I read this a few times over.

I'm fine with granting Descartes to Nietzsche, ala Heidegger.

I'm tempted to say this supports my notion that science and philosophy are distinct.

But I'm uncertain. If I missed something I'd appreciate a clue.

Golly this was 7 years ago: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/512/reading-group-derridas-voice-and-phenomenon/p1

That's where I'd start because @Joshs mentioned Husserl's understanding of mathematics and Derrida is critiquing Husserl's interpretation of the sign from the deconstructive perspective -- at least if we want to generate thoughts from a text roughly in line with the ideas of the thinkers, though we'd have to apply some interpretive leaps from Derrida to Husserl in conversation.

At least as a thought.

After that -- I think the certainties of mathematics can easily be accommodated to the uncertainties of a given post-modern philosophy. The interesting bit is how you do it, and I agree it's interesting but you're asking a question that's hard without more textual fidelity, imo. Though a historicist would say that.... :D

Not too surprising, I think. At least if I'm right that science and philosophy are different, and math is science.

Gotcha. And surely I don't mean to denigrate the attempt -- I've been scratching my head about how to respond and that's still the closest thing I had in my mind.

A riskier response, in generalities: I'm always open to philosophical broaches of sciences by scientists or laypersons with knowledge of the particulars. As such I don't mind a few silly vaunts into the territory of 2+2=5 -- we can all think through it and feel our way to a conclusion so there's no need to think this sacrosanct or silly if a person with knowledge is exploring, though we certainly don't need to believe it's true either. It could just be interesting and that's enough, though I know I can't make five eggs out of a double of two eggs.

But I've come around to denying Quine and thinking philosophy is different from science -- so I'd say postmodernism is philosophy, and mathematics is science, so the relationship is a bit open to explore and depends upon particulars.

Yup.

Just finishing up episode 20, but I empathize with your:

Novak has allowed his genial progressive positivity to get the better of him. — unenlightened

A bit Panglossian at times -- not that it's bad to hear, but I have my doubts.

we first have to establish what exactly we’re talking about, and I think that requires picking a specific writer, whether it be Deleuze, Foucault or Lyotard. — Joshs

Has pretty much been the way I've been thinking about the question. At a certain point "postmodernism" isn't a useful frame for thinking -- you have to dig into a particular author because they don't necessarily agree with one another. "Postmodern" is a generalization about history (in various disciplines -- the periods differ depending upon which discipline you look at), but that generalization doesn't have a general perspective on all science, or mathematics specifically -- which shouldn't be surprising given the themes.

do we discover these laws of nature or do we just invent them. — Pez

Why not both?

There's a sense in which we clearly invent them. Newton's Principia was published in 1687, and that's a science text that uses the Law-like formulation. So it had to be written.

But if they are wrong then we change them, so there's a bit of discovery to it as well. Perhaps discovery and invention are not so opposed as common belief would have it?

P1 if we were directly acquainted with external objects, then hallucinatory and veridical experiences would be subjectively distinct
P2 hallucinatory and veridical experiences are not subjectively distinct(i.e., subjectively identical)
P3 therefore, we are not directly acquainted with external objects — Ashriel

I'm not sure about P1, but P2 seems to have bigger troubles. How do you ascertain that these kinds of experiences are not subjectively distinct? Surely, in the case of hallucinations, they are intersubjectively distinct -- when someone is interacting with the world in a way we do not perceive then we reach for the explanation of "hallucination".

Being able to discriminate between reality and the imagination is a commonplace. That we can make mistakes doesn't mean that we cannot tell the experiences apart at all. If the experiences are not subjectively distinct, they certainly are intersubjectively distinct.

P1 if there is a long causal process between the object that we perceive and our perception of the object, then we do not know the object directly
P2 there is a long causal process between the object that we perceive and our perception of the object
P3 therefore, we do not know the object directly — Ashriel

P1 has to be false, I think. If there is a long causal process between the object that we perceive and our perception of the object then we are talking in a world populated by: perception, object, causes, and process. If we can talk about each of these truthfully then the only thing "indirect" here is between subject and object -- but in a way that construes reality as interacting and connected, so it's not indirect in the sense of unable to ascertain what's real.

Just because something is in aggregate -- like perception is an aggregate from the perceiver in an environment of at least a world -- doesn't mean our experience cuts us off from reality. It just means it's more complicated than two things, which given the complexity of the world shouldn't be surprising.

Oh, sure, I agree that it's not a serious holiday. I think that'd ruin it if it were serious.

