Some additional thoughts on why Kant is relevant to the question of the cogito, and at least Sartre.

The ontological argument is one of the big targets of Kant's epistemology. I'd say the ontological argument Kant criticizes is more Leibniz's version than Descartes, but close enough to count for concepts.

Broad strokes here but with respect to the cogito the differences that pop out to me for each thinker are:

Descartes: existence is a genuine predicate of logic.
Kant: Existence is not a genuine predicate of logic, but is given.
Sartre: The meaning of being is different from what either Descartes or Kant are talking about, and Existence precedes essence. Descartes' reflection is correct, and there's more apodeictic knowledge that comes with it.

Interesting to note, at least to me, is how Kant's cogito is de-emphasized from Descartes', which makes a kind of sense since he's trying to protect the belief in the immortality in the soul from scientific knowledge -- limiting knowledge to make room for faith.

Whereas Sartre has no problem denying such things. Though, simultaneously, isn't coming from a strictly scientific perspective either.

I don't think so. Kierkegaard is the beginning of existentialism. His point was that the the more fully you become lost in the landscape of the intellect, the more disconnected and alienated you'll be from the knowledge that's most direct and intimate: the knowledge of what it feels like to be alive. — frank

Yeah, but Kierkegaard also took up several writing personas to demonstrate a kaleidoscope of thoughts (one I do not claim to understand). Nietzsche wrote a parody of the Bible to expand on original philosophical concepts. These aren't exactly acts of becoming lost in what it feels like to be alive.

Or, more properly, they are -- but they are also acts of intellect.

I don't know if you saw my SEP quotes, but Descartes also points to this as what he meant by "cogito": he is talking about awareness, which is only sometimes of ideas. — frank

I've now read them, and am including them here for reference in the conversation -- but I'm not sure what I've said that disagrees with them.

"Third, the certainty of the cogito depends on being formulated in terms of cogitatio – i.e., my thinking, or awareness/consciousness more generally. Any mode of thinking is sufficient, including doubting, affirming, denying, willing, understanding, imagining, and so on (cf. Med. 2, AT 7:28). My bodily activities, however, are insufficient. For instance, it’s no good to reason that “I exist, since I am walking,” because methodical doubt calls into question the existence of my legs. Maybe I’m just dreaming that I have legs. A simple revision, such as “I exist, since it seems I’m walking,” restores the anti-sceptical potency (cf. Replies 5, AT 7:352; Prin. 1:9)."
— SEP

Also:

"Second, a present tense formulation is essential to the certainty of the cogito. It’s no good to reason that “I existed last Tuesday, since I recall that I was thinking on that day.” For all I know, I’m now merely dreaming about that occasion. Nor does it work to reason that “I’ll continue to exist, since I’m now thinking.” As the meditator remarks, “it could be that were I totally to cease from thinking, I should totally cease to exist” (Med. 2, AT 7:27, CSM 2:18). The privileged certainty of the cogito is grounded in the “manifest contradiction” (AT 7:36, CSM 2:25) of trying to think away my present thinking."
— SEP — frank

So what's it all about? What sorts of things should we think are more or less real than other things? — Srap Tasmaner

I'll note that I'm inclined to not grant degrees to reality, so I suppose I fit the mold.

But in trying to think of ways to make sense of it....

When I dream of something that's happened before while the dream is real it makes sense to me to say that it's less real than the event I experienced. And the memory of the event could likewise be thought of as less real.

But then, just to head off notions of minds being less real, in this same way I'd say that the answer to a complicated mathematical expression that I'm seeking is more real than my belief when I've made a mistake -- so there could be something to be said for Universals being more real than my opinion, too.

No apology needed, you did nothing wrong. You're good!

I'm just going to state my confusion and see where that takes us instead of trying to rephrase the question:

I'm tempted by the exegetical hole again -- I want to at least do a side-by-side interpretation with yours.

I see what you're saying as a reasonable interpretation; and to restate it in my own words to see if I have it right: the ontological argument is thrown in there but given its weakness to persuade those who are not already convinced this indicates that Descartes was relying on God. (At least, that seems like something you could say to excuse why the argument is in the text on reasonable grounds)

The interpretation I'm relying upon is to treat the Meditations at its face value -- and at its face value we start with doubt and, through the power of Man's Reason alone, find true and certain knowledge of the self, God, and the world.

So I see Descartes as claiming not faith but knowledge of God's existence -- and this need not even counter faith. Especially at the time scientists and theologians weren't far apart. In a way I'm trying to bring out "the spirit of the times" by focusing on the prima facie meaning to put Descartes in the context of the Enlightenment.

This I think you'd find amenable because of your reliance on Kant. I see a strong through-line to Kant here where a disagreement is clearly spelled out (though in the abstract).

