What value is Epistemology in a post-Cartesian world?

But, if logic and mathematics are the same for everyone, everywhere, anytime, even in other universes or possibility-worlds, then doesn't that mean that there must be a meaningful sense in which they "are there", independent of minds? How else could they be the same for everyone, everywhere, everywhen? — Michael Ossipoff

Maybe I'm reading too much into what you said about "independent", excuse me if I am... I don't see how systems like mathematics and logic are either external (an interpretation of your use of 'independent') or internal. To me they have to do with the intelligibility (being) in which we dwell. But not 'in' in an internal/external sense, but 'in' in a meaningful sense as in for example, 'in the moment', 'in a pleasant mood' or 'involved in the activity of'. Even though mathematics and logic do not necessarily give intelligibility to the majority of activities and entities we find ourselves involved with in our daily lives, as systems they give intelligibility to their respective mathematical and logical entities. For example, Pi is intelligible only upon the basis of a system of mathematics, and without such a basis it is completely unintelligible, nothing.

Perhaps our main disagreement is based in this? That you want to 'metaphysically' claim that something 'internal' is somehow 'external', whereas I simply don't see the phenomena of mathematics and logic in an internal/external way.

i suggest that abstract facts don't depend on the experiencer. Otherwise, why is it that logic and mathematics would be the same everywhere--in any country, on any continent, on any planet, in any universe? — Michael Ossipoff

Nevertheless, you haven't shown that logic and mathematics are ultimately not derived from us and our shared understanding of being. All you have shown is that logic and mathematics are not relative to one's specific culture. The same is true of physics, biology, and some people suggest this of the virtues, etc.

It seems that mathematics and logic are derivative of a primordial phenomenon, our shared understanding of being.

Or are you suggesting that mathematics and logic are this shared understanding of being?

Here is what Kant said, that existence is not a real predicate or property of a concept. Which is to say that existence is not analytically contained in concepts but is synthetically added to concepts. I think he is right. Saying something exists is saying something different to describing the properties of a thing.

"A hundred real dollars contain no more than a hundred possible dollars. For, as the latter indicate the conception, and the former the object, on the supposition that the content of the former was greater than that of the latter, my conception would not be an expression of the whole object, and would consequently be an inadequate conception of it. But in reckoning my wealth there may be said to be more in a hundred real dollars than in a hundred possible dollars—that is, in the mere conception of them. For the real object—the dollars—is not analytically contained in my conception, but forms a synthetical addition to my conception (which is merely a determination of my mental state), although this objective reality—this existence—apart from my conceptions, does not in the least degree increase the aforesaid hundred dollars." (Critique of Pure Reason "Of the Impossibility of an Ontological Proof of the Existence of God")

God is the greatest thing we can think of. Things can exist only in our imaginations or they can also exist in reality.
Things that exist in reality are always better than the things that only exist in our imaginations.
If god existed only in our imaginations, he wouldn't be the greatest thing that we can think of, because God in reality would be better.
Therefore, God must exist in reality! — Harjas

Kant is disagreeing with this premise (bold)

I am a sick man... I am a spiteful man. I am an unattractive man. I believe my liver is diseased. However, I know nothing at all about my disease, and do not know for certain what ails me. I don't consult a doctor for it, and never have, though I have a respect for medicine and doctors. Besides, I am extremely superstitious, sufficiently so to respect medicine, anyway (I am well-educated enough not to be superstitious, but I am superstitious). No, I refuse to consult a doctor from spite. That you probably will not understand. Well, I understand it, though. Of course, I can't explain who it is precisely that I am mortifying in this case by my spite: I am perfectly well aware that I cannot "pay out" the doctors by not consulting them; I know better than anyone that by all this I am only injuring myself and no one else. But still, if I don't consult a doctor it is from spite. My liver is bad, well -- let it get worse!

Sometimes you don’t experience the facts unless you’re looking for them. But, when you do, you’ll find facts that aren’t inconsistent with the other facts of your experience. That’s why your life is a possibility-story instead of an impossibility-story. — Michael Ossipoff

So no, I don’t mean to say that you always live in logic, facts, verbal description, etc. But, when you visit them, they aren’t as bad as you’ve been taught. In fact they’re pretty good. — Michael Ossipoff

Interesting... On the whole possibility/impossibility idea Heidegger has a lot to say. However, he is talking about ontological rather than derivative factual possibilities/impossibilities.

