It's the part before that that's more important : "If I'm certain of this or that, then I'll interpret your acts (speech and otherwise) into my frame."



-- "Guilt" becoming a tool, like a knife, to shave away parts of another in the name of the good has it backwards to my mind.

Rather, I have to grab the knife to cut away from myself when I see the need.

Now, in a particularly drastic situation, perhaps, this ideal can't be followed. But it is better that way because using a knife to cut the soul without having any idea how any of it works may or may not help someone after all.

I don't know about all this.

A life lived to please one's mother sounds alright enough, but does that strike anyone as ethical? Isn't ethical maturity reached by coming to see your parents' as equally human, weak, and pathetic as yourself? And loving them anyways, in spite of the flaws you know all too well?

***

Levinas' philosophy, if we read between the lines, indicates this occurs after having children: Now you are the parent and you care about the son in a manner that isn't the same as your elemental projects.

But I suspect that people can come to care about others' without having their own children. Growing up is this process of taking on cares outside of the self, no?

What’s the difference between ‘I’ and ‘other’? — Joshs

That's where I get stuck a lot. Recently I've been thinking about this distinction by blending Sartre with Levinas -- Sartre has the "I", and Levinas has "the Other" figured into their philosophy, as a whole, but there are bits here or there in each philosophy that I sort of shy away from, and this sort of "synthesis" between them is a way of attempting to "fill in" the "gaps" (from my perspective, of course -- not for everyone) in each philosophy with each philosophy.

So the "I" is myriad: The cogito of "I think, therefore I am" doesn't follow because "I think" isn't the same "I" as in "I am": thinking is being-for-itself ,but the I-am is being-in-itself.

The Other, though, is exteriority (like Levinas' -- so "outside of experience" rather than "internal/external) -- the face-to-face relation is our recognition of the alien outside of ourselves as more important than our elemental attachments. (The non-self "I", ipseity, is that which is attached to: though of course ipseity is never alone unto itself and is also only known through attachment)

Is the ‘I’ a single thing or a community unto itself?

Both a single thing and a community! :D

Communally we recognize ourselves as responsible agents, as "I's" who are responsible or culpable for various things.

But if the community didn't care for such an "I", then the I would change.

We have bank-accounts and property rights to our bodies which give us a sense of individuality because the legal framework is set up to give individuals power over themselves.

In a lot of ways "Individuality" is a communal dance of respect for others', and Robinson Crusoe is no "I" except in relation to his past.

Perhaps the difference between self and other is an arbitrary distinction we fabricated , and it’s really a matter of degree?

I think so! Though for good reason, probably too. It's arbitrary, but with a point: understanding myself as a person who needs this or that, and another as a person or needs that or this, and that these things are equally valuable requires me to develop this sense of self and other -- else I'd just continue on in my own projects, absorbed in a world away from everyone.

In other worlds, the notion of selfishness is incoherent, because it isn’t a unitary ego we are protecting, but the ability to coordinate the myriad bits within the community of self that makes up our psyche so that an overall coherence of meaning emerges. the sense of a unified self is an achievement of a community , not a given.

Bingo!

Or, at least, it only becomes coherent upon a social dance that we're participating within where selfishness is seen as something to be avoided such that (this that or the other -- some communities prefer asking for forgiveness with various rituals, and some are fine with no more than an acknowledgement)

Whether we do things for ‘ourselves’ or for ‘others’ , the same motive applies, the need to maintain integration and consistency of meaning. None of us can become altruistic, generous, selfless, sharing unless we can find a way to integrate the alien other into ourselves. This isnt a moral achievement , but an intellectual one.

Exactly! At least, this is the sort of thing I'm going for.

The moral achievement is in the doing.

Intellectually speaking we can see that the Other is always radically alterior, and as such my own elemental projections of what the psyche is aren't always going to apply. The intellectual achievement is in coming to be able to distinguish between self and other (collectively?) and realizing that Alterity, Otherness, is not the same as badness -- it's discomforting, but a mature, moral sense of self emerges from recognition of this alterity and giving it moral weight in our deliberations.

