Ah, good ole B-theory and eternalism. If that’s true then we absolutely do not have any meaningful or relevant kind of free will.

Something I’ve been wondering about regarding the block universe is, does the block universe model depend on physicalism being true, or could it also work with ontologies such as monistic idealism? I’m hoping you could help me figure that one out, because I don’t know which ontology is the correct one.

Forgive me, but I have trouble with the “ability to do otherwise” principle of free will. Many have taken it as a priori while I can hardly wrap my head around it. What matters to me, and responsibility in general, is whether he was the source of his actions. Thanks for clarifying. — NOS4A2

I understand. From what I’ve gathered in my time researching free will, the ability to do otherwise would allow an agent to either do or refrain from doing any given action, and I think it is assumed by many that this is highly relevant to moral responsibility. I can see how one being the source of their actions would also be very crucial to responsibility in general, this just seems obvious to me.

You haven't described anything impossible.

You have said that to choose one must select from options. But then you have mistakenly supposed that one needs to have chosen the options.

No, at most you need options. You do not need to have chosen the options.

I have option a and option b. I didn't choose those options, but that doesn't mean I didn't choose a over b when I select a over b. — Bartricks

For each individual thought that one thinks, do they have options to choose from for what it will be prior to them thinking it? Where would they get these options from? They could only come from their own mind and thoughts, nowhere outside of themselves. If they don’t have options in the first place, then they cannot choose their thoughts by definition, as you’ve conceded.

Can we choose how much insulin our pancreas secretes? If not, does this rule out free will?

The brain does what the brain does in the same manner that the pancreas does what the pancreas does. Neither is under our direct control. That fact says nothing about free will. — T Clark

If the brain does what the brain does in the same manner that the pancreas does what the pancreas does, then the brain makes its choices automatically without any input from us as well.

And yet we choose!

Consider the two wolves within, Stoicism, and Cognitive Behaviour Therapy...

Hence Paul's argument is flawed. Mind is recursive, not linear, conflicted, not homogenous. We have the capacity to choose what thoughts we revisit, which thoughts we act on, and what becomes habitual. Hence we can improve who we are.

Curious, that so many folk here think themselves automata.
14m — Banno

If I’m presented with two options, A and B, I can choose between them. The question is, can I choose the thought which chooses between them? If not, do I have any control over what I choose?

Interesting perspective, I never thought about it like this before.

What do you think of the following argument against the ability to do otherwise? Someone recently mentioned this one to me:

1. If one can do otherwise, then one can do either A or not-A at the time of action.
2. If one can do either A or not-A at the time of action, then A and not-A are both possible in the same sense at the same time, which is a contradiction.
3. Therefore, one cannot do otherwise.

I don’t currently see a way out of it, but I’d like to get your thoughts on it.

It does not mean that you do them un-freely either. The action is generated without cause or input from anything else in the universe. There is no restraint or anything barring such actions from being committed. It is not “determined” by any other being. So how is it not free? — NOS4A2

I guess the issue that I’m ultimately concerned with is the ability to do otherwise rather than whether or not an action is considered ‘free’ or ‘unfree’. Forgive me for not mentioning this or clarifying it until now.

Do you think we have the ability to do otherwise?

It doesn’t. To rule out the possibility of free will one will have to show that thoughts, or any action for that matter, comes from somewhere or someone else. — NOS4A2

So you’re saying that if I do an action, that action is free if it comes solely from me? I agree that it would have to come solely from me in order to be considered a free action, otherwise I can’t even claim ownership over it. However, the fact that I am an agent who can claim ownership over my actions does not on its own necessarily mean that I do those actions freely.

As topics go, whether or not we have "free will" might be unanswerable. — Bitter Crank

I think you might be right about this, considering there is no ubiquitous understanding of what ‘free will’ even means. If I had to put a definition on it, I would call it the ability to choose one’s own intentional actions. But that would require one to be able to choose their intentions, which are thoughts. And I don’t see how one can choose their thoughts.

