So you assert, but why should I believe this? Why should I believe that what seem to be truth-apt, cognitive statements like "murder is wrong" ultimately derive from non-cognitive, meaningless non-truth-apt, particular preferences? — darthbarracuda

I didn't say its not cognitive. I'm saying that you can't say that any moral code is objectively better than other. Or at least, there is no reason to believe that there is an objective morality where we can say killing is wrong because it's wrong. We can only say killing is wrong because we value a stable society, biological survival, or whatever you value. But the value is subjective.

Perhaps man had no choice in the matter, if he wanted to survive nature and not have to constantly fear harm from some less civilized neighbors he was forced to become social and form communities and in doing so to create laws, and culture, institutions, a civilization. Wouldn't this entail that any actions, or laws that don't foster a safe, equitable, orderly society are intrinsically wrong, because they jeopardize man's survival, which is the purpose of living in a community. — Cavacava

You could say that any actions or laws that don't foster a safe, equitable, orderly society are wrong because they aren't consistent with your or the majority of society's values which may an expression for wanting to survive (preference). But you can't say they are intrinsically morally wrong - you have to demonstrate that. And there hasn't been any argument that has done that in my opinion.

True, it is my personal preference that stealing is, for the most part, wrong, but I didn't decide this on my own. I was born into a society that is culturally structured around this norm (among many others) so I couldn't help but become normalised by it like everyone else. — bloodninja

That just means that your wants, needs, desires, etc. were socially conditioned which lead to the preference you have today for wanting to the world to be a certain way. If I live in a society where girls shave their legs, I might become conditioned to find girls with shaved legs attractive. Based on my needs, wants, desires that are conditioned, I prefer to be with girls that shave their legs. If you live in a society where certain things are normalized, you might then prefer that society. If you are either socially conditioned or genetically predisposed to like vanilla ice cream, that doesn't make you preference for vanilla ice cream any less of a preference.

I do them because I feel morally bound to do them, even though I don't want to do them and I would prefer not to do them. Why? Because morality is not our personal preference. — bloodninja

The fact that you feel morally bound to them means that you have a preference for that moral code. If you get wronged, you might want to punch the person in the face. But if you decide not to because you think it is immoral, it's because you have a preference to live in a society where people shouldn't punch others in the face. So you create your moral code based off of your subjective value of wanting a stable society (because it benefits you), whether it was socially conditioned or not, and therefore don't punch them.

And also keep in mind even if you truly care about others' well-being and have a moral code that values it... when you choose to live by that moral code, you are still doing it for your benefit. By seeing others' happy you get what you want and it makes you feel good.

If you are either socially conditioned or genetically predisposed to like vanilla ice cream, that doesn't make you preference for vanilla ice cream any less of a preference — SonJnana

But I never said it wasn't a preference! All I said was that the preference was derivative rather than grounding!

Do you understand the word 'derivative'?

And also keep in mind even if you truly care about others' well-being and have a moral code that values it... when you choose to live by that moral code, you are still doing it for your benefit. By seeing others' happy you get what you want and it makes you feel good. — SonJnana

I don't really see how that is relevant to the discussion... But my response to that is: because we are normalised through the social norms (morality) we tend to feel good when those norms are reocognised and feel bad when somebody deviates from those norms. It has nothing to do with our own benefit. The point is that we are constituted by those norms and cannot get outside of those norms.

1 and 2 point to one thing - we have common values. If so it's interesting, to say the least, to inevestigate the reason why this is so — TheMadFool

It is true that many people have common values, but just because even if everyone has similar values because they all prefer to live in a stable society where they are all happy, that doesn't make it any more objective. That would be like saying if everyone like vanilla ice cream best, that vanilla is the best ice cream. It's still subjective, but maybe consistent with everyone's wants, needs, desires.

1. We all want to be happy
2. We all want to avoid suffering

So, to some degree, morality, which is based on 1 and 2, is objective. — TheMadFool

This is actually not true at all. Many people actually want power in the world but don't act on it because they don't want to go to jail. It is true humans have empathy for biological reasons throughout evolution. But my point is that everyone if every single human agreed on how they want the world to be, that would only mean that there is a human consensus of morality. But that doesn't make an action any more intrinsically right or wrong. It only means that everyone's wants, needs, desires are the same or similar so that everyone's preferences are consistent with each other.

