getting my point if I value truth. Emotions don't "allow you to value things"; on the contrary, values allow you to have emotions about things.

I don't know what it means to have a metaphysical experience.

I think it depends on how one understands 'meaning'.

If, in this hypothesis, god didnt exist, how would mankind as a whole decide what is wrong and what is right? moral or immoral? — Aleksander Kvam

It's the economy, stupid!

are you simple?

I think you two are talking past each other in that you have different understandings of what counts as being. One of you two seems to slide in and out of equivocating "being" and "thing", while the other understands being in a broader sense. Quite ironic considering the OP :wink:

does not every language user already have a concept of suffering? Is your concept, or your extension of its usage, different to the everyday concept and its usage?

I see what you're trying to express. But I think it is totally misguided.

Try replacing 'knowledge' with 'understanding', and 'good' with 'true'.

I have to agree with Janus here.

I seem to remember reading somewhere in a secondary work on Heidegger that his concept of authenticity could be equated with Aristotle's conception of phronesis (practical wisdom) in that phronesis consists precisely in knowing what to do in particular situations.

The idea is that each situation is uniquely singular, and that wisdom consists in not falling into the habit of treating a situation as a generality: "one of those situations" where "this is what one does". On this reading wisdom involves more creativity than habit. — Janus

Another way to put the same point is that the practically wise person is phenomenologically open to the unique situation, whereas the unique situation remains phenomenologically closed to the unwise person. It also seems important to practical wisdom that one is not only open to the unique situation, but that one acts 'appropriately'/'hits the mark' (I'm unsure of the right word) in their unique situation. So, not just seeing, it also involves doing. One is what one does, as Heidegger says.

Affectivity is also crucially important for both Aristotle and Heidegger with regards to practical wisdom and authenticity.

Heidegger argues that we are pre-ontological. I think this might help our discussion. I'll try to research what exactly he means by this today.

no not at all. I just feel that the word has strong religious connotations.

Is wisdom a religious concept? I know Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics discussed the difference between practical wisdom and theoretical wisdom; well at least that is how his terms were translated. But this seems different to what we ordinarily understand wisdom to mean perhaps? Do we not usually attribute to the wise a special mystical knowledge? Is wisdom a Christian concept? Are there any wise men now that God is dead? I have no idea but an interesting topic nonetheless.

But the possibility of that distinction is always already implicitly inherent in pre-reflective experience (otherwise how would we ever be able to arrive at the conceived separation?). — Janus

I've been enjoying this discussion. But I'm quite confused by what you mean by "always already implicitly inherent in pre-reflective experience"? What I mean is exactly how is the possibility of a distinction (which I interpret here as 'concept') implicit? To me there seem to be two ways of interpreting what you mean. Either you mean (1) that know-how contains various non-conceptual competencies, skills, distinctions, feelings, etc. that can be (sometimes very poorly and sometimes not at all) articulated through present at hand concepts. In other words that we can attempt to articulate our know-how in a know-that way (through language). Or do you mean (2) that the concept is somehow already "implicit" in the pre-conceptual/pre-reflective know-how. On this view knowing-that would seem to be more primary than knowing-how which seems weird.

Or do you NOT mean that the concept itself is implicit? If so then I agree (with 1) that know-how involves non conceptual distinctions that can in turn be (for better or worse) articulated conceptually.

As I said I agree the "fundamental way of being in the world" is prior to the explicit positing of subject and object. But the explicit positing of subject and object is derived from that fundamental way of being, a way of being wherein I would say that subject and object are "always already" implicit. So, does that mean that the fundamental way of being can be understood in terms of subject and object? — Janus

I guess it depends on what we mean by 'derivative'. If derivative merely means implicit then subject/object might be argued to be fundamental like you have done. However since we know that subject/object is definitely not fundamental for Heidegger, for this reason he surely must mean something other than 'implicit' by 'derivative'. I think what he means is something like: the derivative phenomenon's being (e.g. present at hand) is only possible on the basis of the more primordial phenomenon (e.g. being in the world). Explicit/implicit doesn't really do justice to this transcendental requirement since the explicit phenomenon is always going to be, as you say, "always already" present in the implicit phenomenon, thus there is nothing to derive. The two phenomena are ultimately the same only one is implicit and the other explicit.

Sorry I wanted to try to explain myself more but I must go...

Marx's dialectics according to David Harvey:


'One of the most important things to glean from a careful study of Volume I is how Marx's method works. I personally think this is just as important as the propositions he derives about how capitalism works, because once you have learned the method and become both practiced in its execution and confident in its power, then you can use it to understand almost anything. This method derives, of course, from dialectics, which is, as he points out in the preface already cited, a method of inquiry "that had not previously been applied to economic subjects" (104). He further discusses this dialectical method in the postface to the second edition. While his ideas derive from Hegel, Marx's "dialectical method is, in its foundations, not only different from the Hegelian, but exactly opposite to it" (102). Hence derives the notorious claim that Marx inverted Hegel's dialectics and stood it right side up, on its feet.' (Harvey 2010: 11)

In what immediately follows the above, Harvey makes it clear that Marx's dialectics is to understand "processes of motion, change and transformation."