Would you agree that facts are derivative? In other words that facts depend on a certain articulation of the being of the entities that constitute the particular fact. The particular fact itself being another entity. Or even clearer, that facts are derived from a basic presupposed articulation of the intelligibility of the entities that are engaged with (i.e. used, manipulated, repaired, programmed, thought, spoken). Or yet again, that 'knowing that' (fact) is derivived from 'knowing how' (skillful coping).

that end is arguably the more normal and natural state of affairs for us, in comparison to our temporary life in the world of time and events. — Michael Ossipoff

But how can it be more "natural" for us when we are not, or are no longer? I mean, death is when we cease being the distinct entities that we are. We cease being an entity altogether. We are no longer. There is no 'us' for something to qualify as a natural state for.

Moreover, sleep is only ever something we do, or something that happens to us, when we are. So I think it is misleading to use it as a metaphor for death. It could lead to unclarity.

But can you show that a person’s world and its events aren’t hypothetical? — Michael Ossipoff

Sorry I think you have the burden of proof here, not me. The reason is that it is highly implausible that we experience life hypothetically and/or factually. Myself, and the people within my shared culture, experience the world in terms of familiarity and significance.

When I'm running for the train, for example, I do not think of a hypothetical or a fact. To do so I would first need to abstract from and reflect on the situation. There is never an experience like this. Instead I am completely caught up in the situation and this is grounded in my familiarity with catching trains. I know how to catch trains and know how to catch a train that I'm running late for. I am fully involved. I am the situation. In a sense there is no I, there is only the situation, when I am so fully involved.

Any fact about this physical world implies and corresponds to an if-then fact:
.
“There’s a traffic roundabout at 34th & Vine.”
.
“If you go to 34th & Vine, you’ll encounter a traffic roundabout.” — Michael Ossipoff

Again, this is not how we experience our world. Why? because the way you have expressed this, the roundabout is meaningless and abstracted from everyday experience. It has no significance. For example, someone who is lost and following directions does not go to 34th & Vine to encounter a roundabout, they go there only in order to get onto the road they need to get on to. It is significant to them for that reason. Or, someone who is familiar with the roundabout probably more readily experiences the frustrations of driving in traffic with idiots, or thinking about the discussion they had that morning with their partner, than their surroundings (including the roundabout) as such. Perhaps they are so utterly familiar with the roundabout and their drive to work that they don't even consciously notice it. This happens all the time for me in the flow of life. Notice that in this latter example the person went to 34th & Vine but didn't encounter a roundabout. At least not in a consciously aware factual manner (present-at-hand in Heidegger speak), which is what I take you to mean here by "encounter".

That's why I disagree with your suggestion of implicating or blaming Nothing, for those negative feelings. — Michael Ossipoff

I'm not blaming anything on anything. I'm just interested in the juxtaposition of being and nothing. I haven't thought it through properly but being (which I understand in a purely Heideggerian way as that on the basis of which entities are intelligible and determined as entities) and nothing are probably two sides of the same coin. For example, you can only unconceal the hidden being of entities upon the background of further concealment of being as Heidegger articulates in his phenomenology. Unconcealment requires concealment. That probably doesnt make any sense without examples... for example, a stupidly simple example, for a hammer to be truly unconcealed as ready to hand (being), its properties as physical occurrent object (being) must become backgrounded or concealed (nothing). Perhaps this concealment, or retreating of being, is nothing? Please don't bother criticising me as I haven't thought it through, or even come to terms with it yet...

The immanence of complete shutdown is therefore quite irrelevant and meaningless from our point of view. — Michael Ossipoff

I disagree. I think this "immanence" is the most important aspect of our whole being. This immanence, our mortality, is not what happens during the process of or after our biological death. It is how we are in life towards our end. We are mortals. Oh Whoops, are you just talking about a deathbed situation? Did you mean to type imminence rather than immanence? As you may know, I am a Heidegger nut. And Heidegger suggests of death something like that it is our most pre-eminent possibility, and that our most pre-eminent possibility's imminence is immanent...

