Your efforts are mere exasperations, for those of us who are impatient for the human race to grow up, take hold, and build a better world, which utterly refuses to show deference to any BS threats or guidance from non-existent deities, described via the mouths and writings of nefarious, delusional or frightened humans. — universeness

I can certainly empathize with the desire to build a better world.

And I even believe that people ought not assign supernatural causes to what is natural -- it's one of the tenets of the tetrapharmakos. It causes anxiety to believe that your everday actions have cosmic import, and what's more, they don't have cosmic import. I don't believe in a theology of heaven or hell, nor do I think it likely to really help people live better lives.

But I see allies where you see enemies. I've known too many good people who are deeply motivated by religion, and who are also rational, to discount it -- from activists who are morally badass, to scientists who are rationally badass.

In what way is this different from the moral code of an atheist humanist? — universeness

Would it surprise you to hear that it's not? :D

I've been at pains to point out that we're not enemies, so it shouldn't be.

Give me one of YOUR examples of a theistic claim, that might be made by a non-literal theist?

I'm not comfortable here because... well... I'm not?

And I'm trying to point out how the appeal is not an epistemic game or debate.

So what is it concerned with that is representative of theism? — universeness

From my vantage it seems like a way of life, more than anything. People know where they are, where they're going, and their place in the world. It brings them meaning to their life. Those are the concerns.

God is love, still posits a prime mover that created this universe as an act of it's will. — universeness

Not really. God is love, and the church is its people -- it's a communitarian ethos. And it's not really conceptual in the sense of making a claim. The evidence would be in how the people treat others rather than in a game of epistemic justification or textual analysis.

I'd say that's a literal claim, and then we're in the literalism camp.

Then what is the difference between the bible and any other book of old stories? — DingoJones

Probably historical.

We have other ancient books that fulfill similar roles to the Bible. It's ancient wisdom literature, which tends to mish-mash concepts and even kinds of stories which we hold distinct today.

And I certainly wouldn't say the Bible gets to be the only book in that category. The reason we focus on it here has more to do with cultural history, I think.

why not rely on all the other much better quality books that have improved and expanded on everything the bible has to teach us? — DingoJones

I wouldn't speak against reading more. And, more importantly, the types of people who usually advocate for non-literal interpretations are usually open to reading more books. It's the theistic literalists that tend to focus on the Bible as a singular source of wisdom.

What conviction level do you personally assign to the proposal that the supernatural has one or more existents? — universeness

None. Though I'll note I don't think "supernatural" stands up to scrutiny, here it's a non-starter because this is looking for what is true and what exists, when the non-literal interpretation isn't concerned with either.

So why not recommend the final step and recommend that if you are a theist or you are religious or you are a theosophist then you are irrational, as you are conflating fables and myth with reality. The supernatural has no demonstrated existent and never has had. If you agree with that then WE agree. — universeness

I don't think that follows. Especially if one is using the text non-literally -- then that person is being pretty explicit about what is real and what is myth, rather than conflating the two.

It certainly does. If it does anything, it emphasizes difference in the interpretation of "interpretation". The difficulty is that sometimes interpretations sometimes exclude each other - or seem to. They certainly reflect different presuppositions and different interests.

I suspect two different uses of interpretation here. One is a use in which interpretations do not exclude each other; each is valid or invalid on its own terms. The other is a use in which a rule is applied to a case. (Yes, I'm channelling Wittgenstein). Each application of a rule is an interpretation, so it may be applied in different ways. Sometimes, we can agree that the rule might be applied in different ways; then we seek a "ruling". But if the rule is to have any meaning, we need to be able to say that one way of applying the rule is right and another is wrong.

It seems to me that the conviction that one has the right, correct, true answer is the source of dogma, and consequently the most pernicious view. I don't think that atheism or religion are necessarily pernicious, it is the conviction that does the harm.

Yet, if there is any truth to be found in this chaotic world, and even if there is none, one has to take a stand somewhere. How can one do that and avoid becoming dogmatic? — Ludwig V

This is great stuff.

I think keeping your question open is a good aporetic point. I am tempted to answer, but as I do I am unsatisfied with my answers. At least the ones I've attempted so far.

