Or the penis may become more important because it is always covered up. — BC

True! Especially in self-evaluation we certainly have some kind of attachment to our body.

But unless we actually want men to have penises, we make this judgment sans-knowledge of the physical make-up of most people's sensitive parts. That is the way we normally use the word isn't really in reference to a particular person's genitals (making room for the notion that our judgment of whether a person is a man is in relation to whether he has grown up, i.e., boyhood rather than womanhood)

Too much masculinity is invested in the penis--a mistake. Masculinity is found in the whole body and in the brain. The penis doesn't hang alone as the sole signal of masculinity, and the penis doesn't 'produce' masculinity. Men with big dicks are not more masculine than men with small dicks. — BC

Yup, I agree.

Masculinity, like anything else, stands out against a backdrop of its negation. You'll pick up on your own masculinity when faced with an opposition to it: your wife, mother, daughter, female divinity, female archetype, etc.

Is it a piece of genitalia or genetics that makes the masculine? Yes and no. Imagine that every human has a penis. We reproduce with machines that produce new creatures with penises. Will a penis mean "male?". No, it will just be part of "human "

But in a world with humans who don't have penises, having one means something. It means something. See what I mean? — frank

I generally view your opening with favor -- we come to understand a great deal of our concepts through contrasting them with other concepts: But my contention has been that the backdrop of masculinities' negation is childhood, rather than the feminine.

In a culture which covers up the penis, then the penis isn't as important to gender-identity as many other things that we actually do get to see on the regular.

Now in any given gender-identity -- here speaking in general of a particular identity some individual would affirm they are -- one may be attached to the body in such a way that the identity wants the penis, or identifies with the penis, or is the penis. When speaking of wanting someone in the way that a man wants we usually can pick up on the erotic desire being expressed, and understand that this is an expression of an individual's sexual desire, and if we're sexually active with that person and have pleasured their penis before then, and only then, is the penis a part of our mutual understanding of that gender-identity. In one sense there's the relational element of a self to the body, and then there's the relational element of the penis to a sexual partner who affirms the penis in their desire for it.

But what of the impotent man who, in his manly way, had it blown off by a land mine but still has sexual desires as a man does?

I'd suggest that the bodily attachment is just one way to relate to our masculinity, and that we're not just our penis. In fact we can be a man without it entirely.

In most cases, though, I don't think it's the disagreement itself that alters the meaning of language, but rather the leaders and would-be leaders of a faction, who deliberately distort and misrepresent ideas in order to manipulate their followers. — Vera Mont

The desire to believe their faction's version of reality. The minions are less interested in accurate information than in reassurance and the promise of being made great again - whether they ever had been anything but puny or not. — Vera Mont

On the contrary! Jingo gives them a much louder, more persuasive collective voice than their individual intellect ever could have. Yelling slogans makes people feel strong. — Vera Mont

So in this picture we have a common sense of meaning which is distorted by desire, of a kind -- but the desire is stoked by leaders who know how to speak to people and people who like to be spoken to in a symbiotic relationship of belief-maintenance which in turn has a positive feedback loop from it being an empowering experience -- a place in the world, a social network, power, and a righteous cause all wrapped into one (though with enough moral vagaries that many are dis-affected and simply don't participate).

And we have two camps with that set of motivations disagreeing with one another on the correct way to proceed on... well, lots of things. At base, though, it seems your picture says that it's a conflict of desires to believe such and such means such and such because believing that the words mean this or that is what reassures people of their particular faction's version of reality.

So I suppose where you might see a relatively integral and authentic movement with a sort of media circus mis-portraying it for cynical gain, I see a movement manipulated and altered by the social impact of that media circus such that there's never very much left of the original by the time it's finished with it. — Isaac

Yeah, that sounds like a correct description of our respective views.

Hot damn did we manage to understand one another?

Yes, I think most things boil down to personal preferences and then, often, we select some reasoning as post hoc justifications. I never pursued philosophy, but I did read a little comparative religion and explored a range of spiritual schools 30 years ago. But I've simply found the notion of gods incoherent. The arguments against theism are just garnish. I have come to the conclusion that I simply lack sensus divinitatis - which is probably a Protestant notion more than a Catholic one. — Tom Storm

The philosophy of God, in the big picture of all philosophy, is part of what I like about philosophy -- not irrelevant, but also not the most important thing: just another topic to consider and move on from if it doesn't speak to you. There are certainly theist philosophers, and even the god of the philosophers, but I don't feel a connection to any of that. What I feel a connection to is other people, to their way of life, how they find meaning in it all, and how we can possibly all find ourselves living a meaningful life. It seems important to so many people that I have a hard time simply rejecting the practices.

But that sensus divinitatis stuff? Complete nonsense. At least to me. Surely an experience of the divine isn't a sense -- if it were then there would be about as much agreement on the divine as there is on where the table is at, which we can certainly see is not the case.

