I think for me the vivisection example is still enough. That takes one hell of a disconnect from animal suffering to be able to rationally do or observe or some such. I mean, I can see what you're saying in that at least it's for knowledge rather than just some sick display, but eh. I can see the coherency well enough to say there's a possible danger there from philosophy to activity, but it'd depend upon the interpretation.

Unfortunately, the Wiley article was pay-walled for me. Gone are my days from always being able to access anything.

Cudworth is the kind of example I'm looking for, but I'm a bit skeptical about the trace from Descartes to us still. For instance, the article on Cudworth ends on:

Cudworth’s ideas were far more subversive in his time than they might seem to us today. In his intellectual biography of Cudworth, the late John Passmore noted that Cudworth’s philosophy was “regarded with suspicion, as atheistic in tendency” because “he blurred the sharp distinction, on which Descartes insisted, between the human mind and every other sort of natural entity” (Ralph Cudworth: An Interpretation, 1951).

So while there were people other than Descartes at the time who'd disagree with his animal experiments -- the people I imagined before who I figured probably agreed with me in spite of the spirit of the times -- it doesn't seem like it was Descartes' philosophy, to me, as much as the influence of the church which made his ideas unpopular.

This isn't a small thing to consider. One of the reasons Descartes may be cited isn't because he gave people permission to do what they wanted, but because he wrote them for other people. If it wasn't Descates that gave them an excuse, it may have been someone else after all. As you note, we have the capacity for both kindness and cruelty.

So I think I'd maintain that while I see the coherency between Cartesian philosophy and our present way of treating animals as a resource (even our pets are just resources for our joy, and have owners), but still maintaining some skepticism with respect to the causal claim.

I think that's part of it, but also I think we can change. In a lot of ways I think we continue to treat animals as a resource more out of historical momentum of doing so. (plus, now that there's a whole industry around meat-production, the usual motives against change are at play)

During the Enlightenment, some scholars were beginning to doubt the divine right of man and the dumb bestiality of beasts. — Vera Mont

This is the part I want more details on. Rather than some scholars, or rather than a most vigorous set of debates held within a 100 year period, I was curious if there's a more direct connection between Cartesian philosophy, including those following along in his path (rather than just the man alone, but actual instances of his philosophy), and these scholars who were beginning to doubt and were then either suppressed by the popularity of Cartesian philosophy or convinced by it.

That paper you shared @Mww is doing something similar to the blog post that I'm trying to highlight. It begins with a clear explication of an interpretation of a prominent philosopher's view, and then moves over to a clear set of examples which fit with the explication.

What this demonstrates is coherency, though, and not historical cause, or even a trace.

For instance, prior to Descartes we also used animals as a resource. As has been pointed out, the Christian worldview from which Descartes was building his philosophy already allowed the mistreatment of animals, at least by our sensibilities (which, I'd note, are far from universal even today) informed by the notion that them feeling pain -- even if it is their own kind of pain rather than human pain -- is enough to warrant them as having moral worth, or are worthy of moral consideration.

Not only that, given that Descartes is being used here as an example of a philosophy that denies pain to animals (though it looks like there's scholarly controversy there, so who knows, we're not in a good position to judge), and we here believe that animals feel pain, and yet we also treat animals as a resource, it's even more unclear that Descartes philosophy is the reason we treat animals the way we do.

Which isn't to say it cannot be demonstrated. There's definitely a coherency there I can see. So, in some way we might say that this is the thought-component which happens to live on for awhile to justify treating animals as resources (to varying degrees, of course, but that general principle still holds) -- but I'm thinking it's not Descartes philosophy as much as a much longer historical practice.

I forgot to add the link before posting, but have since edited it. Here it is on a first post.

I was lucky enough to find a translation of the letter on the internet.

You object that sometimes even in a heart that has been taken from the body and dissected, individual parts of it go on beating although no blood is flowing into or out of it. Well, I once made a rather careful observation of this phenomenon in fish, whose hearts after removal from the body go on beating for much longer than the heart of any terrestrial animal. But I could always judge—and in many cases I could see—that some remaining drops of blood had fallen from higher up into the lower part where the pulse was occurring. — Descartes, Letter to Plempius, Feb 15 1638

How could Descartes see the heart of terrestrial animals beating after removing them from the body other than vivisection?