And that's a good point -- I'm not considering all scenarios in my OP, and you're right to point out that Valentine's Day is also a fun holiday to buy kids things and have them write up valentines for one another.

But those are the sorts of love I mean to highlight, basically: Family and friendship.

The question of 'asexual love, involves the question of what is sexuality and how does it come into play in human relationships. What is the difference between friendship and romance? How much comes down to the nature of human needs, connections and the role of the erotic as an aspect of sexuality? — Jack Cummins

There's a sense in which even the romantic isn't quite the erotic, I think: sexual desire is a cross-species phenomena, whereas romance is more of a social relationship that we establish with another on the basis of mutual desire.

Perhaps we'd say all romances are friendships, but not all friendships are romances -- but that's not entirely true, either, since sometimes romances are a bit more about sex than friendship (those tend not to last as long in my experience, though)

Ultimately I'd say we all need to be loved by others, though, so human need is very much a part of friendship and romance.

That's true. And in general that's how I feel about holidays, I suppose -- it's not there celebration as much as the commercial aspect that usually bugs me or makes me feel cynical. But there are other ways to acknowledge things, too.

So you mean Platonic love? — Lionino

A bit yes. Though this gets me thinking: not in the universal sense. Agape doesn't seem to fit in with the familiar and the particularity of love.

I suppose I'd say that it's still "fits" within the notion of the holiday because you're still celebrating a particular bond that is based in love for one another, but it's not romantic. The love of friendship is what I'm thinking of -- though granted these aren't opposed (wouldn't you want to be friends with your lover?), I only think they're distinct given how not all friendships are erotic, but can be just as intensely full of love.

Oh we'd just get together and have a meal, when those friends were around, though of course we all physicall move on as life progresses. It was kind of a way to invert the holiday to be less about "find a partner!" and more about "friends are awesome".

United States.

Oh sure. Basically. But I've always liked it as a celebration of love, in a general sense. I have fond memories of friends making Valentine's Day together in the asexual sense, and then I was thinking about how asexual love isn't often a focus for the day. When else to bring it up?

Which is, I think, a more general justification for holidays: there are important things we care about but when do you celebrate them? It's easy to get lost in the day-to-day, so having an annual day makes sense to celebrate the things we care about.

Heh -- I realize the sentimentality of the notion. Hence, Lounge -- philosophical-ish, but not quite up to par.

There are other holidays I'd speak in favor of, though mostly as advice: the specifics aren't as relevant as the mentions. Even a phone call is good enough for love of the asexual sort.

And, in retrospect at least, while I can acknowledge the pull of sexual desire, I think that asexual desire lasts longer -- though I'm uncertain why. And, anyways, I'm guessing that Valentine's Day is basically sexual in nature in terms of celebrations, though maybe I'm wrong there, and want to highlight this other side of love -- love has always been an important theme in my mind at least.

I have an understanding of Kant's aesthetic judgment, and I've basically been nodding along with you so far. (it's the part on teleological judgment i still get lost in)

The thing I'd highlight that differentiates the critique of judgment from the critique of pure reason is that it's universal, but not scientific knowledge -- instead it's the relationships between the cognitive faculties which give rise to the sublime or the beautiful. It's that interaction between the faculties(powers) which justifies these inferences, though they are certainly different from both scientific and moral inferences or knowledge.

The third critique, in my crib sheet sort of way, is what differentiates analytic from continental philosophy from the historical perspective: do you emphasize scientific knowledge, or do you emphasize aesthetic judgment?

Kant, as is his philosophical perogative, would have it both ways -- and so I agree with the interpretation that the critiques form a unity. (though, I'm a Pluhar reader so that would be the way I read it)

EDIT: Also worth noting that as much as I love Kant I still believe he's basically wrong -- but in an important way. So before I can say how I still have to understand that last half of the Critique of Judgment....

Yes. And No.

Honestly my Big Brain project is seeing how it might be possible to unite both of those big-azz books.

I still have work to do in both, though. And they ain't epicycles, either of them.



They (the sentences which are true) are pesky, though.

FWIW, I'm fine with Zoom too. That'd work just fine by me.

Oh, many reasons -- and part of it is that. I've lived with these feelings for more of my life than I haven't, I've come to realize. There are thoughts like that, but my feelings aren't the same as those thoughts, I suppose....

I feel a connection with 's thoughts, and I think other forum members do too -- dumb thoughts I've had before, things like that -- but was wondering if niki would be willing to say more than the same in an attempt to point out -- that's the next step!