I think the arguments for/against the existence of God are falling into a linguistic trap that's easy to fall into -- the notion that names must have this or that predicate, when in fact(at least by my reckoning) there is no such thing as God, and the locution comes to have predicates we admire because we admire God. Things like power, knowledge, and goodness.

Amen, brother.

So "in most cases" -- what's stopping people who are not the leaders and would-be leaders from seeing that ideas or meanings are distorted or misrepresented? Not in a specific way -- cuz then it's easy enough to see why this or that person didn't pick up on the manipulation -- but how does this deliberate distortion become a part of the common lexicon such that people cannot talk?

I'd agree with this but with one huge caveat. There's only one front page and there are things we can do to make it more likely that those with the power to change international conditions are inclined to do so. Those things need some of the oxygen of political discourse, all of which is sucked out at the moment by the minutiae of identity politics.

That, and the fact that solidarity is literally our only weapon and we ought be more precious of it that to descend into tribalism at the slightest hint of dissent in the ranks. — Isaac

My previous post was meant to point out what level of apathy we're really dealing with. And I'd say it's even a rational apathy -- it's only the people who are in positions of power that care if they get enough votes or people out because that's their job. That's how they make money. For the rest? That's an extra effort. (which is a way of saying the professional organizer, contra Lenin, can never be a genuine organizer: payment changes the relationship enough to matter)

My own approach doesn't focus on the front-page, because I know that the front-page is propaganda. The people in charge, at least in the United States, are motivated by things other than the vote -- you can buy votes through propaganda. Election season is just an inconvenient time when you have to lie and say things that people want to hear so you can get back to the real business of governing.

Solidarity is our only weapon, I agree. But we're a bit defenseless at the moment. Thems who own are good areat breaking us apart -- and really I think that given how trans issues have been a historical reality for much longer than in the past few years when they came to prominence, my thought is that the propaganda machine selected for the most controversial issue on the basis of engagement -- and it just happened to be the one.

Then I think we agree. As I've said in my post above, I'm not here making the argument that we must look at matters like identity from a social constructionist, or functionalist, or even behaviourist perspective, I'm only making the argument that because we can do so, our disagreements are philosophical, not ethical. No one is abusing anyone (not here anyway) and people are not oppressed by the fact the others do not agree with their preferred notion of how identity works. — Isaac

I think we're close enough for meaningful discussion :)

I think there's more to the public discussions than the philosophic or scientific basis of inference, though. But philosophically I think our prime disagreement is on whether or not standpoints are worthwhile, and if so when they are.

Firstly let me say I've really enjoyed our discussion and find your approach refreshing and positive. We don't always see things the same way, but we have managed this respectfully. Thank you. — Tom Storm

Same. :)

I love this stuff. Might be a reason why I stick around here.

I don't think we can go and find happiness. I think it happens as a by-product of other thing, when you are not looking, or if you are not too jammed full of expectations and shopping lists of must haves. I also think it is possible to be 'happy' and be a bad person. — Tom Storm

I agree happiness is not a thing one can find. That's part of its elusiveness for the unhappy.

My strategy is your latter -- don't be too jammed full of expectations or shopping lists of must haves. Also, don't even try to be happy. But when you're in pain that's a lot harder to do than say.

And I agree that one can be happy and bad, of course. So there's something to be said for happiness not being the ethical end-all-be-all.

I believe, at least, that happiness curbs some cruelty, and people are more generous when they aren't frustrated. But I recognize there's another side of desire that works differently -- that one can be cruel and happy, and even more satisfied by cruelty than simple desire.

All critical judgements in the end are in relation to held values. — Tom Storm

Yup :). It's inescapable, I think. There's always some value-theoretic commitment to any judgment.

Some clues for me are that marketing and advertising (totalizing approaches which dominate and lubricate our times) are predicated on making people feel deficient. We are groomed to find solutions to problems which frequently don't exist. This sits neatly upon religocultural views which in the West often construct our identity as sinners and unworthy and in need of transformative redemption. We are socialized towards guilt and self-loathing and a search for deliverance, notions which are cradled in a dynamic tension with advertising's driving narrative that 'you' deserve success and prosperity. Etc... — Tom Storm

That's interesting -- and then, upon trying the cure we find it unsatisfactory, so we think "time to try another one" and so the loop continues.

I think I just got stuck on philosophy, basically. I found more satisfying answers, and more importantly questions and methods, there. But also I've never really hidden the fact that my motivations come from a religious background. I have no problem with saying that philosophy operates on a plain in-between the everyday and the spiritual. Bertrand Russell made a similar comment about philosophy that it's somewhere between religion and science.

I think the shopping experience is part of what a free society looks like -- when you have options you try them out. But yeah I'm not too keen on guilt as a motivator. I think it's overused because we want people to be predictable.