I've been saying that our world of experience is a hypothetical life-experience possibility-story, consisting of a complex system of inter-referring abstract if-then facts about hypotheticals. — Michael Ossipoff

You've lost me. I don't see how experience is hypothetical. There are hypothetical aspects involved with solving problems. However, for the most part, life is not a problem.

When someone wants to invoke unknowability and indeterminacy in metaphysics, I emphasize that definite uncontroversial things can be said about metaphysics, and that we should explain what we can before invoking unknowability or indeterminacy. — Michael Ossipoff

What kind of definite uncontroversial things can be said?

A genius chipmunk with huge prehensile hands could use it to smash an acorn. — Janus

All I was arguing was that the hammer's being as equipment (which is how we primarily encounter it rather than as an object) is dependent on us and a whole nexus of references to other equipment. A genius chipmunk might be able to use a hammer to smash an acorn, but they could just as well use a rock. A rock and a hammer do not have the same being as equipment even though they are used in identical ways by the genius chipmunk. What is relevant is not merely how something is used/misused, but the tool's relation within the whole equipmental context of significance, which comes about only through our shared ontological understanding of entities.

You might argue that relative to the genius chipmunk the rock and hammer have the same being.... To make that argument you would also have to argue for the claim that a genius chipmunk is ontological and has it's own understanding of being. But how can you make such an argument since you are moving beyond your own phenomenology?

Rich you are a madman!

I don't pretend I don't have a mind at all. All I'm saying is that the football game is primarily a shared, engaged and circumspective activity, not mind. There is never anything like a direct observation of the mind observing the mind in a game of football. If players started doing that the game would totally collapse.

I think you need to stop twisting everything into the mind directly observing the mind. You force phenomena to conform to your conception of it rather than directly observing the phenomena itself. If you could actually try to focus on what is happening in your daily experience of the world then you would see that for the most part the mind is secondary and for the most part only comes on the scene when our engaged circumspective activity breaks down. Instead you play games. And you have no phenomenological descriptions to back up your claims, only dogmatic statements. You offer no philosophy only dogma.

Well, it is difficult to draw a hard line between what the Mind creates and the Mind itself. — Rich

Perhaps it's difficult because the mind directly observing itself didn't create any of the examples you offered? What does a football game have to do with meditation or with direct observation of mind? If you directly observe your mind while playing football you'll miss the ball!

Now would be a good time to give some examples to articulate your direct observation of the mind directly observing the mind. In your view is only observation of mind direct and observation of everything else indirect?

I would say that the Mind is the observer that learns (memory) and created new patterns from what it learns. — Rich

So the mind creates the new patterns that it directly observes? Is the mind directly observing the mind?

This is precisely what the mind does and only the mind. Tools are simply that. No more. — Rich

Are 'direct observation' and the 'mind' distinct in your view? Does one come before the other or are they essentially the same?

As some sort of pedogogical training tool, logic is OK. But the longest standing tradition is direct observation of patterns in nature which goes back eons, to pre-historical times, across all cultures, and continues through modern philosophical thought. It is the only method that allows philosophy to move forward. Logic goes round and round. — Rich

How is it possible to observe patterns in nature without some kind of tool that ontologically discloses the patterns as patterns?

It is not direct observation as such but the articulation of this direct observation that is philosophically relevant. Logic is but one tool among many others that good philosophers use to articulate their 'direct observation' (or less pretentiously, their experience of the world).

No one ever experiences Nothing. So, in a metaphysics that's about individual experience, there's no such thing. — Michael Ossipoff

What about the experience of loss, lack, dread, angst? Perhaps these experiences point to a primordial preconceptual phenomenal aquantiance with nothing. It is true we never experience an objectified present-at-hand nothing since everything that is objectified in this way is a something rather than a nothing. But why do we need to objectify nothing and turn it into a something? For pragmatic reasons i guess. In other words because objectified derivatives of nothing such as not, minus, zero, but, etc help us to get around in our worlds...