'There are ways in which, we'll find, this is not exactly true. Marx revolutionalized the dialectical method; he didn't simply invert it. "I criticized the mystificatory side of the Hegelian dialectic nearly thirty years ago," he says, referring to his critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right. Plainly, that critique was a foundational moment in which Marx redefined his relationship to the Hegelian dialectic. He objects to the way in which the mystified form of the dialectic as purveyed by Hegel became the fashion in Germany in the 1830s and 1840s, and he set out to reform it so that it could take account of "every historically developed form as being in a fluid state, in motion." Marx had, therefore, to reconfigure dialectics s that it could grasp the "transient aspect" of a society as well. Dialectics has to, in short, be able to understand and represent processes of motion, change and transformation. Such a dialectical method "does not let itself be impressed by anything, being in its very essence critical and revolutionary" (102-3), precisely because it goes to the heart of what social transformations, both actual and potential, are about.' (Harvey 2010: 11)


Harvey goes on to explain how Marx's dialectics is different from Hegel's and the version of Marx we tend to believe in.

'What Marx is talking about here is his intention to reinvent the dialectical method to take account of the unfolding and dynamic relations between elements within a capitalist system. He intends to do so in such a way as to capture fluidity and motion because he is, as we will see, incredibly impressed with the mutability and dynamics of capitalism. This goes against the reputation that invariably precedes Marx, depicting him as some sort of fixed and immovable structuralist thinker. Capital, however, reveals a Marx who is always talking about movement and the motion - the processes - of, for example, the circulation of capital. So reading Marx on his own terms requires that you grapple with what it is he means by "dialectics." '(Harvey 2010: 11-12)

One example how Marx's dialectics works is seen when he explains the dual aspect of value of the commodity: use-value and exchange value.

'Let us reflect a moment on the structure of this argument. We begin with the singular concept of the commodity and establish its dual character: it has a use-value and an exchange-value. Exchange-values are a representation of something. What is it a representation of? A representation of value, says Marx. And value is socially necessary labor-time. But value doesn't mean anything unless it connects back to use-value. Use-value is socially necessary to value.'
(Harvey 2010: 22)

The dialectics is not about causality, at least uni-directional causality. It is about codependent relations that requires its constituents at the same time.

'How has Marx's dialectical method been working here? Would you say that exchange value, or use-value cause ...? This analysis is not causal. It is about relations, dialectical relations. Can you talk about value without talking about use-value? No. In other words, you can't talk about any of these concepts without taking about the others. The concepts are codependent on one another, relations within a totality of some sort.' (Harvey 2010: 33)

Firstly, how is conscience not a social construct? Humans are basically sheep, and we like the comfort of conformity (conscience). secondly, I agree somewhat that we all share something like what you're calling a "human nature" but I dispute that it is anything natural. And lastly, because it is nothing natural it can and does indeed change.

If you think ethics is grounded in our "nature" then you need to show how slavery was or was not grounded by or in our nature. I think you have the burden of proof here.

Hi there. It seems that what you're getting at with the alienation you describe is covered by Marx's concept of commodity fetishism. He wrote a famous section on it in Capital. I would recommend reading the small section. It is a great piece of writing.

Watch from 54 minutes for a discussion of Commodity fetishism:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=4371&v=zwuMrd_Hgww

But what makes the micro and macro actualizable goals within one's life possible as such? It seems to me like the numerous actualizable goals we have in life might always refer back to, and make sense on the basis of, a non-actualizable existential understanding one has of oneself (e.g. Husband, Father, Wife, Bourgeois, Proletariat, etc.).The latter, which is not meant here merely as an actualizable social status, but rather as a non-actualizable existential self-understanding, might very necessarily be the condition of possibility of the former actualizable goals. I could go into more detail if pressed...

I think it is interesting to consider the possibility that one's social status (as say a Mother for example) might not necessarily align with that person's existential understanding of themselves. I think this point nicely shows the difference between the actual and the existential levels of analysis. She has the social status of Mother, but her world is not significant for-the-sake-of being a Mother

If a social construct can reasonably be considered to be "objective" then morality is "objective". Morality has the same objective status that language does.

I do understand that feelings entail internal brain activity, yet I'm using "activity" to mean external, observable physical activity — jancanc

Feelings are internal and don't seem to necessarily entail physical "public" activity, although the converse seems to be true. — jancanc

Why internal vs external? Don't you think that, for the most part, this way of describing our every day experience misleading. For example, when everything is going well with our jobs, our sports, our band, our transport, etc. there doesn't seem to be any experience of the internal or external.We are simply there, involved in a meaningful world with shared moods, feelings and understandings. And the better things are going and the more involved in the situation we become the less and less our experience is "subjective" and the less and less is there any internal/external experience. It is when we abstract from the situation and attempt to do philosophy, science, or try and overcome some impediment to our tasks, or become self-conscious for whatever reason, that the internal/external distinction (which is an ontological distinction) can then be derived. In my experience, the internal/external distinction is always derivative, derivative of a more basic shared, involved and public experience of our worlds. This latter experience is called being-in-the-world.