The American Republican and Democratic core have already arrived there. — Vera Mont

When we reach a complete mutual understanding, we are of one mind. Nobody wants that, do they? — unenlightened

What enables us to learn another language, or to understand a miscommunication?
— Moliere
The capacity and willingness to learn. An interest in the other group and its culture... or a benefit in interactions with that other group. — Vera Mont

So this is a nice demarcation of scope, to me. Rather than reaching for Big L Language, as I was, this focuses the meaning of meaning, in our case, to meaning in terms of mutual understanding, or meaning in terms of two opposing sides who just seem to refuse to communicate, and asking the far more relevant question: why does disagreement seem to distort meaning to a point that we no longer mean the same things, and are talking past one another?

Some ideas provided here -- no interest in the other group or culture, or no benefit from interaction with the other group or culture, or good old fashioned fun (cooperation is boring! I want to win!)

I don't think this is the rejoinder. There's an assumption implicit here that wisdom and truth bring happiness. I don't agree. Note, I am not saying that wisdom brings unhappiness. I would also say in parentheses that wisdom does not necessarily provide answers or solutions. It's often about developing more probative questions. No one gets out of here alive... Wisdom might involve us living with discomfort rather than with reassuring myths. — Tom Storm

I agree that's my assumption.

Do you have a belief with respect to what does bring happiness?

I'm not sure we can make that distinction. While I agree that there may be good and bad philosophy, who is to say what is in scope and what is not? Some people think Heidegger is an empty charlatan who plays with neologisms, some think he is the greatest philosophical thinker of the 20th century. — Tom Storm

Not in a final way, I agree there -- but also in making the distinction I'm exploring the notion itself. I often wonder about philosophy proper vs. a pop philosophy (non-pejorative) vs. a pop philosophy (pejorative).

In making the argument for or against Heidegger we get to see what the values of philosophy are that people hold, though. Making the judgment is a part of the practice. We recognize that the judgment could be faulty, but it's a place to start.

I'm not sure how many people ever arrive at an insight like this. — Tom Storm

Me either.

But I think that people can come to see it.

I think we live in the cult of personal change and transformation - from social media influencers to Marie Kondo minimalism and the rush to embrace Stoicism. This decade it's Jordan B Peterson, 30 years ago it was Louise Hay. Naturally some people are more sophisticated and read better books, but the idea that we are unhappy, unworthy, not good enough seems to haunt many people's lives. — Tom Storm

That's insightful!

Any idea why?

Against the shelf -- wasn't it our own continued repetition of using "water" (for obvious needs) that allowed the translation to take place?

And we understood this bit, in the translation, but did we get the whole meaning? I don't think so.

Puns and jokes are a good example here -- the meaning of a pun is so contextual that it's pretty hard to understand without context. And surely they had jokes about so common a word? We say "it's water under the bridge" to mean that the past no longer matters. Surely we didn't recover all the meaning of the language in understanding one of its uses that we still use?

Making better decisions may not make you happier. It might be quite disruptive. Being wise might mean knowing just how tenuous our hold on life is, just how fragile goodness is... Wisdom might bring with it insights into the human condition that lead to a more pessimistic worldview. Schopenhauer was wiser than me - and unhappier. — Tom Storm

The rejoinder would be -- if your decisions didn't make you happier, then were they really wise or is that a strike against the philosophy?

But I think this is part of what makes philosophy particularly interesting to me -- that it doesn't close off the study of people who would answer "Yes" to the above question. Whereas the syncretic approach would provide a more solid answer, in the way the self-help books do: people were looking for an answer, after all, so they decided to sell them one.

But philosophy would leave the question open.

No, that's too strong. I said this about the particular search for transformative wisdom I described. If you look at many popular books on self-help which borrow from philosophy and 'wisdom traditions' you'll often find the authors are psychotherapists or psychologists. Cognitive behavioral therapy borrows from Stoicism. Narrative Therapy draws from postmodern and social constructionist ideas to help clients reframe their life stories, supporting them to take charge of their identities and experiences. Existential psychology assists people to explore meaning, purpose, freedom. Gestalt psychology utilizes the work of phenomenology. — Tom Storm

Got it.

You know, as an advocate for philosophy, I'm tempted to say "see, it has a use!"

But I feel you're expressing a kind of skepticism to the approach. Am I misreading you?

For my part I'm fine with any discipline using philosophy, even syncretically, though it might not reach to the levels of proper philosophy -- not every useful use of philosophy need be philosophy proper. Sometimes it's just a useful place to begin, and put to rest when you realize the concepts are clear.

Not sure exactly what you are asking here but it's my belief that people are generally drawn to ideas they already agree with. In other words, we don't readily move outside of our wheelhouse - but what we might do is enlarge our repertoire. I also think we can find ideas 'attractive' in an aesthetic sense. — Tom Storm

A bit loosy goosey on my part in an attempt to show that after you come to realize that you're the one that's attracted to this or that idea, and realize the ideas don't really line up, then you start asking questions like that -- and that's when you're at least starting on the path to philosophy proper, because you're no longer just asking about yourself, but also others. (philosophy proper is a social practice)

There is a large enough overlap to call it the same language, yes. It's not usual for all speakers of a language to be familiar with its entire vocabulary, and it is quite common for each party in a conversation to apply a word as it is used in a different discipline. — Vera Mont

Heh, then I'd say we're in a conundrum: at what point is there not enough overlap? Is it just more like a feeling of frustration which we give into, and so the beginnings of a social divide starts, and eventually -- over time and practice -- the groups evolve differently?