Besides, killing oneself is a gamble, not a guarantee (or even ascertainable likelihood) that not existing will be better than existing, or that death will end your suffering or despair or interminable boredom. Thus, IMO, it's an irrational act because one (non-pathologically) commits suicide out of blind hope. — 180 Proof

I don't want to be too universal, but I'd say my own suicidal ideations -- at least from my perspective -- are the most irrational part of my thinking patterns.

It's probably why I like Camus.

@niki wonoto -- we're about the same age. And our philosophical interests are similar, in that we wonder about the existential parts of life,

But you don't respond to people so I wonder what it is you're asking after?

Re-listening to this one from one whose passed on.

Or is suicide just a permanent solution to a temporary problem? If yes, how so?

Is depression or pain really what leads to suicide? Does the switch really not flip itself? — rossii

Suicide is what sounds like a permenant solution to a problem.

I wouldn't say "temporary" cuz I live with depression. As in diagnosed and talked with therapists and have seen my own trends and everything like that.

Suicide is an odd thought, these days. It comes up all the time. That's part of the symptoms of depression, at least as I experience it.

It seems so reasonable, and yet....

The switch, for me, has never stopped. It's why I say I have chronic depression -- like a diabetic, I have unhealthy habits that aren't going away, and the habit-changers have yet to take away for me.

Rather, I just have had to accept that this is part of my life, that when I think that way it's not worth listening to because I have depression and sometimes the "easiest" way out is just an idle thought which I don't want to pursue, anyways. I'm just upset and uncertain about what to do.

But it took me years to get here, and I'm still improving over time and failing every day. So don't take this as a sign you can't do it.

you can, cuz if I could, anyone could.

I have never cheated on anyone to date, and sort of think it's an odd obsession more than a healthy attitude. People cheat because there are problems in their relationship they don't know how to fix and they think they found some relief in the chaos of life. It makes sense for everyone, regardless of sex, sexual orientation, race, ethnicity, religion, or political affiliation.

Great persons are still people, like you and I, and we can respect their greatness in spite of flaws because we share those flaws.

016

Glad to have these distinctions. In talking about different kinds of time I fear that it's too queer or abstract to be worth exploring, but I also come to these distinctions because of texts like Hegel's, and realizing different theories of history express time differently than the natural sciences do, too.

I think I'd tack on something like an Epicurean notion of time, as competition to the cyclic, etc. -- though I can understand how a Hegelian wouldn't want the universe to be merely stochastic.

Geist is gap; freedom is gaps in the block; being and gap are indistinguishable. — unenlightened

I can make sense of that. All I really mean is to point out that for Hegel there's no limit to knowledge, at least as I understand it. That's the big difference between Kant and Hegel: for Kant the barriers to knowing are established until someone can come up with a better argument for how a priori synthetic knowledge is possible. For Hegel he believes these barriers are temporary, and through the dialectic can be overcome.

So the picture that Freud pointed to in the opening of the article:

[Philosophy] departs from [science] by clinging to the illusion of being able to present a picture of the universe which is without gaps and is coherent […]. It goes astray in its method by over-estimating the epistemological value of our logical operations […]. And it often seems that the poet’s derisive comment is not unjustified when he says of the philosopher: “Mit seinen Nachtmützen und Schlafrockfetzen / Stopft er die Lücken des Weltenbaus. [With his nightcaps and the tatters of his dressing gown he patches up the gaps in the structure of the universe.]”

I think in this sense, too, Hegel would deny gaps -- that is, he provides a picture of the universe that is without gaps, and at least rational (coherency some would probably deny)

But in terms of the block universe, yes I can see Geist being gap, freedom putting gaps in the block, and also the unity of being and gap in that being and nothing are everywhere intermixed.  

What I like most about Hegel so far is his starting place. He starts with phenomena appearing to an empty mind. This neatly cuts out all that interminable talk of internal and external and their disconnection. It's like Descartes without the ego-god-thinking thing bollocks. And that might eventually become a physical science with mind and freedom accounted for.

Yes!

For all of my protestations, there really are good parts in Hegel. My favorite passage comes later when he's reflecting upon art. His various theological notions are also ones that make a good deal of sense to me, even though I prefer a more civic and earthly interpretation of such things.

Seems so, to me.

The idea that I must act for the other's sake and not for my own is a largely Kantian idea, and it is problematic. It is not impossible to do this, but it is difficult and rare, and such an idea should not form the basis of realistic ethics. I think that, more than anything, it has confused us. — Leontiskos

That's pretty close to how I think.

Though I'd extend the range to include all forms of Christianity.

It's a nice thought, but for the wrong species.

