It is interesting how Enrgoran connected the decision to past scams.

Amongst other objectives, Kant wanted to squelch Hume's depiction of cause as only consisting of accidents and coincidence. David and Immanuel both accepted that Fred is real and not a figment of imagination. Immanuel says that the conditions of experience do not rule out asking how Fred appeared by necessity since Fred does not flicker in and out of immediate presence. But the ways we explore that idea is rimmed by a horizon we will never surpass.

Well, the first word in Homer's Iliad is Anger. We are more easily offended than a flower is buffeted by the wind.

In saying "choice and your act aren't separable" are you agreeing with the thesis of the OP that the actor is ultimately the only "cause" that matters? That seems to be an important criterion when separating incitement from action.

In regard to being "honestly mistaken", how far can that logic be applied when the actor expresses a clear goal in the aftermath? The line between reporting a perception and creating one.

I may be trifling here but I always find it hard to conclude a cause without some very clear, fairly exclusive, reason for the act being caused by whatever is in question. Here, I don't see it. — AmadeusD

Such a reluctance should be equally applied to a claim that all is caused by the choices of a single individual.

If you yell Fire in a crowded theater, but are mistaken, you are not culpable since you believed there was a fire. The resulting fracas and potentially injuries are not on your head, if you truly believed there was a fire. — AmadeusD

If it turns out that the calling out of fire served another purpose, that other purpose will be an intention to consider. That is the basis of Tort law in the U.S.

I think the romantic is involved with exclusivity. That is starkly apparent in sexual relations but has other lives in friendships. The experience of jealousy, envy, and betrayal seems to operate in every landscape. So does the desire to see another be happy for the happiness that brings. Grudges, curses, and blessings seem to have no problem occupying the same space simultaneously. Flirtation has aspects that happen in many places beyond attempts to get laid. When we see that our friends are no longer charmed, a light goes out.

So, I think of the exclusivity of being only for another and vice-versa as a prototype of monogamy. I don't know of any marriages that survive on sex alone.

Passing the Federal Civil Service Exam would be pretty darn objective.

That would account for how the idea has no room for harm to reputation.

Nor can any blame be assigned to slander, deceit, or cheating. In this imagined polity, EJ Carroll can only defame herself. Her telling a person to stop could be a way for the attacker to hear go. Each will only hear the sound of one hand clapping. It would make Hobbe's state of nature look like a knitting club.

You are right to think that this text has been studied carefully. I have a read a lot of Aristotle but this work is not one I have devoted time to. I will look around for attempts to unravel the text.

For Biden to be losing this badly at this point would make no sense if the median voter didn’t broadly agree with my subjective perception. — Chisholm

What higher standard of objectivity could one hope for?

I think this from Zahavi does not fit Kant's view:

"To recognize that all objects appear to us through the lens of some meaning (i.e., are, as Husserl calls them, intentional objects) does not mean that the further course of experience cannot confirm that they are indeed genuinely real objects."

When Kant argues against the 'idealism' of Berkeley and Descartes, the contact with 'real' objects is the immediacy of our outer sense:

Idealism assumed that the only immediate experience is inner experience, and that from that outer things could only be inferred, but, as in any case in which one infers from given effects to determinate causes, only unreliably, since the cause of the representations that we perhaps falsely ascribe to outer things can also lie in us. Yet here it is proved that outer experience is really immediate, *

(The following footnote goes to this sentence)

* The immediate consciousness of the existence of outer things is not presupposed but proved in the preceding theorem, whether we have insight into the possibility of this consciousness or not. The question about the latter would be whether we have only an inner sense but no outer one, rather merely outer imagination. But it is clear that in order for us even to imagine something as external, i.e., to exhibit it to sense in intuition, we must already have an outer sense, and by this means immediately distinguish the mere receptivity of an outer intuition from the spontaneity that characterizes every imagining. For even merely to imagine an outer sense would itself annihilate the faculty of intuition, which is to be determined through the imagination. — Critique of Pure Reason, B276

Trying to gain insight into "the possibility of this consciousness" is going to run afoul of the transcendental illusion discussed at A298 if that is going to require confirming "genuinely real objects." The objectivity of our experience is given. The conditions that make experience possible are beyond us. If reason is to be investigated in a different way, something in Kant's model has to go.