Yes! though I'm hesitant with "conflict" because, in some sense, we are all of these at once -- the contraries conflict with one another: I am guilty and innocent ,and comprehend each emotional moment within some frame of evaluation. But I am the one who feels the conflict and am this conflict. In some sense I am both-and.


Or, to use a less-moralized emotion than guilt, if a song triggers anxiety, I am the anxiety now, the memory of anxiety past, and the present knowledge that this anxiety isn't related to anything but the song which happened to be playing during a traumatic event. The attachment is to a very powerful memory which, in turn, triggers the psychosomatic associations of a panic attack.

No one thinks someone who undergoes a panic attack is culpable, exactly, for that panic attack, which is why I'm bringing it up as an analogy to the lines of thinking on guilt that I'm attempting here. I'm suggesting that guilt trips are similar to panic attacks, and that these sorts of events suggest that emotions need not be attached to some rational basis. These emotions can be Pavlovian, where the bell is rung and so one feels guilt (and so a guilt-tripper moves in to ask for something to relieve the guilt)

Of course they can be sensible. When I feel guilty because I've done something I believe to be wrong then I go about and attempt to rectify it, and have no problem with such feelings -- they make perfect sense. But this is a different sort of guilt than what I mean -- it's a sensible guilt based in relationships with others, whereas I'm thinking our emotional lives, while they can develop into these communal and loving relationships, also can develop into irrational brambles and strange, senseless shapes.

And why shouldn't you do what you want? A question that should be taken seriously. — Banno

Indeed. I think that's our first morality. We do what we want to do, more often than not.

Sometime down the line we may want to care for others, though. Or at least want more than one thing and have to make a choice.

Generally I think there are moral sentiments we're attached to, and so (attempt to) enact.

But what those moral sentiments are for an individual -- I'm hesitant to say much. It'd be more beneficial for me to know what an individual believes than what I believe. If we're thinking ethically then already I think that's the viewpoint we've adopted, in some sense. Suddenly there's more to the world than me and my wants, and even though I do not want something it may still be important to me.

And that's when ethics becomes an interesting endeavor: Suddenly I have deliberations and choices not just about what I want, but also others' desires (including different moral sentiments)

I’m not inclined to separate guilt as physiological arousal
or somatic sensation from guilt as cognitive assessment. I think the former are meaningless without understanding their basis in the latter. If guilt , or emotion in general is irrational, then rationality itself is irrational. — Joshs

I'm not opposed to that conclusion.

I think that the somatic response is meaningless, though it's also always connected to some cognitive judgment that brings it meaning.

We try to make sense of these feelings, but ultimately it's our culture around us which helps us to make sense of them -- it's the village we're a part of where sense is made, and it's pre-made for us -- there's already a long history of guilt established and judged of when one ought to feel guilty and when one ought not to feel guilty.

I believe the basis of affect is the assessments that come from our attempts at sensemaking, the extent to which we are able to experience events as intelligible, recognizable, coherent with our aims. Emotion is the barometer that indicates whether we are falling into hole of confusion or confidently assimilating events. Whether a culture invokes guilt or not, an individual will not experience guilt unless they perceive their actions to violate their standards for themselves, regardless of whether this conforms to society’s expectations and norms. Guilt is a crisis of identity that is triggered whenever we discover that our actions dont conform to what we consider our values to be. Guilt is an emotion reflecting the growing pains of personal transformation. To make any significant change in one’s outlook is to risk feelings of guilt.

I suppose that doesn't make sense of trigger-events, to me.

There is a rational guilt, we could say -- a guilt with a story attached and what that means for myself in relation to others (or God) -- but any emotion, guilt or otherwise, can be elicited by any trigger. We aren't rational by default, but grow into those roles through our communal stories of what a rational individual does.

I think I'm tempted by a notion that how we feel can be given a name -- and so separated at least conceptually -- but that feeling can be attached to anything. (been trying to think through a philosophy of emotion recently, and it's fairly rough); in a sense who we are just is these attachments. Without attachment there'd be no reason to do anything at all, and when our attachments change so do we.