A reflection though: I wouldn't want to lump all conviction together as dogmatic because then we'd become Buridan's Ass. And I'm not sure what conviction is other than believing that one has the right, correct, or true answer. But there is this other side of conviction which seems equally undesirable, where we blind ourselves to the views of others, or cease to listen to people, or stop questioning.

I agree that neither a/theism is pernicious, all unto itself, though. Generally I prefer to promote tolerance of others on the basis that we can't know these things. Maybe that's the better route towards understanding dogmatism critically.

If none of these biblical stories are to be taken literally, then perhaps the story of god should not be taken literally, — universeness

I think you're inadvertently agreeing with me here :D

Yes, that's what a non-literal interpretation of the Bible would indicate, wouldn't it?

Hence why talking about God as a literal being who exists like a sky wizard who punishes children for making fun of their elders by feeding them to bears is to miss the point. (honestly it sounds like a story one might tell a child to make them fear, and thereby act like they respect, their elders -- these are ancient stories from a time long past, after all. We have no idea what the original context really was)

The confusion is understandable because there's a lot of theists who basically go along with the literalist interpretation. But, in this case, since literalism is being put out to pasture, these are non-starters.

Interesting. Talking snakes is one thing. But dismissing the existence of Jesus would undermine Christianity, surely? How many practicing Christians would there be who think Jesus never lived? If everything comes down to compelling stories rather than truth then Hamlet or David Copperfield may was well be worshiped (actually I think Harold Bloom did just that). — Tom Storm

I'm not sure of the Christian demographic, but the Universalist Unitarian church has been on my mind as an example of a church organization that doesn't put emphasis on the literal truth of scripture -- it even allows multiple faiths within its structure. I've gone to some non-denominational churches which were similar in their emphasis that the story of Jesus is a transformative story which centers love -- and God is love.

Hamlet or David Copperfield sort of do fit within a holy pantheon of literature :D -- we sort of worship them, but in this different way that's more revering than as a supplicant to them. (though I have to mention -- future isolated society organized around Hamlet religiously sounds like a Trek episode)

In the United States I think this is more a minority position, but I'd prefer it weren't. I'd prefer more people treated the texts like historical objects with stories from a time far away from now and relate to them at a emotive, rather than literal, level. Non-literalists always seem more peaceful to me.

The film seems to be a piece of post-modern pop, a hybrid of mythology and film history styles, so anything you want you will probably find in it - from pirate movie tropes to Cold War metaphors. :smile: — Tom Storm

it'd seemed back in '77 that Star Wars was only a corny mashup of 1930s' era Buck Rogers, Flash Gordon, Wizard of Oz & bad samurai flicks ... — 180 Proof

The interesting part is the hold it has had on culture. — Tom Storm

I'll offer the Marxist theory of Star Wars' hold (40 second mark didn't hold with the embedded link)



But I believe there's also aesthetic reasons, more to do with film and pop-culture, that made Star Wars blow up the way it did. It's definitely a mish-mash of a lot of ideas, and it's neither the plot nor the characters that hold it together (I think the actors other than Mark manages well enough with actor charisma, though). I'm told that the editing on the film is supposed to have made a huge difference in comparison to the script, but I haven't done the dig on that.

Otherwise: Lucas was a master of merchandising on the moment! :D

I'm familiar with Richard Carrier.

The truth of the stories isn't at issue, though. Carrier reads the Bible with a historian's interpretation. This is one (very interesting!) way of reading the Bible.

But it's not the only way.

I've mentioned throughout that it's partly the fault of literalist theists who insist on the truth of the scriptures that this is a common line of attack. Many an atheist, and I include myself in this group, has been dissuaded byof theological convictions on the basis of literal interpretations of scripture being a central part of a particular community.

It's just that the group of my birth isn't representative of the whole tradition of scriptural interpretation. People read these things for a reason, even after figuring out that it's a story. And if we're convicted physicalists, then it's fascinating that a literal work of fiction holds more meaning for so many people than the entire library of Nature (the literal publication, not the metaphorical book of nature).

So to insist on the truth of talking snakes or the existence of Jesus is to miss out on what makes these stories compelling.

I think I'm still alright with using the term, while accepting that it's necessarily vague -- there's an upshot there in that it's worth setting out what one means in talking about dogma.