But Kant wouldn't say that knowledge requires faith, either. So I'm left wondering how to interpret you with respect to these two interpretations of the prima facie Descartes and Kant.

I don't see anything wrong with saying an experience ends. Some experiences are episodic.

But I don't think the cogito, even with the structure of temporality -- even though consciousness is being described -- is even at the level of an individuals' experience (at least in the story so far). The structure of reflection is, but the relationship between the general structure of reflection and even a being-for-itself -- which I'd read as still a general category rather than an individual, only more specific than simply being-for-itself -- isn't specified yet. And the individual hasn't even shown up on the scene.

So I'd say that our personal reflections, while we'll be using them to relate to the phenomenological description, are not themselves yet relevant. They are "too close", as it were.

Yes, probably. You're kind of stomping all over the existentialism with your intellectual observations, tho. — frank

I'd disagree here. The flow of time is being presented in a manner which is a flow, but the various existential writers are attempting to be very precise about their topics in the exact way that philosophers have always done -- they have their own particular meanings and such, but it's still very intellectual.

And see Frege on psychologism. — J

I'd be interested in hearing more from you on this comment. (I've read some of Husserl's anti-psychologist arguments and found them amenable, but not Frege's)

To be clear on my end -- by the cogito, even if there is a psychological theory of it, I explicitly mean a philosophical theory. (For some there's no distinction, but for thems that there is one -- pick the philosophy side)

Yes, but it does feel like a "move," and I wasn't suggesting it seriously. — J

Heh. I don't mind things that feel like "moves" -- they all feel like that, really! It's just which move feels right to the reader which chooses what Descartes really meant. :D

In general I like the skeptical hypotheses, so I'd be open to an argument like that. I'm not fully committed to the notion that there even is a self -- so that would be like a nihilism of the cogito -- but it comes up often enough that I think worth thinking about.

Good observation. I think that philosophers who are hostile to phenomenology want this liminal place to be a mistake, an inability to be clear about what the topic is. A more sympathetic reading, starting with Husserl, is that the distinction between metaphysics and psychology must be put into doubt as a first step toward a new conception of doing philosophy in the first person. — J

Yeah. I actually like the move, but because some of it is obscure or has multiple interpretations or just isn't mathematical enough to taste it's easier to designate that side of philosophy as meaningless wankers cosplaying as sages while saying nothing but poetic drivel** while the serious logicians clarify what we utilize everyday and so cannot help but be really right -- language and science and the language of science and the logic that governs such talk.

Though, to be real, it was always about competition over employment. Philosophy isn't given enough budget to fund a whole two different ways of doing it.
:D

One example where it does create confusion, though, is what I tried to straighten out with frank, above. He quite reasonably wanted to know why a thought must occur in time, which leads us into the two common meanings of the term "thought." One is psychological, the other metaphysical. And see Frege on psychologism.

Yeah there's a lot of confusion at first, but I think that's part of what makes it philosophy. Eventually there's a certain clarity even while there are more than one way to interpret the texts.

What the other side says about the Clear Hard Thinkers is that they are clearly lazy navel gazers because they obsess over language and refuse to learn even 2 different languages**.

** Though I roast both because I find that distinction hilarious, and really probably not so relevant now so the roast shouldn't even sting.

It’s material composition, whatever it may be. — Mww

I vote for time being a necessary condition for the cogito to make sense of anything thought about, which is the same as any thought in general, which is the same as thought itself. I am, after all, nothing but my thoughts. — Mww

Am I to infer that the cogito's material composition is thought, then? So when I think about the cogito the object of my thought is thought and the composition of the thought thinking about thought is thought.

Wouldn't this analysis apply to the objects thought about, no matter what? Is the material composition of what is thought about itself always thought, and Time is what seperates out the object thought about from the thought which is directed towards the object?

The notion of past, future and therefore time itself, would be necessary regarding that which I think about, iff it is the case thoughts are always and only singular and successive. — Mww

Also, I'm not sure I'd sign up for the notion that thoughts are always and only singular and successive, which would put me in trouble.

I find foundationalism problematic, and so Descartes problematic on this point.

Subjectivity comes up too often for me to think the cogito, or the philosophical subject/self, is a mistake to attempt to articulate, though. "What is it that makes an individual what they are?" strikes me as a perfectly sensible question, and even Descartes' desire for certainty -- given all the falsehoods he now knows he's believed -- makes a good deal of sense to all of us. It's nice to be certain.

But I see no reason to start with methodical doubt to find certain propositions -- and even if I were to begin with the cogito I'd still build towards a world with knowledge and such that's part of it. Or at least I'd like those things to be addressed in a given philosophy.