Guilt can be elicited through these stories due to our cultural rituals surrounding acts being blameworthy or priaseworthy, but the story that comes from the guilt isn't the guilt. Our culture invokes guilt in particular circumstances as a means for teaching people to be good (or obedient, or whatever) and the stories arise from that basic manipulation. The particular circumstances of ones own guilt is the narrative, but guilt is an emotional response from an attachment of some kind (the attachment could be as simple as "See clouds:Feel guilt:Explain guilt" -- it needn't make rational sense for the guilt to be there.)

Now, a lot of us happen to have mothers, and parents have an enormous amount of power over children, so it's little wonder that parents influence how children grow (for better or worse), and furthermore that since we're a sexual species it ought not be surprising that children are sexual, too. I give that much to Freud.

And here:

Whatever one does in the light of their understanding of others' outlooks may be regarded as their role. In guilt, our falling away from another we care for could be spoken of as an alienation of oneself from oneself. When we feel we have failed another, we mourn our mysterious dislocation from a competence or value which we associated ourselves with. One feels as if “having fallen below the standards [one has] erected for himself”

It follows from this that any thinking of guilt as a `should have, could have' blamefulness deals in a notion of dislocation and distance, of a mysterious discrepancy within intended meaning, separating who we were from who we are in its teasing gnawing abyss. — Joshs

I think this is a good story, too. Though it's not the guilt, per se, since guilt can be attached to anything at all -- though these are the common sorts of stories which people feel are right about guilt (and I'm not sure any of them are wrong, exactly, though perhaps overgeneralized)

So I'm attached to an image of myself as a good person and furthermore that image is attached to guilt whenever what I do does not match that image within this particular ethical framework where guilt is attached to principle or character.

But guilt could also be attached in other ways, naturally. "Guilt" seems almost like a basic emotion in the same way I'd be tempted to call "red" a basic color -- it's a feeling on the tapestry of consciousness, but it can be configured in so many ways.

Yes, Mummy only says "be good for Mummy" when she has assigned 'badness'. In fact you have it backwards; one is told to be good, and thereby learns to assign guilt to oneself. Because if one was good, one would not need to be told. Children are helpless and dependent on people who assign them to be ... — unenlightened

I'm not so sure. Guilt need not be so narratively driven -- it can be triggered by any number of events and memories, and need not make any kind of sense. I can feel my guilt is unjustified, because I know that the person guilt-tripping me is eliciting a response -- I still feel the guilt, but that doesn't mean I'm really sorry or think of myself as not-good or needing-to-be-good.

In terms of morals and talking about morals and ethics and talking about ethics -- I think Sartre provides a good ontology for us.

And Levinas provides a good text to reflect upon: we are all an infinity and our everyday interactions are the face-to-face, at least after ethical puberty. (meaning, it's easy to sling statements together and even live by them, but becoming a truly ethical person requires hearing others and changing yourself even though it feels like you ought not to)

I ought say yes to be consistent, but I feel like saying no?

Yes, our actions are what it's all about.

But I somehow want to prioritize "listening" as an action. Or togetherness. I'd say that our being-with is prior to our Dasein, tho Dasein is more accessible -- tho terribly close and thereby needing exposition -- something something Levinas lol. (or Sartre)

If I'm certain of this or that, then I'll interpret your acts (speech and otherwise) into my frame.

"Guilt" becomes a category I can assign to others, and by that classification justify my cruelty towards others -- in the name of the good.

There is no thinking here, no conversation, no reflection, no philosophy. Ethical thinking, I suppose I mean, is more open than all that.

I, at least, prefer to hear more and listen -- and by doing so I am continually exposed to other ways of thinking about ethics.

If I were certain then I'd have been defending the Book of Morman for a long time now.

It's not such a bad bargain. — Vera Mont

It's not. Mothers, and grandmothers, are wonderful to us all.

I'm resistant to Freudian notions because I think they're false, in a plain and simple way.

O my -- this is the first time I've seen the frog in your avi. I always saw it on the horse side before.

I suppose my hope is that we could do it without all those stories and such. They have been passed down, but what is their worth?

Or, at least, to open up that kind of discussion. Moral certainty is the death of ethical thinking.

