Oh yeah. I liked that paper because it gave me something to think through weaknesses in the parallel -- I also made the comparison fairly early on and came across that paper in an effort to push against it and feel out its dimensions.

There's a lot in common: the centrality of ethics, for instance, as well as the limitation on knowledge in light of the ethical and logical, ala

That makes sense to me -- The purposes of philosophy differ between them.

I couldn't find a free version -- I wish I could because when I read this I had access, but no longer do. Alas, as a counter-point to the notion I enjoyed this paper: On Interpreting Kant's Thinker as Wittgenstein's 'I' -- would have read it before posting but there's a possible clue for thinking through the thought from the opposite side.

Found an interesting paper that, according to the Izmirli definitions, would count as a Modernist philosophy of mathematics that is simultaneously social constructionist:

SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVISM AS A PHILOSOPHY OF MATHEMATICS:RADICAL CONSTRUCTIVISM REHABILITATED?Paul ErnestUniversity of Exeter

OK so it's more specific than anything I've laid out.

I accept a distinction now, but I don't think I'd follow Heidegger in saying normal science is not-thinking, and revolutionary science requires philosophical thinking -- or something along those lines. "What is the difference between these crafts?" is hard to answer.

Sometimes philosophy and science works in concert, but sometimes they're orthogonal to one another such that a change in philosophical belief will not result in a change in scientific belief, or vice-versa. So not so much at odds as simply different in what they do.

The stick is bent.

But it's not really bent. in that way.

For reals, you can pick up the stick yourself!

I believe it is and isn't -- just depends on how you want to say things, but doesn't depend on the light, the water, or the stick. Language is tricky.

I'm a bit tempted to say the Big Building Thing is causally related. Why build a bigger monument? To show up the other one!

I suppose my thought is that "perception" can't separate us from the real in the manner I perceive indirect realists to say.

at this point I just want you to say which indirect realist you're talking about. I don't believe in indirect realism. I also don't believe in jesus, in comparison. Why the hell should I bother with it?

Certainly.

you did ask, though -- and I answered. And I think, at this point, we've given the blogger enough fodder to blog upon lol.

Seems to follow the logic of indirect realism -- there's an intermediary between reality and you, whatever that is. Acknowledging that there's a difference between the real and perception gives conceptual ground to say something like "your perception of perception is what you need to know to say anything", and so on up the chain if you understand my meaning. You can slip in as many layers of "reality" as you like in the notion to justify whatever you want, in spite of your senses.

According to these definitions I'd not qualify is either, yet I certainly believe reality doesn't care about my beliefs, at least.

I'm not tempted to define realism in opposition to idealism, for instance. And what I paused at most is notions of cause in relation to perception -- I think a realist is open to non-causal relations, as long as they are real.

And obviously there's a difference in meaning, but surely we can parse it together here?

The argument that dislodged me from my belief has already been alluded to. It's the infinite regress argument. Suppose that we're only indirectly aware of reality. If so then how are we aware of our perceptions? Aren't we a step away from those too?

If so then I think we're committed to a homuncular fallacy.

But for the realist without these in/direct commitments, we can say these interminable temptations are just puzzles.

Ah.

Indirect realism is a halfwayhouse between transcendental idealism, and materalism. It wants to be neutral, but can't be because it's incoherent when you try to make it work.

That gets back to asking you for an argument: what argument do you want me to address?

I fall all the time, so no worries about it.


Going back to your original comment: I meant I'm fine with making a distinction between direct and indirect realism. What I believe is that it doesn't hold up as a theory of realism though.

I'm granting the distinction to you to go ahead and make a point, while acknowledging that I'm not on board with it entirely.

Sure, I'm open to that.

Not the same as saying the distinction is foolish, tho.

For myself I think I'm cautioning against a tempting philosophical sleight-of-hand.

I'm committed to saying I'm a realist, of some sort, but the indirect/direct realist distinction is foolish, I think.

What are the underlying beliefs you think are the same?

Makes sense.

I'll say I started out as an indirect realist.

But I'm not googling, only reflecting and conversing. As far as i'm concerned you can define it how you like, if you believe it.

What do they say, according to you?

i'm sitting in a chair at the moment. I'm typing on a keyboard. I perceive these both as I do them. That's basically what I'm thinking.

But what if the statement about minds and perception are the same as whether or not our physical bodies really physically touch other physical bodies?

I don't think @Banno misunderstands indirect realism, only disagrees with it. As do I.

(remove the serran wrap from you face! you have nothing to lose but your false ideas! ;) )

I read this a few times over.

I'm fine with granting Descartes to Nietzsche, ala Heidegger.

I'm tempted to say this supports my notion that science and philosophy are distinct.