You've yet to show why or how or to what extent morality is a subjective preference; all you've done is describe morality as a subjective preference. — Noble Dust

Maybe I haven't been clear. What I am arguing is that individuals' and societies' moralities are based on subjective preferences. And that there is no rational way to say that any moral code is objectively better than another. When our laws and moral codes change over time, we can only say that they are changing. There is no objective standard to judge them off of to say that they are improving. We can say our society has changed it's rules so that now it is in a better position to survive, but that doesn't make any individual action any more or less intrinsically good.

I re-read your original post and I think I understand it better now. Could you explain a little further what you mean by saying it is a derivative?

True, it is my personal preference that stealing is, for the most part, wrong, but I didn't decide this on my own. I was born into a society that is culturally structured around this norm (among many others) so I couldn't help but become normalised by it like everyone else.

Do you see what I mean? I'm saying that you have it in reverse. Our personal preferences don't ground morality, rather, morality becomes our personal preference. — bloodninja

This means that other peoples' moral code based on their subjective values based on their preferences becomes normalized into you. So your preferences become more like the preferences of society's. Maybe it's simply because it's what you get used to and it's too uncomfortable to live any other way so you prefer to live that way. That doesn't seem to be a problem to what I'm saying.

I do them because I feel morally bound to do them, even though I don't want to do them and I would prefer not to do them. Why? Because morality is not our personal preference. — bloodninja

You say it is not your preference... however it is your preference. It's not black as white to say I either prefer to do something or not. There can be multiple reasons in conflict for wanting to do something or not. For example, maybe you donate a lot of money because you feel morally bound to do it even though you say you prefer not to. However, you chose to live by a moral code, which was based off of your values. Your values (wants, needs, desires) may have been socially conditioned or whatever, but the point is that you prefer to live by that code and you prefer to then donate because you feel satisfied in following through with your code and maybe also because it makes you feel good to donate.

Just because you have conflicting desires and you may prefer not to donate for some reasons, you still do it because in the end, you prefer to do it for other reasons that outweigh. I don't think it's fair to say that you do something because your morally bound even though you don't prefer to do it. When you make your decision, you choose to act on your moral code because you prefer that decision over the alternative of not acting on your moral code.

Maybe I haven't been clear. What I am arguing is that individuals' and societies' moralities are based on subjective preferences. — SonJnana

That's very clear; that's the assertion I've been critiquing.

When our laws and moral codes change over time, we can only say that they are changing. — SonJnana

A self-fulfilling prophecy, which presumably is your reasoning for your previous statement:

And that there is no rational way to say that any moral code is objectively better than another. — SonJnana

There is no objective standard to judge them off of to say that they are improving. — SonJnana

Meaningless, given the above.

We can say our society has changed it's rules so that now it is in a better position to survive, but that doesn't make any individual action any more or less intrinsically good. — SonJnana

So is survival the goal, in your view?

Again, I can't see any argument so far.

Sure no problem. By derivative I mean that preference is not original, or at least not more original than morality. In other words, morality is something we are born into and then we develop preferences for, based on our personalities in conjunction with our particular socialisation. In this sense preference is derivative, and morality is more basic or original than your "subjective preference".

I think it might help you to distinguish between intrinsic and objective. There might be no intrinsic morality while at the same time morality might be an objective fact. This is basically my view. Morality just is objective conformism. Conformism is not intrinsic but is an objective fact nonetheless.

We can only say killing is wrong because we value a stable society, biological survival, or whatever you value. But the value is subjective. — SonJnana

But again, you're just asserting this. Why is value merely subjective?

I didn't say its not cognitive. — SonJnana

But you're implying that morality stems only from our "valuation" of things, and nothing more. Either you think morality is a sham (error theory), or you think it's an expression of some mental state (non-cognitivism), since those are basically the two major options for moral anti-realists.