Simply, there is no virtue in being un-fallen - innocence is the natural condition, and virtue arises from the fall along with vice as "knowledge of good and evil" - What philosophers call "moral knowledge". If you don't know good from evil, there is no virtue in doing good and no vice in doing evil, you just do what you do.

(When I were a lad this stuff were taught in school; kids these days don't understand the language and tradition properly in the first place, and then get all superior and dogmatic in their ignorance, mistaking it for virtuous rationality and freedom from superstition.) — unenlightened

Guilty as parenthetically charged ;)

Virtuous rationality and freedom from superstition -- is this an innocent mistake? Or a guilty self-lie?

****

At the least I don't like superiority, dogmatism, and especially so when they are paired with ignorance.

But I also dislike guilt, generally speaking. I think it's not so much a feeling of moral knowledge but a conditioned response which is used to control people.

Now, deciding to not be controlled, by this thesis, does not make one virtuous. But neither is the guilty state virtuous.

I suppose I doubt those philosophers who claim to have "moral knowledge", and so -- by your notions -- no one is virtuous at all because we are all ignorant.

In a sense I ought be guilty.

I have my traditions I come from which would say I am guilty.

They would say I am guilty because of this or that.

So I would be fallen, and thereby virtuous?

True. Fair would be that once you have fallen there is no redemption. Without guilt, there can be no virtue. — unenlightened

Ought I be guilty?

And so we fall into self-improvement, social improvement, and global improvement, as though through our internal conflict we can outthink that nature from which we spring. Yet one does not really have to go all the way to China; in our own Christian tradition, the individual conscience also reigns supreme. If you follow that internal voice, you cannot go wrong. (But on the other hand, you might well get crucified.) — unenlightened

Well that's not fair.

But then again, I agree that the only truly rational solution to the problem is medication. — Tarskian

Cool.

I'm pro-medication!

Though I want to push back a little and say that's not the only true rational solution.

I don't know if the solution is exactly rational even, though it helps me so I'm fine with the solution.

I only know people who are spiritual who struggle with these issues, and so I can't say that it's a spiritual problem.

To stop willing is to cease to experience difference and becoming, since desire is just another word for difference. — Joshs

Hrm!

I'd separate those rather than saying they are the same. (EDIT: meaning here "desire" and "difference")

Stopping-willing is like pulling a tree out of oneself imagined as ground. but difference and differance remain. the will to nirvana, i agree, is still a willing: it's another tree in the ground.

Poetically speaking: the ground remains after the tree is pulled out

I'm a person with clinical depression. And anxiety! It's a fun time.

There are people with these symptoms who are spiritual. Ergo, It's not a spiritual problem

Suicide is different from opiods. Yes?

I agree there

Antidepressants, anti-anxiety medication, and opioids are the rational solution to a spiritual problem. There simply is no rational reason for life itself. Therefore, the only truly rational solution for the rational meaninglessness of life is to medicate it away.

It is not just that the unbelievers do not want children. They are even actively self-deleting. In the meanwhile, we pray to the spiritual Lord, and carry on, with or without the unbelievers. — Tarskian

This has nothing to do with suicide at all.

Camus' essay is still my favorite philosophical reflection on suicide.

THERE is but one truly serious philosophical problem, and that is suicide. Judging whether life is or is
not worth living amounts to answering the fundamental question of philosophy. All the rest— whether
or not the world has three dimensions, whether the mind has nine or twelve categories—comes afterwards.

Oh, yes. I'm not thinking in terms of putting an argument, but reflecting.

If some people feel incapable of going on, unable to convince themselves that things might improve for them in the future, then there would seem to be little scope for argument against suicide in those kinds of cases. — Janus

There I'd disagree.

I'm not sure how to put it though, other than Camus' essay -- a kind of defiance and rebellion against the bleak future, a rolling of the bolder knowing that eventually you'll slip, a heroism in the face of the absurd.

Though I like to tamper the notion of heroism down a bit, that's where I'd think of as a rational place to argue against suicide, philosophically.

