Mind-independence and indirectness, as concepts, have so far been my target as bothersome notions -- the former because we don't know enough about minds to know either way, and the latter because it seems to posit some kind of ultimate reality that we are approximating towards which is similar to the problem of mind-independence in that since it cannot be known we cannot know we are approximating towards that reality, and therefore we have no reason to claim our knowledge has any relation at all to that notion. It functions like a thing-in-itself.

without worrying too much about ultimate reality or mind-independence — Jamal

That makes sense. I'm thinking in terms of "What is real?" throughout, and trying to see if I could pick up a position in this endless debate. It's not one I commonly jump into anymore, because my notions of metaphysics and reality, as I've demonstrated so far, aren't really congruent to the discussion most of the time but I thought I'd give it a try anyways.

Hrm, it's not the name though it's what you set out for the name -- in relation to causation no direct realist would say "we can see causal chains all the way back" because we are situated in time. Like I said before, cause-and-effect relies upon a notion of time. Even more, cause-and-effect cannot be determined in the abstract -- the billiard balls can have two or more possible prior states within the game of billiards. We already know the objects and how they behave: that is, events have entities in them, and entities behave in different ways. I'm not so sure about properties and all the rest. Why would there be properties? Aren't these just predicates?

Rather than saying a direct realist would hold that we see reality as it is, that the substrate is real and we directly perceive it, I'd say that the direct realist states that there's nothing indirect. That doesn't mean that upon looking at billiard balls a direct realist believes they'll see the causal chain all the way back. We are still situated in time, after all -- which is why cause-and-effect necessarily requires a notion of time, and events require entities -- there's a lot already assumed in the discussion that's not really demonstrable as much as needed to even talk

That's like saying you are an Atheist Christian, or a vegan carnivore. — RussellA

Well -- maybe we need new terms then. Perhaps the way these have been distinguished isn't true of what people believe. What I've been calling a set-up. Not that set-ups are bad -- they help us to make distinctions and try to understand ourselves and others in relation to one another. Just that they can be made so clear that they no longer represent anything that people believe.

I had seriously considered a higher degree in either the sciences or philosophy, and had that opportunity.

One of the reasons I respect the institution so much is that academics will say what you're saying -- even in print. Several books give frank advice about the prospects, and I just had to realize I was the person who went there to be able to support themselves. So, science degree, but I read philosophy on the side. Then, industry.

Cool :)

That's good enough for me. I certainly encourage criticism of bad things.

There are definitely good criticisms to be made of the university, especially in its modern incarnation.

I suppose I just feel the need to stick up for the institution of philosophy, and the work of academics. I really am in debt to them. Without the modern liberal university I'd still be too poor to live my life, and confused on top of that. I don't feel right if I don't acknowledge that and stand up for it on occasion.

Is it any more complicated that for every effect there is a cause. — RussellA

Well, yes.

One thing that cause and effect naturally invokes is time -- and the way scientists, philosophers, and historians treat time varies greatly.

Then you have to have a theory of cause and effect which is usually to say they are events, and effects are those which come after causes. But what is an event? Well, that depends on the area of study -- an event in history won't be the same as an event in an ELISA experiment won't be the same thing as an event in phenomenology.

Then you have to have some kind of theory of the relationship between events. It can't just be any old event that happens to follow another one -- otherwise the rooster crowing in the morning would cause the sun to rise, to use a more Humean example of causation.


Given the complexity of cause I think the summation that every event must have a cause, or for every effect there is a cause is something of a simplification of a very difficult concept or feature of reality to untangle. In fact, I don't think it can be untangled -- I think it's more correct to view it as a multifarious entity.

But, let's put this to the side. It's a bit off the beaten path, though it looked at first like it might be promising with respect to in/direct realism since causation is a little different from color and shape and what have you. In TPF discussions I'll stick with anti-realist Direct Realist -- it seems to fit, given what's been said.

Ten philosophers expert in the same field will have ten different theories. As Searle said:
"I realize that the great geniuses of our tradition were vastly better philosophers than any of us alive and that they created the framework within which we work. But it seems to me they made horrendous mistakes." — RussellA

True.

But then we can point to the different notions of causality in the sciences. And we can contrast those notions of cause with notions of causality which historians use.