Descartes gets out of the solipsistic hole through God, and you have no problem with admitting that all knowledge is faith-based, except perhaps for the certain knowledge of your own existence when thinking the thought "I think". Do you follow Descartes in putting God into the rational frame, though? That's what I think is missed with Descartes, frequently: he's not a skeptic, but a Rationalist who, through a priori reasoning -- due to the power of Reason in Man, to link this to our narrative of the Enlightenment -- deduces the foundations of knowledge. So, given his arguments -- at face value -- he knows God exists, rather than it being faith-based.

How does faith get us out of the cogito?

OK Thanks. That one is making much more sense to me. Chewing it over, will post more if I think of something.

But imagine we could derive something.... :D

Okiedokie. That looks like a terminus, though I think there's more to the cogito than that.

A reasonable inference is that God is necessary in order to avoid solipsism.

That seems to be the larger argument he was making. — Hanover

Descartes, you mean?

That's an interesting read, if so -- a theist twist on the interpretation of the Meditations. If I'm entirely wrong on that, well, then I am but to explain myself: I've heard it argued that Descartes' argument for the existence of God is so bad, and Descartes so smart, that there must be some explanation as to why it's in there when the preceding arguments are so crisp and clean.

I'll call this the "Secret Atheist" interpretation: The idea is he must have been an atheist but because the church was so powerful at the time he had to include proofs for the existence of God, given that it's philosophy after all.

So, if I have you right, you're making the argument that he's more targeting atheists in saying that if they do not believe in God then this is all they can know, and given that they know more than that, they ought consider believing in God. Sort of like the Secret Atheist, but instead he's dressing it up for the church while talking to his contemporaries too.

My question for both Descartes and Sartre is this: Are you offering a psychological story -- that is, a story about actual thoughts -- in which case it must indeed occur in time? Or is the "moment" of the Cogito pointing to a different mode of understanding? — J

I can answer better for Sartre since that's what I'm more mired in at the moment:
tl;dr -- no.

Extended: his is not a psychological story in the sense that he rejects reducing philosophy to psychology and he is pursuing philosophy, and in particular, metaphysics. So knowledge isn't as much the focus, though Sartre relies upon a notion of knowledge (that I'm told is, of course, unique to him -- why make it easy?)

For Sartre the cogito is referring to the three ekstases, which I'm gathering is the past, the present, the future -- but in metaphysical speak. To practice the lingo: I think the cogito temporalizes itself in all three ekstases in any rendition of the cogito. I think therefore I was, am, and will be, and these are not discrete one from another but rather I carry my past into my present towards a future each of which is divided by a nothing.


:D

I hesitate to use the word "transcendental" because Descartes probably wouldn't know how to respond, and Sartre had his own very special understanding of transcendentality in phenomenology. So I'm struggling for words here. What I'm groping toward is the idea that the indubitability of the Cogito doesn't rest on any account that involves time at all. Suppose we all agreed that it's impossible to experience a present moment. I think many psychologists believe this; it's a version of the Achilles-and-tortoise problem. Would that mean that the Cogito is no longer operative? That, since it doesn't report an actual experience, my existence is thrown back into doubt? That doesn't sound right. I dunno . . . pardon me if this is too murky for response. — J

Not too murky at all. This is exactly the sort of thing I'm looking for.

I'm struggling with words too -- it's part of why I've been looking for passages -- to force myself to attempt to explain some of these things to others as a "check" that even I'm understanding my own interpretation as I read :D

I think the cogito would still be operative, it only implies more than the singular indubitability which Descartes rested on -- if we accept the cogito, so I'm gathering Sartre to be saying, then we have all three of the ekstases which are metaphysically equal to the objects which they are about.

But it'd be an argument against what Sartre is saying, I think, if you could argue that the cogito was no longer active, due to this move, and so existence is thrown back into doubt -- that'd be an interesting skeptical response.

Does Sartre say that the for-itself is an object of experience, in addition to being the ground for the possibility of experience? I can't remember. — J

No expertise here, just reading it right now. The for-itself is consciousness, and the thing which makes consciousness what it is is that it is about the in-itself. The in-itself is what it is, and the for-itself is what it is not. The for-itself/in-itself are both modifications of Being as such, so they are written Being-for-itself and Being-in-itself in the English translation. That's part of the puzzle he's working through.

No ground for the possibility of experience type argument seems to be going on here -- that'd put him squarely back into the comprehension of being as a given existent, rather than the expanded notion of being which phenomenology relies upon (or, perhaps, merely chases).

So the in-itself is the object of experience, and the for-itself is about those objects, and the cogito secures being-for-itself, being-in-itself, and the three ekstases through which being-for-itself temporalizes itself.