Cool find. I've never read the objections before. Thanks for posting.
***

Following the Descartes SEP article embedded within the blog I pulled the following quote:

In mechanizing the concept of living thing, Descartes did not deny the distinction between living and nonliving, but he did redraw the line between ensouled and unensouled beings. In his view, among earthly beings only humans have souls. He thus equated soul with mind: souls account for intellection and volition, including conscious sensory experiences, conscious experience of images, and consciously experienced memories. Descartes regarded nonhuman animals as machines, devoid of mind and consciousness, and hence lacking in sentience. (Although Descartes' followers understood him to have denied all feeling to animals, some recent scholars question this interpretation; on this controversy, see Cottingham 1998 and Hatfield 2008.) . . . — SEP

I think that the parenthetical comment supports @Vera Mont 's and the blogs contention, and I'm curious how those scholars square away their belief with the already quoted portion of the SEP article on Animal Consciousness, part 3:

Although the roots of careful observation and experimentation of the natural world go back to ancient times, study of animal behavior remained largely anecdotal until long after the scientific revolution. Animals were, of course, widely used in pursuit of answers to anatomical, physiological, and embryological questions. Vivisection was carried out by such ancient luminaries as Galen and there was a resurgence of the practice in early modern times (Bertoloni Meli 2012). Descartes himself practiced and advocated vivisection (Descartes, Letter to Plempius, Feb 15 1638), and wrote in correspondence that the mechanical understanding of animals absolved people of any guilt for killing and eating animals.

Rarely do we get such a clear cut relationship in a historical document of a person's thought directly advocating something so pertinent to the question at hand. How can you rationally advocate vivisection while believing animals feel pain? (If he believes they feel pain, isn't that even worse?)

**

One thing I'd push back a bit on, though, is that social structures don't need philosophical justification. Treating animals as a resource is something we still do, even if we now recognize that it's wrong to cause unnecessary suffering. Something I'd like to see is the connection between Cartesian philosophy and how we still treat animals. Many people will acknowledge that animals feel pain these days, so it's not obvious that Descartes philosophy is connected to how we treat animals even though there are some Christian traditionalists still about. At least, not as obvious as the above connection that I'm in support of -- at least as I see it.



I don't think anyone has said we should cancel Descartes, only that people feel different about the man. And I'd concur -- I didn't realize until doing this dive that Descartes practiced vivisection. I'd guess that the people of the day who didn't agree with vivisections would agree with me, but who knows. I have no problem judging the people of the past in accord with my ethics -- but certainly, I believe in reading one who is not only influential, and so you can begin to draw traces from his thinking to now (I'm more noting that it's going to take some work), but also an incredibly intelligent mind.

But in cases of judgment on the ethos of a man and his philosophy -- I think actions taken counts as are an important part of the judgment.

That's cool. Feel free to comment along.

I've read a lot of Marx, including Capital v 1, but never the Grundrisse -- it wasn't exactly on my list, but I'm easily nudged ;). Plus the whole free course to keep me on schedule is nice.

Well, the person who told me about it bought me a hard copy of the book, officially guilt tripping me into committing. :D (honestly was probably going to do it anyways)

Glad to have some fellow travelers along. Maybe we can use the thread to post thoughts as we go along.

Another unmentioned: Dick Tracey. I love the visuals of the movie in particular, because of how well they translated old comics to film.

Cool. I think I just have this category I put a lot of movies into -- which doesn't mean they're bad, but rather I have to know what someone else likes before I'll suggest them.

Whereas some movies I'll just put out there as something I think anyone can find something good in, or at least I'll have some cinematic reason (like with Predator on the list I was thinking about how it really encompasses the barely hidden homo-eroticism of 80's action flicks -- even if you don't like the movie, I'd point out that it's a perfect demonstration of a particular aspect of a kind of movie)

OOooo... good choice.

As always, too many choices...

I'm impressed with your ability to just have one :D I also enjoy that trilogy. I'll just try a grab-bag for a list of action movies I love that haven't been mentioned yet:

Mad Max: Fury Road
Kill Bill, v 1 and 2
Terminator 2
The 36th Chamber of Shaolin
Predator

While I like story, I also agree with your general taste for the elements of film that are particular to film.

I love action movies because they are almost exclusively composed of that. And there's a genuine difference between the masters of visual story-telling and the cheesy spin-offs. (although, I'll admit, I like the cheese, too)

One that hasn't been mentioned and I'd include, though, is the original Conan: The Barbarian. The visuals, in particular, are what I like about this movie, as well as how the mood is established by the score, pacing, and visual storytelling -- it coheres so well with the character Conan.