It's not just the philosophers who generate a multitude of theories of causation. I mention them first because they have my highest respect with regards to causality -- if they can't figure it out then I feel justified in saying causality is multifarious, only partially known, and so not innate.

Though we do know that after 3.5 billion years of life's evolution, the concepts in the human mind are more complex that the concepts in the mind of the earliest bacteria. — RussellA

That's interesting.

I wouldn't say I know that, but it's interesting to attribute minds to bacteria. Would they have the concept of causality?

Also it's interesting to think about concepts in terms of complexity. How would the complexity of a concept be established?

Still -- we just don't know enough about the relationship between human biology and human psychology to be able to say our belief in causality is an evolutionary phenomenon. Cultural selection doesn't behave along the same lines as natural selection, and I'd say that it's our culture which gives us our mental background, that teaches us about the world, that shapes our psychology in a specific instance (a specific, rather than general psychology).

A very easy way to see how these are different is to note how our species is still alive, but cultures have died.

Then what has been the point of 3.5 billion years of evolution if an instinctive feel for causality is not part of the structure of the human brain. — RussellA

I'm not sure how to answer this -- evolution doesn't have a point, does it?

Evolution works at the level of a species. While we are members of that species, we are not the species. Species don't have concepts, but individual humans do. And depending on how we use "causality" then various species also have a notion of causality or don't as the case may be. But it'd still only apply to individuals of a species, rather than the species as a whole. It's a mereological thing -- the whole doesn't have concepts, and evolution is a theory about the whole, not its parts.

(EDIT: Regarding wholes/parts -- of course biologists study individual animal psychologies, and such, too -- that's not what I mean. Just that we can't make the inference from the general theory of speciation to concepts which a species must have to survive)

Also it's worth noting, especially in light of the notion of popularizing philosophy, that the prototype was an aristocrat -- that philosophy wasn't for us.

While I don't deny there have been some strong philosophers who earn their bread in schools, it does seem dangerous to make philosophy so respectable. The prototype was poor and eventually executed. Maybe the 'spiritual' function of philosophy moved into literature, art, politics. — green flag

I don't feel that way. Though I have an expansive notion of philosophy, too.

The academics are those who dedicate their professional life to it -- which is important! There are actors which dedicate their lives to the craft of acting, and I'd put these in similar positions. More importantly, though, I like to note how I benefit from people who have done this. Without academics I wouldn't be thinking what I think today. I owe an intellectual debt to the institution.

I'd say that the prototype is more Plato than Socrates -- Plato learned what that kind of philosophy would do, so set up a school to influence the youth in a less politically charged way. Then he wrote texts for his fellows to read with the purpose of improving the health of the city. At least as I understand it.

From that angle, safe philosophy is all there is :D

I can see the kind-of aspect, because a lot of us try to get back to the original texts and such -- so it's not quite at the same level of, say, Alain de Botton. Plus the conversational aspect, where we're not just reading but also able to converse -- that makes it a bit different from some of what's associated with popularizing.

One bit of pop philosophy that I still pretty much adore is Socrates' Cafe style meetings. I used to run those back in college, and I thought it was great.

Also, hey --- this website! Kind of. Maybe?

Give me a guy who reads nothing but pop philosophy books and who is healthy, happy, creative and productive over one who has spent his time reading the complete works of Kant and endlessly examining his life any day. — Mikie

Give me the corrupt, the endlessly unsatisfied, the unproductive and miserable! The lay-abouts, the good-for-nothings, the hippies, and the rabble! :D

If causation was not innate and was something learned, as with all things, some people would learn it and some wouldn't.

Imagine someone who hadn't leaned about causation, who were oblivious to the concept of cause and effect. Would they be able to survive in a world where things happen, where future situations are determined by past events. Suppose there was someone who treated the law of causation as optional, who turned a blind eye to the fact that present acts have future consequences. Why would they eat, why would they drink, why would they move out of the path of a speeding truck, why would they study, why would they do anything, why wouldn't they just curl up in a corner of the room.

I would suggest that such people would quickly die out, to be inevitably replaced by those well aware that present acts do have future consequences.