Back to your question on psychology, though: He starts in metaphysics but the part I'm reading now is dealing with questions of how these metaphysical concepts relate to a very highly abstract psychology. So it fits in that funny place phenomenology often does -- between metaphysics, but then sort of drifts into psychology. What I really like on this front, however, is it gives a solid theoretical foundation for rejecting Freudian analysis -- the id/ego-superego are the in-itself, and it's the psychologist who is crafting this in-itself without access to the for-itself except through their own for-itself.

Having said something, one has expressed a distinction that makes a difference.

Descartes' "I exist" is, at best, a tautology; he concludes only what his conclusion already necessarily presupposes. Saying "I exist", therefore, doesn't actually say anything.

Cotard's "I do not exist", a delusion, is a pathology; otherwise, as a statement (rather than a feeling) it's a performative contradiction, which says nothing. — 180 Proof

Do you think anything can be inferred from the cogito, whatsoever? Or is it entirely different from the philosophical subject, or are they one and the same and yet meaningless tautology?

No. It seems as though there is something more to it than the solipsism Descartes allowed in his analysis on the cogito. I think that one can allow skepticism about things like God's intention or even the Will itself. — Shawn

I'm not following how your justifications justify "no" -- I'd almost think you were saying the opposite, even. I've given it a bit to think over but I'm afraid I'm still scratching my head.

(I'm not sure if I'm right to equate pre-reflexion with being-as-such).

An instantaneous cogito implies the structure of doubt, that is, suspension of judgment. But the cogito is committed to more than mere suspension of judgement; it is by necessity interwoven within a time "architecture."

The architecture of doubt is directly mirroring the architecture of the cogito itself, in time, but as a negation.

This architecture is pre-ontological in the sense of not yet truly ontological. That is, it is prior to the formulation of an ontology. The movement from pre-ontological knowing, the cogito, to a pre-reflexive ontology of being-as-such (that is to actually study being), requires transcendence of the cogito, where "doubt" is understood as just the negation of the cogito, ego.

It may be strange for pre-reflective awareness to be after the cogito's pre-ontological mode, but this is just the path of consciousness. Whereas pre-reflection is wholly prior to the cogito, in consciousness it comes after, as it is from the perspective of the negation of the ego that pre-reflection is attainable in a self-conscious way. This is why the saying "I think, therefore I am" is concluded after Descartes' "doubt" meditation. The saying is not the culmination of cogito but its transcendence. — NotAristotle

Can you unpack that more? I've read over a few times and find myself confused lol.

I suppose I'm more persuaded by Descartes argument that in the moment of thinking "I think" that seems an indubitable proposition even though I'm thinking the cogito requires more than solipsism, or perhaps invokes more.

In some way the repetition of "I think" allows for our bodies to be entirely different from what we experience, as well as the world, but the proposition of thinking leads to the indubitability of my own existence. I'd go that far with Descartes.

One thing I can infer from thinking "I think" is that I think.

So if I think then I think.

Indubitability is the easy thing to attack, I think, but in some ways this is to give into the Cartesian impulse -- to look for a certain foundation. So it is easy to point out that just because I think "I think" that it does not follow that "I am" in some kind of logically deductive fashion. It's just something that makes sense: in order for me to do I must be.

The part that doesn't follow from all this is that the "I think" refers to the same "I" as the "I am": in the context of the meditations it makes sense because we're presented with a story of a man who goes to his desk and thinks a few things until he gets tired, then comes back the next time to push his thoughts further. But in the context of Being and Nothingness it doesn't immediately follow because the "I think" is the in-itself, whereas the "I am" is the for-itself. (there's no reliance upon "clear and distinct ideas")

Now it seems apparent to me that Descartes and Sartre don't get lost in the cogito, but rather see certain things as equally indubitable or conceptually interdependent -- the turning point for Descartes, as you hinted at @frank, is God -- going further into the Meditation 3:

Wherefore there only Remains the Idea of a God, wherein I must consider whether there be not something included, which cannot possibly have its original from me. By the word God, I mean a[44] certain Infinite Substance, Independent, Omniscient, Almighty, by whom both I my self, and every thing else that is (if any thing do Actualy exist) was created. All which Attributes are of such an high nature, that the more attentively I consider them, the less I conceive my self possible to be the Author of these notions.

From what therefore has been said I must conclude that there is a God; for tho the Idea of substance may arise in me, because that I my self am a substance, yet I could not have the Idea of an Infinite substance (seeing I my self am finite) unless it proceeded from a substance which is really Infinite.

But I don't see it as magical or faith-based -- it seems to follow from the arguments presented.

Though if we're inclined to believe that being cannot be derived, but must be given, then we'd say that Descartes' argument, more or less, is the ontological argument and since existence is not a predicate it does not follow that the idea of infinity, which is not in me, can only come from God.

But having a benevolent God is how I understand we begin to get out of the solipsistic experiment where all that we are is a thinking thing (and not even our body), based upon the method of doubt.