And so far I think I've been clear enough in agreeing that a literal interpretation of the scriptures when a non-literal interpretation is offered is dogmatic. Pointing out that snakes cannot talk in response to a non-literal interpretation of the fall of man really seems to miss the point. (unless you're dealing with someone who insists on its truth -- which is common! -- but in this OP that's clearly not an issue)

I don't have an issue with that. But there is another point to take into account. Some people talk about "hinge" propositions - ideas around which the debate turns, but which are never the focus of debate. I don't understand the ins and outs of this idea. A related idea is that of conceptual or grammatical propositions. Most people are happy to talk about analytic or a priori propositions. These relate to the language in which debate is carried on or to the ideas that frame the debate.

However that may be, for a debate to occur, there needs to be an agreement about what is at issue and what isn't and what counts as evidence or argument. These things are not dogmas merely because they are not at stake. They can be challenged at any time, but that amounts to changing the subject and that's the difference.

My point is that these are also protected, but legitimately. On the other hand, they can be challenged at any time, and to refuse such a challenge would be dogmatic.

Following this a little further, "dogma" used to mean simply doctrine or principle, but it now has a a value built in to it, so it means something like unreasonable resistance to a reasonable challenge (where what is reasonable can itself be open to challenge). That's my basic point. Unfortunately, one person's dogma is another person's evident accepted truth. So I wouldn't necessarily feel upset if someone called me dogmatic. I might just feel that the discussion was over and about to degenerate into abuse. — Ludwig V

True. And there's a sense in which looking for The Definition of something as vague as dogma, with its evaluative and emotive dimension, is foolish. It's not a precise word. As the various ideas put forward show! :D -- and you're right that dogma isn't necessarily bad, and just because something is unquestioned or in the background that also doesn't make it dogma. Which complicates identifying someone else's dogma even more!

Cool.

But in practice? Not many keep the literal fire alight, and you can see the Christian themes still? (Christians are guilty of being derivative... )

Fair.

But redemption from the darkness?

I have now downloaded a pdf, but I have no plans for it. Just to be honest. Tho I'm interested....

That's super interesting to me that it has resonances across religious experiences, too. Maybe there's a more general pattern which particular social groups could relate to?

I can see The Force being inspired by Taoism in the original film, but even there it feels like a Christian interpretation of Taoism, to me: the visuals make it clear that the empire is evil and the accents make it clear that USians should relate to the good guys. The Good vs. Evil plot, I think, is what makes me think of Christianity in particular, especially with regards to choice. Taoism isn't as much about choosing good things, as I understand it, but about finding your place in the universe. But Christianity is all about choosing the Good Things -- as Luke implores Darth to do, and succeeds. (tho, thinking on that more literally, it *is* a reverse Christianity in that the son redeems the father)

Damnation and hell isn't as emphasized, but neither is that as emphasized in more liberal interpretations of Christianity. (more liberal = you live the creed not because hell will hurt forever)

I think that emphasis upon factual knowledge comes in some portion from the emphasis upon the confession of belief that is expressed through creeds. Contrast the significance of repeating the Nicene creed with providing an offering to Athena at her temple. Athena is not testing if you have a correct set of beliefs. She might help you if you honor her properly. — Paine

I agree. My own departure from The Rod of Truth involved both factual and emotive forces. The factual bits were important because they made me feel like I had a point, and they were also important because people would insist that this or that is true.

I don't think this quite counts as dogma though. This is more emotive narrative and personal. Maybe it's such a common feeling that it's dogma in the sense that we want to protect it, and believe it? Which would surprise me.

One thing I'd change is your opening question. Molecular biology, gene therapy, genetics and such aren't the same as Eugenics. I think this link goes over Eugenics well enough in differentiating between the racist social movement, and questions of bioethics.

For myself, I tend to believe in a non-hierarchical medical model. So a lot of these questions would be answered by informed consent. There wouldn't be a line to draw in the sand as much as everyone would have to draw their own line.

Did you grow up in the U.S. South? Mormons have historically been especially disfavored in that region, although that is changing. — Hanover

I was more midwest, but we spent some time in both Kentucky and Texas too -- it may have been in those states. The memory is too vague to remember exactly where it was at.