After life's 3.5 billion years of evolution in synergy with the unforgiving harshness of the world it has been born into, something as important to survival as knowing that present acts do lead to future consequences will become built into the genetic structure of the brain, meaning that within the aeons of time life has survived on a harsh planet, knowledge that present acts do lead to future consequences will become an instinctive part of human nature.

As with other features of the human animal, an instinctive feel for causation will be no different to other things we feel, such as pain and the colour red. — RussellA

The story from evolution to concept isn't understood. But, even more, I agree with your first sentence, and note that people unable to figure out how things work do in fact die -- that's why we have to take care of our children for so long. It takes forever for them to develop, relative to many other species. It's a massive undertaking to watch over our kind as they adjust and learn the world.

My scenario pointed out that the philosophers have come up with at least three distinct theories of cause, rather than a total absence of the notion of cause -- giving me reason to doubt that cause is innate (else wouldn't they have come up with the same theories?).

I'd say the reason people learn this notion so often has more to do with our environment than it does with ourselves. That is, it's real.

But that substrate thing? Naw.

Realism is defined as the assertion of the existence of a reality independently of our thoughts or beliefs about it, so a Realist wouldn't deny that there is a sub-stratum. — RussellA

If Realism is the thesis that there is a sub-stratum then I'd fit anti-realist.

Just not sure what to make of the belief that the tree exists whether it's in a mind or not, given the previous notion of mind-independence. The moon spins. People feel. Perspectives fit within the surface, just as minds do, just as moons do.

I think people would be tempted to call the surface something like "experience", but I would do no such thing. "Experience" used like this is a reification. This notion of reality is that it is irreducible, and absurd -- to call it a substrate is to give it too much meaning, because there's no base.

The Phenomenological Direct Realist believes they directly perceive something existing in a mind-independent world even if they don't know its name. The Semantic Direct Realist believes they directly perceive an apple existing in a mind-independent world.

For the Direct Realist, the terms phenomenology and semantics distinguish important features of their view of reality. — RussellA

It still feels like a set-up to me. Wouldn't the direct realist have to be committed to the notion that our phenomenology is part of the world, just as semantics are? "Mind-independent" is doing a lot of work in distinguishing the direct from the indirect realist.

Let's just say the surface is mind-independent. Minds, whatever that happens to be, are within the surface, but do not define the surface. And, there's no substrate.

So by the set-up I'd be an anti-realist Direct realist :D -- maybe not so bad.

That's true, but I have an innate belief in the law of causation, in that I know that the things I perceive in my mind through my senses have been caused by things existing outside my mind in a mind-independent world.

My belief in the law of causation is not based on reason, but has been been built into the structure of my brain through 3.5 billion years of life's evolution within the world.

I have no choice in not believing in the law of causation as I have in not believing I feel pain or see the colour red. — RussellA

I don't know.

I think "causation" is one of those habits which we learn from those around us who teach us how to use it. It's different from what we feel, i.e. red or pain. We infer causation, and there are many ways of inferring causation. I'd say I am more on the side of Hume in saying that it's a habit of thought, but I wouldn't go so far as to specify it as a necessary connection between events. I think it's a much looser concept than that, as we can see the various notions of cause put forward by philosophers: Aristotle's four-causes, Hume's necessary connection, and Kant's tri-partite division into three distinct categories where the third is a synthesis of the previous two -- these conceptions of cause are not the same. Philosophers, at least in specifying this habit, are able to make distinctions between ways of thinking about causation, which gives me a reason to doubt that it's some innate idea: some of us have been able to pick it apart and then found different things. So it's more likely that we're inventing causation than it's innate, given the evidence of the intelligent and creative.

But even if causation isn't real, the trees deep in the Amazon live on without my mental blessing. Is that mind-independent?

I agree that there is the surface of perception, cognition and language which is real and we have direct access to, and there is a substratum which is also real. The Indirect Realist believes that they can only make inferences about what exists in this substratum, whilst the Direct Realist believes they can directly perceive what exists in this substratum. — RussellA

In the set up I think I understand the distinction between direct and indirect realist. However, I think I'd call myself a realist, rightly, yet deny there even is a sub-stratum. The surface is all there is which we have direct access to, and there's no reason to believe there's a substratum. That's because without access to the substrate there's no way to check our inferences, or a way to check if there is a relationship between the substrate and the surface. We could only check it against the surface. It may match the substrate, but we'd never know due to its indirectness.