Many of my favorites have already been said :D

The Last Starfighter — T Clark

I wanted to special mention this one, though, because I grew up with that movie (and later read it was the first movie to use CGI effects in it). So it's definitely one of those movies I'll watch but would never recommend unless someone wants to watch a cheesy 80's sci-fi film with me.

EDIT: Over time, this category has grown. There's a lot of movies I grew up with that I enjoy for what they are, but when I think about them now in some aesthetic sense I'm like "ehhhh"

Isn't it a kind of pleasure which deepens desire rather than satisfying desire?

I think philosophy is like that for me.

It's an intrinsically satisfying activity which always leads to something more, unfinished.

But this simply isn’t true. I may have failed to emphasize this, but while this transfer of profits to shareholders — which has increased these last 40 years — hasn’t been good for workers, it hasn’t been good for businesses either. — Mikie

Fair point.

Maybe not good for the business as an organization, but if there's a class which controls said organization and they don't particularly care about the health of the business, but rather how much they can extract from it, then that'd explain why those in charge make decisions which are bad for business, even in the Back to the Basics Economics sense.

But this is just a thought at this point, not an argument. It's just where my mind went.

Sure. But a particular kind of capitalism— one that is currently choosing to distribute 90% of profits to shareholders. This is the background on which people in states and, more relevant to this thread, corporations operate. It’s a system of beliefs and values.

Shareholder primacy theory is a major justification for these actions in my view.

I share your thought about capitalism, but I don’t think it’s sufficient to answer the OP questions. — Mikie

What?! My very generic Marxist view didn't provide enough details?! :D

Cool. I don't think I have another answer, though.

That's not actually what I said. I'll acknowledge the US has done things it shouldn't have. My point is that there is a way to compare the two, and it does boil in part down to the murder of citizens, but it's also things like gulags, purges of people from the party as a form of ostracism, starvation, and a whole host of other horrible events. These things are not ancient history. It's like saying we can't condemn Nazi Germany (which is closely wrapped up in all of this) as Americans because Americans are also bad. Of course we can. — Hanover

There's a similar list for the United States. Right? Genocide and chattel slavery aren't ancient history, either.

Something about an afternoon comparing gulags to genocides seems like a sad game, at least. And then -- do you really feel like you know more about which system is better or worse?

I don't.

I'm aware of the evils of socialism. I don't think of these things lightly, for that matter. I'd rather not have gulags or the Khmer Rouge.

I don't think those evils are necessary features of socialism, though, as much as necessary features of nation-states. And I've heard the numbers crunched before and seen the United States come out on top.

Didn't do much for me, though, other than leave me thinking -- this whole thing is fucked up, really. (EDIT: I'll also note I've seen the numbers tabulated the other way -- hence my thought that it just depends on what side you want to win. You'll choose a theory of counting based upon which side gets to win)

A few reasons we care. The first is that it does serve as an example of what Marxist thought can cause, and that should offer pause when using Marxism as a philosophical basis for social change. The fact that it's not just a theoretical danger but an actually realized one matters. The other is that it's hardly a defunct state, with an actual war taking place right now between a former Soviet state and Russia in an effort to re-establish its former perceived greatness. — Hanover

The USSR can serve as an example of what Marxist thought can cause, sure.

But you're going to have to draw the connections between a Marxist analysis of the workplace and, say, Stalinism.

Stalin, while a very famous Marxist -- and I'm not interested in trying to get the hard cases out of the category, as I hope is apparent by now -- is not the only Marxist. There are many Marxists, and not all of them are Stalin. For instance, Salvadore Allende was a Marxist (which the United States helped to overthrow in a coup of his country -- something the United States has a habit of helping and doing in South and Latin America).

And for me, at least, I'm fairly heterodox on the question of history. I don't think it's necessary at all -- rather, it's open. So one of the things I tend to say is "Well, what if we just didn't do that?" -- i.e., just because we're organized militantly for power doesn't mean we'll use that power to create gulags.

So I agree with you that it's important to know history. I think we can learn from it.

But I disagree with the inference that Marxism is a failure. I think history is far more open on that question, and it really depends on who you are within your particular social system. It's a lot easier to sing the praises of capitalism when it's treating you well, just as it's easier to sing the praises of socialism when it's treating you well.

I'm not trying to salvage Marx, and I thought it obvious that this was so when I said I'm not trying to defend Marx on idealist grounds, or when I said socialists have done evil shit.

