One does not, however, make someone who’s been having some false opinion afterward have some true opinion, for there is no power to have as opinions either things that are not, or other things besides those one experiences, and the latter are always true. But I suppose that when someone with a burdensome condition holding in his soul has opinions akin to his own condition, a serviceable condition would make him have different opinions, of that sort, which latter appearances some people, from inexperience, call true, but I call the one sort better than the other, but not at all truer. — Plato, Theaetetus, 167a, translated by Joe Sachs,
Seeing as how whatever sorts of things seem just and beautiful to a city are those things for it so long as it considers them so, it’s the wise man who, in place of each sort of things that are burdensome for them, induces serviceable things to be and seem so. — ibid,167c
Now if you do this, those who spend their time with you will hold themselves responsible for their own confusion and helplessness, and not you, and they’ll pursue you and love you, but hate themselves and run away from themselves to philosophy, in order to become different people and be set free from what they were before. But if you do the opposite of these things, as most people do, the opposite result will follow for you, and you’ll make your associates show themselves as haters of this business instead of philosophers when they become older. — ibid, 168a
Soc: Well then, Protagoras, we’re also stating opinions of a human being, or rather of all human beings, and claiming that no one at all does not consider himself wiser than others in some respects and other people wiser than himself in other respects, and in the greatest dangers at least, when people are in distress in military campaigns or diseases or at sea, they have the same relation to those who rule them in each situation as to gods, expecting them to be their saviors, even though they are no different from themselves by any other thing than by knowing; and all human things are filled with people seeking teachers and rulers for themselves and for the other animals, as well as for their jobs, and in turn with people who suppose themselves to be competent to teach and competent to rule. And in all these situations, what else are we going to say but that human beings themselves consider there to be wisdom and lack of understanding among them? — ibid, 170b
Soc: Those who’ve bounced around in courts and such places from their youth run the risk, compared with those who’ve been reared in philosophy and that sort of pastime, of being raised like menial servants as against free men. — ibid, 172c
This may be true but more along the idea of the permeating lifeforce imminent in all living beings. — Jack Cummins
With regard to justified true belief, this is a long standing but, in my opinion, incorrect interpretation of the Theaetetus. — Fooloso4
Soc: And it’s totally silly, when we’re inquiring about knowledge, to claim that it’s correct opinion along with knowledge, whether about differentness or about anything whatever. Therefore, Theaetetus, neither perception nor true opinion, nor even an articulation that’s become attached to a true opinion would be knowledge. — Plato. Theaetetus 129b, translated by Joe Sachs
For if a book has been written for just a few readers that
will be clear just from the fact that only a few people understand it. The book must
automatically separate those who understand it from those who do not. Even the
foreword is written just for those who understand the book.
Telling someone something he does not understand is pointless, even if you add
that he will not be able to understand it. (That so often happens with someone you love.)
If you have a room which you do not want certain people to get into, put a lock on
it for which they do not have the key. But there is no point in talking to them about it,
unless of course you want them to admire the room from outside!
The honorable thing to do is to put a lock on the door which will be noticed only
by those who can open it, not by the rest.
– Ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, 7-8
But the members of the dialogue find no way that anything which is commonly called "knowledge" could have the possibility of falsity ruled out. — Metaphysician Undercover
Soc: Therefore, knowledge is not present in the experiences, but in the process of gathering together what’s involved in them, for in the latter, as it seems, there is a power to come in touch with being and truth, but in the former there is no power. — Plato. Theaetetus, 186d, translated by Joe Sachs
Theae: That true opinion is knowledge. Having a true opinion is surely something safe from error at least, and all the things that come from it are beautiful and good. — ibid, 200e
Soc: Then whenever the jurors are justly persuaded about things it’s possible to know only by seeing them and [C] in no other way, at a time when they’re deciding these things from hearing about them and getting hold of a true opinion, haven’t they decided without knowledge, even though, if they judged well, they were persuaded of correct things? — ibid, 201c
The dialogue is concerned only with the lower kinds of cognition, our awareness of the sense-world and judgments involving the perception of sensible objects. — F.M. Cornford, Plato's Theory of Knowledge, page 28
I find it more than persuasive; I'm compelled by it. And why? Because, in the broadest sense, as soon as you appeal to reason then you're already relying on something very like the knowledge of the forms. — Wayfarer