I'm sure there are many varieties of dogmatic atheism and one of them may be anti-scientific. But I think science is not exempt from dogmatism quite apart from the atheistic variety. Dogmatism is a tendency (!) in people, including scientific people to protect what they believe in, and there is a temptation to rule difficult questions out of court because they are inconvenient and to confuse that motive with more respectable justification for rejecting a question. I would agree that it's not part of what science should be. But then, one needs agreed starting-points to start any research. Is temporary or provisional dogmatism ok? — Ludwig V

Fair, this makes sense to me. Science ought not be dogmatic, but it's done by people so it, too, can be subject to this human tendency. And many a scientist has gone to their grave defending an abandoned theory -- scientific change happens because new scientists are born, not because people change their minds. So I'm definitely painting an ideal picture rather than a real one in saying dogmatism is anti-scientific.

This is a new feature of dogmatism that hasn't been mentioned yet: dogmatism as a tendency to protect a belief. Maybe to combine two theories put forward, yours and @Wayfarer 's -- dogmatism is a tendency in human beings to protect the regular form of an accepted principle. And dogma is whatever is being protected.

Then the atheist dogma would just be those beliefs which atheists tend to accept and want to protect. Similarly so with any other person.

Here the commonly accepted bit of dogma is literalism of scripture -- interpreting scripture with respect to factual truth. I don't know if this is a principle as much... but there is a tendency among atheists to interpret scripture with an eye towards factual knowledge. Maybe not quite a principle? But close enough to count as dogma, for my purposes at least, which is to avoid becoming dogmatic.

I've often wondered if Mormons are protestants. They were born out of the early 1800's American rise in religion, but they were also ultimately driven out by protestants too. Accepting them back into the fold of Christianity, which does seem to have happened from my vantage now, is a relatively recent phenomena -- I recall Christians handing out anti-Mormon literature growing up.

Dogma is not only religious. 'The central dogma of molecular biology is a theory stating that genetic information flows only in one direction, from DNA, to RNA, to protein, or RNA directly to protein.' Political orthodoxies have their dogmas, as do many other disciplines - Soviet Communism was notoriously dogmatic. Dogma is simply the regular form of an accepted principle or axiom. In itself it is not necessarily problematic, but becomes so when it is allied with authoritarianism, which is often is. — Wayfarer

This is probably a better, more neutral way of putting dogma. But I'll protest on the central dogma -- I had the thought and put it down because the central dogma is pedagogic. Everyone knows that it's not strictly true, so it doesn't really fit in the same way. It's almost the opposite of dogma -- called that because it's useful for students who are beginning to learn, but known that it will be disbelieved in the long run if the student keeps studying.

But "Dogma is simply the regular form of an accepted principle or axiom" -- I think I'd switch out "axiom" for "belief", because I don't think dogma is a part of formal systems of inference. Or, at least, that would be very strange if it were (harkening back to the myths of Pythagoras) -- but that works for me too. And it's a more value-neutral way of putting it, which I think is important if there's to be a way of talking about dogmatic tendencies which can be shared by either atheists or theists.

I have mixed feelings about Star Wars. I now have little interest in new Star Wars productions, but growing up it was great.

And I always have that love of historical things, but this one is different because it has nostalgia attached -- so it doesn't have the same feel as other historical things.

I think there's a Christian bent to Star Wars, but that may just be my upbringing -- the thoughts I have on it though: Darth Vader as example of a person who has been corrupted and now comes out on the other side a good person, redeemed. Like a baptism. Without the prequels, there was golden age from which humanity had fallen, at least according to the old religious mythos (itself a Christian belief about being outcast in a world dominated by science). The focus on trusting your feelings, at least in the protestant sense of Christianity, accords with the personal experience theology of some Christians.

Also, the whole farm-boy to savior arc has Jesus all over it.

That's so... epistemic. Gross. :D

Our two theories of dogma could align. Also, I'm open to changing mine. I mostly just wanted to open up a conversation on what we mean by dogma, since it seemed important to understanding one another. What do we mean by dogma?

The way I'd rephrase mine to be as short as yours -- dogma is a primary belief in a web of beliefs that fulfills an important social function that is not truth-functional.