A lot of our mental activity goes on outside of the portion that we are consciously aware of. What the brain delivers to our consciousness if pretty much fait accompli. We don't decide what we like, what we want, or what we think. Do you like strawberries? If so, did you decide to like strawberries, or did you just find them delicious?

For instance, I may have consciously decided that your topic title was interesting, but I'm not sure about that. Perhaps an unconscious predisposition compelled me to respond to you. I did not "decide" how to compose this response. It just arrived in my fingers on the keyboard. I have, however, edited what occurred to me. Was the editing an act of free will or was it the product of a fussy compulsion? Don't know. — Bitter Crank

I agree. I think it boils down to how much of one’s own mind is under their own conscious control, which is not much.

It doesn't matter, really. Whether we free will or not, we have evolved to operate more or less successfully. We are, fortunately, not left to our devices. We require years of careful rearing before we are able to live independently. A lot of who and what we are is supplied by genes and experience before we have a choice in the matter. — Bitter Crank

Yes, this is true. However, do you think people misuse the concept of free will to blame others?

I’ve always loved that quote from Schopenhauer, it makes things pretty clear.

I’ve been contemplating free will and the lack thereof from a metaphysically neutral perspective without committing to physicalism, dualism, idealism, etc. Free will seems to fall apart when I introspect upon my own experience of thinking.

How is that different from plain old, vanilla determinism? — T Clark

Necessitarianism is stronger than determinism because determinism allows for the possibility that the causal chain as a whole could have been different, even though every cause within the chain could not have happened differently, given the antecedent causes.

I don't understand why this would be true. I don't see why either philosophical option couldn't be consistent with determinism. — T Clark

If one takes libertarian (or even certain versions of compatibilist) free will to mean that one could have done otherwise, then necessitarianism being true would make this impossible because nothing in reality could have been otherwise, including our choices and actions.

On the other hand, I did think of a potential philosophical effect - If necessitarianism were true, then the fine-tuning argument for God would never arise. — T Clark

Yeah, that’s true.

To me, that means it is a metaphysical question. I won't inflict my oft preached sermon on metaphysical entities here. — T Clark

It is a metaphysical question without doubt, not going to dispute that.

By the way, the reason I posted this question in the first place is because I read Amy Karofsky’s recent defense of necessitarianism in her new book A Case for Necessitarianism. It’s a very interesting read if anyone is curious.

I think there would have to be proof that separates some fundamental laws from their derivatives for contingentarianism to work. We can only meaningfully speak about things in existence so I think that dictates everything. — Shwah

I agree. Contingentarianism suggests multiple ways reality could have been, but there is nothing in reality that implies this is the case.

No, not on that basis because, if for no other reason, both positions posit only a single entity / principle. — 180 Proof

Doesn’t contingentarianism suggest that there genuinely are, in some sense of the word ‘are’, ways reality could have been? It must hold this position because if it didn’t then it would collapse into necessitarianism.

So if contingentarianism holds to that, then it adds additional assumptions about reality that necessitarianism does not, thus making it less parsimonious.

1) Are there any physical consequences if necessitarianism is correct and contingentarianism is not? — T Clark

It depends on what you mean by physical consequences. If necessitarianism is true, then libertarian free will definitely cannot exist because all human choices and actions would have to unfold they way they do.

2) Is there any way to determine whether necessitarianism is true and contingentarianism is not? — T Clark

There might be a way to determine which is true logically, but I do not think we can determine which is true empirically.

3) Are there any philosophical consequences if necessitarianism is correct and contingentarianism is not? — T Clark

It definitely negates the possibility of libertarian free will.

Perhaps I should have gone into more detail about my view of the self. I essentially believe that the notion of a permanent, unchanging self or soul is misguided. We are temporary, changing “patterns” who should be held responsible for our actions, because each individual pattern has its own tendencies regarding action.

