I'm still struggling slowly through "Question and Answer". — Jamal

Oh yes much more can be said on each of the sections. I sort of jumped ahead because the text started to flow, but in that way where I'm just seeing one pattern -- i.e. if something didn't quite click I let it go to keep going and move with the thoughts as I was perceiving them.

Just noting it as a mark for where we're at roughly. (I've found myself rereading each of the sections multiple times so far in our reading group and never regretting the reread like it was a waste of time. the text is very dense, in the good way)

(In no way equating marriage to murder, btw. :grin: ) — javra

Well, not today at least. There are times...

That said, again, my interest here is in what Epicurus himself taught.

I'm interested in that too. And in helping people to understand the philosophy generally. I had mistaken your counters to @180 Proof for what they are.

But

I can concede there. Still, improper expressions can all too easily lead to improper interpretations and the misinformation that can then follow. I do like your general rendition of Epicureanism, though. — javra

Hard to argue with that, isn't it? :D Thank you.

Whether the rendition is correct: I know more needs to be said, which is why I began with the tripartite theory of desire, but the down-and-dirty version of what is good and what is bad -- which the philosophy itself sort of doesn't pursue at all -- made sense to me. It's not like it's easy to summarize these ancient philosophies so they're digestible.

As to the quote you presented, please notice that I did not state that "romantic love always leads to unnecessary pains" or something similar whereby it is "a bad/wrong onto itself", but that it is best shunned because in most cases, aka typically, it does — javra

Sure, makes sense. Though I'd put it that this was the man speaking more than the philosophy -- yes, Epicurus the man cautioned against it. But the Epicureans calmly went about doing it anyways as evidenced by the continuity of the texts from Epicurus' time to Cicero and Lucretius. How to explain that?

For one thing, I don't agree with Epicurus that everyone ought to be an ascetic like he was. For starters, just because most cases of romantic love lead to pains that would not have otherwise occurred does not to me entail that therefore romantic love ought to be shunned by one and all as a form of wisdom. — javra

Is the part that made me think so, along with the other two examples you meant to counter @180 Proof's summary with.

It occurs to me that we may just be disagreeing on what constitutes a good enough summary -- I read your examples as something which were counter to Epicureanism in addition to @180 Proof's rendition, but is that wrong? You're disagreeing with Epicurus, in one sense of with the man himself, and you're disagreeing with 180, in the sense that his rendition is incorrect?

But, in point of fact, in “not really” concluding that you are then concluding that peer-reviewed quotes such as this with scholarly references are erroneous.

Epicurus actively recommended against passionate love and believed it best to avoid marriage altogether. He viewed recreational sex as a natural, but not necessary, desire that should be generally avoided.[38]
— https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epicureanism#Ethics — javra

I do not think that scholarly reference is erroneous. That's why I said:

If it be a romantic love in the sense of Romanticism -- full of pathos and self-justifying -- then that sort of love I think Epicureanism is opposed to. But Epicureans did marry and have children, even if The Master did not. So there must be a kind of sexual love that was generally deemed as OK. Even if there be a honeymoon phase that fades away -- that's only natural. — Moliere

Yes, there's a kind of love Epicurus cautions against. No, that does not mean that marriage is a bad unto itself.

Rather it's a natural, unnecessary desire -- Epicurus didn't want to marry, but that does not then mean that marriage is bad.

I then take it that you find Epicurus wrong in his stance that romantic ("passionate") love, and marriage, are to be generally shunned. — javra

Not really -- I'm giving an exposition of what I think a reasonable Epicurean response to your example. As in Epicurus wouldn't say "Do not marry", but would instead contextualize your action back to why you're doing what you're doing. Romantic love is not to be generally shunned -- it's not a bad unto itself. It depends upon why you're motivated towards it.

If it be a romantic love in the sense of Romanticism -- full of pathos and self-justifying -- then that sort of love I think Epicureanism is opposed to. But Epicureans did marry and have children, even if The Master did not. So there must be a kind of sexual love that was generally deemed as OK. Even if there be a honeymoon phase that fades away -- that's only natural.

You seem inclined to defend and uphold Epicurus's doctrine. — javra

I'm willing to play the apologist in order to increase understanding.

OK Can you then comment on your own stance as regards romantic love being a general wrong as per Epicurus's convictions?

Sure.

The outline of desire to which @180 Proof wrote needs further specification to address why, though.

There are three kinds of desires: the fulfillable and the unfulfillable, and that which falls in-between. Or another way to put the same categories: the natural and necessary, the unsatisfiable, and the natural and unnecessary desires.

Romantic love in this division falls under "natural and unnecessary"; one may live a content life without it, and one may live a content life with it -- the important part is to live a content life. Similarly so with the marathon runner: If someone is taking on the pains to run marathons out of the pleasure of running a marathon then there's nothing wrong with pursuing a natural, unnecessary pleasure (unnecessary here because one need not run marathons to live a content life). What would be in error, though, would be to run marathons out of a fear of death because no matter what you do you'll die, and then the entire time you're here all you did was spend time pursing that fear.

To put that latter part in terms of the lover: imagine the person who never settles down because every real person doesn't satisfy them from the vantage of "The One" -- when, really, there is no "The One", there's a relationship you can build with someone who wants similar things out of their life.

It's not that we must avoid pains -- it's that we shouldn't be the cause of our own mental anguish; the pains aren't so bad as they stand, and the pleasures are not so alluring that we need to punish ourselves for not obtaining them.

OK, I don't though. For one thing, I don't agree with Epicurus that everyone ought to be an ascetic like he was. — javra

I want to mark a distinction here: @180 Proof's description of the good/bad pleasures is accurate to Epicureanism is what I mean -- as in, descriptively, this is what Epicurus says are the good/bad pleasures in a rough-and-ready way.