To say "I value society" can be a true statement that represents a non-cognitive state, the state of my valuing society. From the non-cognitivist perspective, statements like "murder is wrong" is not really a proposition, it's more like "boo murder!" or "I dislike murder". The difficulty with this, of course, is that "right" and "wrong" seem to not obviously equate to "like" and "dislike". Whereas subjective preferences are one thing that we know frequently, rightness and goodness seem to be non-natural, indefinable things. Which is partially why I said I think the choice is between moral realism and error theory. Rightness and goodness just can't be reduced to subjective preferences. Either morality is a real thing or it's a "cobweb of the mind" (to use Kant's phrase).

Maybe I haven't been clear. What I am arguing is that individuals' and societies' moralities are based on subjective preferences. — SonJnana


That's very clear; that's the assertion I've been critiquing. — Noble Dust

I understand what you're saying. I re-evaluate my position. In the absence of any argument that rationally demonstrates that there is an objective morality, let alone how that morality would judge actions, it is not being intellectually honest to say that any action is objectively morally good or bad. I'm open to objective morality, but still haven't seen a good argument for it.

So is survival the goal, in your view? — Noble Dust

Survival is the goal for many people's moral codes. But even if every individual agreed on a moral code, and they may think that it it is objectively wrong to murder, that doesn't mean that it is objectively wrong to murder. It only means that their is consensus.

Sure no problem. By derivative I mean that preference is not original, or at least not more original than morality. In other words, morality is something we are born into and then we develop preferences for, based on our personalities in conjunction with our particular socialisation. In this sense preference is derivative, and morality is more basic or original than your "subjective preference" — bloodninja

The morality that people grow into seems to me to just be an expression of everyone's preferences. They may themselves think that murder is objectively morally right or wrong. And people that grow into it may adopt the same kind of thinking. It has to be demonstrated though that there is even a reason to believe there is an objective morality before we can even begin to judge any actions by it's standards.

I think it might help you to distinguish between intrinsic and objective. There might be no intrinsic morality while at the same time morality might be an objective fact. This is basically my view. Morality just is objective conformism. Conformism is not intrinsic but is an objective fact nonetheless. — bloodninja

If there was universal consensus, you can say that it is objectively true that everyone in the world thinks that murder is wrong. But that doesn't mean there is an objective standard we can use to judge whether it is right or wrong. If aliens come along and don't think that, what would you tell them? You can show them how it is useful to think that it's wrong to murder, but that doesn't mean that it is wrong to murder.

But again, you're just asserting this. Why is value merely subjective? — darthbarracuda

I have re-evaluated. In the absence of any argument that rationally demonstrates that there is an objective morality, let alone how that morality would judge actions, it is not being intellectually honest to say that any action is objectively good or bad. I'm open to objective morality, but still haven't seen a good argument for it.

The difficulty with this, of course, is that "right" and "wrong" seem to not obviously equate to "like" and "dislike". Whereas subjective preferences are one thing that we know frequently, rightness and goodness seem to be non-natural, indefinable things. Which is partially why I said I think the choice is between moral realism and error theory. Rightness and goodness just can't be reduced to subjective preferences. Either morality is a real thing or it's a "cobweb of the mind" (to use Kant's phrase). — darthbarracuda

I apologize that I'm not too familiar with technical terms in philosophy. I am still learning.

I agree right and wrong aren't the same think as like and dislike. My point is that we claim to say something is right or wrong based off of our preferences. If I like to live in a stable society, I may say murder is wrong. But when we say something is immoral, we're using the standard of our own personal moral code which is based off of our like and dislikes. Or maybe it's because it was socially conditioned and any other moral code is too uncomfortable. Or maybe it seems intuitive because of the person's genes. Or maybe the person themselves beleives something is objectively right or wrong.

It's often probably a case of many of those reasons. But it has to be demonstrated that there even is an objective morality. And then to judge murder as wrong objectively, we would have to then know how that objective morality would judge the act of murder.

Regarding Emotivism, which is being expressed by some of these responses, there seems to me to be a crucial difference between "I don't like liver" or "Boo, Liver!", on the one hand, and "Torturing children for fun is wrong", on the other.