If we just let every violent criminal go free, those patterns are often likely to continue their destructive behavior in society. Whether or not there is a core, persisting self that has free will is irrelevant to the issue of responsibility, in my opinion. Maybe we’re not *morally* responsible in an ultimate sense, but for practical purposes we need to hold each pattern responsible for harmful actions they perform, ideally for deterrence and rehabilitation (although in the US this is rarely the case).

Kastrup’s view does indeed essentially boil down to open individualism (the view of personal identity according to which there exists only one numerically identical subject, who is everyone at all times). There have been points in time where I took it seriously as a possibility, but now I’m more of an “empty individualist” in that I don’t think there even is a persisting self.

Technically he says we’re the same universal consciousness or “core subjectivity” but we’re unique dissociated alters or localizations of it.

Yeah, at the end of the day you’re absolutely right. I think I just need to accept that metaphysical positions cannot really be falsified and that we don’t (and probably can’t) have all the answers.

I'm no expert here but it seems to me Kastrup - who is a very articulate communicator and does a great road show - is essentially riffing off Schopenhauer's idealism and updating it. K argues that humans are dissociated alters of cosmic consciousness and matter is what consciousness looks like when viewed from a certain perspective. Mind is all that exists. Importantly, like Schopenhauer, K argues that cosmic consciousness (Will) does not have a plan for existence, it is instinctive, does not communicate and is not a god surrogate. Much of Kastrup's model involves demonstrating how materialism is incoherent. — Tom Storm

Considering Kastrup wrote a book that attempts to “decode” Schopenhauer’s idealism and show how his own model is very similar, I would say you absolutely nailed it here.

Other than creating a flurry of rebuttals or anxieties in the so called scientific physicalist community, what does the model give us? Does Kastrup straw man naturalism by reducing it to materialism? He's clearly benefiting enormously from the current gaps in the understanding of consciousness and quantum physics. — Tom Storm

Kastrup’s public display is of someone who is absolutely convinced of his position, granted I don’t know how certain anyone can actually be when it comes to metaphysics.



I hope not.

Elaborate on this. How do you know that the past does not extend infinitely in the same way that the future does? — _db

If presentism is true, there is no past or future that extends infinitely, there is only a changing present moment. On the other hand, if eternalism is true, then it could be the case that the past and future extend infinitely or in a finite manner, but we would have no way to know which of these possibilities is true. But if eternalism is true, then there is no objective progression of time, meaning that my entire life just exists eternally in the block universe.

There is no evidence to suggest that post-expiration existence is a thing. From a philosophical perspective, that's pretty much all that matters as far as conclusions are concerned. — Garrett Travers

Good point, but there’s no evidence to suggest that post-expiration existence is *not* a thing either.

Wow, I never actually made the exact connections or came to the conclusions that you did about how important one’s view of death is regarding morality and ethics. But after reading your post I have to say that I wholeheartedly agree.

Your point about the atheist afterlife of perpetual nothingness makes a lot of sense.

I agree that, as far as we can tell, we are entirely physical entities, which means that I agree that there probably is no supernatural soul that leaves the body or some sort of transportation of consciousness at death.

However, I am open to the possibility that when I as a body die and the experience that I as a body am having permanently comes to an end, another living body’s experience follows it. Under this view, the two experiences (i.e. mine that ended and the one that follows it) would in no way be related to each other nor would there be any connection between them. My experience stops occurring, and an experience that is occurring follows it with nothing connecting them.

It doesn’t have to be the case that the next experience is that of a baby or child. Maybe the next experience after mine ends will be that of a fully grown adult or an entirely different species.

I will be the first to admit that this is speculation, but I think it’s at least a possibility.

I think out of sheer intellectual curiosity it can be interesting to try to determine what happens after death. Does it really serve any practical purpose? Maybe not. And no one can know with absolute certainty.