Now the Theaetetus will later have much to say about memory. Why is there no mention of that peculiar impersonal memory of knowledge before birth? There is no ground for supposing that Plato ever abandoned the theory of Anamnesis. It cannot be mentioned in the Theaetetus because it presupposes that we know the answer to the question here to be raise afresh: What is the nature of knowledge and of its objects? For the same reason all mention of the forms is excluded. The dialogue is concerned only with the lower kinds of cognition, our awareness of the sense-world and judgments involving the perception of sensible objects. Common sense might maintain that, if this is not all the 'knowledge' we possess, whatever else can be called knowledge is somehow extracted from such experience. The purpose of the dialogue is to examine and reject this claim of the sense-world to furnish anything that Plato will call 'knowledge'. The Forms are excluded in order that we may see how we can get on without them; and the negative conclusion of the whole discussion means that, as Plato had taught ever since the discovery of the Forms, without them there is no knowledge at all. — F.M. Cornford, Plato's Theory of Knowledge, page 28
Neoplatonist interpretations of Plato continued to dominate until the early modern period. From then on, Neoplatonic readings tended to be displaced by the idea, now almost universally accepted, that Plato was properly to be understood from his own dialogues, not from or through anyone else. It is extraordinary, given how obvious that idea may seem to us, how recent in origin it is. But underlying its emergence is a much more significant switch: from using Plato as a source of ideas to think with to treating him as an object of study. — Christopher Rowe
You care more about mollycoddling the current media darlings than you do about holding the most powerful nation on earth to account. I find that morally bankrupt, but if you're proud of it, there's little I can do about that. — Isaac
An academic approach to Plato would not settle in any one interpretation, but would just explain what we know about the times and the various ways Plato has been interpreted since. — frank
The mirror processes are probably important to ego development — Jack Cummins
Neoplatonism isn't one line of thought. It's any interpretation of Plato that fills in the blanks in a certain way. — frank
Plato’s ontology must remain radically incomplete, limited to but not constrained by what is thought. — Fooloso4
I am wondering about the way in which human identity is established, with potential soliptist or narcissistic aspects. How much are we influenced by others' minds and intersubjective meaning. Buber wrote in, 'I and Thou', how people see thou as God or in the communication with the other. — Jack Cummins
This jubilant assumption of his specular image by the child at the infant stage, still sunk in his motor incapacity and nursling dependence, would seem to exhibit in an exemplary situation the symbolic matrix in which the I is precipitated in a primordial form, before it is objectified in the dialectic of identification with the other, and before language restores it, in the universal, it functions as subject......
These reflections lead me to recognize in the spatial captation manifested in the mirror-stage, even before the social dialectic, the effect in man of organic insufficiency in the natural reality---in so far as any meaning can be given to the word 'nature'.
I am led, therefore, to regard the function of the mirror-stage as a particular case of the function of the imago, which is to establish a relation between the Innenvelt and the Umvelt.
In man, however, this relation to nature is altered by a certain dehiscence at the heart of the organism, a primordial Discord betrayed by the signs of uneasiness and motor unco-ordination of the neo-natal months. The objective notion of the anatomical incompleteness of the pyramidal system and likewise the presence of certain humoral residues of the maternal organism confirm the view I have formulated as the fact of a real specific prematurity of birth in man.......
This development is experienced as a temporal dialectic that decisively project the formation of the individual into history. The mirror stage is a drama whose internal thrust is precipitated from insufficiency to anticipation--And which manufactures for the subject, caught up in the lure of spatial identification, the succession of phantasies that extends from a fragmented body-image to a form of its totality that I shall call orthopaedic ---and lastly, to the assumption of the armour of an alienating identity, which will mark with its rigid structure the subject's entire mental development. Thus, to break out of the circle of the Innenvelt into the Umvelt generates the inexhaustible quadrature of the ego's verifications. — Lacan, Écrits
If the revolution was a staged event, and can be shown to be so, this will undermine the authority of Ukraine as an independent nation.
— Paine
I don't see how. High quality elections have taken place since then. What it proves is the US's meddling in the region. It puts the lie to the idea that the US are only involved because of the Ukrainian people's sovereignty — Isaac
Yep. "always opposed to the previous war, never the current one". That way the war machine can just keep trundling on and everyone gets to pretend they're not supporters. — Isaac
It's often decades after the event that we find out the sort of details you're using the lack of to exculpate the US — Isaac
If there's even the slightest sign that the US are repeating the same abuses of power that we know for a fact they've done before, then it matters that we kick up a hue and cry about it. — Isaac
Hopefully make of it exactly what it said. Hurt feelings are less important that holding power to account. — Isaac
Right now they know can expect nothing but obsequious compliance from the likes of you so long as they don't slip up and release documentary evidence of the master plot in excruciating detail. — Isaac
So on what possible ground is it right to give the most powerful nation on earth the benefit of the doubt here? — Isaac
If they did it, and we let them get away with it, then we've allowed power to dictate foreign governments to suit their needs. — Isaac
If they didn't, and we assume they did, we hurt the feelings of the people who actually brought about the revolution. — Isaac
Indeed. That is why I referred to a famous example to contrast the difference of conditions in Chile and Ukraine.The cases of the US staging coups are more than I care to count. — Tzeentch