****

It makes me think that the cogito in Sartre does not rely upon ourselves as a thinking thing: If we remove ourselves as a substance which thinks (and is not extended) then there is nothing for the "I think" to refer to -- though "I am" remains true, it's not through the indubitability of the cogito that we come to this. Rather, given that it's phenomenology, existence isn't even attempted to be proven: rather "the things themselves" are described as they are in the phenomenonal capacity


****

A point of contention with Kant here @Hanover is Sarte's notion that Being-in-itself is transphenomenal; but there isn't any of the arguments which Kant tries to bring to bear on separating the noumenal from the phenomenal, and usually if something "has being" then it exists. But with the phenomenological turn the meaning of being is in question, and even non-being has its own being such that when Pierre is not in the room then that absence still has being.

We must understand that this being is no other than the transphenomenal being of phenomena and not a noumenal being which is hidden behind them. Itis the being of this table, of this package of tobacco, of the lamp, more generally the being of the world which is implied by consciousness. It requires simply that the being of that which appears does
not exist only in so far as it appears. The transphenomenal being of what
exists for consciousness is itself in itself. — B&N, lxii

So being is transphenomenal, but he's still relying upon the intuitive move that Kant makes -- he just includes time within phenomena, even though being-for-itself is actively synthesizing being-in-itself. The cogito is respected, it's just given more dimensions than a point-like certainty or than a formal "I think..." which can be appended to any judgment.

Fair. Yeah, we can do a whole thread on Descartes, and that's already been done too. I realize there's a lot to Cartesian interpretation which I'm fine with bringing in to the question, I just don't want to get bogged down in arguing what Descartes really meant is all.

So I'd be more than happy to grant that Descartes may escape this charge that Sartre is bringing up, when we consider the whole of his work. I think that all the greats are like this when they speak about one another: We can choose one or the other in defending them because they're just that rich of thinkers.

But with something as... airy?... as the philosophical subject I want something to grasp onto in thinking out the concept.

I think, generally speaking, the trap of skepticism which these thoughts can inspire is worth skipping over, but I'm hopping in and just looking at the dimensions of it. Why is this temptation here? What brings people to the Inn of Solipsism as they travel the philosophy road?

Is everyone on the same page that Descartes gives an argument for his existence from doubt? (link) Some, like ↪frank, seem to be missing this. The "shift from certainty to doubt" is not Sartre, it is Descartes, and it is not a shift from certainty so much as an avenue to certainty. — Leontiskos

By "Shift from certainty to doubt" I mean that Sartre is asking what would remain of doubt if we were only an instant, whereas for Descartes the instant in which one speaks to themself the cogito that is a certainty that even an evil demon could not deceive. Descartes uses doubt, and his doubt is even a genuine exploration, but he's on a search for certainty. Whereas Sartre is trying to explicate the metaphysical structures of a being which can lie to itself, or find itself in bad faith. How is it possible for this seemingly singular unity which flows through time, that seems transparent to itself, can lie to itself? So he focuses on the necessities of doubt in order to divide up the cogito into the tripartite division of time.

But think about why Descartes responded so vehemently to Gassendi when Gassendi made a similar claim. What you are saying is, "Descartes' wrangling with skepticism wasn't real; it was just a charade." If it wasn't real, if Descartes did not really descend into skepticism and really come out, then his meditation is completely worthless. "Descartes came back up with knowledge, therefore he never seriously entertained skepticism," is a really problematic way to assess Descartes' meditation, and Descartes explicitly rejects this problematic/cynical reading. — Leontiskos

Because Gassendi was passing over the important part to his argument. I'm not saying that Descartes' methodological decision is a charade, only that if we keep reading the meditations we eventually get out of skeptical doubt and find knowledge.

Yes! It might take us too far astray, but the notions of continuity are actually deeply related -- the quote here is in the third section on temporality, but the first section on temporality references a definition of mathematical continuity proposed by Poincare as a basis for understanding his ideas about consciousness. He requires a being which is what it is not and is not what it is as its very
being, and he states Poincare's definition as "a=b, b=c, a÷c" -- when I did the dig, because I had no idea what he was on about, what I found was that it's better to read "a÷c" as "a divides from c"; this got along with another rendition of Poincare's definition which made more sense to me: "a=b, b=c, a<c" (where a, b, and c are infinitesimals, which from what could see would be why it's not so popular nowadays since infinitesimals aren't really used anymore, from what I saw)

That "flow" from the past towards the future with a nothing that divides the two as the present is very much what he's getting at rather than a continuous series of instants.

Descartes’ mistake: the subject isn’t as much a different substance than the object, as it is differently conditioned than an object. — Mww

What is the substance of the object (and, thereby, the subject by your sentence)? And what is this different conditioning?