The reason this isn't a principle is because its not a rule, but a definiton. Maximising ones experience is to improve said experience according to some set of values. To ought to do something is to do so because it has increased value. Hence, you ought to maximise your experience, by definition, since it would improve said experience according to your values. It's like if I was to say "One wants to listen to songs that one enjoys", this isn't a principle, its definitional. — Ourora Aureis

If a person is to maximize experience, then we have to have a way of measuring experience.

How do you accomplish that?

If the measure is whatever the individual wants, then there is no guide being provided for action -- "Do what you want" isn't hard when you know what to do, and is hard when you're trying to make a decision. That would mean there's no advice to be had in this egoism.

How could it serve as a guide to action, then?

I've never seen that one, but want to now.

He showed up to Occupy Vancouver!

Thanks for sharing.

Have you considered putting this on a radio program?

I enjoyed listening because you gave a fair presentation of ideas with a passion for them. It's great.

My "congregations" were theatre troupes, and I have no regrets.

@unenlightened said the right things. If you connect then that's a good promise, though it may end in disappointment.

Love is more an act of feeling and giving than an act of calculation, though our current world requires us to think in those terms (due to patrilineal laws, etc.)

Even so: I'm certain you can find bookish and contemplative persons who don't just want what seems superficial.

In fact I'd say that's what most people are looking for. (heh, not the "bookish", but the "not superficial")

Excellent dialectical theme you’ve created here; I appreciate the thought-provoking aspect, even without total mutual accord.

Thanks :).

No need for total mutual accord, at least I don't demand it. It's pretty hard with the greats. And don't be shy -- say wherever and however you wish to disagree. I don't bite, though if questioned I'll give a quote or admit I don't know :D

Isn't Kant's philosophy predicated on a "free will"? So that being said, having the maximum playing field to enact one's will freely, would seem to be entailed for this to be played out, no? — schopenhauer1

Freedom is central to his ethics, but I don't think there's a maximization function -- that sounds a bit more like utilitarianism, and I'd be hesitant to reduce it all to free will: there's things like duty, respect, humanity, rationality that are all in play. Plus the religious background, at least so I've been saying (though where to draw the line...)

Also, my deontology isn't strictly Kantian-based, though I think most modern deontology is inspired by his framework... Intent/autonomy/rights/dignity/not being used, etc.. — schopenhauer1

Sure. I'm not really presenting my direct ethical view, though it's not like I don't feel empathy for Kant's view at times -- but I don't think it's as universal as he'd like it to be. I think it's more of a time-and-place thing, like I do of all the normative theories.

Granted, which is why I think the freedom to choose is part of deontological considerations. — schopenhauer1

That's interesting. I had never put together that freedom could act as a kind of limit to practical reason, just as metaphysics is a limit for theoretical reason. Though I'm not sure it's strictly Kant as this point, it's still an interesting parallel!

Okay, then I am more comfortable in my claim that you are misinterpreting Kant. From my edit: — Leontiskos

Oh it wouldn't be the first time ;). And it wouldn't surprise me that my memories are off -- I through this in the lounge for that reason. I didn't feel like doing the deep work :D -- but I wanted to think through the ethics a bit.

As far as I recall, Kant follows Christianity in claiming that one can fail to treat oneself as an end in oneself, and this would seem to undo the autonomy thesis. If it were just a matter of autonomy then treating oneself poorly would be impossible. — Leontiskos

My memory on that claim is that it was with respect to masturbation, which always made me kind of shrug at that claim -- though, yes, that definitely fits with his Christian heritage. It may be here that this is what previously was raising feathers : I can acknowledge the Christian heritage, but at what point are we talking about Kant, the man, and Kant's philosophy, as intended, and Kant's philosophy, as written.

That was one of his examples I always sort of put to the side as worthless, though I could see the case being made for, say, substance abuse -- I don't think that's respecting yourself as an end (not sure if it would be a universalizable maxim, that one)

Though respecting someone as an ends-maker wouldn't entail, I don't think, that autonomy makes right or something -- rather, it is right to respect autonomy. It's a pretty important feature of the ethic, I think, though I agree that there would be times where just because someone says they choose something that then they are morally good or something like that. (EDIT:...is not a claim to morality)

You'd have to go through the process of reflection.

