How absurd that judgement might be needs to be assessed in the context of the differences between criminal and civil law, especially as that regards the application of Tort law. The distinction between compensation and punitive damages is still a loose ball in U.S jurisprudence as explained in this SEP article on
Theories of the Common Law. The matter is described there as:
This entry examines philosophical accounts of tort law, distinguishing its obligations from other types of private legal obligation, and distinguishing its characteristic remedies from the punitive responses of the criminal law and from administrative regulation. It focuses exclusively on tort law within common law systems, that is, legal systems descended from English law, including Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Singapore, the United States. Other legal systems, originating in continental Europe, are usually described as “civilian” systems. They have detailed civil codes covering many of the same issues as the common law of torts. Some civilian systems share many doctrinal features with common-law system; others, particularly France, offer fundamentally different ways of dealing with the same set of interactions and the problems to which they give rise. — Arthur Ripstein
The purposes and justification for distinguishing compensation from 'punitive damages' is easier to measure when the damage is 'in kind.' The Dominion suit against Fox, for example, gave ways to calculate monetary loss. The case was settled so no punitive damages were involved. Punitive damages often become an issue when paying compensation by itself does not stop the defendant from injuring the plaintiff again. Dominion must have satisfied themselves on that score.
The Giuliani case involves monetary consequences that are difficult to calculate. The harm and fear along with the burden of disrepute imposed upon the life of the plaintiffs are incommensurate with any particular financial penalty. If the defendant does not accept that an injury has occurred, the only instrument left to get something from them is with money.
The need for the incommensurate quality of injury and redress is because it is something the defendant can elude responsibility for altogether if not applied. A common example is making the cost of repeating the injury too expensive for an agent to write it off as an expense incurred in the course of doing business.
The problem of arbitrary values being assigned by juries is an ongoing matter for constitutional law. Limited guidance and obscure means of calculation bring challenges to fairness and due process. The argument made by
Mark A. Geistfeld does a good job of showing how this relates to case law. I agree with his proposal as a way to make this process better:
Even if this damages practice passes constitutional muster, the ideal of due process does not disappear. As compared to current practice, the tort system could adopt a more constitutionally defensible method or determining pain-and-suffering damages by being more true to the constitutional values of notice, predictability, and reasoned decision-making. Such a tort system may also be more secure from legislative reforms like the tort-reform bill passed by the U.S. House of Representatives in March 1995, which capped pain-and-suffering damages in a section of the bill entitled "Limitation on Speculative and Arbitrary Damage Awards."8 2
As the issue of pain-and-suffering damages illustrates, the tort system can be guided by the ideal of due process without abandoning its reliance on fairness and individual rights. In a rights-based tort system, damages for pain and suffering provide redress for rights-violations. Money is not equivalent with the right, nor can money represent the value of the pain and suffering. These characteristics of the tort right do not imply that there is no method for determining the appropriate form of redress for a rights-violation. Au tort right creates a corresponding duty of care for the duty-holder. To determine the safety precautions required of the duty-holder, the standard of care must monetize pain-and-suffering injuries. To violate the plaintiff's right, the defendant must have breached the duty of care in a manner that caused injury to the plaintiff, making it appropriate to redress the rights-violation by relying on the way in which the standard of care monetizes the injury. Not only does the nature of the tort right provide a method for determining the amount of damages, it also provides the foundation for a tort award that can be securely defended from constitutional attack — Geistfeld
This above is a roundabout way to say that the damages were not based upon what Rudy could cough up. Probable factors include the lack of full acceptance by Giuliani that injury had occurred. His lawyers argued the damage was less but did not argue how to evaluate it. The decision does not look absurd with the latest move by the Mayor:
The judge later ruled that they were false and defamatory. But now Giuliani is pulling a remarkable public about-face. In an interview outside the courthouse on Monday night, Giuliani claimed that “everything I said about them” — the two women — “is true.”
“Of course I don’t regret it,” Giuliani said. “I told the truth. They were engaged in changing votes.”
When it was pointed out that there remains no proof of that, Giuliani responded, “You’re damn right there is. Stay tuned.” — Aaron Blake