Yeh. Hopefully the above clarified a bit, but to reiterate -- I'm the one bringing in the notion of the skeptic to the notion of the subject by way of Descartes and Sartre. By my understanding, to go towards exegesis (but I'm trying to not fall into a sandpit of exegesis), neither of them are skeptics at all.

I think it's correct to assume that we cannot understand the world without reference to time, and so the Cogito must be understood within the context of time.

However, that does not mean that the Cogito proves that time exists, nor does it suggest that Descartes failed in his attempt to be infinitely skeptical by assuming the existence of time. It only means that an understanding of the world is impossible without placing events within time.

This approach I'm arguing is consistent with Kant's view that time does not necessarily exist outside humans because it is a form of intuition necessary for our perception of reality, but not an inherent property of the world itself. — Hanover

The cogito in Kant is interesting since it's just an abstract appendage to every assertion that one could possibly make. It refers to the transcendental ego -- a necessary feature of any assertion prior even to being baptized in the schematism of time.

I think the phenomenological approach gets by Kant's objections (well... not really objections, since the order of argument started with Kant and a lot of the ideas Kant started are "baked in" to phenomenology as a concern. Perhaps better to sya "gets around Kant's conceptions"). Using Chalmer's idea of the philosophy room: In some sense since we're in the phenomenology room when Kant shows up we can point him down the hallway towards the noumenology room where his points will stand. But since we're only speaking of the phenomena we can leave the things-in-themselves and the various noumena behind and underneath the phenomena, forever locked away.

Some commentators insist that it does, but I'd have to go on an expedition to find those sources. :smile: — frank

My thinking is that the text and some exegesis is there to give us a little something more to dig into than our own thoughts, but I do mean to ask the question about what it is I or we think about the cogito -- what is it we can infer from stating "I think"? Can you infer "I am" by thinking "I think"?

But I don't know how to interpret Descartes as getting stuck on the evil demon since he moves past the evil demon in the meditations. It seems to me that this is a temptation for modern readers because the solution isn't persuasive to us but the problem, as stated, is.

But Descartes didn't get stuck there.

Well, given that Sartre is talking about radical doubt as being given to us only through time reference (something like Kant's intuitions I feel) there is nothing other to hang experience off of is there?

'Rely' is probably the sticky word here. Sartre likes to make words less like words. — I like sushi

Skepticism is something I'm bringing in to thinking about the subject, or the cogito, but Sartre is not a skeptic.

I'm still in the middle of reading it, but yeah the in-itself is not who I am but a kind of facticity (or, at least, historicity -- I'm thinking these things are on the same plane, ie. the in-itself, but I could turn out wrong): the familiar objects of the world but without any synthetic relation which the for-itself brings (though there's a twist, here, because consciousness, the for-itself, is nothing). The for-itself brings its past along but the speaking of my past as an event that I partake in is to make of myself an in-itself, as I understand it.

I'm cool with introducing jargon and technicalities and revisiting these themes. In large part I've been looking for a good quote for entry to force myself to go back over the text from where I'm at and respond to various objections people might bring up with what I've read so far of the text to sort of solidify where I'm at.

I just wanted to avoid them so that the barrier to entry was relatively low.

Descartes' foundation is a benevolent God, right? The Evil Demon is used to show that logical truths aren't indubitable. For a piece of knowledge to survive the Evil Demon, it would have to be intrinsic to the Cogito itself. Is change intrinsic to the Cogito? — frank

I'd say certainty -- clear and distinct ideas -- is how he gets there. Looking at Meditation 3 right now:

....For without doubt, Those of them which Represent Substances are something More, or (as I may say) have More of Objective Reallity in them, then those that Represent only Modes or Accidents; and again, That by Which I understand a Mighty God, Eternal, Infinite, Omniscient, Omnipotent Creatour of all things besides himself, has certainly in it more Objective Reallity, then Those Ideas by which Finite Substances are Exhibited.... — Descartes Meditation III

I read up to about there to refresh my memory. The theme I see is certainty, which is understood as something which is clear and distinct that cannot be doubted.

I'm noticing upon looking at this that Descartes allows a past for his own argument, and seems to include objects even as he builds up there so it seems, at least by the Meditations, he's closer to Sartre than I was getting on about, and that this is really mostly a pop-notion that I'm describing.

I think of the Cogito as experiential. At this moment, I experience the world around me. I find that I can't doubt that this experience is happening. That I think of cognition as something that's happening does suggest that I think in story arcs. — frank

Does "I think" refer to the experiential whole?

Are you supposing that the Evil Demon cannot manipulate our experience of time? — Leontiskos

I don't think so.