With your examples what I'm saying is that the Epicurean ethic can handle them. So with:

For starters, just because most cases of romantic love lead to pains that would not have otherwise occurred does not to me entail that therefore romantic love ought to be shunned by one and all as a form of wisdom.

And your example of the marathon runner, and your example of the altruistic firefighter.

It's not that all marathon runners, firefighters, or lovers are bad. It's the ones who run marathons for glory, heroes that save people for praise, and lovers that possess their object of love that the Epicurean philosophy is aiming at.

So it's not that marathons are bad -- it's the character of the person who is running marathons in order to achieve immortality that's causing themself to be miserable.

Maybe this is all differences of opinion. So be it then.

Oh, of course it does in some way, though we can still offer reasons and such for the opinions and attempt to pursue what's good, or at least enjoy reflecting for awhile.

But my post was in direct relation to how Epicureanism was outlined by 180 Proof. And with that description I yet disagree. — javra

I thought his summation good enough, basically -- in a rough and dirty way, sure that's what the bad pleasures are, and the good pleasure is ataraxia and aponia, like the link he linked says.

I'd disagree with that link in marking a distinction between Epicureanism and Hedonism -- but I understand the distinction he's drawing (I'd just call them two types of hedonism)


Also, your post gave me an in to laying out a bit on Epicureanism -- I had been thinking about what to say yours was just the first comment that finally sparked words.

Going by Epicurus's thoughts as just outlined by you, running marathons would then be bad, this because they result in increased unnecessary pain. As does weightlifting, and a good number of other human activities often deemed to be eudemonia-increasing. The altruism to running into a house on fire and thereby risking grave unnecessary pain (to not even get into the risk of mutilation and death) so as to rescue another's life would then be bad and hence unethical? — javra

That's not quite right.

Something that's difficult to understand with ancient ethics is we have a tendency to want to classify an act as good or bad, but these ancient ethics don't address the goodness and badness of acts in the way modern moral philosophy often does. For Epicurus:

No pleasure is a bad thing in itself, but some pleasures are only obtainable at the cost of excessive troubles. — Diogenes Laertius, Epicurus' Principle doctrines

to respond to your example of training for a marathon. (so it'd depend upon how much anxiety a person is burdened with in training for the marathon -- if they are tranquil and accepting of the pain then no evil is found in training and running a marathon)

For saving someone in a burning building: were you to do it because of anxiety that you would not be perceived as altruistic (even if just by yourself or before God) then that'd be bad, but if you were to do it because you have a natural kinship towards other human beings and no fear of death then ataraxia is still achieved.

That is, just as there aren't good/bad acts for Epicurus in particular there are no heroic acts one must strive towards. None of us are Odysseus and Homer is a storyteller more than a doctor: surely it's good that someone else was spared pain, and surely it's good to care for our fellow man, because this is what it means to live a good life.

But whether a particular act in a circumstance is good or evil -- as if there were some consequentialist calculus that tells us the right action to take as an individual at a given moment -- just isn't what the ethic is driving at, and is more contextual than asking after whether a particular act just is good or bad because of some rule.

Nice exposition of Heidegger's relevance to this text.

And making sense of why Adorno is tying the question to the answer: i.e. one could assert that Heidegger's opening of the question is the work, whereas Adorno wants to put that line of thought to rest in noting that for philosophy the question asked often is already connected to the answer.

This does not mean, however, as in the
constant parroting of Kierkegaard, that the existence of the questioner
would be that truth, which searches in vain for the answer. Rather in
philosophy the authentic question almost always includes in a certain
manner its answer.

Idealism would like to drown out precisely this, to always
produce, to “deduce” its own form and if possible every content...
[But]...There can be no
judging without the understanding any more than understanding
without the judgement. This invalidates the schema, that the solution
would be the judgement, the problem the mere question, based on
understanding

Although I think he wants to target all phenomenologists including Husserl with this, just to make that explicit (not that you said otherwise), and not just Heidegger -- but Sartre, and Bergson, and anyone who might lay claim to "the things themselves" absent ratio: this being a sort of "flip side" to Hegel who claimed everything is "analytic" --- the idea goes from one to the next as any philosopher could judge -- where now by looking to the non-identical we are trying to set aside our desiderata in favor of the things where we cannot do so without some sort of ratio for the things themselves to be mediated by.

EDIT: I finished Being, Subject, Object and see I was following along with the general pattern of thinking -- he notes the difference between these thinkers there while grouping them.

Adorno is very aware of this objection, which is why in the introduction and in the lectures he emphasizes that negative dialectics rigorous, stringent, and so on. — Jamal

This theme is what I think attracted me to pursue reading Adorno, along with your and everyone else's help.

Stringency, rigor, reason -- these are things I care about and only argue against because I care about them.

And Adorno is taking up dialectics, which I've always struggled with, so it helps in my understanding there too.

I'd say that's only because we're all rats in the mindless race. It's just a part of life in the capitalist world.

I'm pretty sure that's what the university is meant to be, though it fails to live up to the ideal.

Personally I think we have a preponderance of bullshit jobs in the sense we could get rid of them without much changes in terms of economic output: Rather, the structure of jobs is there to create a moral caste system of the deserving and the undeserving based upon how much money one has so we continue to make up new occupations to have a chance at survival when we could just limit the economy to the necessities -- which we've already done before in a practical way during the pandemic -- and let people live as they want while distributing out the hours of necessary labor.

But, then, why am I bigot? Or why am I, if you prefer, speaking bigotry? — Bob Ross

I don't believe you're a bigot. I think you're a person of good character: else I wouldn't have engaged.

I'd rather say that sometimes the words we use are used by others in a manner which we wouldn't approve of -- but since we live in a social world we have to find another way to express ourselves.

Make sense? I have faith in you @Bob Ross, but the words you've used are used by others who want more than a philosophical reflection.