Edit to Add:
Reading the whole review, I see that a distinction is made between Husserl's and Kant's views:

Appealing to a notion of Kantian things in themselves in discussions of realism vs. idealism overlooks the fact that for Kant himself, the things-in-themselves to which we do have access in a positive sense are not the objects that physics describes. — Thomas Neenan

When we discover the indubitable, we've found it. — frank

How do you see that idea expressed in Kant's project?

But what does the way we're bound to think have to do with the way the world actually is? My answer is that Wittgenstein explains that in the Tractatus. What's your answer? — frank

I hear the Tractatus as an anti-explanation. We want what we will never get. Sort of a weird parallel with Kant. But definitely not the same.

If you can't conceive of objects without spatial extension, this shows that you don't learn about space through experience. Knowledge of space and time are a priori. That actually is Copernican! To me, anyway. — frank

In terms of the question of what Kant's view of the limits of empirical knowledge were, it seems to me to be a mistake to see that aligned to any theory of physics. How does one traverse the gap between space and time being posited as intuitions and having those concepts build a model of the world as it "truly" is?

Is it not correct to describe the phenomenal state as a modification of whatever that primordial mass was that that preceded the formation of the phenomena? I use modification and distortion interchangeably here, unless you think that's not a fair move for some reason. — Hanover

I think Kant is saying we would like to answer that question, but we are suffering from a transcendental illusion which will always prevent us from doing so:

The transcendental dialectic will therefore content itself with uncovering the illusion in transcendental judgments, while at the same time protecting us from being deceived by it; but it can never bring it about that transcendental illusion (like logical illusion) should even disappear and cease to be an illusion. For what we have to do with here is a natural and unavoidable illusion a which itself rests on subjective principles and passes them off as objective, whereas logical dialectic in its dissolution of fallacious inferences has to do only with an error in following principles or with an artificial illusion that imitates them.
Hence there is a natural and unavoidable dialectic of pure reason, not one in which a bungler might be entangled through lack of acquaintance, or one that some sophist has artfully invented in order to confuse rational people, but one that irremediably attaches to human reason, so that even after we have exposed the mirage it will still not cease to lead our reason on with false hopes, continually propelling it into momentary aberrations that always need to be removed. — Critique of Pure Reason, Kant, B355, A298

This "passing off as objective" is related to the Analogies of Experience discussed starting from page A176. Kant establishes that the three modi of time are persistence, succession, and simultaneity (page 177). The mode that permits a causal explanation of phenomena is said to be that of simultaneity. The footnote to that section says:

* The unity of the world-whole, in which all appearances are to be connected, is obviously a mere conclusion from the tacitly assumed principle of the community of all substances that are simultaneous: for, were they isolated, they would not as parts constitute a whole, and were their connection (interaction of the manifold) not already necessary on account of simultaneity, then one could not infer from the latter, as a merely ideal relation, to the former, as a real one. Nevertheless we have shown, in its proper place, that community is really the ground of the possibility of an empirical cognition of coexistence, and that one therefore really only infers from the latter back to the former, as its condition. — ibid. A215

As a participant in the U.S. polity, your roll of the dice between candidates does not capture the cultural war happening here.

Whatever one fears or hopes for with a second Trump term, the first is not a good template for the future because there will be less restraint from the team he was saddled with to win party support. I would rather not find out.

This is hitting me right now:

Only compliments? My siblings built me up and tore me down. Both efforts hit the mark.

But your challenge is fair. Will consider.

Listening like that reminds me of the Miranda warning.

"You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can and will be used against you."

Everyone likes options.

How are we to understand 'fiction', as you describe it, as the builder of experiences? If you are appealing to a principle of causality, that sounds more like an ontology.

I understand that view. I thought the OP was asking if there is something to consider beyond that perspective.

Evocative. So that will be counted as a vote of no.

The question of the ultimate conditions constraining what can be known or said about our lives is not a theory, as such. Different theories that propose a closure is possible to answer such a question can be interesting but do not make them less provisional in relation to how little we know.

I agree that views of the 'body' seem to always be in the different narratives. I was taking the Count's remarks about detachment as an invitation to see experiences as a life beyond their various descriptions and that relationship makes comparisons even more difficult than is presented by different theories of the real. I do believe that different practices lead to different experiences, but I am very much limited by what I can attempt as my experiment. The sense of boundaries in this regard does not give me a geography of other places. I question the idea of a global view that would permit such a map. I submit the example of how slippery "materialism" is in different narratives as evidence for my case.

Yes, the nature of the questions show that the Supremes are just narrowing down the basis for rejecting Colorado's ruling.