My line of thinking here is if we know something, then at least in that respect we are not deceived. I think the change in outcomes with respect to the thought experiment has to do with emphasizing doubt over certainty -- rather than looking for a certainty that I cannot doubt, and so cannot be decieved by even the evil demon the process of looking for certitude requires I already know things that are uncertain.

To kind of do an inversion here on that line: In some sense we could say that if we accept the certitude of the cogito then we must also accept the certitude of the before-after, and so the self is not this indivisible point-particle that thinks.

The Cogito is: I think, I am. Maybe we could show that change is integral to thought. Is that Sartre's point? — frank

I think his point is to argue for a tripartite division of time which the cogito seems not to require. But mostly I'm riffing from the text here while thinking about skepticism and the philosophical self.

To doubt is to doubt. It is somewhat contrary to suggest we 'rely on' doubt. What cannot be questioned cannot be appreciated. That is all there is too it. — I like sushi

I don't think we rely upon the cogito, exactly. This isn't really a pragmatic question. When we doubt some statement or other there's a huge web that the judgment is embedded within. Here, though, the philosophical concepts are cut new to demonstrate some point or other, and so the doubt isn't that kind of doubt, but the radical kind of doubt often associated with Descartes.

I think the appeal to the Augustinian exploration of self was done as a safe place as leverage against the
Scholastic schools who dominated the discussion of nature at the time. So, not about skepticism at all. — Paine

Yeah -- though I can see how the ideas taken out of context can easily lead one to a skeptical conclusion.

One of those ideas I think the argument is targeting is the notion that the self is an indivisible point-like unity.

For purposes of this thread I think I'd like to simply stipulate the difference rather than get down into the exegesis of whether or not Descartes was really a skeptic or not.

Taking Descartes at face value in the Meditations we end with knowledge of self, God, and world. So the doubt is surely methodical rather than radical.

For the Pyrrhonist I'd stipulate that the purpose of their philosophy is to remain in a state of suspended judgment. With respect to Sartre's argument that's permissible because he's relying upon a more full-throated notion of doubt that Descartes uses which the Pyrrhonist escapes by noting they're the ones not interested in belief so have no need to defend it, but are forced to do so by those who insist on having them. For them belief is a disease to be cured.

I think stipulating what the evil demon can and cannot do is a part of the game, in a way. By stating what the evil demon is or isn't limited by you begin to pick out a foundation, be it certitude or something else.

Even the instantaneous cogito?

We don't see the skeptic Sartre is responding to in the OP. I find it difficult to tell exactly what radical doubt he's responding to. — fdrake

He's not responding to a skeptic here really, but using Descartes as a foil and it seems to me to fit a certain conception of the self as popularized in The Matrix, and so serves as a certain disentangling of concepts -- the topic he's writing about here is the structure of temporality after a bunch of other stuff. Mostly I've been looking for quotes that could be decontextualized and this is one of the first that struck me as a good entry into an old topic.

If an account of the argument can be given without use of the specific transcendental concepts Sartre is using, how can we say his analysis of necessary preconditions follows? Since the argument can be conceived otherwise. — fdrake

The way Sartre is talking isn't quite like having necessary preconditions, though the critique of Descartes relies upon that notion. But since it's Descartes that sets up the problem by using doubt it's not Sartre's necessary preconditions but Descartes' starting point (which is why it kind of reads like a deconstruction to me).

I don't think he intends this against a skeptic as much as I could see how his reflection on the cogito mirrors pop-understandings of the self as an instantaneous moment. At the moment he is describing the structure of temporality -- what I have in mind with the cogito here has more to do with The Subject, in elevator word terms, but I thought Sartre's text provided a nice entry way into that thought topic. As well as being something new to throw into the mix of thoughts here.

This is almost a troll reading, but I want to give it anyway - no further resources are needed to talk about the validity of "I think, therefore I am" than seeing if, in the circumstance of the utterance, predicating an entity entails it exists. In normal circumstances it does. Therefore the argument ought to be understood as valid by competent speakers of English. — fdrake

I'm fine with this approach. The quote is an entry-point, not a barrier.

I see a problem though. Descartes wrote "I think, therefore I am", and Descartes does not exist. He's dead.

What isn't a troll reading about it - Sartre's commentary is transcendental, a reading of the necessary preconditions of Descartes' ability to argue, judge, doubt ensuring the truth of the claim it seeks to demonstrate. That the doubter exists. The above account involves only norms of language, and specifically talks about predicability rather than any phenomenological, a-priori or transcendental structure.

Right. My interpretation so far would emphasize the phenomenological method more than the other bits. In a lot of ways there's a certain dissolution going on of transcendental structures through the phenomenological description that doesn't just waffle around in a circle like Heidegger.

At least so far.