Without us, nothing is describable because descriptions require a set of conventions called language and is invented by human society. If humans never existed, then everything would be completely indescribable. To call something a universe would be an act of description. So without us, there would be nothing that you can describe as a universe. — Purple Pond

I think agree with this! You are talking about being. It seems you're not denying the universe's independent metaphysical "existence" only it's being. If you loosely replace your "describable" with "being" then what you wrote makes sense not as a subjective idealism or metaphysical idealism, but as an ontological idealism.

How can the universe exist without us? As you rightly say it cannot precisely because it exists through us. This is not a metaphysical or epistemological claim but an ontological and phenomenological claim.

I would have to agree. I still maintain that our shared understanding of gender changes with our shared understanding of being however.

Have you not heard of that madman who lit a lantern in the bright morning hours, ran to the market-place, and cried incessantly: "I am looking for God! I am looking for God!"
As many of those who did not believe in God were standing together there, he excited considerable laughter. Have you lost him, then? said one. Did he lose his way like a child? said another. Or is he hiding? Is he afraid of us? Has he gone on a voyage? or emigrated? Thus they shouted and laughed. The madman sprang into their midst and pierced them with his glances.

"Where has God gone?" he cried. "I shall tell you. We have killed him - you and I. We are his murderers. But how have we done this? How were we able to drink up the sea? Who gave us the sponge to wipe away the entire horizon? What did we do when we unchained the earth from its sun? Whither is it moving now? Whither are we moving now? Away from all suns? Are we not perpetually falling? Backward, sideward, forward, in all directions? Is there any up or down left? Are we not straying as through an infinite nothing? Do we not feel the breath of empty space? Has it not become colder? Is it not more and more night coming on all the time? Must not lanterns be lit in the morning? Do we not hear anything yet of the noise of the gravediggers who are burying God? Do we not smell anything yet of God's decomposition? Gods too decompose. God is dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him. How shall we, murderers of all murderers, console ourselves? That which was the holiest and mightiest of all that the world has yet possessed has bled to death under our knives. Who will wipe this blood off us? With what water could we purify ourselves? What festivals of atonement, what sacred games shall we need to invent? Is not the greatness of this deed too great for us? Must we not ourselves become gods simply to be worthy of it? There has never been a greater deed; and whosoever shall be born after us - for the sake of this deed he shall be part of a higher history than all history hitherto."

Here the madman fell silent and again regarded his listeners; and they too were silent and stared at him in astonishment. At last he threw his lantern to the ground, and it broke and went out. "I have come too early," he said then; "my time has not come yet. The tremendous event is still on its way, still travelling - it has not yet reached the ears of men. Lightning and thunder require time, the light of the stars requires time, deeds require time even after they are done, before they can be seen and heard. This deed is still more distant from them than the distant stars - and yet they have done it themselves."

It has been further related that on that same day the madman entered divers churches and there sang a requiem. Led out and quietened, he is said to have retorted each time: "what are these churches now if they are not the tombs and sepulchres of God?"

has there not always been the two separate spheres of being in each culture and time? — Mr Phil O'Sophy

Sorry I don't really understand this. By being do you mean gender?

What particular characteristics have varied so much so as to completely disregard gender roles? — Mr Phil O'Sophy

Gender roles aren't disregarded, gender roles change as society changes and our shared understanding of being changes. An interesting Marxist take on our changing gender roles would locate the main source of this 'ideological' change in the ever 'evolving' technological infrastructure.

perhaps the difference between sex and gender is the same as the difference between ethnicity and race? In any case, it seems to me obvious that gender is how one's biological sex is taken up and acted out (roles) within society. Gender is largely determined through the social possibilities available to one's biological sex and you don't have to be a genius to see that these possibilities are changing all the time.

More specifically, gender was the social aspect of sex. Stereotypical behaviors and societal roles that correlated strongly with sex — Roke

So you don't think sex and gender are synonymous? Is gender is a social construct?

emotions are necessary but not sufficient for morality just like rationality is necessary but not sufficient for morality. Read Aristotle.

I think feeling is essential to morality. Surely this is what keeps morality from devolving into a blind conformity, no? I would say your aliens are conformists, not moralists. They have no morality.

The ideal government would be one freely chosen by its people through open and non-coercive means (e.g. rational discussion/debate).

Are you distinguishing between a desire for non existence (or a desire for some kind of existence) and a disclosure of the Buddhist truth that you don't exist? In other words the doctrine of non self. Or are you interpreting this Buddhist truth of non self in terms of a Nietzschean/Schopenhauerian desire/will? Sorry I'm tired I cannot think clearly...