The people in here are trying to claim that I am a bigot or at least speaking bigotry by saying that transgenderism is bad and transitioning is immoral; but yet when it is transgender person that says it now it all of the sudden isn't bigotted. — Bob Ross

I'm not following your ending here -- I'd note that there's nothing wrong with being trans or gay for the various reasons I've stated. And I don't think it's who says what with respect to this issue -- i.e. I don't think there is a morally or factually correct stance which states that trans or gay people should not be what they are.

I suspect the reason such sentiments creeped into spiritual texts is that we are the authors of our own spiritual texts and we're as imperfect as they come: Sometimes a bigot got to pen a spiritual passage.

"Transitioning" only became a thing in the past few decades — Outlander

Supposing that's true: So what?

Can't you see the lunacy in assuming a life-changing and often permanent and irreversible procedure that hasn't had the time for any actual lifelong studies to be done is the "first, best, and only option"? — Outlander

Can't you see that the life-changing decision is truly life-changing one way or the other? That to not-transition is as life-changing as to-transition?

Yes, people have to make decisions for themselves and live with that.

No, others who have feelings elsewise about those decisions don't have much of a say in what they do, and ought not to.

Would you consider that transgender person a bigot then even though they were pro transitioning as a necessary evil? — Bob Ross

A bigot? No. They're clearly in a place of conflict. I'd only want them to feel it's OK to transition while they don't think it is.

Also, come to think of it, that transgender person I mentioned to ProtagoranSocratist agreed with me that transgenderism is caused by gender dysphoria, that it is bad, and they even went so far as to say it is immoral to transition; — Bob Ross

This is exactly the sort of thing I want to combat: it's not immoral to transition. This is a false belief passed down from an ancient world where bigoted beliefs could easily be passed on.

To consider it immoral is to hate onself if they want to transition. That's a bad ethic.

Your explanation of ‘tendencies’ seems to deploy realist semantics to convey your point; and it is tripping me up.

If humans do not share a nature, then we cannot say that there is such-and-such a way a human will tend to behave because there is no such thing in reality as a human—no? — Bob Ross

Sure we can.

Because you were saying it is eudaimonic: that’s an Aristotelian term that refers to happiness as a biproduct of realizing one’s nature; and you description of Epicurean thought seemed to imply the same thing. I think I just need to understand how you are analyzing what a nature is and then I can circle back to this. — Bob Ross

I think that's not quite right :D

I'd rather say that your response here is exactly where we're missing one another.

Epicurus follows along with Aristotle's assumptions, which is why I choose him as a foil to Aristotelian philosophy.

I think Epicurus has a point about human nature that's much more limited than what he thought, though still applicable in all cases where someone wants to live a tranquil life.

I'd say that this is still eudaimonic because once one accepts they want tranquility all the other components of character-development towards one's nature come into play.

In a sense I'd say that there is more than one nature a human can pursue, even if they contradict one another in terms of what all humans can be. (I'm still persuaded by the existentialists)

Are you saying you deny that the heart functions in a way to pump blood? I don’t understand how one could hold that: can you elaborate more? — Bob Ross

I deny that there's a teleology to an organ: once the heart stops pumping this is as natural as any other function our body undergoes. We have the capacity to pump blood with our heart, and due to natural selection we're endowed with that power, but there is no truth to our teleology -- one day all of humanity will be extinct in the same way that the heart stops pumping. There is no purpose which secures these capacities.

But that's the question, isn't it? Can excluding certain debates ever be done in a philosophical manner? — Leontiskos

I'm not sure. That's what I'm attempting at the moment, though.

There's a sense in which, sure, if I follow along with the thoughts of my own heritage, I understand the lines of thought which note differences between various sexual acts, feelings, and so forth.

I think they're all mistaken, though. Were I still religious I'd consider them abominations which desecrate the texts -- human beings being what they are, fallen, of course they'd write scripture which supports bigotry against sexual minorities.

As it is I'm of the opinion that it's the religions which need to come to terms with the world we are in, if they be peaceful. If not then I suppose we get to be on different sides of a divide in spite of both wanting peace.

I think this qualifies as classical.

should try hard to entertain the possibility that some people who hold to traditional sexual ethics really are acting in good faith, and are not bigots. — Leontiskos

This has been my approach all along.

I am also strongly stating that these sorts of questions aren't really up for debate here -- but am hoping to do so in a philosophical manner. Insofar that a sexual ethic thinks that homosexuals or transexuals are immoral that is something not really worthy of debate as much as persuading someone who is reflective that they are in error.

Wonder away: But I'll insist that you're wrong factually and ethically.

Ok, but what is a ‘nature’ then? — Bob Ross

For Epicurus the human nature is more fixed (though fixed by atomic combinations so the possibilities for what a human can be is pretty large). I'd rather say that "Human nature is a tendency" while noting the useage I mean is with respect to the locution "human nature"; it's the sort of thing we mean by what something is, as you note. I just don't believe that there's exactly a set of necessary/sufficient conditions or secured by the essence of its type. Rather we have to come to some sort of understanding between ourselves in a particular conversation with respect to a question to contextualize our interests instead of thinking about human nature qua human nature.

What concepts are we considering with respect to human nature? What environment do we find these humans in already? If we're to speak biologically then we'd be talking in terms of natural selection, but in terms of our history we'd be reflecting on a different body of texts, and a different body of evidence that displays what human beings do.

For the purpose of Epicurus human nature is our tendency to get wrapped up in our desires to the extent that we are the cause of our own suffering.

"Tendency" since there are no necessary/sufficient conditions to include a member in the set "humans". That does not thereby mean that the human is not a natural human: they could participate in other tendencies. And, really, descriptively speaking, because we treat someone as a human basically everything they do is an example of human nature in some circumstance or other: the outliers are just as much evidence for our nature as the ones which follow norms as they are a possible tendency.

But that's because we treat them as such, not because they are such-and-such a thing.