:D

I put more trust in him than any of the usuals, that's for sure -- a better constant than anyone else! :D

Here in the USA, I know they teach Nietzsche at Fordham only, cause Fordham Theologians should know what an atheist said about them. Maybe there are a few, but most of the philosophy programs I have searched do not teach Nietzsche (I don't blame them). — Eros1982

The USian universities are usually more analytic focused in philosophy departments.

But I know I have heard people say that grumpiness due to hunger is a part of their personality, and other such things, when I know that I am able to consciously change these aspects of myself. So, I think I can fairly say that I have a better working model for myself (what I imagine consciousness to be) than most other people. — Brendan Golledge

Maybe you're just better at changing your attitude towards hunger than the people who told you that, among the things that others have told you.

Or maybe you're just as grumpy as everyone else, but you don't feel grumpy. In this scenario you'd actually have a worse model than the other person because you're incorrect about your grumpiness.

Or maybe you're only looking for people who aren't as good at you as changing their attitude towards hunger -- the people who are good at it don't have a need to announce to you their ability.

Or maybe they're incorrect about being able to change themselves and they're really just telling you that they're not interested in changing.

:D

It's frustrating, but I find it fascinating too. The influence cannot be denied, so there's the part of me that likes the history of philosophy and charting the lineages of ideas.

But then the strangeness of it all is part of its fascination, and trying to wrap my head around the strange is something I find rewarding in philosophy. It shows me another way of looking at the world.

I think the article sides with Freud a bit :D -- I don't think there are gaps for Hegel. I'd reconcile them by saying that Philosophy is a higher kind of knowledge than Psychology, and so the very explication of the unconscious makes us conscious of the unconscious, but that this is already a stepping-across a barrier such that we can engage with the unconscious by making it explicit, and finding its rational core. In a way Freud could be read as completing Hegel instead of in conflict, if we prioritized Hegel instead. (which is kind of the omni-move of Hegel -- every philosophy has a time and a place...)

******
https://www.coppelia.io/graphing-the-history-of-philosophy

And to see the whole graph at once, though it can be hard to read:

https://dailynous.com/2014/04/21/graphing-the-history-of-philosophical-influences/

Interesting to note that the graphing technique separated out Freud from Hegel, though unfortunately for what that article highlights it looks like he gets lumped in with philosophy by it.

I'm considering following his instructions because I'd like to play with the graph.

EDIT: Oh, and the significance is that it's an analogy for Hegelian "time" -- if we let the philosophers' names stand in for their ideas, then we have a kind of "mapping" between concepts which can serve as a visual picture of how Hegel's concepts might relate -- and perhaps "Geist" is a kind of movement along these relationships (or, better -- they even change relationships over time and move about)

A thought --

In comparing the Block Universe to Hegel, and using McTaggart:

The Block Universe as ontology posits that the A-series is an illusion.

I think Hegelian time does the opposite -- the B-series is an abstraction built from the A-series (which is not composed as McTaggart describes time for the A-series, though I think the analogy works to get a sense across)

I gave it a relisten, and I think you're right to say he's confused: I think he presents something of a rationalization for Hegel, but one I wouldn't be tempted to make.The Phenomenology of Spirit was published in 1807, and The Origin of the Species in 1859, and the theories of the universe he's reconciling with Hegel come even after that.

But I also can understand the desire to provide this reconciliation on a podcast -- it's not just introducing basic concepts of Hegel, but is pointing out how Hegel can relate to our day (and so be worth studying, in spite of the difficulty).

I just have a different motivation than him so it's OK that I disagree with the rationalization.

Suppose we start with a many worlds, non-collapsing universe that evolves physically but remains probabilistic. Now intuitively, my suggestion would be that Schrödinger's cat has enough geist to collapse its own wave function, and will obviously collapse it to the state in which it is alive (because it can't see itself dead). So the form of geist's freedom is in the first instance the necessary choice of freedom itself, that is, the choice of life. Thus natural selection selects for freedom to select.

How say ye? — unenlightened

I think that works. Just supposing that consciousness emerged in some kind of event that likely is the birth of religion then, supposing natural selection to be true and reconcilable with Hegel, that would be a good guess for reconciliation -- in the beginning there was no consciousness, only the atoms and void which somehow formed creatures which, in these many-worlds, we happen to be in the branches in which we're alive because while there are branches in which we're not, we obviously wouldn't be a part of those branches. We only get to experience the branches where we do come out alive, so even if it's a fluke that happens only once in a universe we just happen to live in that universe where it happened.