Is it something like "the importance of truth is not at issue" (which I agree with)? — Ludwig V

Yes! Not an abandonment of truth or anything like that, only a difference in emphasis. One can believe, for instance, that Jesus did not rise from the dead, and yet believe that the Christian way of life is a good way of life regardless, and feel a connection to it through the stories and community.

The power of the stories to enhance people's lives and give them meaning -- that's what's important. And upon finding out they are somewhat fantastical stories that doesn't mean one has to put down what is good in them.

With ancient texts I'd say that this is close to a kind of truth. Not the kind of truth we mean when talking about the fact/value distinction, or the kind of truth we mean when talking about propositions -- but this more fuzzy notion of truth that dithers facts with values.

But surely it's obvious that what is true - whether a particular proposition is true or not and even which propositions are capable of truth or falsity - is often at issue?

Well, yes.

And truth is still important.

There's just more to these texts than a literal grouping of facts. They are products of the human imagination and will, and so speak to those parts of us.

It seems to me that the distinction between religion and science is usually over-simplified. Religion often includes claims that are supposed to be facts about the world which provides what is most important to it - an account of the world that provides purpose and meaning - I prefer structure - to life. Science includes ideas about what is valuable, primarily truth, of course, but a great deal about how to live life, what is worth pursuing and how it is to be pursued (which, of course, is the stock in trade of religion). Incidentally, how far modern capitalism is an outcome of science is unclear to me, but I would like to think that alternative outcomes of the primacy of science are available. — Ludwig V

I agree that the distinction between religion and science is usually over-simplified. There are overlapping concerns of both human practices. As science has become more predominant (I don't know about primacy, but the church certainly doesn't have the primacy it once did either) so religion has changed. The literal truth of the scriptures is often very important to people, and that literal truth cannot be preserved in the face of a scientific worldview.

But for some that literal truth is entirely missing the point.

For that viewpoint I think I can see what @unenlightened is getting at. Atheists have a dogma, and that dogma is that scripture must be interpreted in accord with scientific truth.

But surely that's false.

I'll also note that with the preponderance of biblical literalists who are theists there's something understandable in taking this tactic. There are dogmatists who are theists, too. The version of Un's story which is more sympathetic to the atheist points out that this dogmatism was transferred from the theistic literalists to the atheistic literalists, which is often the case.

But anything that provides a basis for a way of life and justifies certain practices and is available to large numbers of people, is going to find lots of different kinds of people amongst its followers. So whatever was originally proposed or recommended is going to find different tendencies developing. So all religions have fundamentalist tendencies, liberal tendencies, intellectual tendencies, practical tendencies, missionary tendencies, quietist tendencies, and on and on. That includes the way(s) of life that exist around science. So I'm inclined to see dogmatic atheism as a tendency within the practice of science which is bound to develop.

I find grand narratives like the conflict between religion and science very difficult. They tend to evaporate when looked at too closely.

I agree that the grand narratives evaporate upon close inspection. It's too big to make anything but a hasty generalization

I like your notion of tendencies. I'm not sure that I'd put dogmatic atheism with science -- usually my feelings on dogmatic atheism is that it's anti-scientific. But the notion of tendencies is really helpful, I think, in this conversation in particular between all of us. Dogmatism as a tendency that spans the human spectrum means that neither theist nor atheist are somehow exempt from that tendency. Under this rather idealistic model it's the theist that should be most concerned about theistic dogmatism, and the atheist that should be most concerned about atheistic dogmatism.

It X a dogma when X is demonstrably true? I don't think so. — 180 Proof

Isn't this the pattern pointed out in the OP?

I think I'd accept that dogma is truth-apt, and therefore can be true -- at least insofar that it's a declarative belief.

So a piece of Christian Dogma may be "Jesus Christ rose from the dead". What makes this dogma? I think I'd say that its position within the web of beliefs is what makes it dogma -- it's the sentence that, if you flip its truth-value, you also flip the truth value of a large section of beliefs which holds the way of life together.

And then there's a social component to dogma, which I suspect is how we all excuse our own beliefs as not-dogmatic. Insofar that we subject them to questioning, we might say, then our beliefs are not dogmatic. But I'm not sure. Because of the social nature of belief, in terms of enactment, the act of questioning doesn't really change dogmatic activities. There's this other, non-truth value which keeps the dogma attractive: which is a way of life.