Surely there is more than one language. And surely there is miscommunication. What enables us to learn another language, or to understand a miscommunication?

The agility of the human mind. We apply associations and imagination to accommodate variation. We can usually correct quite accurately for errors on spelling and regional difference in pronunciation, as well as discern the merits of creative linguistic construction - hence the appreciation of poetry and humour. — Vera Mont

I find that unsatisfying because it comes back to the idea that meaning is mental. While I'm happy to say we need a mind to speak, or at least a brain, I don't think meaning is mental. Or at least, if meaning is public, you get into some weird thoughts about the mental then -- like that the mental is also public, when we usually think of our individual minds as being not-quite-so-public.

Not entirely false, but definitely counter-intuitive.

Part of my background thoughts is that meaning is a part of the world, and overflows our attempt to grasp it -- and language is that very attempt to solidify, in thought, what can't be solidified in thought.

Well, sometimes we don't understand. — BC

Good point.

And maybe that's the better question too: why don't we understand, sometimes? Or maybe I'm just barking up the wrong tree.

So: we encounter new words that are familiar to other speakers; we can guess at the meaning from context, ask what it means, or look it up. — BC

A handy list of techniques for determining meaning.


Really, I think that's basically exhaustive. At least these are the usual ways of determining meaning.

So, as @unenlightened hinted at, there was no question here at all, and all the theories of meaning are just so many words missing the point because you can't determine meaning ahead of time, you have to learn it.

Is it because of this experience that we believe others are wrong when they use a word in some way we perceive as novel? "Look, the locution has been this way for a long time, and I don't understand why you'd change it..."

Or is it always a matter of some other disagreement -- that the meaning is well understood, but the claim that one or the other person does not understand the meaning is usually an exaggeration, and is more like shorthand for "I wouldn't say it like that"?

Moliere tells me the self is entirely social (I think), and for the record that strikes me as nuts. As nuts as thinking our ideas about sexuality are entirely cultural. But I don't have a theory to offer about our identity intuitions, and if I did have one it wouldn't be worth much. That's a research program, far as I'm concerned. — Srap Tasmaner

Earlier in the conversation I said to @180 Proof that we should at least be able to, through philosophy, get to the point of saying "needs further research" or at least make clear that the issue is not clear.

So I'm happy with the conclusion that these questions are snowballing into, to be appropriately addressed, what would require a research program.

And you understand me in my thinking that the self is entirely social -- though I hope to make it explicit that this is a philosophical stance. Basically these are the concepts I'd start with in a research program, the conceptual machinery around the question, that sort of thing.

There are some reasons for starting with culture that I'd put forward: feral children and enculturation, and the multiplicity of sexual expressions across cultures suggest that our cultural environment at least influences our performances. Also the cultural lens doesn't make a strong distinction between bodies and who we are, in a way skipping over the mind-body problem (whereas if we wanted a psychological explanation of identity we'd pretty much have to at least address the mind-body problem, which seems to lead us, with our present knowledge, to reject that there even is a self)

Further by starting from culture it opens the conceptual door to theatrical theories -- which I think are very ripe for talking about identity. It's kind of the actor's craft to be able to recreate identities, wear them, perform them convincingly, and step out of them. And if identity just is performance, then what they have to say on this performance might prove fruitful. (also, interesting!)

But -- I'm also happy with the conclusion "needs further research" -- though I'll keep picking at the question, as I do.

I find this interesting and I read similar sentiments to this fairly often. But I personally would never associate philosophy with a search for contentment. I can see it as a search for 'truth' or 'wisdom' or an attempt to discover what someone can reasonably say about reality, but i don't associate these with resolving unhappiness or bringing fulfilment. — Tom Storm

Hrm!

I don't see them as unrelated, obviously.

What else would wisdom be other than the kind of knowledge that leads one to make better decisions?

What I sometimes hear in these discussions is a description of a project to cannibalise various bits and pieces of philosophy (generally that which appeal to one's values) and then create some kind of syncretistic self help tool that resembles psychology for the most part.

I'd be surprised to find philosophy resembles psychology, actually.

But cannibalization and syncretism for the purposes of self-help: sure! I see that. I do it!

I don't see it as a bad thing, though. I see it as the fledgling beginnings of a philosophy. The syncretic form is great for working things out for yourself, which I certainly believe that's where I started, but then I think it starts to become apparent that the syncretism doesn't really work at certain cracks, and that the only reason these concepts are being brought together is the common thinker who thought them and thought they were cool or seemed to work or what have you.