Perhaps your problem is precisely that you are thinking of yourself (or identity itself) as a thing or a collection of things. In Heidegger's jargon, this is to think of yourself as something present-at-hand (or occurrent). But a present-at-hand thing is something that, strictly speaking (or ontologically speaking), you (we) are not and can never be. So there is an ontological confusion going on in your questioning.

You, as dasein, are not an objective occurrant thing, whether that be a memory, thought, soul, your evolved biology, or evolved psychology, etc. And neither are you the fragmented occurrent parts of other fragmented occurrent things. You belong to an altogether different ontological mode proper to the uniquely distinct kind of being you are, dasein. Dasein can be translated as existence, or being there, or being the there, etc. Basically you are there in a world (not the present-at-hand world of science but the existential world of shared significance) and find yourself mattering. Mattering is existentially basic. Existentiality is basic. Everything else is derivative. Everything. Literally.

I would recommend reading Heidegger or a commentary on him. He goes into great detail (gives a phenomenology) about dasein's existential structures and how dasein exists (or can exist) as a whole phenomenon. You will never think of yourself as a thing again. I am therefore I think! Easiest solution to your problem!

That doesn't make any sense in multiple ways. Over and out

our definitions for objective differ if you define objective as just consensus of what people think or believe — SonJnana

I don't define objectivity by what just anyone thinks, but by what the relevant people think. For example scientific objectivity depends on a consensus among scientists (i.e., experts) about what counts as scientific knowledge and correct practices for testing hypotheses, etc. Moral objectivity similarly depends on a consensus among suitable moral agents. This does not mean it depends on just what anyone thinks, and it absolutely does not depend on what philosophers think. A moral philosopher's job is merely to articulate this background objective morality.

How would you define objectivity?

If there is a general scientific agreement that the earth is flat then it would be true that the earth is flat. It turns out that there is no general scientific agreement that the earth is flat. Some religious groups think this, but they do not belong to an appropriate group to satisfy the objectivity claim in this case. — bloodninja

I don't see what you have a problem with? I never said the earth changed shape. I was making a claim about the conditions for objectivity.

It makes perfect sense. That's what happened....

Under these definitions if everyone was in agreement that the world was flat, then wouldn't it be objectively true that the world was flat. — SonJnana

Good point. Yes it would. BUT there would be relevant people (the people who determine the particular kind of objectivity) and irrelevant people (the people who have no influence on the particular kind of objectivity). So for example the shape of the earth is a question that can be fulfilled scientifically and not religiously. This is because it is a scientific question. If there is a general scientific agreement that the earth is flat then it would be true that the earth is flat. It turns out that there is no general scientific agreement that the earth is flat. Some religious groups think this, but they do not belong to an appropriate group to satisfy the objectivity claim in this case.

The objectivity in question won't always be scientific. It could be artistic, moral, law, philosophical, etc.

I decided to no longer use the word preference because I think it was misleading for my point. The burden of proof is on you however because I am taking the position of being unconvinced that morality is objective or non-objective. I am not making assertions so if you claim that it is objective, that is up to you to support. — SonJnana

Ok I will jump through your hoop. What would count for objectivity? My claim would be others in agreement. It all depends on this. A philosophical term for this is intersubjectivity.

So if there is an isolated group of humans that have a completely different lifestyle and have never made contact with the rest of the world, would you tell them murder is objectively wrong? — SonJnana

I would say that In our society it is objectively wrong, even for the psychopaths. If they wanted to live in our society then it would be objectively wrong for them too, even if they are a psychopath.

It has to be demonstrated though that there is even a reason to believe there is an objective morality before we can even begin to judge any actions by it's standards. — SonJnana

If morality was merely one's subjective preference then there would be nothing normative in it. What makes morality significant is the fact that it has strong normative force, in other words, that it provides us with an 'ought' by which we feel compelled to act. It can only provide this because we take it as something bigger and more objective than our subjective preference. Moreover I think it is clear
that you have the burden of proof in this case, so it is you that has to justify your position, not us.

But that doesn't mean there is an objective standard we can use to judge whether it is right or wrong. If aliens come along and don't think that, what would you tell them? You can show them how it is useful to think that it's wrong to murder, but that doesn't mean that it is wrong to murder. — SonJnana

I would explain that murder was not our way, but there are no arguments to give for why it would also be an ought for their way of life if they have a completely different way of life and different way of organising their shared worlds. If they had any respect for beings other than themselves then they might respect our way of life and we could reach a compromise. If not then I guess there would be conflict. I think our shared way of life is as deep as it goes regarding morality however.