No, I have not given an account of why someone should accept realism: I was noting that you are a nominalist and you are an epicurean that accepts eudaimonia which requires realism. You are holding two incompatible views. — Bob Ross

Why does it require realism?

I'd say it just requires wanting a tranquil life. For Epicurus he went out and actively recruited people due to his realist commitment, but I don't think we have to be realists to utilize an ethic. We could just want what the ethic wants.

Let me reword it in a way that you might be on board with: the anus’ natural functions are such that it secretes and holds in poop. That’s what it does for the body. You may divorce the functionality from teleology, but let’s start there. — Bob Ross

"Natural function" is the same as teleology. It'd be the sort of thing I'd deny as knowledge. Instead I think we can use our body however we see fit within its capacities: Rather than purposes there are things we have the power to do and the will to control these powers. The purpose a body has is the purpose towards which I put it, not the purpose which a theoretical device can define.

Basically the same response in noting how teleology is used in biology: Sure it is! And it's just a way of organizing our thoughts rather than the ontology of speciation. We're the ones who think in terms of form-function and that's how we make sense of the world. There's a sense in which a teleology arises but they also fall in the same sense so it's not like there's an actual proper function -- extinction is as much a part of evolution as birth, and that's when all the functions stop.

Nominalism is the view that essences are not real: you are denying realism about essences, so you are a nominalist. Semantics aside, you are still affirming realism about natures in a way that doesn’t seem coherent; but I’ll wait to elaborate on that until you give me your account of what a nature is. — Bob Ross

I associate more with nominalism than the belief "Essences are not real", so that's why I protested. If they are one and the same then no problem. (for instance I can make sense of "wholes" without "essences", which would count me out as a nominalist in some uses of that word)

How can it though if you are claiming that Epicureanism is Aristotelianism without the social obligations derivable from one’s nature? — Bob Ross

I don't agree with your characterization there -- rather there are different social obligations in different social worlds -- but in terms of hedonism it's because people want to do these things. Sometimes Fathers actually like their kids and so want to sacrifice themselves for them out of a sense of love and care. The pain isn't so bad in light of this pleasure.

Ok, would it be fair to say that Epicureanism is the same fundamental, naturalistic project that Aristotle is doing but it focuses on well-being of the organism independently of an ordering to any higher goods? For example, it seems like Epicureans would say that sacrificing yourself as a father for your son is not good; because it goes against the immanent well-being of the father and there is no recognition of the higher good that relates to the father’s role as the father. — Bob Ross

Re-reading and seeing I did not address this.

I'd rather say that a father understands their role and accepts pain when it comes.

The Epicurean cure is supposed to relieve worry about desires we can do nothing about: as human beings we want pleasure, we avoid pain, we want to live forever, and we'd like luck on our side and hope it grants us what we desire.

Since we're a social species who learns roles and desires to fulfill them hedonism can explain sacrifice.

There is much more to say, of course. I might try. — Jamal

I agree. There's much more that needs to be said for a proper summary.

Do you, on the one hand, believe that things have natures that they can realize to live a happy life (as you describe with Epicurus) or do you deny the reality of natures altogether? This seems internally incoherent to me. — Bob Ross

I deny that men or women have natures, that sex has a nature, and that gender has a nature but I think the concept of a human nature workable. And I wouldn't put "nature" in terms of "essence" either.

I don't believe in universal criteria for inclusion in a set, such as necessary and sufficient conditions, which specifies what a thing is.

But there could still be a use for "nature" in our thinking even if we're not adopting Aristotle's ontology.

I am not arguing that we can know everything about the nature of something at first glance: we’ve impacts the natures of many things over many thousands of years. It’s an empirical investigation: it is not a priori. — Bob Ross

You are arguing you can know the ends of things, though. Their teleology. Yes?

If that can come to be known over time then by what means do we infer the teleology of organs as you have?

This is the thing I'd deny empirical investigation can really do: We utilize teleological notions in biology but they're an organizing apparatus more than the ontology of speciation. Rather all we can do is describe -- at least if we play Hume's Guillotine.

If we do not then

Ok. We aren’t discussing the ethics involved in the medical industry nor what should be the ethic there: we are discussing what gender and sex are. I think you are jumping to my ethical views on sexuality when I have not imported it into the OP’s discussion. — Bob Ross

... it was explicitly your description of the anus' teleology that got me started on this line of thinking.

Likewise, Epicureanism may be an alternative: we would have to explore that; but it definitely doesn’t seem coherent with nominalism (which you accept since you reject essentialism).

This is your Argument 1. There is either Realism or Nominalism. Nominalism is not tenable, ergo Realism.

Epicurus' epistemology is one of direct realism. It's a naive epistemology with respect to the critical turn in philosophy heralded by the Enlightenment thinkers. I don't agree with it in specifics, though I think it's harmless in general -- its' major fault is shared by all other philosophical theories in that it is wrong.

I'm not claiming nominalism. I'm speaking in my own words and not as part of a category of people with such-and-such beliefs well known, unless nominalism really is nothing but the belief that essences do not exist.

I would say that we possess knowledge, though -- it is provisional and not ontological, but still knowledge of what's real. In that vein I think the poetics of Epicurus' ontology get along with what we know about the universe at present. But that's not the sort of knowledge which the Epicureans would have claimed -- they claimed to have the truth that all of reality is atoms and void.

Which I take ontology to be: not real but rather a poetics that allows us to comprehend and bring sense to the real. It does not encompass all of reality and we cannot deduce things about reality from our categories. However we define our terms the reality of things will always slip beyond our categories such that we cannot have deductive knowledge of the real, but rather provisional knowledge.

But that means the sorts of claims we find in Aristotle, Epicurus, the Stoics, the neo-Platonists, and on forward which make claims about reality as it really is cannot be treated like we know them. They're just ways of organizing what we know into sense for ourselves so that the absurd is manageable.