And that's where it gets hard to really apply the ethic to others. How can you reflect for someone else whether they are following a maxim?

The key here is that it is not legitimate to reduce "treat them as an end in themselves" to "treat them as an ends-maker." Those are not the same thing for Kant. The latter does not exhaust the former. Just because we are treating someone as an ends-maker does not mean that we are treating them as an end in themselves. The specific emphasis on autonomy and ends-making comes later, and I would argue that if taken too far is a strong deviation from Kant.

(Hence, in the arranged marriage, the parents are failing to treat the betrothed as ends-makers, but they are not necessarily failing to treat them as ends in themselves.)

One thing I don't think the ethic handles well is disparity in power. Kant doesn't really talk about children at all -- are they born with the categories? Do the categories become more apparent as they develop? When are they rational beings?

But I agree there's more to it than just because someone chooses something, or something along those lines, as I said above.

Seems a bit goofy to me. You could get around all this notion of suffering simply by noting, or adhereing to, a duty to preserve life, suffering or no.

I think a hedonic ethic or a utilitarian ethic or a consequentialist ethic will serve AN better. Not that you couldn't put AN into deontology -- here you are doing it -- but others will have different maxims from you, and part of deontology is respecting others' choices.

You want an ethic that lets you tell when others are wrong, but deontology is more about the self choosing actions, I think. It's only in the eyes of God that we could tell if someone is right or wrong, but we only have the eyes of a human.

Could just be a turn of phrase, because I don't disagree with what you wrote. By "individuals" I was more thinking with respect to "everyone should"

So to rephrase more properly with this in mind:

The will is the faculty of right action, or, volition. I can see acting on a principle, or in accordance with a principle, but I don’t see the willing of one. — Mww

Individuals act on principles, or in accordance with a principle would be the same thing as I meant there. The contrast was -- can Everybody act in volition with a principle? Can I act in a manner that makes everyone act? It doesn't seem so to me. We'll want others, oftentimes, to follow our maxims, but the actual calculus isn't of the sort where if everyone is not following the maxim, for instance, I shouldn't -- it's the individual, rather than the group, that's more important in thinking through whether a maxim can be universalized, or an act is moral. (Or, really, it's the philosopher contemplating the individual)

Right -- but the "mere" part is what mitigates the choice.

And in any case, while AN isn't self-contradictory, if you're to respect the autonomy of other human beings you have to let them make their own choices under deontology, which would include having children. (it's not like that's self-contradictory... )

There are circumstances where I can imagine having a child violates the 2nd formulation -- say that you decide to have a child to save a marriage. That would be something where I can see how the child isn't being thought of at all, but is a solution to a problem: a marriage. That seems to violate the second formulation.

But I'm not seeing it for all birth. Sometimes people have children because they want their child to have a better life than they had, for instance -- they care about the child as an individual. In those circumstances I'm just not seeing how you could make the case.

I have all along been uncomfortable with this language of "respecting them as ends-makers," because this is a reduction of the second formulation to autonomy. Obviously that is part of the second formulation, but I want to say that it is not the entirety of it. If it were entirely a matter of respecting them as ends-makers then I really would have to place their autonomy on a very high pedestal. This would be a rather significant, albeit interesting, deviation from Christianity. Is there textual warrant in Kant that the second formulation should be interpreted this way? — Leontiskos

Nothing super direct comes to mind, other than "treating them as an end unto themselves" and noting how individual freedom is central -- as in a category of reason -- for moral thinking in Kant.

Since I can choose my ends, I have to recognize that others can do so as well.

Also, something Rawls points out, deontology is a literal lack of a goal: so to treat someone so that they fulfill a goal would be to violate them.


****


There are times, of course, that we do this -- for the betterment of the person, even, and especially with children.

Still -- I'd say arranged marriages are just a bit much (as a USian), and generally I think that childhood autonomy is undervalued in our society. For the most part, yeah, I'd say that the emphasis on autonomy is at least a partial deviation from Christianity -- though there are strains in Christianity which emphasize the importance of choice, too.

If you force someone to church that doesn't mean they really believe in Christ, for instance. What's important is that they actually assent, in their heart of hearts, not the goal of "Increase church membership"

heh, then we're getting into the nitty-gritty, cuz the question becomes more of when the 2nd formulation applies.