Basically I see it as part of a philosophical journey that one can choose to take, if they want to or not. Eventually I think it possible to start reading texts and letting them breathe on their own and seeing why other people thought differently from you. I think that's when philosophy proper really begins, at least of the non-academic sort, and certainly of the more casual sort too. But still there's that drive for consistency and the pleasure of seeing the ideas at work, and also of making it about something more than just yourself -- not just your own self-help tool, but something which appeals to others.

And what's up with this "appealing"? What are the aesthetics of ideas, if any? Or is it mere attachment and accident?

But you are not "taking a minute of fame" you are contributing a minute (or seconds, really) of fame. For which I am grateful. Every second counts. — BC

One of the things I like about the Oxford English Dictionary is that it is empirical in its research -- it looks for actual uses to support the record of meaning. It is an empirical historical method of inquiry.

And with that comes new uses. The dictionary is never finished since, from our present record, we clearly see that meaning shifts over time.

Maybe the better question is -- how is it, given that meaning is public, that we understand novel uses?

over a far larger population that incorrectly believes it owns and speaks a single language. — Vera Mont

Now that's intriguing, and I think forms the most radical interpretation of @frank's "creative" side of the gradient of meaning.

At a certain point we don't speak the same language. It becomes Middle English or German or some such.

But are you and I speaking the same language in this series of posts?

Those images produce guilt (or axon potentials in the anterior middle cingulate cortex with accompanying increase in cortisol and adrenaline and changes in heart rate accompanied by digestive discomfort, depending of your preferred frame!), we need to understand that and do something to make that nasty feeling go away. Physiologically, those feelings are 'designed' specifically to force us to come up with a plan to alleviate them. — Isaac

I think that when we've become inundated in propaganda the guilt starts to fade away. It's just another emotion floating along with the others.

Earlier I posited that a man who is mature is content with his discontentment. I have no desire to let go of my emotions, but I also know when I'm being manipulated. A mature man accepts his emotions, feels them even if they are uncomfortable, even if they are from a source of manipulation. But it's not like I'm going to defer much to a source which basically gut punches the heart, usually to follow up with an ask for a donation to the cause. I know why I feel what I feel, but that doesn't mean the source of the guilt trip is something worth listening to.

And in a society where manipulation is the norm people will develop these defenses to their emotions, which in turn will cause people to make enemies as they begin to lose the desire to offer charity. It's learned callousness so you can get on with life, which is what the grind does is teach you to be selfish and stop caring about the world. It's enough to care for your family, and after that -- for most it's too much to care about. Especially given the uncertainty of it all: it's not like caring about politics is going to lead to good or bad outcomes. Most people feel like they have no power over these things, and so it's back to the hand-to-mouth, paycheck to paycheck. Let the people rich enough to care duke it out, and if you really feel something then go vote.

Beginnings of wisdom? I feel similarly. It's funny - in life I do not reflect much or agonize over decisions. I don't tend to have any burning questions about 'meaning' per say. I'm not really in the market for a guru or philosophical approach to help with anything. I find I am not generally dissatisfied and it seems to me that dissatisfaction is a major springboard into speculative thinking. In my case, I see a separation between philosophy and life. Although I am well aware that every person is an agglomeration of suppositions and values that are derived from philosophy, culture and socialization. Is unpacking this and reassembling our belief systems even possible or useful? — Tom Storm

It is for me, but I definitely attribute that to my being raised with all these questions like they had certain answers and always finding the answers unsatisfactory, but the questions remained. Then eventually I came across this whole subject called philosophy that seemed to delight in that very exercise! At the very least in the spirit of finding the limits of reason.

But if someone is happy with their life? One of the things I like about Epicurean philosophy is that while there was a master, the life of the philosopher is not thought to be special -- but just one of the roles people play within a community. Some people tend the garden, some people learn the words, some people teach the words, but it's an interdependent community and the philosopher is not made special by the practice.

And if philosophy's purpose is to bring people to happiness, then there's no need for the happy person to learn philosophy. But life has a way of bringing pain, and we have a way of making ourselves miserable, so the philosopher offers possible salves for the injured if they come to want them.

This is the better way to put the question given the nonsense of private languages:

Given that meaning is public -- for what reasons do we disagree over meaning?

All of these evolutionary changes are possible without disrupting communication, only as long as they take place logically (there is a need for a new word, a comprehensible reason for an adjustment, and consensus among the primary users of the jargon) and gradually (so that the users of the language have time to learn the new application.) Otherwise, Babel ensues. — Vera Mont

In favor of this picture of linguistic change I'd say that languages do, in fact, take a long time to change. There's a stability there which is the reason we are tempted by the metaphor of the Public Shelf of Meaning, or in more sophisticated prose, metaphysical Propositions.

What I'd substitute for Propositions is repetition. By repeatedly using a locution in a similar fashion it comes to seem that the days resemble one another, or even that there are days at all rather than intermittent light-space dark-space. Then by finding ways to preserve our writing over time that allowed us the metaphor of nature as book that we can read. The fundamentals of writing are the same between speech and the script, the only difference is rate at which the sign fades, which in turn allows us to start interpreting the sign in the same way that we were interpreting the world, which gives rise to the picture of Propositions.