The part you're not liking is when I say the United States has done enough evil shit that it's a sad and stupid game to pick a side on. The only way you'll make the point is to add up the numbers, and how you add the numbers is how you choose which side you're on. That's why there are historians which are both pro and anti. But it has more to do with the historian than the events, when they tabulate, and it's a dry affair that doesn't really capture human suffering. And at the end of the day I suspect you'd disagree with the things which the United States does, so why is it we're talking about a now defunct state?

Marxism is a living, breathing philosophy and tradition of both thought and action. Marx doesn't need to be salvaged -- the concrete conditions of our life are what makes Marx relevant. His critique of political economy fits even if Stalin is a worse leader than any US leader.

You can't say "just like us" unless you're willing to engage in the analysis you just said you wouldn't do. You can't refuse to consider the evidence and then answer the question. — Hanover

I'm saying I've considered the evidence, and my conclusion is that both nations are prone to doing all kinds of evil things to the extent that, after looking at it, it's not really a worthy goal to say which somehow eeks out a slightly better score.

Historians been at this game for awhile. There's books by historians that are pro- and anti- Marxist. I've read a handful of them, and there's more I could read. There's even more that could be written, too.

From what I hear, it sounds like you'd get along with Robert Service's description of communism.

The past has to matter to you if you're trying to come to a solution for the future to at least know what you're fighting for and to be sure you're not recreating something we know doesn't work.

To the extent you want to organize labor to fight for more rights, that seems appropriate, but that is a far way from communism. That's just being an advocate of labor unions. — Hanover

I agree that Marxism and labor unionism are not the same. If anything, my critique of labor unions is that they aren't militant enough.

I wouldn't say I'm fighting here, though, either. Just to note. I'm still doing philosophy -- this is just a conversation between thems of us who like to think about this stuff, rather than some political activity.

And, duh, the past matters. If anything I'm over-historical in my approach to things. I'm just noting how the Soviet Union's various failures don't have much to do with American workers who should organize militantly if they want the good things in life.

Eh, it's a sad line of conversation I've already had the displeasure of going down. Wracking up the sins of each nation is a good way to feel sad the rest of the day, and at the end of it you really wonder why you're obsessing over such macabre things. In my estimation, when you go through the list of sins, it's something of a wash. Nations will behave like nations, in the end, and whether that benefits you has a lot to do with what your social position within that nation is.

For the purposes of historical tabulation, though, I include Stalin. Like I said, no idealist defenses. As a USian with a passing interest in Marxism I've been bombarded with the litany of socialist sins most of my life, so it's unlikely you'll find a shocking fact that will move me. Socialists done some evil shit.

Just like us.

And at the end of the day, it doesn't even matter to me -- the analysis makes sense of the patterns between the classes in the United States, and my advice to become organized remains the same. After all, the owners are organized.

Heh. I may just be too democracy-poisoned ;) I've heard "democracy" as a palliative to concrete wrongs far too often, putting justice in a place far beyond what a body will experience. I think the term elicits notions of propriety and correctness, which is the sort of thing that -- if one's political actions are going to be successful at all -- needs to be pushed to the side. Political action isn't about propriety, respect, correctness, or any of that.

I remember during Occupy well-meaning (and well to do) liberals lecturing us about how they agreed with our goals, but not our methods. And if we were only more proper then we'd have more support from the likes of them.

For me "democratic participation" just sounds a lot like that, when successful political action, in the sense of obtaining concrete goals for a group, is the exact opposite of these recommendations, and where they come from has less to do about what is efficacious and more to do with what well to do people feel comfortable with.

I'm not going to claim that this is universal or something, but it's that hesitancy to act which I think I'm pushing against. A lot of the time people believe "democratic participation" amounts to nothing more than reading the news, thinking about issues, and going to the voting booth. That's the civic religion, after all. And I think that does fit the term. I'm trying to point out -- it takes more, if you happen to fall into a particular class of people at least.

Yes! But, most importantly, this picture centers the worker as a political actor -- rather than being a part of the electorate, the worker can organize outside of the state due to the dependency relationship between workers and the rest of the world.

So, not democratic participation in the sense of being a part of a liberal party within a capitalist state -- but rather as being a member of an organization dedicated to worker's power.

And so it converts what looked like a moral question into a political question.

You'll hear no idealist defenses of Marx from me.

But you won't hear idealist condemnations either.

Yes, millions died under socialism due to socialist policies. Millions more will die tomorrow.