So, anti-realist with respect to ontological commitments, but realist with respect to reality, anti realist with respect to essences, realist with respect to nature, and explicitly agnostic with respect to ontology: Not only is it not known, but due to our position it cannot be known.

So sex, gender, and boning under this umbrella: Speciation roughly follows Darwinian evolution because some molecules formed at one time that started to self-replicate. Natural selection took care of the rest. Sexual reproduction is a method for mixing up genes, however that's done. There's no "natural" sex as much as there are methods for swapping genetic information such that the next generation has a mixture of genes. Male/Female is a rough, metaphysical speculation which we utilize to understand this infinitely complicated process.

Gender is social and inter-social and inter-personal and personal. Sex is our metaphysical belief about others' biology, and gender is the identification one has in all the previously designated senses. It functions as a means for understanding one's role, understanding one's place within a community, understanding what desires are acceptable and what are not acceptable for the kind of gender you have, understanding the sorts of desires that are had by said gender, all in order to then enact it within the social dance. This social dance is real, note -- not essentially so, but as real as you and I talking right now. People perform gender.

The important thing to note here is that does not then mean:

Well, it wouldn’t be real; because reality is objective, and socially constructed ideas are inter-subjective (even if they are expressing something objective). — Bob Ross

Since there's no underlying reality which defines the perfect specimen of a genus the performance is all there is to it: the surface is expansive and deep, but not undergirded by a purpose or soul. Rather it's something that arises naturally through coming to learn how to act with others: socialization.


****

So I'm definitely taking the critical turn more seriously than the neo-Thomists are. And without some way to specify how natures are determined rather than offering a common-sense teleology it would seem to me that the neo-Thomists aren't so much overcoming the critical turn as ignoring it and stubbornly continuing in their tried ways.

An attempted (very, obscenely brief) summation of the Introduction:

Philosophy is a discipline unto itself, and ND is an attempt at sketching a method for philosophy in light of its various previous attempts such that it is not slap-dash, not arbitrary, but still up to the classic task of philosophy: truth of the world we find ourselves in -- the truth of the non-conceptual through concepts.

OK with your help I finished the introduction now. Thing, Language, History I read as Adorno's answer, actually -- and the follow up is a "close second" through Benjamin's adherence to a tradition rather than the immediate. The last section sets out what Negative Dialectics aims to do in philosophy: save rhetoric as something more than a mere means to an end or something to be discarded as trickery.

I find the metaphor for how philosophy can be positive -- as the prism that directs the light -- Interesting.
Adorno is using one of the oldest metaphors in philosophy here that, to my mind, would run somewhat counter in some readings to what I think I've read so far. Maybe not -- the concept is not the thing (the prism is not the light) but that which operates upon the thing in order to render it perceptible. The light was there but only became a perceivable object by passing through the prism of concepts forged by philosophy.

Or maybe philosophy is the hand which spins the prism, itself the idea. . .

Something like that. It's an interesting metaphor to think through.

I'm finding this useful for the beginning. I reread the first paragraph several times before deciding to find someone else's interpretation just to get started. It is dense.

Ok, so, then, you are viewing gender as a social construct—correct? — Bob Ross

Sort of. I worry about that phrase if we're being specific. One thing to note is that I think we're a social species, for instance, so "social construct" does not thereby mean "not real" as is often mistakenly taken to be the case.

The social is as real as beans.

They aren’t telling you what you ought to do; so they are not imposing ethical commitments on you. — Bob Ross

I'd rather say that this qualifies it as something worthy of considering as an ethic. Ethics which set out to tell me or anyone what to do shut down the most important thing to consider in doing philosophy: thinking for oneself and reflecting in new circumstances.

How is it eudaimonic when eudaimonia is achieved by properly fulfilling one’s nature—not chasing pleasure or avoiding pain? — Bob Ross

Because Epicurus describes human nature differently from Aristotle. Rather than a biological creature embedded within a social whole which produces the proper roles for those who can be truly eudomon -- the politician and the philosopher in the city of slaves -- humanity is embedded within a different ontology of atoms and void. Another point of comparison here would be the stoics who give yet another version of human nature which then justifies the norms put forward, just like Aristotle.

In the ontology of atoms and void the gods do not care about you and there is no afterlife so theological goods are distractions from pursuing our true nature. Furthermore people get confused about their pleasures and pains in thinking that they must avoid pain and pursue pleasure in the sort of modern cartoon version of hedonism. So there is a nature to which Epicurus appeals in making ethical decisions with respect to forming a proper character. The big contrast here between Aristotle and Epicurus is that Aristotle thinks proper birth and upbringing are the only means to living a truly eudemon life, but Epicurus believes anyone can be taught how to live a truly eudemon life -- hence setting up the garden which takes people away from the hustle and bustle of the city and into a reflective space where one's character can be worked upon.

But rather than finding means between passions as a way to pursue a virtuous life that takes part in all of what humanity's capacities have Epicurus teaches people to let go of their pleasures and accept their pains. The pleasures are easy, not difficult, to obtain. Pain is easy to endure, not something to be avoided at all costs. To those who believe the Gods care for us they do not -- they are perfectly content where they are and have no interest in our brief life. This means we can stop killing animals in the hopes of obtaining rain -- the world we live in is a natural one of atoms and void. Furthermore there is no afterlife, but only the dissolution of one's atoms into the void, so there is no special code of conduct one must adhere to obtain immortality. You will die regardless, so focus upon the type of creature you are instead and live a happy life.

I'm sure you can see how this isn't reducible to any sort of "liberal" attitude or possible conception that that pop-category might denote.

Likewise, how can your view be eudaimonic when you deny the existence of natures and eudaimonia is relative to the nature of humans?

Can you elaborate on this? I’d be interested to hear how. — Bob Ross

I tried to address your concerns in the preceding paragraphs.

