In applying Occam’s Razor to these two positions, shouldn’t we accept necessitarianism over contingentarianism due to parsimony? — Paul Michael

No, not on that basis because, if for no other reason, both positions posit only a single entity / principle. To paraphrase Einstein: "Everything should be made as simple as possible, but no simpler."

Necessitarianism suggests there is exactly one way reality can be, which is the way it actually is. In contrast, contingentarianism suggests there is more than one way reality could have been. — Paul Michael

A couple of questions:

1) Are there any physical consequences if necessitarianism is correct and contingentarianism is not?

2) Is there any way to determine whether necessitarianism is true and contingentarianism is not?

If the answer to these two questions is "no," and I suspect they are, then the difference is either metaphysical or meaningless.

A third question:

3) Are there any philosophical consequences if necessitarianism is correct and contingentarianism is not?

If the answer to that question is "no," then the difference is meaningless.

No, not on that basis because, if for no other reason, both positions posit only a single entity / principle. — 180 Proof

Doesn’t contingentarianism suggest that there genuinely are, in some sense of the word ‘are’, ways reality could have been? It must hold this position because if it didn’t then it would collapse into necessitarianism.

So if contingentarianism holds to that, then it adds additional assumptions about reality that necessitarianism does not, thus making it less parsimonious.

1) Are there any physical consequences if necessitarianism is correct and contingentarianism is not? — T Clark

It depends on what you mean by physical consequences. If necessitarianism is true, then libertarian free will definitely cannot exist because all human choices and actions would have to unfold they way they do.

2) Is there any way to determine whether necessitarianism is true and contingentarianism is not? — T Clark

There might be a way to determine which is true logically, but I do not think we can determine which is true empirically.

3) Are there any philosophical consequences if necessitarianism is correct and contingentarianism is not? — T Clark

It definitely negates the possibility of libertarian free will.

I think there would have to be proof that separates some fundamental laws from their derivatives for contingentarianism to work. We can only meaningfully speak about things in existence so I think that dictates everything.

I think there would have to be proof that separates some fundamental laws from their derivatives for contingentarianism to work. We can only meaningfully speak about things in existence so I think that dictates everything. — Shwah

I agree. Contingentarianism suggests multiple ways reality could have been, but there is nothing in reality that implies this is the case.

I've heard people try to say "if my arm was an inch away it would be possible" and it seems trivial but that entails different physical principles which entails different math then logic, ontology all the way back to the most fundamental law that we can perceive which is a change of "is" but I'm not sure that's coherent because all we can perceive is "is" so even if it changes it's an epistemic limit.

If necessitarianism is true, then libertarian free will definitely cannot exist — Paul Michael

I don't understand why this would be true. I don't see why either philosophical option couldn't be consistent with determinism.

On the other hand, I did think of a potential philosophical effect - If necessitarianism were true, then the fine-tuning argument for God would never arise.

There might be a way to determine which is true logically, but I do not think we can determine which is true empirically. — Paul Michael

To me, that means it is a metaphysical question. I won't inflict my oft preached sermon on metaphysical entities here.

I don't understand why this would be true. I don't see why either philosophical option couldn't be consistent with determinism. — T Clark

If one takes libertarian (or even certain versions of compatibilist) free will to mean that one could have done otherwise, then necessitarianism being true would make this impossible because nothing in reality could have been otherwise, including our choices and actions.

On the other hand, I did think of a potential philosophical effect - If necessitarianism were true, then the fine-tuning argument for God would never arise. — T Clark

Yeah, that’s true.

To me, that means it is a metaphysical question. I won't inflict my oft preached sermon on metaphysical entities here. — T Clark

It is a metaphysical question without doubt, not going to dispute that.

By the way, the reason I posted this question in the first place is because I read Amy Karofsky’s recent defense of necessitarianism in her new book A Case for Necessitarianism. It’s a very interesting read if anyone is curious.

Necessitarianism is a lot neater and simper. Unfortunately, it seems to be false. It's partly due to a scope fallacy:

Necessarily: what is, is; what was, was; and what will be, will be That's ok. However:
What is, necessarily is etc. That will take some establishing.