But I'm uncertain. If I missed something I'd appreciate a clue.

Golly this was 7 years ago: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/512/reading-group-derridas-voice-and-phenomenon/p1

That's where I'd start because @Joshs mentioned Husserl's understanding of mathematics and Derrida is critiquing Husserl's interpretation of the sign from the deconstructive perspective -- at least if we want to generate thoughts from a text roughly in line with the ideas of the thinkers, though we'd have to apply some interpretive leaps from Derrida to Husserl in conversation.

At least as a thought.

After that -- I think the certainties of mathematics can easily be accommodated to the uncertainties of a given post-modern philosophy. The interesting bit is how you do it, and I agree it's interesting but you're asking a question that's hard without more textual fidelity, imo. Though a historicist would say that.... :D

Not too surprising, I think. At least if I'm right that science and philosophy are different, and math is science.

Gotcha. And surely I don't mean to denigrate the attempt -- I've been scratching my head about how to respond and that's still the closest thing I had in my mind.

A riskier response, in generalities: I'm always open to philosophical broaches of sciences by scientists or laypersons with knowledge of the particulars. As such I don't mind a few silly vaunts into the territory of 2+2=5 -- we can all think through it and feel our way to a conclusion so there's no need to think this sacrosanct or silly if a person with knowledge is exploring, though we certainly don't need to believe it's true either. It could just be interesting and that's enough, though I know I can't make five eggs out of a double of two eggs.

But I've come around to denying Quine and thinking philosophy is different from science -- so I'd say postmodernism is philosophy, and mathematics is science, so the relationship is a bit open to explore and depends upon particulars.

Yup.

Just finishing up episode 20, but I empathize with your:

Novak has allowed his genial progressive positivity to get the better of him. — unenlightened

A bit Panglossian at times -- not that it's bad to hear, but I have my doubts.

we first have to establish what exactly we’re talking about, and I think that requires picking a specific writer, whether it be Deleuze, Foucault or Lyotard. — Joshs

Has pretty much been the way I've been thinking about the question. At a certain point "postmodernism" isn't a useful frame for thinking -- you have to dig into a particular author because they don't necessarily agree with one another. "Postmodern" is a generalization about history (in various disciplines -- the periods differ depending upon which discipline you look at), but that generalization doesn't have a general perspective on all science, or mathematics specifically -- which shouldn't be surprising given the themes.

do we discover these laws of nature or do we just invent them. — Pez

Why not both?

There's a sense in which we clearly invent them. Newton's Principia was published in 1687, and that's a science text that uses the Law-like formulation. So it had to be written.

But if they are wrong then we change them, so there's a bit of discovery to it as well. Perhaps discovery and invention are not so opposed as common belief would have it?

P1 if we were directly acquainted with external objects, then hallucinatory and veridical experiences would be subjectively distinct
P2 hallucinatory and veridical experiences are not subjectively distinct(i.e., subjectively identical)
P3 therefore, we are not directly acquainted with external objects — Ashriel

I'm not sure about P1, but P2 seems to have bigger troubles. How do you ascertain that these kinds of experiences are not subjectively distinct? Surely, in the case of hallucinations, they are intersubjectively distinct -- when someone is interacting with the world in a way we do not perceive then we reach for the explanation of "hallucination".

Being able to discriminate between reality and the imagination is a commonplace. That we can make mistakes doesn't mean that we cannot tell the experiences apart at all. If the experiences are not subjectively distinct, they certainly are intersubjectively distinct.

P1 if there is a long causal process between the object that we perceive and our perception of the object, then we do not know the object directly
P2 there is a long causal process between the object that we perceive and our perception of the object
P3 therefore, we do not know the object directly — Ashriel

P1 has to be false, I think. If there is a long causal process between the object that we perceive and our perception of the object then we are talking in a world populated by: perception, object, causes, and process. If we can talk about each of these truthfully then the only thing "indirect" here is between subject and object -- but in a way that construes reality as interacting and connected, so it's not indirect in the sense of unable to ascertain what's real.

Just because something is in aggregate -- like perception is an aggregate from the perceiver in an environment of at least a world -- doesn't mean our experience cuts us off from reality. It just means it's more complicated than two things, which given the complexity of the world shouldn't be surprising.

Oh, sure, I agree that it's not a serious holiday. I think that'd ruin it if it were serious.

And that's a good point -- I'm not considering all scenarios in my OP, and you're right to point out that Valentine's Day is also a fun holiday to buy kids things and have them write up valentines for one another.

But those are the sorts of love I mean to highlight, basically: Family and friendship.