I can play the Hume game and say that the OP is making purely descriptive claims about sex and gender; and then you will need to discuss why you agree or disagree with my account of sex and gender without invoking morality. This would only be an invalid move if the OP was making ethical claims; which it isn’t immanently. — Bob Ross

That's perfect acceptable to me -- but then it seems you can't make normative claims like:

A body part doesn’t have a nature: it is a material part of a substance with a nature. A human has one nature: either maleness or femaleness. This nature is instantiated in one underlying reality that exist by itself (viz., a substance) which is provided that nature (essence) by its form and it, as such, is one complete instantiation of that type of substance (viz., one suppositum). The form has the full essence; and the matter receives that essence. The human body is the matter as actualized by the human form; and the body parts are parts of that body.

A finger, hence, does not have a nature: a human has a nature which is in its form, and its body has parts which are developed by that form. The finger is something developed by that form.

The finger has a natural end insofar, although it doesn’t have a nature proper, it is a part of the teleology as imposed by the human form (which is the human soul). The fingers are for grabbing, touching, poking, etc.

The anus is obviously for holding in poop and excreting poop: any doctor will tell you that. That’s obvious biology at this point. Now whether or not it is immoral to abuse the anus is a separate question — Bob Ross

I don't know that a doctor would tell me that, actually. That seems the sort of thing we'd think of immediately upon thinking about the ass as if it must have a purpose "Well, it does this a lot, so that must be its purpose"

I'd imagine that medically it'd be as you said -- the doctor gives advice on the basis of knowledge rather than telling the patient exactly what to do as a moral authority would.

But, I'll mark you down as "Yes" to the question, then: The nature of things is that obvious that we can just say, by looking at something, what it is for, what it's proper purpose is, what its essence is. But that doesn't seem like the sort of conclusion you'd want, either.

I don’t understand what objection you are making with the Kinsey report: can you elaborate? To me, it’s just a report that people feel happy, when they don’t believe it is immoral to, having all sorts of sex. — Bob Ross

I think it's a superior empirical basis for understanding sex without norms. So basically a continuation of one of the forks, as I'm putting it -- either we speak as if sex has no norms that are dependent upon the facts (We play Hume's Guillotine) or we speak as if they do (we don't play Hume's guillotine). If the latter then The Kinsey Report isn't "in the game", so to speak, because it's pretty much attempting a descriptive project without norms about what that project is studying. If we play the former we play Hume's Guillotine then I'm pointing out modern medical ethics. as well asIf we don't play Hume's Guillotine Epicureanism is a possible other way of thinking on the question of sex, gender, and boning.

(EDITed last paragraph for clarity -- the expression was confused, but I substituted in some names for pronouns and shortened the sentences to make it clearer)

Who knew that honey was the ejaculate of interspecies sex? — unenlightened

The perverted plants knew, all along -- having sex thru other species all under our noses (and with others' noses and knowses).

What are these ties then? How do they work? If there’s no real essence to, e.g., a woman in virtue of which she is a woman; then how is she even said to be of the female sex? Likewise, even if she is granted as of the female sex without a real essence nor exhibiting the essential properties of a female, how is gender related to sex in your view? — Bob Ross

"Sex" is a differentiation within a species. "Gender" is a differentiation between cultures. The relationship between "gender" and "sex" is fully one of cultural habit.

The relations that arise are due to habituation in thinking and learning to live within a social world. They are subject to change with time, place, and even individual relationships. Even "sex" isn't exactly "biological" but more cultural in that we tend to think sexes are di-morphic when really it's just a spread between markers, an extension of the reproductive system outside of a single organism reproducing itself and a manner for a species to exchange and mix-up genotypes. How it happens varies wildly throughout nature -- consider the Sea Horse's birth patterns.

They do deny doing ethics insofar as they don’t believe they are making normative statements by evaluating and conveying the health concerns or issues with someone. Of course, they have a ‘code of conduct’ ethically that they are taught for dealing with patients.

No doctor says: “Moliere, unfortunately, you have cancer; and you are morally obligated to get treatment”. No, they “Moliere, unfortunately, you have cancer. I want to outline your options so you can make your own informed decision of what you should do.” — Bob Ross

Why isn't the latter "doing ethics"? How is that a denial? Must ethics be the sort of thing a person, upon knowing, now knows what's good for others?

I'd say that's upside down.

You are presupposing that happiness is about hedonism (which I understand you are a hedonist, so it makes sense) which is a prominent liberal view. Like I said, the fundamental disagreement between conservatives and liberals lies in the totality distinct usages of the concepts of happiness, harm, goodness, and freedom.

Happiness is not about this superficial hedonic pleasure; it’s eudaimonic. — Bob Ross

I choose happiness because Epicurus is a eudaimonic hedonist and so it dodges all the things that you discuss in dismissing the "liberal view" -- i.e. goes against your initial argument that there are only two possibilities when discussing gender.

Epicureanism basically side-steps all the accusations against liberalism you've conjured as your other that props up your position.

Christianity isn’t going anywhere in the West: it is essential and integral to the very Western values we espouse; and there’s way too many members in powerful positions and institutions to get rid of them.

If I am being honest, society would collapse if we followed hedonism. — Bob Ross

You'll notice a theme in my responses here -- that would be so much the worse for the society resisting what's good, from my perspective. I'd celebrate letting go of Christian guilt in favor of hedonic calm because then people would be living in accord with their nature.

The symmetry breaker is that the vagina is designed for it and so it is not contrary to its natural ends; whereas, the anus is not designed for it and it actively inhibits it from realizing its ends. One is with and one is contrary to the natural ends of the body part. — Bob Ross

This is what @unenlightened has been driving at -- how do we designate one form of damage "natural" and the other "unnatural" other than to say this is what the speaker prefers?