Counterexamples:
I could have made this post longer. I could not have made it a million words long.
The ball could have broken a window. The ball could not have destroyed the whole house.
Hence: contingentarianism.

If one takes libertarian (or even certain versions of compatibilist) free will to mean that one could have done otherwise, then necessitarianism being true would make this impossible because nothing in reality could have been otherwise, including our choices and actions. — Paul Michael

How is that different from plain old, vanilla determinism?

Doesn’t contingentarianism suggest that there genuinely are, in some sense of the word ‘are’, ways reality could have been? — Paul Michael

Yeah, more or less identically with actualism (a position I favor contra both possibilism & modal realism).

It must hold this position because if it didn’t then it would collapse into necessitarianism.

This is like saying that predictions such as "Black Holes" and the "Cosmological Constant" which are implied by, but not described in, General Relativity make the theory less parsimonius than Newtonian physics. As I understand the topic, contingentism, like necessitism, posits only one fundamental principle – acausality or causality (like 'stochastical or deterministic'), respectively – and the equivalent quantity of these respective posits do not themselves in comparison to one another raise the issue of parsimony. Ockham's Razor only pertains to posits, or assumptions, (of entities) and not to conceptual implications (or theoretical predictions) derived from them.

How is that different from plain old, vanilla determinism? — T Clark

Necessitarianism is stronger than determinism because determinism allows for the possibility that the causal chain as a whole could have been different, even though every cause within the chain could not have happened differently, given the antecedent causes.

Parsimony presupposes two or more realities to exist. This kind of weird reality exist in the great Everett fairytale of the many worlds. A fascinating fantasy. As long as one realizes that it's that only. Maybe in a parallel world I would be fooled.

vanilla determinism? — T Clark

:lol:

Necessitarianism is stronger than determinism because determinism allows for the possibility that the causal chain as a whole could have been different, even though every cause within the chain could not have happened differently, given the antecedent causes. — Paul Michael

To me, as the saying goes - it's a distinction without a difference.

determinism allows for the possibility that the causal chain as a whole could have been different, even though every cause within the chain could not have happened differently, given the antecedent causes. — Paul Michael

So two different causal chains can lead to the same outcome?

To me, as the saying goes - it's a distinction without a difference. — T Clark

Seems to me there is a difference, which is the cause for the two different words. Two different causal chains can lead to the same outcome. Determinism. Necessitarianism says there can be one such chain only.

So two different causal chains can lead to the same outcome? — EugeneW

Yes. The ball could have broken the window. Hailstones could have broken the window.

Necessitarianism says..... — EugeneW

OK, but it seems to be false and there seem to be knock-down counterexamples. I could be wrong. But I could not be writing this from the moon. If I'm wrong, then I could have written something else that was not wrong. But I could not have written it - wrong or right - if I did not have lungs.

Necessitarianism would be simple and straightforward. All counterfactuals would be false. There would be no modality. Contingency entails all kinds of woulds, coulds and shoulds.

If parsimony is our only criterion, necessitarianism wins by a mile.

If we are not bothered whether our theory is true or not, let's go with necessitarianism.

If parsimony is our only criterion, necessitarianism wins by a mile — Cuthbert

Parsimonious people buy only the necessary. Only an object pushing can break the glass. The object is enough. Regardless you break it by hand, stone or hard wind.

If we are not bothered whether our theory is true or not, let's go with necessitarianism. — Cuthbert

Why is that? If we're not bothered with how the window broke?

Why is that? If we're not bothered with how the window broke? — EugeneW

If we are not bothered whether our theory is true or not......

I prefer my theories to be true. So I'm giving necessetarianism a miss, despite its undoubted attractions.

It depends, to some degree, on how many entities need to be posited/proposed to explain necessetarianism as opposed to contingentarianism. If the universe was/is necessary, how complex is the explanation for such a state of affairs? The same question for contingentarianism.

Off the top of my head, I think we can come up with multiple hypotheses for both scenarios with varying levels of complexity and that would be our cue to whip out our novacula occami and shave off the superfluous and reduce to the bear essentials. I like beards though!