I was just disappointed that Jackson and Kagan blew off the prerogatives of the States so summarily. Shannon's defense was the only instance where the principle of State's power was put forward as such as a dimension of constitutional law.

Mystical literature is often written precisely to produce such experiences, to insert the experiences of the adept into the head of the reader. But this isn't successful if they are approached in a detached manner. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Plotinus offers a good example of that as his "contemplation" is a training for experiencing beauty. It is interesting how he opposed the Gnostics who had their own set of practices for personal 'liberation.' Different views of struggle in the world frame the experiences. Plotinus says this, for instance:

The All is a single living being which encompasses all the living beings within it. . . . This one universe is all bound together in shared experience and is like one living creature, and that which is far is really near. . . . And since it is one living thing and all belongs to a unity nothing is so distant in space that it is not close enough to the one living thing to share experience. — Ennead 4.4.32

Just finished listening to the oral arguments. One element that I found interesting was how the general concern about disunity of state results expressed by all the Supremes was most succinctly challenged by Colorado attorney Shannon Stevenson who said the existing balance of State and National powers could deal with that messiness.

The point I made is that you are asking for me to 'do my worse' as a matter of debate where the wrong argument is made to seem to be the true one. Plato and Aristotle both relegate that practice to be sophistical diversions.

You brought up the possible harm words can do. Against what measure of benefit is your claim made against? Your response dodges that question.

From the safety of your nihilistic premises, you can neither be harmed nor helped.

For Aristotle, recognizing the harm that words can do requires looking at their possible benefits:

No other of the arts draws opposite conclusions: dialectic and rhetoric alone do this. Both these arts draw opposite conclusions impartially. Nevertheless, the underlying facts do not lend themselves equally well to the contrary views. No; things that are true and things that are better are, by their nature, practically always easier to prove and easier to believe in. Again, (4) it is absurd to hold that a man ought to be ashamed of being unable to defend himself with his limbs, but not of being unable to defend himself with speech and reason, when the use of rational speech is more distinctive of a human being than the use of his limbs. And if it be objected that one who uses such power of speech unjustly might do great harm, that is a charge which may be made in common against all good things except virtue, and above all against the things that are most useful, as strength, health, wealth, generalship. A man can confer the greatest of benefits by a right use of these, and inflict the greatest of injuries by using them wrongly. — Rhetoric, Aristotle, 1355b, translated by Amy Holwerda

The matter of the "listener being the agent of his own persuasion" requires access to a shared world of true events and values for the concept of harm to have meaning. Otherwise, the "listener" is floating in a nihilistic sea of pure self-reference.

An argument against the power of words uses words to make the case for the proposition,

Maybe they will hear it.

One factor in the language of the decision is that it puts the Supreme Court in a difficult position. If the Supremes end up agreeing with it after a drawn-out process, the time taken will stand out as politically motivated. If they come down against the decision on the basis of constitutional parameters, they will have to put forward interpretations that negate the grounds of the DC appeal decision. That language directly addresses the problem of the separation of powers.

I bet the Supreme Court will punt.

The DC Circuit Court of Appeals rules against claim for immunity that has been holding up the Federal election interference trial of Trump and company.

That is a tough one and I have not been wearing shining armor enough times to speak with authority about it.

I have found, in work situations, that saying the phrase without saying the phrase has merit. Connecting with what is honored rather than claiming one has done so. Easier said than done, of course. But if it is impossible then it is a conflict, honor should call it that.

Interesting questions.

Probably perceived as obsessed with certain texts and willing to discuss them way beyond general interest. That is true and can be explained to some degree. I have a chip on my shoulder like the Jude the Obscure character since I engage in scholarly debate but work as an artisan.

I lose my composure on a perennial basis so that has to leave a mark.

For the bonus points: I had friends who readily understood me but by they have died. I appreciate the surviving friends even though they admit they don't understand much of what I say. They don't ask me to stop. Good fortune,

That reminds me of a once oft heard slogan: "Army of One."

I guess 'never' is too much to claim. Strike it from the list.

I have seen a lot of the dark side of it, though.

"With all due respect"?

Yes, I have read Gerson's thesis and some of his essays on Aristotle. We have argued about them for years. A search for "De Anima" in the site search function gives a flavor for the dispute. My question to you was if you see that disagreement only in terms of your objections to 'modern' naturalism.

For my part, the two issues are only connected through a history of interpretation and not through trying to understand Plato and Aristotle on their own terms.