Does the nature of things spring forth so obviously that there simply is no reason why the vagina can be damaged but the ass cannot?

This isn’t relevant though to the OP even if I grant it. The OP isn’t facially discussing ethics: it is discussing what you would call ‘descriptive claims’.

If Hume’s Guillotine applies, then all ethics goes out the window. At best, you end up with a view like Bannos that is a hollow-out version of moral cognitivism or you end up with a version of moral intuitionism (like Michael Huemer’s); or, worse, you end up being a moral anti-realist. Just a companions in guilt response here. — Bob Ross

I want to highlight here how you're doing it again: You're setting up the bad consequence in order to preserve your generally reasonable position. When some criticism is pointed out that seems to be your go-to: To either point out how the other possibility is worse, or to note that the criticism is "too analytic" and if they adopted the mixing of norms/facts like Aristotle then they'd come to see the light.

Here, on TPF, people have read these guys, though. The defense you're offering is one of plausibility in the face of a possible bad conclusion.

But if there is a third possibility then we can criticize away without fear of this unwanted conclusion.

or it does not, in which case while you want to discuss human ontology ethics happens to apply since ontology and normativity aren't separated without an is/ought distinction of some kind.

Ethics ultimately applies, but it isn’t immanently relevant to the discussion about ontology. In principle, someone could agree with my formulation of gender and sex and reject moral naturalism. This is a false dilemma.

If we're discussing descriptive claims alone then how does your account square away with the evidence in the Kinsey Report? Does it go through and label "Well, that act is unnatural"; in which case, what's the use of it? To make people part of said community to feel guilty enough to stay in line?

But this is the modern theory of gender. You just described gender as a social construct and social expression. This is exactly what we are disputing here. — Bob Ross

Sure.

I agree and am not meaning to convey that there are liberal or conservative theories of genders; but, rather, that there are gender theories compatible with liberalism and conservatism and some are prominent among each.

This is why I think diving into politics in this thread is and was a red herring: people are skipping past the philosophical and psycho-sociological discussion about gender theory to ethics—which puts the cart before the horse. Ontology is prior to ethics. — Bob Ross

Says who?

Levinas notes the opposite.

If gender is a performance within culture that is for self-identification, then gender is divorced from sex; for anyone can perform in a manner that is properly identified with such-and-such social cues and expectations and they thereby would be, in gender is just that, that given gender.

What the OP is getting at is something more subtle in metaphysics: is the ‘performance’, social expectations, and social cues identical to gender OR is gender an aspect of the real nature a being has. — Bob Ross

I'd say my position is both/and -- yes there are ties to sex from gender, but they are not essentialist ties which a philosopher can dream up within a normative frame to apply to everyone else(With respect to Aristotle and Aquinas: especially not for all time). Rather the gender a person has is something they come to find. There's a sense in which I can go so far as to say that person comes to know themself -- i.e. what they thought they are is not who they are -- but not so far as to say that any philosopher knows that better than the person.

We like to think now like Hume: doctors deny doing ethics when they inform you of the ‘descriptive facts’ about health because prescriptive and descriptive statements are seen as divorced from each other. — Bob Ross

I disagree with your first assertion: Many people do not like thinking like Hume.

Doctors do not deny doing ethics -- it's just a medical ethic that's informed in a certain way. I note the medical model because I don't think you're presenting a medical ethic at all, but rather a religious one. They also fit in an interesting place with respect to the Humean fork: i.e. it's a practice which blends factual and normative concerns in a productive manner.

When it comes to questions of sexual health I'm going to pick the people who really just want people to be happy and healthy regardless over the people who want people to be happy in a particular way, else they're sinners.

I think the Dominican priests, at one point, played the role of doctors of body, soul, culture, mind -- but no longer do.

I'm not religious, but if the religious want to continue to live on in the world we happen to be in -- rather than fight against it -- then they'll have to come up with some other function than advice on how to have sex.

Once upon a time it may have made sense -- but it doesn't any longer. Homosexuality is not a sin, and if a Christianity wishes to present it as such that's such much worse for that Christianity.

Likewise, health wise, it is obvious that many forms of sex that people engage in are unhealthy for the body. Like I stated to other people on here, anal sex does damage the anus (even granting it heals itself to some extent over time and one can do exercises to help strengthen it); and deepthroating does damage the throat’s ability to gag (which is for avoiding choking). — Bob Ross

Have you seen what birth does to a vagina?

It's not pleasant.

Like I was trying to note to Jamal, this is the real debate for sexuality ethics is indeed...ethics; and this isn’t incommensurable to resolve: we would need to start with metaethics, then normative ethics, then applied ethics. In order to dive into our metaethical disagreements, we will have to dive into metaphysics and ontology.

More importantly, the OP is really about whether or not gender is a social construct or something else; and whether or not the Aristotelian take accounts for it. It is not a discussion itself about ethics: it is a discussion about human ontology. — Bob Ross

Cool.

Then I'm squarely against the Aristotelian account of gender, obviously.

The question there is in what capacity?

Either Hume's fork applies, in which case we're speaking descriptively of gender rather than normatively, or it does not, in which case while you want to discuss human ontology ethics happens to apply since ontology and normativity aren't separated without an is/ought distinction of some kind.

Which way do you prefer?

I agree with you that it is important to begin with an exposition of the fundamental concepts at play; but I would say that this is best exemplified by giving definitions and descriptions of the key concepts involved (like ‘sex’, ‘gender’, etc.). — Bob Ross

And that is specifically where we disagree in terms of meta-criteria. My thought in thinking about liberal/conservative was to note how there's not really a definition as much as these are attitudes we ascribe to others that are also somewhat dependent upon eachother: i.e. to be conservative is to be not-liberal, and vice versa. I wanted to start here because it seems like the fulcrum around which your initial argument rests (the two options for thinking about gender), and I don't think it's a conceptual division but a cultural one -- one of perspective and attitude rather than definitions and inferences.