We have nothing to lose but our blockchains.

I've felt in reading along we've been in concert in our thinking, just from different angles. It's been great to read along.

Cool. I guess I am anxious not to be or sound disrespectful or needlessly antagonistic when I post. — Tom Storm

In this libidinal economy?

Totally understandable.

Ok, yes I can see some of this in Epicurus. From my modest exposure, I've certainly found Epicureanism more congenial than Stoicism. — Tom Storm

Glad to hear it :) -- though I'll give stoicism to the truly stoic, I think it's lessons are over-emphasized for how it interacts with most humans.

A good point. Philosophy is a word used with various meanings. One of the hallmarks of our time is the oversaturation of ideas and possibilities, lifestyles and worldviews available to us, whether it be as a social media influencer and shill in spandex, or a bushy-bearded Thomist contemplative pondering infinities. I often wonder how people choose what they will settle on. — Tom Storm

Right! So can one be a philosopher outside of academia, or are they just another YouTube personality, guru, or self-styled life coach?

For my part I'll say I'm not even a guru, because I'm still uncertain about so much and all I can bring you is uncertainty. Not reasons to do, but reasons to not do. A totally useless philosophy. Or so I hope. :D

OK I see that context wasn't in this thread -- guess I should have waited a bit in thinking out the OP after all. Oh well.

It's the metaphor I reject from the outset, at least. Though it seems we're in agreement on the limitations of the PLA, too. So I think it just makes me confused.

I'm sorry, I'm out of the loop on what the original disagreement was. If the question is asked: "Is that a dog?", the meaning of the uttered sentence is partly a matter of context and partly about what we pick out as dogs by convention. — frank

Probably best to leave the context behind. That was the idea behind starting a new thread -- I didn't want the conversation on identity in the masculinity thread to become a conversation on the meaning of statements of identity. But the creation of this thread was a bit extemporaneous from my usual approach: trying to spin off into another discussion that is more suitable to the question of meaning.

"By convention" is doing a lot of work in that sentence, with that in mind. Isn't that like pointing to the public shelf of meaning?

Like "Jack is a dog"? That kind of statement? — frank

Yup, that fits the form. The original question was with respect to gender-identity, but the form is there.

The one thing about the form that might elude the original disagreement is that "Jack is a dog" can be read not just as an identity-statement, but also as a description. It'd depend upon the context -- if the question is "Did you buy a cat or a dog?" then that's a description, but if Jack is running around the yard barking like dogs do, and so you express "Jack is a dog" then that's an identity-statement.

Not trying to be provocative, but none of that means anything to me. Reads likes some motherhood statements. What exactly is the connection between philosophy proper and its relationship to the 'problem's' of life? Can you provide examples? I understand that philosophy might be a source of some aphorisms or concepts which can be collected and blended into a kind of belief system casserole, but is that philosophy at work or just a kind of shopping for ideas that resonate? — Tom Storm

Please, by all means, be provocative. I don't mind. You're not wrong: Epicurus' philosophy comes across as aphoristic and motherly, especially in my emphasis of the letters (Cicero and Lucretius formulate more coherent arguments). The task for his interpreters is to turn it into something more than that, which I believe it is.

With regards to Epicurus' philosophy I think one problem of life is the fear of death -- how to deal with that? Then there are also fears of supernatural beings, that we need to touch the roof three times before saying "Happy Holidays!" or else the Banshee will eat your first born. I think the human mind has a tendency to find patterns that are unreal that cause fear or anxiety. Addressing one's fears and anxieties is much of what Epicurus means by the practice of philosophy and the search for wisdom.

Then there's the desire for things, and the desire to avoid things which, because we are human, can become compounded by the very words we use to understand those desires -- I don't just want such and such I must have such and such. Or if I am to lose tomorrow I cannot live with myself, and am miserable now because of that misery!

However the fear I have is that it's not philosophy at work, but instead is just a shopping for ideas that resonate. One of the questions I still ask is about what philosophy proper looks like outside of the academy, and I do not have an answer.

Sorry I must have missed your reply earlier, didn't mean to ignore it. — Isaac

No worries.

Yeah... I think that's guilt-based too, though. No one genuinely buys that shit... do they? — Isaac

Yes, and not just yes, but absolutely yes. The reason politicians can get away with saying what looks like obvious bullshit is they know what people like to hear, and that's what wins elections. The reason good union members with a strong foundation in solidarity vote for Republicans is because they can speak to the issues a union member believes are important -- like abortion, gun rights, and God. I always summed up Republican politics in the red states as revolving around God, guns, and babies -- you need God in your life to get you right, you need guns in your life to defeat the bad guys, and if you're going to have sex then you should take care of that baby no matter what.

