Perhaps the problem is I'm not sure what you mean "last exit from the highway of absolute idealism". — Janus

As the concept of knowledge is contained in the self-consciousness of judgment, there can be no account of knowledge that does not represent the subject who knows as understanding herself to do so. An account of knowledge seeks to bring to explicit consciousness the self-knowledge of her who knows; it articulates what is contained in her knowing herself to know. If we are to express in language the self-consciousness of judgment, we need to articulate the idea of a judgment in which and through which she who judges comprehends that judgment to be knowledge, comprehends it to be true to, agree with, reality. This task is rarely confronted in epistemology today. Thomas Nagel and Adrian Moore confront it. We will discuss their thoughts in Chapter 5. While both are oriented by the understanding we have of judgment in judging, they fail to appreciate the significance of this; they fail to appreciate the significance of the self-consciousness of judgment. They hold fast to the notion that the objectivity of judgment resides in its being of something other, something that is as it is independently of being thought to be so. In consequence, their result is an ultimate incomprehensibility of our thought of ourselves as judging and knowing. — SC&O, page 14

According to absolute idealism the world just is the world as experienced by humans—"the rational is the real", so it doesn't seem clear that Rödl is moving beyond absolute idealism. — Janus

There is a major obstacle to the reception of absolute idealism, the history of it and, more importantly, the thought of it: this is the notion that absolute idealism is a species of—idealism. In an appropriately vague and vulgar way, idealism can be represented as the idea that the world, nature, the object of experience, depends on the mind. Reality is mind-dependent. Absolute idealism is the most radical, the most thorough, and the only sound rejection of that. — ibid. page 16

The recent reintroduction of the idea of the power of knowledge into epistemology is a huge step. Yet the idea is confounding. It is confounding on account of the objectivity of judgment. Since judgment is objective, the power of knowledge is not a power to this or that; it is the power, the power überhaupt. And this makes it hard to understand how it can provide for the recognition of the validity of a particular judgment. We make progress as we see that the power of knowledge is not a given power. It is not a power that is as it is anyway, independently of being understood in acts of this very power. (As Aristotle notes, this distinguishes the power of knowledge from powers of sensory consciousness.) As the power of knowledge is nothing given, it is what it is only in its own exercise: it determines itself. The power of knowledge is what is known; it is what we know, or the knowledge (Chapter 8). — ibid. page 17

Perhaps the problem is I'm not sure what you mean "last exit from the highway of absolute idealism". — Janus

I suppose that's understandable. — Arcane Sandwich

I don't agree with you — Arcane Sandwich

Paine I'll only note that the passage quoted is suggestive of the non-duality of mind and world. — Wayfarer

Thomas Nagel and Adrian Moore confront it. We will discuss their thoughts in Chapter 5. While both are oriented by the understanding we have of judgment in judging, they fail to appreciate the significance of this; they fail to appreciate the significance of the self-consciousness of judgment. They hold fast to the notion that the objectivity of judgment resides in its being of something other, something that is as it is independently of being thought to be so. In consequence, their result is an ultimate incomprehensibility of our thought of ourselves as judging and knowing. — ibid. page 14

I think this very close to the thrust of Rödl's arguments, which I presume explains Rödl's focus on Nagel. — Wayfarer

The aim of this essay, as an introduction to absolute idealism, is to make plain that it is impossible to think judgment through this opposition: mind here, world there, two things in relation or not. To dismantle this opposition is not to propose that the world is mind-dependent. Nor is it to propose that the mind is world-dependent. These ways of speaking solidify the opposition; they are an impediment to comprehension. — SC&O, Rödl, page 16

I did add page references in those notes. — Wayfarer

It must be an error to suppose that thought, in order to be objective, must be of something other than itself — Sebastian Rödl

Except Hegel was never such a heart-throb. Gotta say, though, that for me the toughest sell so far in S-C&O is the connection to something genuinely Hegelian. — J

Now the reason why earlier thinkers did not arrive at this method of procedure was that in their time there was no notion of “essence” and no way of defining “being.” — Parts of Animals, 242a 20, translated by Peck and Forster

(See also The Unity of Intellect in Aristotle's D'Anima.) — Wayfarer

That part of the soul, then, which we call mind (by mind I mean that part by which the soul thinks and forms judgements) has no actual existence until it thinks. — De Anima, 429a 16, translated by W.S Hett