In one sense treating others to become better, for instance, is to treat them as means to an end: to the end of virtue. Even if they would, in fact, be better, we wouldn't be respecting them as end-makers if we manipulated them into being good, regardless.

Basically, autonomy, as I see it, is part of the second formulation. I don't think it would only apply when when someone is acting on a maxim? Though then perhaps I'm just being more expansive with the notion than you'd be.

If you think it violates the second formulation, then who is being treated as a mere means? I don't quite see it, and I am thinking of the analogous situation of an arranged marriage. If parents arrange a marriage for their child, or if someone pre-selects an infant for a hierarchical role, does it follow that they are being treated as a mere means? — Leontiskos

Well, I'd say so, yeah. I don't believe in arranged marriages or pre-destined roles for children, because I believe autonomy is more important than that.

For BNW, though, I'd say that it's at a different order than either because even with arranged marriages and roles the individual gets to choose within those confines(run away from home, get a divorce, use the role to their ends rather than to their parents as a king, whatever). What's happening in BNW is that the reproductive cells are being planned to produce people who will fit within different roles within a planned society -- so the Gammas that are needed for menial tasks are produced in a vat to push the elevator up or down and be happy with their position in life.

Building people to fit within a social structure seems to me to violate the general notions of autonomy that are valorized in Kant's ethic.

So going along with anti-natalism: if the reason you're creating a child is to use the child as a means to an end, and there is nothing more to it than that, then sure. — Moliere

Something that came to mind here: Aldous Huxley's Brave New World.

The quote that came to mind is about a scientifically designed society which creates hierarchies before people are born: (pdf page 6 in the link)



I'd say that this society violates the second formulation while maintaining the first: it's consistent, they continue on, and yet by relegating people before they are born to certain hierarchies -- even though everyone is happy -- it does not respect the humanity of people.

That, however, is a far cry from having children at all @schopenhauer1 -- I think utilitarianism, and psychological hedonism would be better friends to you than deontology, at least if you want to universalize anti-natalism (I did admit some conditions where I could, and even in my own life I can see, where having children isn't a good choice -- but the universal program is a bit much for me)

Does anyone know of any dating apps or places to be, where people seeking a deep, long-term relationship with an intellectually substantive partner go? — Bob Ross

I have no tips for partners. Love is a queer thing, which some say is its attraction.


But for intellectually substantive long-term relationships: I can say a little on that. And really, I have a hard time thinking that finding a partner is much different in terms of finding someone compatible. (not sure if there is a method for anything more certain, which is part of the anxiety -- and perhaps even joy -- of the task) -- on that, I find most of my friends from similar interests. Usually there are local groups interested in similar-ish enough things, and really that's what church is basically about: building community together, which happens to include partner-matching in various rituals.

So: commune with people in things you like, keep an open eye, and wait until you feel the moment is right I suppose is my thought. After that: ask someone else.

That's the crux of it. There can be a lot more:
Don't cause harm, and justify it by mitigating harm if you didn't have to.
Don't assume for others what is good for them, and worth suffering for, especially without consent.

All this comes down to the second formulation of not using people.
Don't use people, disrespecting their dignity, by putting them in harmful conditions because you have positive-ethical project you would like to see carried out. — schopenhauer1

M'kay.

One thing that comes to mind is that I think of it as not merely using people. The pietism makes sense of this distinction: when, in your heart of hearts, you ask yourself if you're using people, even if you do not want to use people, you'll admit that you go to the shop keeper not because you're following a duty, but because you want to buy something for yourself. (EDIT: That is, you are using the shopkeeper, but you don't need to use him merely as a means to an end -- you can still respect his humanity)

This isn't a wrong mind -- it's just not right.

So going along with anti-natalism: if the reason you're creating a child is to use the child as a means to an end, and there is nothing more to it than that, then sure. But I think many parents feel a deeper attachment than that: they can recognize the biological inclination to continue on the species while at the same time treat their children as more than means to satisfying that biological inclination.

There are many maxims, after all.

Go on.