I have re-evaluated. In the absence of any argument that rationally demonstrates that there is an objective morality, let alone how that morality would judge actions, it is not being intellectually honest to say that any action is objectively good or bad. I'm open to objective morality, but still haven't seen a good argument for it. — SonJnana

This doesn't sound quite right, since it's question-begging. Why should morality, in the absence of any argument that demonstrates it to be objective, be seen as not-objective? Why shouldn't the opposite be the case? Why shouldn't you have to demonstrate the morality is not-objective? After all, morality certainly seems to appear to us as "objective", as a command-from-afar, an imperative, something we must do out of free will.

To put the "burden of proof" on the moral realist is question-begging because it only makes any sense at all if we already assume certain other metaphysical notions: notions that (if we are to discuss philosophy) need to be argued for (which would then just lead into an argument for moral anti-realism).

So you probably are assuming something along the lines of a "modern" naturalistic picture of the universe: the world operates (mechanically? statistically?) by certain "laws" that are discovered by science, and part of this includes the rejection of any sort of non-physical "stuff". Objective morals are seen as necessarily being non-physical, and thus we can assume they do not exist given the prevailing physicalist framework.

Okay. You may believe this is true. But you need to argue this to be true. For someone like myself is going to deny that physicalism is true, and a realist naturalist is going to deny that objective morals have to be non-physical. You can't just assume this naturalist framework is true, because not everyone agrees with it.

I agree right and wrong aren't the same think as like and dislike. My point is that we claim to say something is right or wrong based off of our preferences. If I like to live in a stable society, I may say murder is wrong. But when we say something is immoral, we're using the standard of our own personal moral code which is based off of our like and dislikes. Or maybe it's because it was socially conditioned and any other moral code is too uncomfortable. Or maybe it seems intuitive because of the person's genes. Or maybe the person themselves beleives something is objectively right or wrong. — SonJnana

The ambiguity here is with your claim that morality is "based" on our preferences. I'm not sure what this exactly means. You say right and wrong are different than like and dislike, so as to regard them as separate things. But you say we claim something is right or wrong based off of our preferences. Since you deny preferences (like and dislike) are identical to right and wrong, and want to argue for anti-realism, you're effectively left with error theory: we have concepts of right and wrong, but they never are instantiated because there are no such things as objective right and wrong moral truths.

You claim that if I want to live in a stable society, I may say murder is wrong. Thus it seems as though you see morality as something people use for their own benefit. But this makes it ambiguous, still, as thus statements like "murder is wrong" seems to be basically saying "do not murder because I want to live in stable society". Yet I will press you on this - is this really what we mean? Do we really think something is moral or immoral based on our contingent preferences? Because it seems obvious to me that the two statements are not equivalent in any sense. One is a moral imperative and the other is non-moral supplication.

The difference between non-cognitivism and error theory is basically that of truth-aptness. Non-cognitivists think moral claims are expressions, say, of emotions or preferences, which themselves cannot have any truth value. Liking chocolate is not a truth claim. Whereas error theorists claim that moral propositions are truth-apt: saying "murder is wrong" is literally saying that murder is something: it is wrong. What separates the error theorist from the moral realist (they are both cognitivist positions) is that the error theorist denies there is anything real about right or wrong (or good and bad, etc).

You have said that the moral realist must provide the demonstration, but you yourself have offered mostly "maybes": maybe morality is socially conditioned, maybe it's "because of someone's genes", maybe they're fooling themselves, etc. You'll need to provide more to convince someone.

So in conclusion there are two things I think you need to explain and clarify:

1.) the general metaphysical framework you are coming from (including what you think objective morals are/must be), and

2.) what the claim "morality is based on preferences" ultimately amounts to, because although I think you wish to present something along the lines of error theory, you nevertheless seem to also vacillate into non-cognitivism.

I understand what you're saying. I re-evaluate my position. In the absence of any argument that rationally demonstrates that there is an objective morality, let alone how that morality would judge actions, it is not being intellectually honest to say that any action is objectively morally good or bad. I'm open to objective morality, but still haven't seen a good argument for it. — SonJnana

Pretty much covered it in his response to your paragraph which was essentially the same as what you wrote to me here. But I wanted to point out one more thing. "Intellectual honesty" is an objective moral. And no, it's not a "subjective preference", because this suggests "intellectual dishonesty" would be an equally valid subjective preference. And to assert that such preferences are equally valid is to assert an objective morality: "these two preferences are equally valid". Honesty, by it's nature, is objective. Honesty is anti-dishonesty. It looks like one moral objective for you is intellectual honesty, which is an admirable one, but you don't seem aware of it.