A problem for many-worlds though: it exacerbates the binding problem in that there's no cause or reason for why I continue to inhabit the branch that I do if my choices make a branch in the universe. Do consciousnessness multiply with every choice that we make, and along with that universes? Why on earth am I in this branch, and not the one where something else happened?

It would seem to me that that's where the coin-toss has to come in: you had a 50/50 chance, or whatever the odds were, to go along for the ride in this branch. Maybe someone else went along for a ride in the other branch. But if that's the case then we're back to a random universe we experience, stochastic and not freely chosen.

I think of The Phenomenology of Spirit as a story about the birth of Humanity. There's a rational beginning to this story, but the conceptual structures don't necessarily fit in with the historical timeline allusions throughout the text. It skips forwards and backwards, at least by my memory, to make connections. It's as if Geist has always been moving and the Phenomenologist can step out of the phenomena and describe them, as a scientist would, but then coming to realize that this is itself an act of Geist, or experiencing Geist and that all the worlds philosophies are expressions of this structure. So even if the historical timeline as we'd normally construct it is linear, I'd say Hegel's time is not linear because he's still talking about conceptual structures that are the basis of reality. So at the Birth of Humanity, or the beginning of consciousness, we'd have access to all the structures which are described through the history of philosophy, they just wouldn't necessarily be articulated yet, or would need development from the concepts that were expressable at the time -- while Geist lays the foundation.

For Hegel he just lives in a moment where enough has been accumulated by philosophers that he can begin to build a body of knowledge with it, contra the Kantian impulse to limit knowledge to the natural world.


Or, well, that's how I'd put it right now. Though I'm rusty.

I have for several years been in the habit of consciously and deliberately changing my emotional state by this method. This is a large part of what convinces me that I have a higher level of consciousness than most people. Most people do not realize that their emotions are under conscious control. But I don't just choose what I do; I chose what I want to do. — Brendan Golledge

So I take it that this is the core of your reasoning: you've been in the habit of consciously changing yourself for the better, and so you are persuaded that your consciousness is higher than others.

But how do you know others aren't doing the same? What is it that makes this change a higher change such that one's consciousness is increased? How do we numerate or compare consciousnesses to one another?

014

I agree with the title. Freedom is the core of Hegel, same as Marx. This would be the center if we could connect them together.

I wasn't jiving with the QM interps, tho I suppose that's predictable.

There's some Epicurean handwaving with the swerve.

But I prefer the existential approach where we obviously must choose things every day. So it's worth noting that these descriptions won't tell us what to do.

If anyone has questions about how to make that work I can field them. PM or otherwise.

But if someone that voted yes has a preference for something else I'm fine with going with that and learning. (meaning Discord, as a talking app that's easy to organize around)

013

Good intro to a classic. I encourage others thinking along to read it

011

Glad to see the podcast highlighting the thesis-antithesis-synthesis being an oversimplification that doesn't exactly correspond to what Hegel wrote. And I like his quotes of Bohm in relation to Hegel. The Bohm quote about the in-itself and the for-itself and the in-and-for-itself is a better rendition. I didn't realize Bohm was a victim of McCarthyism. And I agree that the most important part of the dialectic is that it is a movement.

EDIT:

Decided to skip 012.

Here is a paper on Marxist dialectic as the result of his "inversion" of Hegel.
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/21598282.2022.2054000

Looks like a total misunderstanding to me from my ignorance. — unenlightened

Read the paper over the day. I think it's a fair interpretation of Marx, but I'd also separate out Marxist from Hegelian dialectics. The one thing I'd disagree with the author of the paper on is that Hegel's argument is fallacious, because the accusation of fallacy requires a logic and Hegel is working at that level of generality where since he's building a logic there's a choice to be had -- you can choose Hegel's logic, or the one that paper chooses (which is far more popular, and gets along with Marx, so fairs fair)

I'm only pointing to a warning sign on the path: make sure you're enjoying the activity, rather than ruminating in a circle, since we can get stuck in that pattern. I think when it's a pleasure is when we're not feeling despair and we're trying to make sense of the experience. Camus' contemplation of suicide is attempting to rationally pursue the question of the absurd and whether or not we should commit suicide on philosophical grounds.

But if what we need is healing then it's important to note we usually need help with that, and thinking about it isn't the same as talking about it with a therapist or a trusted friend, and philosophizing about it -- well, only do that when healed. You have more important things to do than philosophize about it when you're hurting.

Found this to listen along to an interpretation of Hegel at the part cited in episode 010 quoting paragraph 53 of The Phenomenology of Spirit.