If that's so I wouldn't put it that there is some kind of "liberal" theory of gender, for instance. There are possibilities for theorizing gender which rather than being defined by concept, definition, and description of the concepts can be understood more provisionally, but with greater accuracy, by listening to what people say about their gender.

This notion of gender is something that can create particular social expectations which are played out. That is, there is no liberal or conservative gender so much as gender is a performance within a culture which utilizes this spectrum for self-identification. But not all genders are liberal/conservative or even thinking in such terms at all. They are diverse and difficult to categorize in such manners.

And lastly I'd note where we began: There is something completely alien to your way of looking at sex and gender to me. It looks like an old idea preserved in moth balls for no purpose other than to claim that one has a conservative notion of what gender is as opposed to a liberal notion of gender. But I don't think what I've presented falls into this category you've denoted in your first paragraph where one must either think in terms of essences where there are two genders which must adhere to such-and-such rules regarding sex and relationships OR we are left with psychologizing.

Rather I think we can be empirical about gender and look towards the facts about how people behave. Hence my highlighting the Kinsey report, and noting how your criteria are not medical as much as religious.

As you say here:

Aristo-Thomism is the predominant view for roman catholicism; so at a minimum you are saying the latin, Dominican scholastics is ratshit. Nothing you have critiqued of mine really varies from standard Aristo-Thomism. Likewise, most of the broader points I am making are accepted by traditional Christianity (viz., orthodox and roman Catholicism).

Christianity, even for protestantism, is a version of essence realism, of the immorality of homosexuality, moral naturalism, etc. — Bob Ross

But, medically speaking, all of that is wrong. There is nothing wrong with having sex of the various kinds. There is no nature to which our soul must aspire towards which a Dominican scholastic was able to perceive. The opinions of priests are often mistaken when it comes to sexual health.

So, I mean, we can say it's a perspective, yes. But it's a perspective that relies upon false notions about what human beings are empirically speaking, and when it comes to the normative component that's something you'll just be appealing towards your sense of what seems right on the basis of some sort of shared cultural artifact like religious texts and interpretation.

Which is why I mentioned hedonism -- sure I can check the math, but if there is at least one other reasonable ethical stance towards this problem of ethics (the ethics of sex, gender, and boning) then we're lead right back to "Which ethic should we choose?"; the is/ought problem, Hume's fork, is more ignored in these old philosophies that believed the facts spoke for themselves about what is good, when in reality it was the philosophers interpreting the facts towards such-and-such norms (which means we are free to do the same).

This is the sort of hyperbolic, elevated, aggressive language that intentionally makes these issues impossible to discuss rationally. — Leontiskos

Where am I wrong?

Do you or do you not believe others -- every single other human being -- should be married before having sex and should only be married to an opposite such that children will be produced or reared?

I'd say that people can have sex however they want.

Some Christians agree.

What about you?

Seems like no.

It's not crazy to me what @Jamal said -- it was something I felt.

Well you've moved from "no difference in the world" to ↪Jamal's "no relevant difference," and I'm guessing that, at least on your pen, this idea of "no relevant difference" is an unfalsifiable claim. If it's not then you would need to spell out what it means. — Leontiskos

No one -- absolutely no one -- thinks about Aristotle while fucking.

Yes or no?

The way that members are being treated in this thread is exhausting, and would not fly in any other thread. ...And it is moderators who are behind much of it. :yikes: — Leontiskos

I think this thread is exhausting -- that I have to explain to someone that talking about others sex acts as a bad thing in the mind like they are schizophrenics that need help is the saddest thing I've had to deal with in recent memory here.

As in, yet again, here we are, in the same dumb bullshit I've always dealt with because Christians really care a lot about how others fuck -- not because they're fucking, but because others fuck wrong.

The most obvious reason this proposition is false is because an organ that is inherently sterile is different from an organ that is sterile through some impediment. — Leontiskos

I'd say the reason I'm short with your responses is this line of reasoning.

It looks entirely irrelevant to the point at hand. It's like saying "but the light was on!" when talking about a bank robbery.

Which is why I say it's in the mind of the philosopher. I assure you that the people who are having sex with their organs in various ways are not thinking about this distinction in any which way whatsoever.

I think the various rules around sex are a religious fetish that basically hurts people. Hence my mentioning things like conversion therapy. It's something that, if anyone wants religion to be seen as good, religion should recognize as a prejudice carried on into the world now. Sure it could be revived, but why would I want to hate more people than I already do? What benefit or goodness do I get out of that? Seems much happier to allow people to bone as they will

I'd like to start somewhere in our presuppositions.

I don't think we've nailed these down at all, but that feels like the proper place to start if we're attempting to do philosophy.

There are some distinctions you've stated that I could start questioning, but then I feel like we'd go back to where we started.

In some ways then it feels like the most appropriate place to start is to ask -- where should we start in relation to thinking about sex, gender, and the various identifications and actions that result?

I've stated before that I'm basically an Epicurean on such things.

I believe you're a Christian on such things.

I have ideas about what "Christian" entails because of my own upbringing, especially with respect to the "conservative" brand of Christianity.

This all by way of leading to the place I think we could begin: What is the difference between liberal and conservative Christianity in the USA?

That feels far astray but it also feels at home to me: as a possible place to bounce off from that's not going to result in the same tired dialogue which, at least so I've expressed, looks inspired by bigotry (even though I don't believe you are a bigot the words are used by others and that retains a meaning)

EDIT: Also, it might be something so far astray that it's not for this thread. As in my first response I'm reaching for a root and that will produce different conversations. Ultimately, though, I'd like it if we could all stop talking about the specifics of sex and whether this or that act is eudomon or not -- we're not in a sermon here, we're thinking together about things that are hard to think about.

Yeh, we're the same there. I'm also willing to take my chances.