BTW I think what Bitter Crank said was pretty to the point...

Sure no problem. By derivative I mean that preference is not original, or at least not more original than morality. In other words, morality is something we are born into and then we develop preferences for, based on our personalities in conjunction with our particular socialisation. In this sense preference is derivative, and morality is more basic or original than your "subjective preference".

I think it might help you to distinguish between intrinsic and objective. There might be no intrinsic morality while at the same time morality might be an objective fact. This is basically my view. Morality just is objective conformism. Conformism is not intrinsic but is an objective fact nonetheless.

If you are either socially conditioned or genetically predisposed to like vanilla ice cream, that doesn't make you preference for vanilla ice cream any less of a preference — SonJnana

But I never said it wasn't a preference! All I said was that the preference was derivative rather than grounding!

Do you understand the word 'derivative'?

And also keep in mind even if you truly care about others' well-being and have a moral code that values it... when you choose to live by that moral code, you are still doing it for your benefit. By seeing others' happy you get what you want and it makes you feel good. — SonJnana

I don't really see how that is relevant to the discussion... But my response to that is: because we are normalised through the social norms (morality) we tend to feel good when those norms are reocognised and feel bad when somebody deviates from those norms. It has nothing to do with our own benefit. The point is that we are constituted by those norms and cannot get outside of those norms.

It does seem to be the case that, when push comes to shove, suffering and pleasure usually disable these other goods, and not the other way around. — darthbarracuda

Good point!

It seems to me that our moralities are nothing but subjective preferences... nothing else. It is kind of uncomfortable, but I am trying to be intellectually honest and I don't see how there can be a case for an objective morality that lies outside our subjective values. I've tried to find arguments for objective morality, but they don't seem right to me. — SonJnana

I understand what you're getting at. But I think you go too far when you reduce morality to "subjective preferences". True, it is my personal preference that stealing is, for the most part, wrong, but I didn't decide this on my own. I was born into a society that is culturally structured around this norm (among many others) so I couldn't help but become normalised by it like everyone else.

Do you see what I mean? I'm saying that you have it in reverse. Our personal preferences don't ground morality, rather, morality becomes our personal preference.

Also I think it can be a bit misleading to talk about values like it is the same thing as morality. I despise the bourgeoisie, because I value a different ideology, but this has nothing to do with morality. And there are particular moral values that I have a greater or lesser personal preference for due to my personality, but this does not mean that I have a unique morality, nor does it mean that I won't still do the things that I have a weak preference for doing. I do them because I feel morally bound to do them, even though I don't want to do them and I would prefer not to do them. Why? Because morality is not our personal preference.

That is a major assignment in a University course on philosophy or intellectual history. Here's a summary by a philosophical theologian, David Bentley Hart: — Wayfarer

Hey Wayfarer, where is that David Bentley Hart quotation you gave from? I would be interested to read more. Thanks

In The Gay Science Nietzsche criticises his former pessimistic idols; he calls Schopenhauer's and Wagner's pessimism, a romantic pessimism. Romantic pessimism, he argues, suffers from "the impoverishment of life and seeks rest, stillness, calm seas, redemption from themselves through art and knowledge, or intoxication..." (aphorism 370) He is seeking a different kind of "pessimism of strength" rather than a pessimism of weakness; a pessimism that affirms life rather than denies life. This, he argued in the Birth of Tragedy, existed in Greek culture prior to the arrival of Socrates. Here is a quote from The Gay Science; it's the very end of aphorism 370:

"(That there may be quite a different kind of pessimism, a classical pessimism - this presentiment and vision belongs to me, as something inseparable from me, as my proprium and ipsissimum; only that the word "classical" is repugnant to my ears, it has become far too worn, too indefinite and indistinguishable. I call that pessimism of the future, - for it is coming! I see it coming! - Dionysian pessimism.)"