The only thing I'm noting is -- it's not that different under capitalism. And rather than look to the famines of the past as a reason to dismiss Marxist analysis, I'm just applying Marxist analysis to the question at hand.

So last Great Depression it didn't happen here, but it did happen in Russian and millions died. So, sure, this time it will happen in the right way, or whatever Marxist thought says. — Hanover

This is just an imaginary of an imaginary.

We done killed our millions. Racking up bodies won't decide what's the better way to live, though it makes for good propaganda.

Either way -- the free market ain't real.

And you, too, just like the people that employ you, can manipulate it.

So, as I said, it comes down to how organized your class is. How much power you have, in your given class. Who butters your bread.

There is no free market. At this point in development it's simply stupid to think that there is. There is an environment set up some degrees away from what economic actors do through the relationships between states and other economic actors.

As notes -- them chicken owners are plenty organized with how much state funding they get.

All the same, if the chicken killers organize, and the farmer and the engineer and the veterinarian and the marketer aren't going to kill the chickens then there's a dependency relationship which can be utilized to drive the price of labor up.

Heh, I do not share this view of the world. I think it's naive.

What has changed governments -- and especially so-called democratic governments -- has been the power of the masses to organize and force it to change because of the dependency relationship I mentioned earlier. The uppers depend upon the lowers. So the lowers, if they are able to organize themselves, can demand what they want up to and including the bakery.

Rather than the liberal lie that democratic participation and dialogue and changing hearts or minds are the paths to change, the Marxist way is militant, organized action which forces concessions.

Unions, for instance, were most powerful when they had more members and acted militantly. It's only as they became bureaucratized, making them a rational apparatus of the state, that they slowly lost power -- because a worker's power is not in treatises and laws and legislatures. It's at the point of production.

So, rather than the importance of democratic participation, I'd say I'd emphasize the importance of class power and organization.

Maybe, with the above picture in mind, the way I'd put it is -- I don't want a slice of pie, I want the bakery. Once I have a say in how the bakery operates, then the size of slice we all get becomes pertinent. As it is, since ought implies can and we cannot, there's no moral imperitive. People's hands really are tied, no matter which position they sit within the social dance that's capitalism.

It's really more like no one is in charge, and the beast just lives a life of its own, and we're along for the ride: strapped to a bull or a bear, ready to be thrown off and eaten at any moment.

Well choose a better word then. If the blame cannot be placed on the board of directors of multinational corporations, because our governments structure how business is conducted, then the state is ultimately the culprit.

I don’t completely agree with this picture, but if this isn’t what you’re saying I really don’t see what your point is. — Mikie

I think I'd prefer something like a causal nexus to highlight that there's more than one entity contributing to the overall pattern that we observe, and that the patterns of history aren't dependent upon something singular. To ignore the state would be silly, given how central it is to politics, but the patterns of capitalism aren't singularly dependent upon a state, either, because the state just sets up an environment.

So it's not a board of directors or stakeholders which are making decisions as much as there are a multitude of businesses which make many decisions, a lot of them fail, and through a simplified notion of natural selection we can see what kinds of patterns tend to survive the environmental set up. The organisms which survive and thrive in capitalism are the organisms which put profits first (which, due to the labor market being what it is, will mean sometimes having to pay more for labor than you want to, but labor is always a necessary expense in this set up).

But notice how it's not a fault of the board, then. It's just what it takes to have a business win the game.

And which ones happen to win at a given time is largely dependent upon things no one has any control over, so "winning" isn't even an attribute of acumen or skill. Rather, there are things one must do to survive, and then dependent upon what happens some of the organisms survive and some don't, and whatever does survive are the results of both making the right decisions and chance.

The causal nexus for this, now though, is an international economic organization. It's not just one state. It's a large international order.

So can you see why I might be hesitant to want to say "yes, it's the state for certain" ?

“We’re all responsible” isn’t saying much, however true that may be. Can’t we say that about any problem whatsoever? The war in Iraq…we all share blame. The Challenger explosion? We all share some responsibility. Etc. Fine — but let’s narrow it down a bit. — Mikie

I don't think we all share responsibility for any event, so no. I mean, I suppose one could say that but that's not the sort of culpability I was meaning-- I'm trying to highlight how there's a difference between capitalism and these particulars. Capitalism is the more general structure and environment within which actors -- be they corporations, states, individuals, or groups -- act. In the case of capitalism we're talking about something so giant it's not quite right to say that the state is the cause of capitalism. After all, there are states which are not capitalist, and there are lands without states which behave in accord with the giant world system that is capitalism, and socialist states do interact with capitalist states too.

