Such accounts seem to head towards the mystical and the murky realm of ineffability. No doubt this idea of god's infinite, unknowable and divine essence could be said to overlap with other religious traditions such as Advaita Vedanta. — Tom Storm
.I send no agent or medium, offer no representative of value, but offer the value itself.
There is something that comes home to one now and perpetually;
It is not what is printed, preach'd, discussed-it eludes discussion and print;
It is not to be put in a book-it is not in this book;
It is for you, whoever you are-it is no farther from you than your hearing and sight are from you;
it is hinted by nearest, commonest, readiest'-it is ever provoked by them.
You may read in many languages, yet read nothing about it; You may read the President's Message, and read nothing about it there;
Nothing in the reports from the State department or Treasury department, or in the daily papers or the weekly papers, Or in the census or revenue returns, prices current, or any accounts of stock — Whitman, Leaves of Grass, Song of Occupations.
There's a developing philosophy to it, denying certain assumptions of the Enlightenment, for instance. — frank
For the hardcore neo-reactionaries, democracy is not merely doomed, it is doom itself. Fleeing it approaches an ultimate imperative. The subterranean current that propels such anti-politics is recognizably Hobbesian, a coherent dark enlightenment, devoid from its beginning of any Rousseauistic enthusiasm for popular expression. Predisposed, in any case, to perceive the politically awakened masses as a howling irrational mob, it conceives the dynamics of democratization as fundamentally degenerative: systematically consolidating and exacerbating private vices, resentments, and deficiencies until they reach the level of collective criminality and comprehensive social corruption. The democratic politician and the electorate are bound together by a circuit of reciprocal incitement, in which each side drives the other to ever more shameless extremities of hooting, prancing cannibalism, until the only alternative to shouting is being eaten. — Land, The Dark Enlightenment
Seems like you wouldn’t make these cuts if you were interested in revitalizing American industries. — praxis
but to pretend your 50 lawsuits are nothing more than the bureaucracy trying hold the tide against what the majority want is really silly. — philosch
The capacity for partnership must be realized in this particular way, not just any form of partnership or cooperation. — J
Aristotle didn't think it was possible for a man to be either a lower animal or a god, right? — J
but speech is designed to indicate the advantageous and the harmful, and therefore also the right and the wrong; for it is the special property of man in distinction from the other animals that he alone has perception of good and bad and right and wrong and the other moral qualities, and it is partnership in these things that makes a household and a city-state. — Aristotle, Politics, 1253a forward, translated by H Rackham
if each individual when separate is not self-sufficient, he must be related to the whole state as other parts are to their whole, while a man who is incapable of entering into partnership, or who is so self-sufficing that he has no need to do so, is no part of a state, so that he must be either a lower animal or a god. — Aristotle, Politics, 1253a forward, translated by H Rackham
It is the executive branch that gets to decide the contracts and the staffing — NOS4A2
From these things therefore it is clear that the city-state is a natural growth, and that man is by nature a political animal, and a man that is by nature and not merely by fortune city-less is either low in the scale of humanity or above it (like the ‘clanless, lawless, hearthless ’ man reviled by Homer, for he is by nature city-less and also a lover of war) inasmuch as he resembles an isolated piece at draughts. And why man is a political animal in a greater measure than any bee or any gregarious animal is clear. For nature, as we declare, does nothing without purpose; and man alone of the animals possesses speech. The mere voice, it is true, can indicate pain and pleasure, and therefore is possessed by the other animals as well (for their nature has been developed so far as to have sensations of what is painful and pleasant and to signify those sensations to one another), but speech is designed to indicate the advantageous and the harmful, and therefore also the right and the wrong; for it is the special property of man in distinction from the other animals that he alone has perception of good and bad and right and wrong and the other moral qualities, and it is partnership in these things that makes a household and a city-state.
Thus also the city-state is prior in nature to the The State prior in nature, household and to each of us individually. For the whole must necessarily be prior to the part; since when the whole body is destroyed, foot or hand will not exist except in an equivocal sense, like the sense in which one speaks of a hand sculptured in stone as a hand; because a hand in those circumstances will be a hand spoiled, and all things are defined by their function and capacity, so that when they are no longer such as to perform their function they must not be said to be the same things, but to bear their names in an equivocal sense. It is clear therefore that the state is also prior by nature to the individual; for if each individual when separate is not self-sufficient, he must be related to the whole state as other parts are to their whole, while a man who is incapable of entering into partnership, or who is so self-sufficing that he has no need to do so, is no part of a state, so that he must be either a lower animal or a god. — Aristotle, Politics, 1253a forward, translated by H Rackham
Nature also teaches me by these feelings of pain, hunger, thirst, and so on that I am not only residing in my body, as a pilot in his ship, but furthermore, that I am intimately connected with it, and that the mixture is so blended, as it were, that something like a single whole is produced. For if that were not the case, when my body is wounded I would not therefore feel pain, I, who am only a thinking being; but I would perceive that wound by the understanding alone, as a pilot perceives by sight if something in his vessel is broken. And when my body needs food or drink, I would simply know the fact itself, instead of receiving notice of it by having confused feelings of hunger and thirst. For actually all these feelings of hunger, thirst, pain, and so on are nothing else but certain confused modes of thinking, which have their origin in and depend upon the union and apparent fusion of the mind with the body. — Descartes, Meditation 6, pg 81, translated by L.J Lefleur
Now the question is how Jeffry Goldberg was added to Waltz’s contact list, and subsequently the chat. — NOS4A2
It was rhetorical — AmadeusD
If that's all you need to make you 'sure' of a generational speculation, I'm unsure where to take this.. — AmadeusD
Yes, from the reports from my friends and family, many of whom are public servants, inside and outside of the government per se.Are you sure this is what's happening? — AmadeusD
However with 'spirit' he indicates that substance is not dead matter, but living, as in a 'spirited individual'. — Tobias
In the act-of-recognizing (Anerkennen) the Self ceases to be this isolated-particular (Einzelne) here; it exists (ist) juridically [that is, universally or as absolute value] in the act-of-recognizing, that is, it is no longer in its immediate [or natural] empirical-existence (Dasein).....