But we must also distinguish certain senses of potentiality and actuality; for so far we have been using these terms quite generally. One sense of “instructed” is that in which we might call a man instructed because he is one of a class of instructed persons who have knowledge; but there is another sense in which we call instructed a person who knows (say) grammar. Each of these two has capacity, but in a different sense: the former, because the class (genos) to which he belongs, i.e., his matter (hyle), is of a certain kind, the latter, because he is capable of exercising his knowledge whenever he likes, provided that external causes do not prevent him. But there is a third kind of instructed person—the man who is already exercising his knowledge; he is in actuality instructed and in the strict sense knows (e.g.) this particular A. — ibid. 417a 22

Well, that's what I'm often trying to do, apparently without much success, even though it seems quite clear to me. 'Metaphysical realism' is really just philosophy-speak for direct or naive realism, which phenomenology criticizes as 'the natural attitude' - the world just is as it seems, and if we can learn more about it, it can only be through science. By idealism I'm referring to the usual advocates - Berkeley, Kant, German idealism, and nowadays Bernardo Kastrup. I think there's a reasonably clear core of tenets, isn't there? — Wayfarer

Metaphysical realism is not the same as scientific realism. That the world’s constituents exist mind-independently does not entail that its constituents are as science portrays them. One could adopt an instrumentalist attitude toward the theoretical entities posited by science, continuing to believe that whatever entities the world actually does contain exist independently of our conceptions and perceptions of them. For the same reason, metaphysical realists need not accept that the entities and structures ontologists posit exist mind-independently. — SEP 1

In psychology one may or may not be a behaviourist, but in linguistics one has no choice … There is nothing in linguistic meaning beyond what is to be gleaned from overt behaviour in observable circumstances. - Quine — ibid. 3.2

More precisely, he [Kant] says that the I think must be able to accompany all my representations, for all my representations must be capable of being thought. — J

It is necessary then that mind, since it thinks all things, should be uncontaminated, as Anaxagoras says, in order that it may be in control, that is, that it may know; for the intrusion of anything foreign hinders and obstructs it. Hence the mind, too, can have no characteristic except its capacity to receive. That part of the soul, then, which we call mind (by mind I mean that part by which the soul thinks and forms judgements) has no actual existence until it thinks. So it is unreasonable to suppose that it is mixed with the body; for in that case it would become somehow qualitative, e.g., hot or cold, or would even have some organ, as the sensitive faculty has; but in fact it has none. It has been well said that the soul is the place of forms, except that this does not apply to the soul as a whole, but only in its thinking capacity, and the forms occupy it not actually but only potentially. But that the perceptive and thinking faculties are not alike in their impassivity is obvious if we consider the sense organs and sensation. For the sense loses sensation under the stimulus of a too violent sensible object; e.g., of sound immediately after loud sounds, and neither seeing nor smelling is possible just after strong colours and scents; but when mind thinks the highly intelligible, it is not less able to think of slighter things, but even more able; for the faculty of sense is not apart from the body, whereas the mind is separable. But when the mind has become the several groups of its objects, as the learned man when active is said to do (and this happens, when he can exercise his function by himself), even then the mind is in a sense potential, though not quite in the same way as before it learned and discovered; moreover the mind is then capable of thinking itself. — De Anima, 429a 16, translated by W.S Hett

For instance, when he is explaining what Bone is, he says not that it is any one of the Elements, or any two, or three, or even all of them, but that it is “the logos of the mixture” of the Elements. And it is clear that he would explain in the same way what Flesh and each of such parts is. Now the reason why earlier thinkers did not arrive at this method of procedure was that in their time there was no notion of “essence” and no way of defining “being.” The first to touch upon it was Democritus; and he did so, not because he thought it necessary for the study of Nature, but because he was carried away by the subject in hand and could not avoid it. In Socrates’ time an advance was made so far as the method was concerned; but at that time philosophers gave up the study of Nature. — Parts of Animals, 242a 20, translated by Peck and Forster

Another passage which is traditionally read together with the De Anima passage is in Metaphysics, Book XII, Ch. 7–10.[2] Aristotle again distinguishes between the active and passive intellects, but this time he equates the active intellect with the "unmoved mover" and God. He explains that when people have real knowledge, their thinking is, for a time receiving, or partaking of, this energeia of the nous (active intellect). — ibid.