Both the body and thus all states of the body dissolves upon death. — NOS4A2

I agree with this quote completely. However, when a body dies and all of its experiential states dissolve, there are still other living bodies having experiential states, either now or in the future. I don’t think there would be a continuation or transference of any experiential states from a body that dies to a body that is living, but I do think the entirely distinct and separate experiential states of a body that is living would follow the cessation of the experience of a body that died.

This, of course, assumes that there really is no dualism — no souls, spirits, or permanent selves that inhabit bodies, just bodies having experiential states.

Sleep has always been an interesting phenomenon to me. In dreamless sleep, it always seems as though there is no perception of time, space, or even self, though there is a vague sense of existence or presence. I don’t think that dreamless sleep is the complete absence of experience, but rather a temporary state of repose from the richness of the experience of the waking state.

Interesting observations. Your explanation definitely seems less speculative than mine. I don’t see a way to definitively prove that this is the case, but it’s just where logic is taking me at this point.

You bring up a good point. In my opinion, I think it all depends on whether there actually is an aspect of our individual being that continues on after this life ends, which is currently unknown. It seems to me that it would have to be some aspect of our consciousness or mind that isn’t strictly tied up in our brains or bodies. From a naturalist perspective, there really is no such thing — when you as the body die, everything that makes you ‘you’ permanently ends as well.

If we’re taking a strict naturalist point of view, then it could be the case that the experience of a fully grown adult human could follow someone’s death, for example, and neither the person who died nor the person who’s experience followed that death would be aware that this happened. In other words, it doesn’t have to be a newly born human’s experience that follows death, it could be any living experience.

I can go along with attributing a form of DID to everyone.

But not to nature. We don't know if nature is intrinsically like or unlike experience, so it seems to me to anthropomorphize nature in the extreme, to speak of objects as "alters". — Manuel

I concur. I personally don’t think we have good reasons to attribute experience to the whole of nature, yet others disagree.

And yet the two definitions you gave are different. — Janus

I guess they could be seen as different in the sense that the first definition is broad and the second is more of an attempt to target one’s intuition of what the first definition means.

Aren't we aware of things, other entities, events and environments rather than "the universe/ reality". I think we conceive of the latter, but are not aware of it, meaning that they are ideas, not experiences or percepts. — Janus

Yes, we are, but everything we are aware of falls within the larger context of the universe/reality. So we are aware of the universe/reality, just not all of it in its totality.

So are qualia "individual instances of subjective, conscious experience" or ."individual instances of what it is like to have sensations, perceptions, and thoughts"? Is there a difference? — Janus

I don’t think there is a difference, but I was attempting to illustrate what I was referring to by the word ‘qualia’.

Doesn't "what it is like to be aware" really just mean "what it is to be aware", in the sense of "how does it feel to be aware", since the idea of comparison is inapt in this context. And does how it feels to be aware of something differ from the apprehension of the qualities of wnatever it is we are aware of? — Janus

To me at least, being aware just means having a live first-person perspective of the universe/reality.

Just out of curiosity, how would you describe the “what-it’s-likeness” of being alive without referring to ‘experience’?

His is a very interesting case. He makes some good points, I mean, it is true that in terms of acquaintance, we are best acquainted with experience than anything we study in nature.

However, it seems to me that if consciousness were as fundamental as he says, we should be able to introspect and know everything about the world. And there's lots of things to say about unconscious brain processes which are far more prevalent than mental states. — Manuel

Kastrup argues that all lifeforms are actually “dissociated alters” of the one universal consciousness, analogous to dissociative identity disorder, and this is why we can’t introspect and know everything about the world. But this seems ad hoc to me.

It leaves the status of experience exactly as it was, "metaphysically neutral", as it were. — Manuel

Maybe neutral monism is a better metaphysical model/position than either idealism or physicalism, if this is the case.

No, I mean, I personally don't have too much issues with "qualia", but it seems to me *some* people here start arguing about the term, which I don't see the point of.