The question of 'asexual love, involves the question of what is sexuality and how does it come into play in human relationships. What is the difference between friendship and romance? How much comes down to the nature of human needs, connections and the role of the erotic as an aspect of sexuality? — Jack Cummins

There's a sense in which even the romantic isn't quite the erotic, I think: sexual desire is a cross-species phenomena, whereas romance is more of a social relationship that we establish with another on the basis of mutual desire.

Perhaps we'd say all romances are friendships, but not all friendships are romances -- but that's not entirely true, either, since sometimes romances are a bit more about sex than friendship (those tend not to last as long in my experience, though)

Ultimately I'd say we all need to be loved by others, though, so human need is very much a part of friendship and romance.

That's true. And in general that's how I feel about holidays, I suppose -- it's not there celebration as much as the commercial aspect that usually bugs me or makes me feel cynical. But there are other ways to acknowledge things, too.

So you mean Platonic love? — Lionino

A bit yes. Though this gets me thinking: not in the universal sense. Agape doesn't seem to fit in with the familiar and the particularity of love.

I suppose I'd say that it's still "fits" within the notion of the holiday because you're still celebrating a particular bond that is based in love for one another, but it's not romantic. The love of friendship is what I'm thinking of -- though granted these aren't opposed (wouldn't you want to be friends with your lover?), I only think they're distinct given how not all friendships are erotic, but can be just as intensely full of love.

Oh we'd just get together and have a meal, when those friends were around, though of course we all physicall move on as life progresses. It was kind of a way to invert the holiday to be less about "find a partner!" and more about "friends are awesome".

United States.

Oh sure. Basically. But I've always liked it as a celebration of love, in a general sense. I have fond memories of friends making Valentine's Day together in the asexual sense, and then I was thinking about how asexual love isn't often a focus for the day. When else to bring it up?

Which is, I think, a more general justification for holidays: there are important things we care about but when do you celebrate them? It's easy to get lost in the day-to-day, so having an annual day makes sense to celebrate the things we care about.

Heh -- I realize the sentimentality of the notion. Hence, Lounge -- philosophical-ish, but not quite up to par.

There are other holidays I'd speak in favor of, though mostly as advice: the specifics aren't as relevant as the mentions. Even a phone call is good enough for love of the asexual sort.

And, in retrospect at least, while I can acknowledge the pull of sexual desire, I think that asexual desire lasts longer -- though I'm uncertain why. And, anyways, I'm guessing that Valentine's Day is basically sexual in nature in terms of celebrations, though maybe I'm wrong there, and want to highlight this other side of love -- love has always been an important theme in my mind at least.

I have an understanding of Kant's aesthetic judgment, and I've basically been nodding along with you so far. (it's the part on teleological judgment i still get lost in)

The thing I'd highlight that differentiates the critique of judgment from the critique of pure reason is that it's universal, but not scientific knowledge -- instead it's the relationships between the cognitive faculties which give rise to the sublime or the beautiful. It's that interaction between the faculties(powers) which justifies these inferences, though they are certainly different from both scientific and moral inferences or knowledge.

The third critique, in my crib sheet sort of way, is what differentiates analytic from continental philosophy from the historical perspective: do you emphasize scientific knowledge, or do you emphasize aesthetic judgment?

Kant, as is his philosophical perogative, would have it both ways -- and so I agree with the interpretation that the critiques form a unity. (though, I'm a Pluhar reader so that would be the way I read it)

EDIT: Also worth noting that as much as I love Kant I still believe he's basically wrong -- but in an important way. So before I can say how I still have to understand that last half of the Critique of Judgment....

Yes. And No.

Honestly my Big Brain project is seeing how it might be possible to unite both of those big-azz books.

I still have work to do in both, though. And they ain't epicycles, either of them.



They (the sentences which are true) are pesky, though.

FWIW, I'm fine with Zoom too. That'd work just fine by me.

Oh, many reasons -- and part of it is that. I've lived with these feelings for more of my life than I haven't, I've come to realize. There are thoughts like that, but my feelings aren't the same as those thoughts, I suppose....

I feel a connection with 's thoughts, and I think other forum members do too -- dumb thoughts I've had before, things like that -- but was wondering if niki would be willing to say more than the same in an attempt to point out -- that's the next step!

Besides, killing oneself is a gamble, not a guarantee (or even ascertainable likelihood) that not existing will be better than existing, or that death will end your suffering or despair or interminable boredom. Thus, IMO, it's an irrational act because one (non-pathologically) commits suicide out of blind hope. — 180 Proof

I don't want to be too universal, but I'd say my own suicidal ideations -- at least from my perspective -- are the most irrational part of my thinking patterns.

It's probably why I like Camus.

@niki wonoto -- we're about the same age. And our philosophical interests are similar, in that we wonder about the existential parts of life,

But you don't respond to people so I wonder what it is you're asking after?