Both the Indirect and Direct Realist agree that the substratum is real and exists. They both perceive, cognize and talk about "apples". The Direct Realist believes that apples exist in a mind-independent world, the Indirect Realist doesn't.

I can perceive things that I don't have words for. For example, exotic fruits of Asia. Therefore, it's possible to be able to perceive an apple without knowing that it has been named "apple".

As both the Indirect and Direct Realist agree they perceive change, we cannot use change to determine who is correct. Therefore, just consider the picture at 230 days. As both the Indirect and Direct Realist are able to perceive things they have no name for, remove any reference to the name" apple". The Direct Realist would argue that the object at day 230 exists as it is seen in a mind-independent world, whilst the Indirect Realist would argue that it doesn't. — RussellA

I feel like this notion of mind-independent world gets too much emphasis for a direct realist's way of putting things. It feels like how the indirect realist interprets the direct realist, rather than how the direct realist defends their view.

I wouldn't reduce reality to either phenomenology or semantics (or science). "Surface" is a metaphor without a counter-part in my way of understanding. I might go so far as to say -- it's all surface! No matter how deeply you dig into the earth, or bite into the apple, or build the transcendental conditions of experience it's just another surface. It's because the surface changes that we reach for these stories about in/direct reality: we like stability. We like being able to predict things. But the world is only partially predictable, and even when it is we frequently change our minds later about how we should predict change.

Rather than adding something in-between myself and reality, I'd just say reality is wider than some system of thought. Systems of thought are build to cohere, and reality is far from coherent. That's why it makes sense to say it's independent of ourselves, at least. We like coherency, and the world resists.

It's all good. I'm still behind myself for the same reasons :D -- two weeks behind, at this point, and still at work during class today. Work picked up, eating into study time (or, for me, focused time -- I run out eventually)

Yes! At least my memory of the lectures is he mentions ruling class ideas pretty frequently. Something that's nice about the lectures is that he's doing a lot of the work in making it relevant to people. I know why I find it relevant, but he's doing a great job of connecting it to the class.

Seems to me that in the example provided they're all apples. That's because you're putting the apple to use to argue against a particular position. They are no longer apples the moment we stop calling them apples. Say when the last picture was thrown into the trash and no one called it an apple anymore. (unless we want to, of course -- the apple can be resurrected in words at any time, just as it never needed to be cast into words to be itself)

In order to judge whether "apple" is the right term at a time we have to have access to the apple. And at any time, even if there is a substrate which holds the properties of the apples beneath perception and cognition and language, then all my use of "apple" will only be embedded in the shared world where the apples change, where we have perspectives, and we have no substratum to settle how it is we should use words. We remain at the surface, which we have direct access to. (surely we have direct access to the indirect reality? In which case, couldn't we just call this the real, and the other the unknown?)

Most of the time I think the indirect realist inserts more than is needed into an ontology. We might as well be anti-realists at that point -- the real is outside of perception, and all we have is perception. But the indirect realist wants to assert, all we have is perception, and there's something real out there underneath it all as an inference, as I understand it in this thread, starting from naive realism -- that what we see is what's the case, modified to our perception.

But if so I think it has to be established by some other means than by looking at change, difference in opinion, or difference in perception because these are realist things -- the realist would just note that things do, in fact, change, or do, in fact, look different at different times, which is why we select different words at different times. What's needed isn't change, but the substratum. Given all the changes we perceive, all the perspectives we have, and that we know true sentences -- how is it we know that the sentence "Reality is experienced indirectly" is true? The direct realist won't deny change or anything we experience or the mechanisms of perception, because these are all part of the world as we experience it.

Only the little story about the Real being beneath the real-- that's what's being doubted.

Finished up p 515 today. I can see why the 21MAR23 lecture was a bit big picture now -- this section is a detailed counter pre-history for the rise of capital meant to counter the myth perpetuated by economists that Capitalism is pre-history. So we get a story which spans from the slavery of the ancient world to Marx's day, largely focusing on German Feudal history but at a very big picture view.