I agree right and wrong aren't the same think as like and dislike. My point is that we claim to say something is right or wrong based off of our preferences. — SonJnana

You keep saying the same thing over and over again. But we (the collectivity of society and its various institutions) don't care what your preferences are. Further more, we teach people from childhood on up that we expect them to prefer what we (collectively) have defined as legal, right and good. Finally, whatever your preferences, you will be held to society's standards, whether that matches your preferences or not.

You think that might makes right? You're damn right. And we have the might, and you do not. Therefore, you will prefer what is right, or you will be severely punished.

As for your possibly felonious preferences, where do you think your preferences come from? Do you think you just make them up? Do you think your preferences are under your control? For the most part, no. You mostly prefer what you are allowed to prefer, and there isn't much you can do about it.

Consider chocolate cake and blueberry pie. Which do you prefer? Where did that preference come from? If you lived in France in 1500, you could not have a preference for either one of these, because they didn't exist in Europe at the time. Social realities have something to do with your preferences.

What you prefer depends on your genetics, the time and place in which you live, your pre-natal experiences, your early childhood, and later experiences. None of these things are under your control, and your preferences aren't freely chosen. Parents and society strongly discourage preferences that are not compatible with the prevailing morality. Society goes to considerable inconvenience to make sure that children prefer what we wish for them to prefer.

*applause*

Regarding Emotivism, which is being expressed by some of these responses, there seems to me to be a crucial difference between "I don't like liver" or "Boo, Liver!", on the one hand, and "Torturing children for fun is wrong", on the other. — Mitchell

I agree there is a big difference in those statements. One is an expression of what one likes and one is an expression of what one considers to be morally wrong. So now I ask you why is torturing children for fun wrong? What makes it objectively wrong?

No; what makes torturing children not objectively wrong?

It has to be demonstrated though that there is even a reason to believe there is an objective morality before we can even begin to judge any actions by it's standards. — SonJnana

If morality was merely one's subjective preference then there would be nothing normative in it. What makes morality significant is the fact that it has strong normative force, in other words, that it provides us with an 'ought' by which we feel compelled to act. It can only provide this because we take it as something bigger and more objective than our subjective preference. Moreover I think it is clear
that you have the burden of proof in this case, so it is you that has to justify your position, not us.

But that doesn't mean there is an objective standard we can use to judge whether it is right or wrong. If aliens come along and don't think that, what would you tell them? You can show them how it is useful to think that it's wrong to murder, but that doesn't mean that it is wrong to murder. — SonJnana

I would explain that murder was not our way, but there are no arguments to give for why it would also be an ought for their way of life if they have a completely different way of life and different way of organising their shared worlds. If they had any respect for beings other than themselves then they might respect our way of life and we could reach a compromise. If not then I guess there would be conflict. I think our shared way of life is as deep as it goes regarding morality however.

BTW I think what Bitter Crank said was pretty to the point...

This doesn't sound quite right, since it's question-begging. Why should morality, in the absence of any argument that demonstrates it to be objective, be seen as not-objective? Why shouldn't the opposite be the case? Why shouldn't you have to demonstrate the morality is not-objective? After all, morality certainly seems to appear to us as "objective", as a command-from-afar, an imperative, something we must do out of free will. — darthbarracuda

The claim is that morality is objective. If I take the position of not believing that morality is either objective or non-objective, then the burden of proof lies on someone to demonstrate that it is objective. And in the absence of any argument for it that is convincing, I think it is unfair for me to say that any action is objectively wrong even if that feels uncomfortable to me.

I don't think I have to argue for my position because it is a lack of belief of objective morality. And one has to make an argument that something nonphysical exists, not the other way around. That would be like you telling me that there is an invisible unicorn in the room and telling me to prove that it isn't there.