So I speak of seeing outside your window, listening to music or tasting chocolate. If people have trouble with that, then we aren't going to have much of a conversation. — Manuel

I see what you mean now.

Sure. That makes sense. It's assumed to be the case, because what other option exists? — Manuel

People who reject physicalism and, for example, adopt monistic idealism (á la Bernardo Kastrup) claim that consciousness/experience is fundamental to reality itself as a whole rather than generated by the brain.

I think it's a kind of massive epistemic gap. We can say some things about the human body as well as physics, we can say some things about the brain as a biological organ.

But the difference between looking at neuronal activity in a person and actually having the taste of chocolate or listening to you favorite tune, etc. is just enormous. We lack intelligence to know how this is possible. — Manuel

Yes, it is a seemingly insurmountable epistemic gap, and in fact it is possible that we may never bridge it. But I’m claiming that we don’t need to bridge it in order to know that physicalism is true.

Just look at the reports of people who have taken large doses of psychedelics, for example. The chemical directly interacts with the brain, as can be observed by neuroscientists, and they all report extreme changes in their experience. These reports are pretty convincing to me that the brain generates experience.

Most problems in understanding the world are "hard problems". — Manuel

I agree.

Anyone can use whatever vocabulary they see fit, I'm thinking qualia here is just a very loaded word. We all have experience, we can see outside our window and see a blue sky, or a green tree or a person walking around.

We can listen to music, etc. No problem with that. — Manuel

Yes, we all have experience, though our experiences are all unique. I actually used the word ‘qualia’ in an attempt to simplify the OP, but perhaps it caused more confusion than it alleviated.

We know way too little about the brain to think about how the brain interprets a stimulation as an ordinary object.

We have problems with the behavior of particles, much simpler than a brain. So, it's not surprise we can't say much about something as complex as seeing another person or looking at the sky, etc. — Manuel

Right, I completely agree. However, I think there is a conceptual difference between being able to know why and how the brain might accomplish this and being able to know that it does so. That is to say, we don’t need to know the manner in which the brain gives rise to experience in order to know *that* it does.

Although understanding the ‘why and how’ would conclusively show *that* the brain gives rise to experience, I don’t think it is necessary for us to go that far in order to confirm that it does.

To what degree can we really be said to know what we mean by 'qualia'? — ajar

Interesting point. There’s only so far we can go with language and communication in general, but I would elaborate on the meaning of the term ‘qualia’ by saying that they are individual instances of what it is like to have sensations, perceptions, and thoughts. I can see why you have doubts about the meaning of qualia, though.

The argument (the title of the OP) rests on the presupposition that time had no beginning. — Shawn

But couldn’t it be the case that something existed timelessly prior to the beginning of what we perceive as time?

If time existed in nothingness, and there was a possibility of the big bang, then it becomes necessarily so that something came out from nothing. — Shawn

Not sure if I’m following this. There would be no time in nothingness, at least in how I conceive of it. Time is something. Also, wouldn’t the possibility of the big bang itself be something?

Imagine now the first thought you ever had (I'm about 99% certain that you won't recall it), itself initiated by factors beyond your control, set the ball rolling and you are what you are (thought-wise) because of that first thought! — TheMadFool

That would be thought-determinism in a nutshell, wouldn’t it? :grin:

Interesting point, didn’t consider that. InPitzotl also helped me understand why the OP isn’t a good argument.

I can see where the argument goes off the rails, thanks for the response.

This is an interesting and good question. I’m by no means an expert in this, but I would say that there are “pure” thoughts and action-initiating thoughts. If you’re just sitting there thinking about something, those thoughts are not leading you to perform an action. But if you desire to get up from where you’re sitting and go get a glass of water, for example, the thoughts which lead you to do this are action-initiating thoughts.

This is just my take on it, however. What would you say about this?