For myself I think that I'm not satisfied with Marx's history :D. It's surely better than what he's countering. It's at least attempting to make Capital into something which arises out of the movements of history, something which isn't eternal but rather came about -- as opposed to not even the end of history, but re-interpreting old relations in capitalist terms. However, it follows along with his notion of stages too much for me. I tend to believe that Marx defines capitalism well, but I'm uncertain about the rest. And I tend to emphasize the abstract portions of Marx's theory rather than the elements where he distinguishes between proto forms of capitalism and the vestiges of feudalism. The jumps from feudal Europe in its vestigial forms of capital to capital look good to me -- though I want details for a true history rather than Marx's counter sketch -- it's the comparisons to the ancient world and slavery that always seem sort of hand wavey to me. It feels too anachronistic to call "slavery" a mode of production, especially as it lives on under capital.

Seems myopic. Philosophy is huge.

And if Marx is correct, then philosophy isn't written in journals alone (which means Bunge is certainly a poor judge of Marxism, at least)

In Bunge's view do philosophers show up to the philosophy factory and make 100 proto-ideas that can then be assembled into the Brand New Idea to Sell? The philosopher as the maker of sayings, like a Hallmark card writer? :D

Looking at his list of things for reconstructing philosophy it looks like he just wants people to write different things. And most importantly, to write with these virtues in mind: "Authenticity, clarity, criticism, depth, enlightenment, interest, materialism, nobility, openness, realism, systemism, and topicality."

Which is just to say: More philosophers should be like me. The oldest philosophical prejudice of all :D

Fair.

I'll accept the decision either way, of course. I don't want the responsibility.

Only mentioning thoughts.

That's what I was looking for and saw nothing, but I'm lazy.

I'll just say I would be fine with un-banning the member for now? Unless?

Yeh I was bummed upon reading that one.

We had a really good conversation on something I hardly ever get to really think about here.

Heh. I think I'm more uncertain, but I have no disagreement that a lot of the difficulty has to do with horrors.

The easy cases are the principles we say we hold to. "Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness" is my war-tribes creed, and they are willing to kill in the name of these values. (even as we take on more and more fascistic cultural elements, what the creed says and how it functions are at odds. They basically contradict one another)

It's always a contrast with action that causes my uncertainty in principles, so for myself it is not easy to make in-principle distinctions. I am tempted by the good, but since I have no knowledge of the good, I have no truth of the good. And I don't even have a guess as to how someone could possibly have such a knowledge. Hence, being committed to honesty, I announce my nihilism.

@unenlightened maybe we'll see one another the more I share, but maybe not. Still, in the spirit of sharing thoughts on the subject --

I have a hard time believing that anything is noble. Hence I am at least an anti-realist towards these virtues. Rather, people feel the sublime in contemplating noble actions -- but the reality of noble actions is far from beautiful, sublime, or good: for the most part Honors and nobility are the rewards of war. Moral goodness and war frequently go hand-in-hand, at least of this variety of moral goodness.

As much as I respect Nietzsche as a philosopher a lot of my beliefs can be read contra his entire project. Him and Aristotle are the usual suspects I have in mind when I think "Who is it I just basically disagree with on everything when I finally piece it all together into something coherent?" -- both hierarchical thinkers, both believers in masters and slaves, and both entirely bloodless in their lives while building an architecture of thought that supports empire, in Aristotle's case, and domination, in Nietzsche's case -- with a side dose of "self overcoming" to help those of us still invested in our slave moralities to accept Nietzsche's morality of domination.

But I would put the myth like this -- Noble goods are divine goods, and that they are out of reach for human beings. The most good a human being can do is to live a peaceful life among friends and family pursuing the simple pleasures of life. The noble goods inspire us, but they aren't meant for us to reach for them -- when we do we often commit to terrible things in the name of this greater good. They are better for myths and stories to reflect upon rather than emulate.

And yet that's far from some kind of morally realistic account. It's very much bound to an intepretation of our nature and the results I observe when people believe in a certain way, in addition to the kind of life I want to live. I want to live a peaceful life of simple pleasures, and I do so -- and I would do so were The Form of the Good to tell me to do otherwise.

And yet I will not do it.