I think I'm resistant to the notion of responsibility really applying.

In a particular case sometimes we can figure out, through political analysis, who is the most likely person to be able to influence a particular decision.

Responsibility is with all of us, in the sense that this is how we live with one another.

I don't recall Marx claiming that shareholders care solely about profit at the expense of everything else?
...
To be clear: in my view, a shareholder cares more than simply profit above all else. — Mikie

I think so too: Namely, the “class” of owners. The capitalists, really. Today that’s mostly owners of particular property, like stocks. — Mikie

I disagree.

It's not the owners who decide, in this more general sense. It's the property relationships themselves which form an environment that motivates the collective to behave in a particular pattern. So, seeing as there's an over and an under class -- as Marx said, "The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles" -- the "decision" is made between two competing factions which, depending on how well they are organized, will set the price-point in a labor market.

Whether a particular shareholder cares more about profit is irrelevant to the effects that the state-enforced property relation which creates an environment which we creatures operate within with enough predictability to say "yeah, that company pretty much just wants to make money, and the laborers they employ pretty much just want as many benefits for as little as possible".

And why wouldn't you want more for less, after all? Doesn't that sound like a rational, self-interested desire?

Basically, I'd say that the structure of property over-rides any commitment a shareholder may have. They may look like they have power, but I'd say it's ephemeral.

We have a dog. What is the first member of its ancestor that is just like it such that our perception recognizes it as a dog.?Now that dog came from non-dog parents? That's not possible my friend. Who did it mate with? If you know how this works then explain it. This is all about philosophy and has nothing to do with how scientists see the world. — Gregory

So if this is all about philosophy and nothing about scientists, why are you arguing that species cannot be related to one another through mating?

The way this works -- that's what the scientists have laid out. And, if you don't feel like buying a book, there is a free version ;). I just like the Coyne book because it's easier to read.


Yeah.

Fair point.

I'll address the actual argument later. To treat it fairly, I'd have to do a bit more work -- and I'm not feeling like doing that now ;).

I agree.

I didn't, for instance, say that it's a true book. I just said I like it, and it'd be useful for you to read because it'd develop your philosophy better -- you'd be better able to appeal to people who disagree with you.

Now, to be honest, I believe evolution is true. But that shouldn't matter for all the points I'm making.

I like Jerry Coyne's Why Evolution is True

It's an easy introduction to the theory that covers the physical evidence.

Now, probability or God -- that you will not find in the book. But evolution -- yes.

And I think, even if you disagree with evolution, it'd be useful for you to know what those who do believe in it believe and why they believe.

I pulled out the old Pluhar to look and see what I was talking about -- and I think you're right. I'll just post the quote that was in my head upon finding it to offer clarification on what you quoted:

In this treatise I deliberately refrain from offering definitions of these categories, even though I may possess them. I shall hereafter dissect these concepts only to a degree adequate for the doctrine of method that I here produce. Whereas definitions of the categories could rightly be demanded of me in a system of pure reason, here they would only make us lose sight of the main point of the inquiry. For they would give rise to doubts and charges that we may readily relegate to another activity without in any way detracting from our essential aim. Still, from what little I have mentioned about this, we can see distinctly that a complete lexicon with all the requisite explications not only is possible but could easily be brought about. The compartments are now at hand. They only need to be filled in; and a systematic [transcendental] topic, such as the present one, will make it difficult to miss the place where each concept properly belongs, and at the same time will make it easy to notice any place that is still empty. — CPR Pluhar translation, A83/B109

Maybe; dunno. Specific in what way? — Mww

Just in the way that multiple people can work with it, understand it, communicate about it, and even -- sometimes -- use it. Speaking about Kant we don't really use his categories as much as argue whether or not they are necessary for all the other stuff we do. It's a confusing logic, even if it is ultimately correct. With Kant's categories he is so certain that we know what he's talking about that he says we already know what he's saying.

Yet, here we are -- reading a transcript of a talk about different interpretations of modalities.

Not that one couldn't work this into Kant's project, necessarily... that's why I posited the as-such/transcendental distinction between different notions of logic. Especially because @Banno was emphasizing how this is just a way of talking, rather than a metaphysics. I think transcendental logic gets close to metaphysics in the wider sense of the philosophical tradition, while demarcating what is and isn't metaphysics by Kant's philosophy.