So the ancient texts, if we follow Alasdair Macintyre, don't have a strong fact/value distinction -- and for those reasonable theists who do care about such things, they'll integrate the values that are important with the facts as we learn them. That's part of the tradition is to re-interpret the ancient texts with respect to how one lives in an everchanging world.

Does that make it clear nowhow truth, while important, isn't at issue?

All the bad religious shit listed by may or may not be caused by ideas -- but the idea of the OP is a pattern of thought some atheists adopt.

The OP is strictly speaking about atheist dogma, rather than the other dogmas.

I'd say there's a fair pattern of thought in the OP. Not that this is a good way of thinking, but rather it is a dogmatic way of thinking.

No claims on causes -- but atheists create ideas, including ideas about fundamentalism. This is how I read the OP.

1. Make a strong fact/value distinction, as per Hume.
2. Establish the scientific method with truth as the only and unquestionable value. — unenlightened

I might eliminate point one in favor of point two. Point one is where the philosophically interesting action is at, at least as I can tell, but I think point two is a far more common point of atheist dogma, and that it is frequently not even viewed as dogma -- making it behave more like an ideology and a dogma in that it's unquestioned by many. And the philosophy has already been written on the questions of science, at least at this level of comprehension -- 20th century analytic philosophy made some great inroads into understanding the beast that is science. But it doesn't look like the pure method of unquestionable truth and value when it comes out after the process of questioning.

Yet even theists will treat it like that.

Is this a misunderstanding between "common" and "consensus"?

It's been more than a minute since I read Chalmers, but even on the 2nd page:

An intermediate sort of lightweight realism has also developed, holding that while there are
objective answers to ontological questions, these answers are somehow shallow or trivial, perhaps reflecting conceptual truths rather than the furniture of the world. Deflationary views of this sort have been developed by Hirsch (1993; this volume), Thomasson (this volume), Wright and Hale (2001; this volume), and others. These views contrast with what we might call the heavyweight realism of Fine, Sider, van Inwagen, and others, according to which answers to ontological questions are highly nontrivial, and reflect the ultimate furniture of the world

Which would support the notion that there's no consensus.

But "common", as in held by some prominent persons, sure.

Common for whom?

I don't know the domain you mean.

A joke version of the question: how are a priori synthetic judgments of a priori synthetic knowledge possible?

(I'm not being at my most systematic here, I'm afraid, but luckily this *is* the lounge.) — Dawnstorm

:) no worries. I put it here for that reason -- there's something-ish there, but I am also not being systematic. More floating and grasping.

That was wonderful.

I'd say an A does not definitely represent more knowledge than an F -- for instance, if one grades on a standard curve such that there will always be a person who gets an F and always be a person who gets an A the grading system forces people into a grade rather than measures knowledge because the teacher believes it fairest. Grades are awarded on a basis of merit, which in turn requires a standard -- but the standard is never the same between classes, or even between teachers.

What's more, in a comparison between persons I wouldn't ask what someone's grade was or their respective GPA's -- these things are very much a feature of our social world wanting hierarchies associated with merit and less to do with what people know. In a workplace no one cares what grades someone got, they only care that the person is competent.

In a way -- in order for us to posit a grade scale we already have to be able to make this judgment about how knowledgeable someone is.

I come from a sociology background; this sounds rather... mundane? — Dawnstorm

I think that likely. :)

Quantifying innumerable things is what sociologists have always done. But they don't usually do it for the sake of it; there's a research question that drives how to quantify things.

I've once been asked, on the street, to test new recipees for orange juice. They'd ask questions about how much I liked the taste, colour, etc., and they provided me with a ordinal scale from 1 to 10. Oh goody. The ordinal scale made sense. I mean, the minimal ordinal scale would be: (1) don't like, (2) like. It's an ordinal scale, because we value (2) more (I won't buy juice I don't like). What's not there is a stable distance between (1) and (2). It's just an order.

The minimal ordinal scale isn't very thorough, though, and judging can become kind of arbitrary for so-so cases, which might fall in either slot, depending on mood. So maybe something like this (1) yuk, (2) meh, (3) yum.