I think this is the problem, and it’s even in the language you’ve used: our thoughts might be given to us, but our “deliberate actions” come from us. We have a thought to do one thing and a thought to do another; options and a choice. — AJJ

I agree that our deliberate actions come from us. However, if the thought which leads me to do one action over another is itself not freely willed, how can you be said to freely will the action?

Here’s an example. Let’s say I think about doing action A or action B. Both A and B are present in my mind. I’ve already established that I couldn’t have freely willed to think about doing action A or action B, since no thought is freely willed. In order to do one of the two actions, I must think a thought which leads me to do one over the other. But the thought that leads me to do one over the other is itself not freely willed. So I can’t freely will the action.

Very interesting, I’m not familiar with CEMI field theory but I’m definitely going to look into it starting with the thread you linked.

That's certainly what critics of religion argue - that it provides an anodyne for suffering. — Tom Storm

Yes, right.

I suspect however that a transcendent meaning will only serve to magnify feelings of cosmic injustice and misery - how to explain the death of babies and childhood cancer and the unbelievable savage cruelty of nature... If all is just physicalism then, so what? But if it was designed this way by a transcendent being or force, then what a staggeringly wasteful and vile approach to being this is. Of course believers can always cobble together justifications or escape clauses. — Tom Storm

I tend to align with Schopenhauer and Kastrup on this particular issue in that, if there actually is a transcendent force, it does not deliberately or self-reflectively do anything in its pure form. It could be that the manifestation of the world by the transcendent consciousness or force is entirely instinctual or involuntary, analogous to a non-lucid dream.

Now, I will be the first to admit that this is pure speculation on my part, and I personally do not claim to know with certainty that this is the case.

I wonder if life would be any less tedious or fraught if idealism holds true. What do you suppose is the advantage of transcendent meaning? — Tom Storm

In my opinion, if there legitimately is transcendent meaning for us to discover, finding it can alleviate at least some of the psychological and emotional suffering and discomfort that many people endure by showing them that life is not inherently limited to this brief window of experience we get while we are here. For example, if consciousness were definitively discovered to be fundamental, then it would show how our lives are directly interconnected and potentially shift the way people view reality. It would also imply that death is not the end of consciousness. In effect, it would give people some ground to stand on, so to speak.

I have a lot to respond to here :lol:.

physicalism is reconcilable with idealism if consciousness exists, insofar as idealism is falsified, but not reconcilable if consciousness does not physically exist but is nonetheless real, insofar as idealism is obtained.

Physicalism is reconcilable with idealism if the entire field of consciousness is existentially physical, the possibility of abstract field content, is falsified. — Mww

Well, like any other "physical field", do you have a candidate for a "force carrier", or gauge boson, for fundamental interactions (e.g. EM field has photons)? Or does this "physical field of consciousness" operate in a non-physical manner not subject to known physical laws (re: fundamental forces)? — 180 Proof

In thinking about this topic some more, rather than trying to reconcile physicalism with idealism and invoking a ‘physical field of consciousness’, perhaps it would be more meaningful for me to ask: can what we consider to be physical and what we consider to be mental (consciousness) actually be identical? And I don’t simply mean in the case of living organisms — I mean universally.

Some things are physical AND some things are nonphysical. There, reconciled. — TheMadFool

Yes, this does indeed reconcile them quite well. However (and I should have specified this so forgive me), what I had in mind was a sort of monism where what is considered to be physical and what is considered to be mental are identical.

Generally underlying a question like this is an attempt to locate some kind of transcendent meaning that perhaps can't be found in physicalism (however we define this latter term). Is this where you are heading? — Tom Storm

In a way, yes. I agree with philosophers like Bernardo Kastrup who essentially say that physicalism/materialism tends to suck the transcendent meaning out of life. However, I am not wholly motivated by a personal search for transcendent meaning, but mainly by sheer metaphysical curiosity as to the way things are. If it turns out that physicalism is ‘true’, then that’s the way things are and I must accept it.