Yet I will press you on this - is this really what we mean? Do we really think something is moral or immoral based on our contingent preferences? Because it seems obvious to me that the two statements are not equivalent in any sense. One is a moral imperative and the other is non-moral supplication. — darthbarracuda

They are different types of statements. When I was saying preferences I was meaning it to include what one's "conscience" tells them but I think me using the word preferences was misleading and caused confusion. I may have been misusing the word. The point is people create a moral code for many reasons. That's obviously true. The question is what makes the statement "murder is objectively morally wrong?"

I am just unconvinced that it is objective. I'm taking the position that if someone were to ask me "why is murder objectively morally wrong," I would say I don't know. I won't tell them that it is, but I also won't tell them that it isn't. So that is up to you argue for since I am not asserting that morality is objective or non-objective.

(My position from the original post has changed a little bit because I have found some holes in what I was originally, and I thank you all for that).

But I wanted to point out one more thing. "Intellectual honesty" is an objective moral. And no, it's not a "subjective preference", because this suggests "intellectual dishonesty" would be an equally valid subjective preference. — Noble Dust

I don't understand. I thought objective morality was about what one ought to do. What makes intellectual honesty an objective moral?

What makes intellectual dishonesty a subjective moral?

Regarding Emotivism, which is being expressed by some of these responses, there seems to me to be a crucial difference between "I don't like liver" or "Boo, Liver!", on the one hand, and "Torturing children for fun is wrong", on the other. — Mitchell

Of course there is a difference. There is even a difference between "I don't like liver" and "I don't like Brussels sprouts." But, assuming emotivism for the sake of an argument, what is "crucial" about this difference, other than the strength of the emotion?

That is not a rhetorical question, but an invitation to elaborate the point. "Emotion" is one word, but that doesn't mean that all emotions are of the same sort. Is there a difference here that cannot be accommodated under some ordinary idea of emotion?

What you prefer depends on your genetics, the time and place in which you live, your pre-natal experiences, your early childhood, and later experiences. None of these things are under your control, and your preferences aren't freely chosen. Parents and society strongly discourage preferences that are not compatible with the prevailing morality. Society goes to considerable inconvenience to make sure that children prefer what we wish for them to prefer. — Bitter Crank

When I was using the word preferences, I never said that it isn't controlled by many factors. I have stated a few times now that they may have been socially conditioned, etc. But just because they aren't fully in control doesn't mean that at that point in time your preference is not your preference, regardless of what caused it to be your preference. I also think that by using the word preference I was not explaining my position very clearly so I'll avoid using it now.

People create their moral code for many reasons. Socially conditioned, beliefs about what is right or wrong, etc.. But if someone asserts that stealing is wrong, why is it objectively wrong? That is up to you to argue since I am taking the position of not asserting that it is objective or non-objective.

What makes intellectual dishonesty a subjective moral? — Noble Dust

I didn't assert that. You asserted that it is objective moral so it's up argue that.

Also I'm not really sure I understand what moral means in this context so this may be just a big understanding lol.

This all is only true when you start with the premise that morals are subjective. Circular reasoning.

If morality was merely one's subjective preference then there would be nothing normative in it. What makes morality significant is the fact that it has strong normative force, in other words, that it provides us with an 'ought' by which we feel compelled to act. It can only provide this because we take it as something bigger and more objective than our subjective preference. Moreover I think it is clear
that you have the burden of proof in this case, so it is you that has to justify your position, not us. — bloodninja

I decided to no longer use the word preference because I think it was misleading for my point. The burden of proof is on you however because I am taking the position of being unconvinced that morality is objective or non-objective. I am not making assertions so if you claim that it is objective, that is up to you to support.

I would explain that murder was not our way, but there are no arguments to give for why it would also be an ought for their way of life because they have a completely different way of life and different way of organising their shared worlds. If they had any respect for beings other than themselves then they might respect our way of life and reach a compromise. If not then I guess there would be conflict. I think our shared way of life is as deep as it goes regarding morality. — bloodninja

So if there is an isolated group of humans that have a completely different lifestyle and have never made contact with the rest of the world, would you tell them murder is objectively wrong?

My position on this has changed in my more recent responses. I just made an EDIT on the original post at the end to clear up the confusion.