I mostly just wanted to throw this in the thread to see what happens. — fdrake

Keep at it, I say! :D -- I brought in the skeptic because it's another topic that I think on, and the description here reminded me of The Matrix, and how that can easily lend itself into -- if you do not accept Descartes' solution -- thinking the only thing certain is the repetition of the cogito at the moment.

Doesn't Descartes explicitly court the suspension of judgment? It seems to me that Descartes thinks he can descend even below the level of Pyrrhonism and nevertheless re-surface with certain knowledge. — Leontiskos

Yeah, but it's very different -- methodical doubt is a process for finding a certain foundation for knowledge in Descartes. He's using it as a tool to dig out the foundations from the confusion.

Also, since he finds his certainty, he's no longer a skeptic at all by the end of the meditations. Whereas the Pyrrhonian wants to sustain the attitude of suspension of belief to the point that supposing someone came up with a persuasive argument then it would be the Pyrrhonian skeptic's task to invent another way to dissolve that belief.

When Socrates asks for a definition of a term that he and all the interlocutors believe is important but disagree about, he is surely trying to find the view from nowhere, the place where we transcend doxa and perhaps, eventually, dianoia as well, and can see the Good itself... — J

The beauty of Plato is that it's in the form of a dialogue. Socrates in the dialogue believes, perhaps, that there's an answer but that's not the view from nowhere. "the view from nowhere" is a more modern term, I think, though maybe I'm wrong there.

I'd go as far as to say that Plato's philosophy believes in The Forms, but that The Forms have a place.

Going with the Wiki here:

The Forms are expounded upon in Plato's dialogues and general speech, in that every object or quality in reality—dogs, human beings, mountains, colors, courage, love, and goodness—has a form. Form answers the question, "What is that?" Plato was going a step further and asking what Form itself is. He supposed that the object was essentially or "really" the Form and that the phenomena were mere shadows mimicking the Form; that is, momentary portrayals of the Form under different circumstances.

This gets along with the analogy of the cave, though it's hard for me to discern if the forms are the puppets making shadows or the sunlight above the puppet-masters.

But see how the analogy has a place, rather than being a "view from nowhere"?

I think Biden would have won a second term if he hadn't done so bad in the debate.

And it's noteworthy that the United States was willing to elect a black man, and not a black woman.

I don't have data, but that's my gut instinct -- there was a change and it was to a woman so vote for the penis-haver.

Hawt damn. Looks like it was worth all the posts after all :D

OK, yes, same question. Nevermind to my above.

Right.

But is there anything more to it than the difference in the shapes of the letters?

Oh, yes. Very much. The topics are related but I'm trying to remain on target with @NotAristotle here.

Cool. We agree there.

So when we start using things like "P" to represent any proposition whatsoever this relies upon substitution. Without a notion of substitution we'd not be able to make sense of variables.


Or, what's probably a better way of stating this, informal substitution is subject to more criteria than formal substitution is. Informally substitution is usually reserved for mathematics and statements of that form -- which is what formal logic is very much like.

But since A -> ~A uses symbols it's more appropriate to call this a formal construction of material implication, which we can write the truth-tables out for and easily conclude it's valid, but unsound, as said.

You can of course say that there is no difference and that "informal logic" and formal logic are infinitely separated, but I think that is to put the cart before the horse. Something which has nothing to do with human reasoning is not logic, and so I would say that if someone is talking about something which is wholly separate from human reasoning then they are not talking about logic (and besides that, they are not paying any attention to the historical development and motivations behind formal logics). — Leontiskos

I think there's a difference and I've committed to indications for the difference -- in the recent posts substitution has been the criteria I've been using.

I don't think that makes them entirely separable.

You are talking in terms of the first premise of a modus ponens, and that is what the material conditional is in many logics. If there is a difference between modus ponens and disjunctive syllogism, then there is a difference between A→B and ¬A∨B. — Leontiskos

The difference is the shape of the little squiggly marks.

Right.

So I'm asking -- what else is there? What does the full meaning say?

I'm sympathetic to informal logic taking priority over formalization, though it gets difficult because of the inherent ambiguity in informal logic. When I say "If I touch the stove then my hand will burn" I'm not talking in terms of material implication or disjunction at all, but a causal relationship between action and event.

But cashing out that causal relationship into the formalization is not in any way easy. Which is why we usually rely upon the informal.

But once we start introducing symbols and substitution I tend to believe we're not really talking about this imprecise, though more frequently utilized, informal reasoning.

1. Right, I mean P entails Q. The logical equivalence (not-P or Q) is an implication of the conditional, not having the same meaning as the conditional. — NotAristotle

What on earth would the meaning of P -> Q be such that it differs from not-P or Q? It's not like P -> Q is in any way a natural language sentence. We're already relying upon substitution (with the variables P and Q) so what prevents us for substituting "not-P or Q" for "P-> Q" when they are logically equivalent?