Or maybe (1) get this away from me, (2) if it's all there is, (3) maybe sometimes, if I'm in the mood, (4) yeah, that's good, (5) MUST HAVE!

Go higher than (5) and the accuracy of the scale falls apart, because it's really hard to even figure out what the bullet points mean. — Dawnstorm

So one of the things that's different here is that with sociology you're interested in the opinions of others, at least in this form of numeration. So with the orange juice research they were probably interested in which orange juice formula would sell more, and hoping that if they test it out in small batches with opinion surveys they can find which formulation might sell better.

There's no such question with respect to numerating knowledge. At least, if I were to come up with a scale for knowledge then I wouldn't ask people's opinions about it. Knowledge isn't opinion-relative, unlike the example of using numbers to give an order to how much someone likes something or doesn't like something.

At least with the orange juice example you can say what 1 and 2 and 3 mean -- Good, meh, and bad. In a way it's more of a counting exercise where there are three sets of persons and you're asking people to classify themselves into one of the sets as the operation of counting.

But what possible operation of counting would there be for quantifying knowledge that actually somewhat tracks with what we intend when we make a judgment that a person has more or less knowledge than something else?

(also, is knowledge the sort of thing that can only be judged by comparison? I.e., it is more or less, but not numerated, even in an ordered sense)

So, yeah, knowledge is probably best described as an ordinal scale. It doesn't meet the requirements for an interval scale. And how you quantify it depends on what you want to know, and how you can fruitfully measure it. — Dawnstorm

So let's just take the example problem of comparison, since we're on the same page there -- we agree that we can make a comparison between persons and have a vague but still true idea that someone is more or less knowledgeable within a particular discipline in comparison to another person within that same discipline.

So would the operation of counting be relative to some kind of expert who knows more? Such that the comparative judgment is also relative to a third person, a judge or expert?

Interesting: could you elaborate more an this distinction between a proposition being "objectively true" vs. "objectively good"? I do not fully understand what that entails. — Bob Ross

This is where I lose the plot, and hence why I favor moral anti-realism out of laziness. I could make something out of this distinction, but I can't tell if it's better or worse or what... but it's the sort of thing that I think would be interesting at least because the division between truth/good at least sets it aside as a moral realism that doesn't just reduce to a form of Platonism.

Very interesting: so, to you, a moral judgment can exist without being true or false and whether it is true or false can be later provided by a will? Is that the idea? — Bob Ross

Yup.

No comment on anything else, but I wanted to say you got it.

What a talent. Amazing to hear all that from one guitar

I am a naturalist in the sense that I do think we are all a part of one, natural reality though; I just don't think that that justifies claiming that the propositions who's truthity is relative to (a) will(s) is somehow objective in virtue of our will's being a part of nature. — Bob Ross

I'm not sure that a fixated upon virtue is something I'd say relies upon a will. Making the virtue true -- that part takes a will. But if goodness is somehow a natural pattern, in a similar way to procreation being a natural pattern (the desire to procreate isn't exactly something one wills) -- then the objectivity comes from it being apart from our will.

Such and such a moral proposition -- whatever form we decide is best(virtues, rules, or consequences) -- could be objectively good, if not objectively true. (Or we could also drop objective/subjective as a distinction and instead focus on the belief that there are real morals, as opposed to objective morals)

Do you see how this is different from the usual notion of will, which generally revolves around making choices?

I want to clarify that my commitment to fixating upon what is of my nature is not itself an objective moral judgment. I don’t think that a metaethical theory that simply contains the obligation to what is one’s nature is thereby a form of moral realism. — Bob Ross

I'd counter here and say that a metaethical theory in conjunction with a metaphysical theory of naturalism is what makes that fixation a form of moral realism.

The metaphysical claim of naturalism is what girds it. If you're a naturalist, what could be more objective than your nature?

I am not sure if I entirely understood your second post, but let me try to adequately respond. If someone acts as though “P is good”, that does not thereby make P objectively good (although, arguably, it may be subjectively good). A normative judgment is objective iff the proposition (that expresses it) has a truthity that is will-independent. If the truthity, on the other hand, is indexical, then it is subjective. — Bob Ross

Right! So the truthity of a fixation is your nature, and since nature is all that is real, it's a form of moral realism. It's not like you got to will your nature -- you were born human.