I wouldn't be surprised if some of it is guilt based. Guilt is an emotion which builds institutions -- it makes people predictable enough that you'll have the numbers you need. Catholicism got by with that for over a millenia, so clearly guilt is an important motivator in building long-lasting institutions.

I just don't think it's going to be a guilt based in Marxism. The starving kids in China, as Mom would say to guilt trip us into eating vegetables, don't seem to have much to do with an individual's life, which is circumscribed by nationalist politics. Especially in the USA, I think people view themselves as having won the lottery by being born here. And if they just work hard enough they can be rich like Elon Musk, and they don't want to pay taxes because they know how to manage their own money on the stock market better, and all the other individualistic nonsense people really do believe.

There might be an underlying guilt for those with the conscience -- but that there's a carrot at the other end where you're in charge of your own destiny, I think, is what distracts from the reality of an industrial society. Plus there are all these reasons to reject Marxism, such as the violence of its political movement which is very real. (and capital's violence is intentionally designed to be easy to overlook, I think)

That's a more charitable way of looking at it that maybe I could adopt. I'm not sure I'm ready to excuse the lack of perspective relative to the major victims (the destitute), but I'm willing to go as far as to see genuine victimhood. — Isaac

That's pretty much where I'm at. If there's somehow, miraculously, a reasonable chance to actually change international conditions I'd sign up. In the meantime there are victims nearby who certainly aren't the destitute, but aren't doing too good either.

We do. So many threads to pull on here, not sure which to follow and which to save for later... — Isaac

Honestly I'm pretty happy with where we've ended up -- if I can complete the reduction to philosophical disagreements then there are future discussions to be had, and I think we agree there at least.

Well, then I'd be wrong! Again, supporting an active inference model of language is probably another thread we could pull on, but it's been combed through on other threads. — Isaac

Heh OK makes sense.

The thing I'm most vexed about is the victim culture, the way that not adhering to this (or any other) scheme is treated as an act of oppression. That I think is dangerous because it undermines attempts to address actual oppression. Most of what I'm doing here is showing that it's not oppressive. It might be old-fashioned, clumsy, but not an act of abuse. — Isaac

I think that makes sense.

For what it's worth, I believe you. I don't think it wise to jump at people for every possible slight. I said earlier on I believe there are some egos that need deflating. I can go that far ,because I don't like self-righteousness when it comes to politicking. It's far too gray to really go full-on into one's own self-righteousness unless one hasn't reflected enough.

But, hey, I was young enough once to have that feeling, too.

Then it what sense is it a 'social' creation, if others play no role in it and are overruled by the individual? That doesn't, on the face of it, sound very social. It sounds entirely private. — Isaac

This is going to get into the conceptual territory I've already admitted I'm uncertain about. But I'll take a stab anyways.

One of the things I like to remind people about Marx who are starting is that his scope is something a new reading is unlikely to be familiar with -- political economy. It's a jump even from standard sociology which tries to find some scientific explanation for phenomena -- it's an attempted scientific explanation for all social phenomena including the genesis of the state. It's a scope wider than countries, because it deals with the economies of countries and their transition from feudalism to capitalism.

The socially constituted subject is at a scope of explanation that doesn't impinge upon conversations except to say something about higher level rules that might explain why we're talking about this or that, but once we get down to the level of identity the scope is different.

But how to differentiate the scopes? Well, that's exactly where I'm stuck. The old question for me is finding the difference between social and psychological entities. I haven't answered it yet.

Your title reminds me of Martha Nussbaum's The Therapy of Desire.

And I'm a lover of Hadot's take on ancient philosophy. He's definitely worked his thoughts into my own.

The one name unlisted that I'd highlight is Epicurus. I've posted this quote before, but I'll do it again because I love Epicurus.

Let no one be slow to seek wisdom when he is young nor weary in the search of it when he has grown old. For no age is too early or too late for the health of the soul. And to say that the season for studying philosophy has not yet come, or that it is past and gone, is like saying that the season for happiness is not yet or that it is now no more. Therefore, both old and young alike ought to seek wisdom, the former in order that, as age comes over him, he may be young in good things because of the grace of what has been, and the latter in order that, while he is young, he may at the same time be old, because he has no fear of the things which are to come. So we must exercise ourselves in the things which bring happiness, since, if that be present, we have everything, and, if that be absent, all our actions are directed towards attaining it. — Letter to Menoeceus

Which is really just a way to say -- yup. I love the study of philosophy in its relationship to the problems of life.

That's absurd, but there are people on this forum who will blow through that absurdity and assert it anyway. — frank

I thought that at one point, though sometimes I flirt with the notion too. But it is absurd, I understand. (though the world is too by my reckoning, so there are worse conclusions)

One of my pet peeves is the way the Private Language Argument is misinterpreted on this site. Some people do it over and over and that misinterpretation spreads. The argument only suggests that you can't have a language that is untranslatable even in principle. This has no bearing whatsoever on whether you can make up your own words for things, or have your own private thoughts which you never share with others. — frank

I think I'm tracking. This is why I thought going down the PLA was different from understanding Identity -- but I do think the PLA has a bearing on some common thoughts about the meaning of identity-statements. Of course we have private thoughts we can keep to ourselves, but this doesn't speak against the argument basically. In defense of this interpretation it's common for people to go the other way with it, too, and claim that Wittgenstein is wrong because we obviously have a private life, or some such.