I need to read more Nietzsche! I think he is using the term differently to our everyday understanding of it. In a Heideggerian sense, pessimism (as an attunement) would disclose the world to be in a certain way. This way would disclose certain truths of our existence. Pessimism, as Nietzsche means it, seems to be this disclosure plus an affirmation of this disclosure.

I think both systems are stupid. Defining value merely in terms of work makes no sense, since machines can also do useful work, and obviously, in Marxist terms, you ought not pay them a wage for it. Also some may do work faster than others. — Agustino

In Marx's view machines don't create new value like human labour power. Machines (that were all originally created through human labour power, and thus have value) merely transfer a portion of their value into each commodity they help produce until they have become used up or obsolete. Human labour power can produce new value over and above its labour price unlike machines which merely transfer value.

So to raise my price 100 times, I must produce 100 times as much value for that customer. If I can do that, I'm 100% sure I will be able to sell at x100 the price - why would anyone refuse? Figuring out how to do that though, isn't very easy. — Agustino

This quote sounds Marxist to my ears. I'm thinking of a website like a machine. Like a machine, eventually the website will become redundant and need to be overhauled. Like a machine, contained in the website's value are the labour power (your qualifications and genius), the raw materials (software/hardware in this case), and the value transferred from other technologies (e.g. google analytics, etc). Like a machine, the website can be used in conjunction with fresh human labour power (in this case perhaps a marketing department?) to create new value over and above the value of the actual machine or website.

So if I make a website for an oil tank producer, where one sale is worth $1,000,000 on average, that is entirely different than if I make a website for a local coffee shop, where one sale is worth $5. I will charge the oil tank producer a lot more, even though it's about the same amount of work for me. — Agustino

I might have misread you, but this example you gave makes your website pricing look arbitrary. Marx looked at the economy from a socially average perspective. So for example, within our economy there are millions of website designers all trying to sell their product. The basic idea is that competition (and supply and demand) among website designers in conjunction with their socially average labour power (value) will determine a socially average exchange-value; not value but exchange-value. I feel like I'm ranting sorry....

value isn't defined by the person willing to buy the good or service and the whole thing an interaction between supply and demand. Hence there's the fundamental difference between Marxism and mainstream economics. — ssu

I'm saying this from a Marxist perspective. If everything you said is true then it follows that the difference between Marxism and mainstream economics is that the latter does not discuss value as such. What Marx calls value has nothing to do with supply and demand as you say, however, within Marxism the price of commodities is somewhat determined through supply and demand. Marx terms this 'value' of the price of commodities 'exchange value'. To me, from what you say, it seems like mainstream economics only wants to discuss 'exchange value' which they term 'value'. Am I confused, or are there many ambiguities here?

It's probably easiest to explain through a caricature. Think of it like Nietzsche's metaphysics is pessimist, for example he takes on board a lot of the truths Schopenhauer disclosed about existence, but Nietzsche's prescriptions are life affirming nonetheless.

A contradiction.. — Janus

Not a contradiction, a subtlety.

Life affirming pessimism perhaps?

There may not be a purpose for us to fulfill, there may be no unifying pattern which makes all life meaningful. We are lucky to be dynamically alive. However happy or sorrowful each of us may be, we will not be here long before we are gone forever. It is better to seize the day and make the most we can of it. — Bitter Crank

I think this, and the rest of what you said, says more about how you find yourself to be attuned to the world or to "life in itself" than it does about life in itself. I don't know what "life in itself" is, but the way you are towards it is surely a positive way to be.

How is what you're calling utility different to what Karl Marx called use value? Is it that use value relates to commodities but utility does not?

Would you consider yourself a Marxist economist?

because in this theory is grounded the exploitation of capitalism — filipeffv

Are you saying that economists disagree with Marx on an ideological ground? I.e. they don't want to suggest (for ideological reasons) that capitalism is exploitative in its very essence so they do not support the labour theory of value?

Regarding the island example you gave. The kind of value you depict was aptly termed 'use value' by Marx (and perhaps others). In terms of economic value there is Value, Exchange Value, and Use Value. Value is "objective" and is average social labour, Exchange Value is kind of "objective" too and also includes supply and demand, and Use Value is more "subjective". Marx details how these different aspects each influence one another dialectically... Very interesting....