Man is necessarily recognized, and he is necessarily recognizing. This necessity is his own, not that of our thought in opposition to the content. As act-of-recognizing, Man himself is the [dialectical] movement, and it is precisely this movement that dialectically-overcomes (hebt auf) his state of nature: he is [the] act-of-recognizing;
the natural-entity (Naturaliche) only exists (ist); it is not [a] spiritual-entity (Geistiges)
-Jena lectures, 1805-1806. — Alexandre Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, page 236, translated by Nichols Jr.
The thing in itself is a consequence of Kant's formality. — Tobias
Why are our thoughts different from our senses in that the content of thoughts cannot be doubted? — Kranky
There is no 'thing in itself'. 'A world of the unknown' is contradictory because how can we know of such a 'world' and in what way would something posited as absolutely unknown, constitute a world? — Tobias
This thought, which is proposed as the instrument of philosophic knowledge, itself calls for further explanation. We must understand in what way it possesses necessity or cogency: and when it claims to be equal to the task of apprehending the absolute objects (God, Spirit, Freedom), that claim must be substantiated. Such an explanation, however, is itself a lesson in philosophy, and properly falls within the scope of the science itself. A preliminary attempt to make matters plain would only be unphilosophical, and consist of a tissue of assumptions, assertions, and inferential pros and cons, i.e. of dogmatism without cogency, as against which there would be an equal right of counter-dogmatism.
A main line of argument in the Critical Philosophy bids us pause before proceeding to inquire into God or into the true being of things, and tells us first of all to examine the faculty of cognition and see whether it is equal to such an effort. We ought, says Kant, to become acquainted with the instrument, before we undertake the work for which it is to be employed; for if the instrument be insufficient, all our trouble will be spent in vain. The plausibility of this suggestion has won for it general assent and admiration; the result of which has been to withdraw cognition from an interest in its objects and absorption in the study of them, and to direct it back upon itself; and so turn it to a question of form. Unless we wish to be deceived by words, it is easy to see what this amounts to. In the case of other instruments, we can try and criticize them in other ways than by setting about the special work for which they are destined. But the examination of knowledge can only be carried out by an act of knowledge. To examine this so-called instrument is the same thing as to know it. But to seek to know before we know is as absurd as the wise resolution of Scholasticus, not to venture into the water until he had learned to swim.
Reinhold saw the confusion with which this style of commencement is chargeable, and tried to get out of the difficulty by starting with a hypothetical and problematical stage of philosophizing. In this way he supposed that it would be possible, nobody can tell how, to get along, until we found ourselves, further on, arrived at the primary truth of truths. His method, when closely looked into, will be seen to be identical with a very common practice. It starts from a substratum of experiential fact, or from a provisional assumption which has been brought into a definition; and then proceeds to analyse this starting-point. We can detect in Reinhold’s argument a perception of the truth, that the usual course which proceeds by assumptions and anticipations is no better than a hypothetical and problematical mode of procedure. But his perceiving this does not alter the character of this method; it only makes clear its imperfections. — Hegel's Logic, Being Part One of the Encyclopaedia of The Philosophical Sciences, page 116
With self-consciousness, then, we have therefore entered the realm of truth. We have now to see how the shape of self-consciousness first makes its appearance. If we consider this new shape of knowing, the knowing of itself, in relation to that which preceded, viz. the knowing of another, the knowing of an other, then we see that though this other has vanished, its moments have at the same time no less been preserved, and the loss consists in this, that here they are present as they are in themselves. The [mere] being of what is merely 'meant', the singleness and universality opposed to it of perception, as also empty inner being of the Understanding, these are no longer essences, but are moments of self-consciousness, i.e. abstraction or distinctions which at the same time have no reality for consciousness itself, and are purely vanishing essences. Thus it seems that only the principal moment itself has been lost, viz. the simple self-subsistent existence for consciousness. But in point of fact self-consciousness is the reflection out of the being of the world of sense and perception, and is essentially the return from otherness. — Phenomenology of Spirit, B. Self-Consciousness, IV. The Truth of Self-Certainty, 167, translated by Miller
Yes, Hegel goes beyond those limits. — Tobias
The independent members are for themselves; but this being-for-itself is really no less immediately their reflection into the unity than this unity is the splitting-up into independent shapes. The unity is divided within itself because it is an absolutely negative or infinite unity; and because it is what subsists, the difference, too, has independence only in it. — ibid. 170
Life in the universal fluid medium, a passive separating-out of the shapes becomes, just by doing so, a movement of those shapes or becomes Life as a process. The simple universal fluid is the in-itself, and the difference of the shapes is the other. But this fluid this fluid medium itself becomes the other through this difference; for now it is for the difference which exists in and for itself, and consequentially is the ceaseless movement by which this passive medium is consumed: Life as a living thing. — ibid. 171
I don't understand when people don't understand this. :wink: — Tom Storm
I’ve never claimed to be a libertarian. — NOS4A2
If I am right, it is much easier to point out to Republicans how their government is not moving toward their goals. — AmadeusD
Has anyone here had any sort of success, and what did they do and how did they do it? — tim wood