When the truth is that Wittgenstein was such a philosopher's philosopher that it's best to reserve judgments from thinking he supports this or that thing we care about. (early on cutting my teeth on W. I did the same thing -- seeing connections to leftist politics and all that. Eventually I figured out that that part was all me just trying to grasp the thoughts of a genius mind. It's an easy mistake to make with the greats)

Yes, that was the idea. We are the avenues by which meaning accrues, but, in some real sense, it must also be external to us since it is objectively encapsulated and shared. It is a bit of an enigma. Possibly the notion of a collective entity solves this? — Pantagruel

Unless I'm misunderstanding what you mean by "collective entity", I think that's the idea behind Propositions. But I thought your original proposal more interesting because it makes meaning dependent on even more than context, but also one's knowledge of a particular language. So this multiplies meanings even more while sensibly saying how it is they are multiplied -- since meanings are changed by what they are couched in, not just the meanings that are around the sentence but even the knowledge of a speaker is relevant.

Which would really put a number on determining identity-statements -- the very same phrase in the same context spoken by two different speakers, even in the third person, can mean different things. "He is a cautious man" so rest assured vs "He is a cautious man" so don't expect him to do much.

My penalty is too heavy to bare! :D I probably have earned the sentence, though, given how often I wonder about meaning.

I like the relationship between poet and philosopher -- subversive to put the poet as the maker of what the philosopher needs to do his craft!

Meaning evolves as it accrues new experience. Barring simple ostensives, the meaning of words derives from their function in sentence-level constructs (or larger). Average vocabulary ranges typically from about 10 to 30,000 words. What any given (non-trivial) word - duty for example - means for a person with a vocabulary of 10,000 words must be different from what it means for a person with a vocabulary of 30,000 words. Except if the former is in the military, and the latter is a cloistered academic. So meaning must be complex function of both social activity and linguistic competence. — Pantagruel

Your opening sentence is a bit cryptic. Is it the meaning which accrues new experience, or is it the speaker?

:D I'll only take a minute of your remaining fame.

Yes; "home" has numerous Public Shelf meanings and usages.

a) baseball (home base)
b) the 'home' keys on the QWERTY keyboard--'f' and 'j'
c) magic (rub your ruby crocs together 3 times and say "get me the hell out of here and back home."
d) a place to die ("Home is where, when you go there, they have to take you in." The Death of the Hired Man by Robert Frost
e) retail (Home Depot; the Home Store; HOM;
f) medical (a facility you may be sent to possibly against your will) old folks home; nursing home; a home for the very bewildered
g) a trait of animals -- homing instinct

Words have recognized usage. Where can you find a record of current and past word usage? In the 20 fat volumes of the Oxford English Dictionary.

Words have denotations (their plain most direct meaning) and connotations (their nuanced, shaded meaning). "The armored car weighs a ton" is denotative. "She weighs a ton" is connotative.

Take away: The Public Shelf meaning of words has plenty of room to maneuver. It isn't necessary or desirable for each individual to supply his or her own meaning nor for each use of a word to have a unique meaning.

You could be like Humpty Dumpty: 'When I use a word,' Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone, 'it means just what I choose it to mean — neither more nor less.'

Fine for the cracked egg. — BC

We both agree that words have a recognized usage. Meaning is public. I think the part of the metaphor I dislike is the "shelf" part, as if it's in a garage somewhere or containable in a Museum: language-as-bicycle. I certainly don't subscribe to the Humpty Dumpty theory of meaning, though.

But let's take a gander to a time before the Oxford English Dictionary was invented. The "shelf" part of the metaphor looses potency, though we might have to gander further back before the printing press to take the wind out of its sails. And before ships how were journeys and transitions talked of? What of the record of the metaphors before the script, when all writing was phonic?

My uncertainty is more to do with how meaning becomes public than whether it is. Or, since private meaning is a nonsense a how question for publicity is likewise nonsense, how is meaning shared?

Bullshit:(Creative---Orthodoxy):Bullshit

Is Bullshit on the left-hand side the same as Bullshit on the right hand side?

And do you mean Bullshit like Harry Frankfurt?

In the spirit of the original thread, though, I'd ask what is the meaning of identification statements?

Is there a Public Shelf Meaning to:

"I walked home"?

I suspect that's not an identification statement in the sense of identifying-with, except for how we might interpret "I"

"Richard Nixon was a good Democrat"

doesn't sound like an identification statement to me. It sounds like a statement written to make people angry.

But it is of the form of an identification statement, complete with the "way" modifier "good".