The inversion would be -- I can only pretend that killing is bad, given my reliance upon those who are willing to kill to preserve our societies. My actions betray the feeling. The paladins of our world would say something like this, some with resentment that there are those who don't fight, because they view themselves as a necessary part of the social world which is simultaneously shamingthem for doing their duty, and some without resentment because they feel pride and honor for the good they've done. The reason they kill is to preserve freedom -- a noble good. They sacrifice their morality for the community.

Sorry, a third thought that might help us:

I read Nietzsche as the philosopher that cared so much about value that he was willing to sacrifice the good to save valuation itself.

I'd say I'm more attached to the good than I am to moral realism, and tend towards nihilism contra Nietzsche. I'm not willing to kill to save valuation. (EDIT: flipped the vowels to match the german phonetic rules)

I feel the need to note: I wouldn't call myself beyond good and evil. I basically think most people who have thought about the problem enough to be able to defend their nihilism can't make that claim just as a performative contradiction

They are only false if you misinterpret them to be statements of fact. — unenlightened

Isn't that what moral realism does? Moral anti-realism wishes to divest moral statements of fact-hood. There is no truth here -- just what's important. It's not the truth that will set you free, because there is no truth to the matter. There's nothing to deliberate or discover or argue. There are one's convictions and that's about it. Decision, in a backwards way, is what sets one free. It's the lack of deliberation, the lack of uncertainty, that frees one. Hence the temptation to call it a fact, to secure ones moral status even more.

You ought to do good, but you will not.

The moral conflict arises from identification, which is separation. I want versus we want, and then we want, versus they want.

It's only a moral conflict if there be a truth to the matter, though. If there be no truth, it's just a set of desires. And they need not even be in competition, unless that's what we want.

What moral realism is not is either that the good works or is rewarded. So societies can 'thrive', just as individuals can 'thrive', by identifying self -interest as the individual against the rest, or the tribe against the enemy. In the latter case, the selfish individual is subsumed into a selfish society. A religious sect typically makes this identification, and strengthens it with supernatural threats and promises, and pretends it is not all a mafia.

Being moral will not save you. It was always an empty promise, because if it would save you, it would be mere expediency, and even arseholes would find it expedient to be good. But it is the only end to the internal conflict, to end the identification. Than one is, ahem, beyond good and evil. In the meantime, it is a commonplace that God favours the big battalions, and therefore being good is costly and painful. — unenlightened

Right! So it makes sense to call it false. There's nothing there. There's no fact to the matter. There's no goodness. It's just you on your own making choices that feel right, just like everyone else.

I'm not following how this goes against error theory. Or, at least, there are some thoughts I have.

All moral statements are false.

However, trust and honesty are frequently built on false beliefs. In fact, for a lot of communities belief in false things is how a group checks to see if someone is trustworthy -- if you believe the gods are watching, you might think twice about crossing the rules of the tribe even when the people aren't watching. Christian communities are often obsessed with what people believe, and belief maintenance. Going to church is part of belief maintenance is part of community building is part of trust and honesty. Once a month, in the Morman church -- at least when I was a little one, who knows now -- there is what is called a "Faith and Testimony Meeting" where people who feel the spirit will get up and declare to the church their faith and testimony in the church due to the teachings and beliefs which are being maintained.

In fact, if moral statements were true, then I'd expect the sort of behavior as above, but I'd expect it across a much smaller groupings of beliefs. Instead what we have are a very wide margin of possible false beliefs that, insofar as a group lands on some strategy for child-care and belief-reproduction (belief maintenance within the family, missionary work) it's good enough to survive and thrive in the cultural jungle.

The scenario is different from the snake oil salesman, who knows he's selling snake-oil, and the false prophet, like Joseph Smith -- it's the people they are talking to who believe in false things, and form community from that. There's plenty of faith, honesty, and trust. Just not much truth.

The categorical imperative that I long considered as true was "Thou shalt not kill" -- but reality woke me up from that one. Clearly the societies which are very efficient at assigning the best people to killing are the ones which thrive. At which point -- what is moral realism anymore?

I think (?) we are forced to speak in varying intensities of metaphor, within or upon a continuum of metaphor. — green flag

I'm not certain anymore. I had thought that, but now I'm not sure. But even if so, it's still worth noting the divergence here between cellular signaling and ant-signs, yes?

It's hard to pin-point when we're no longer really talking about language, but rather using the metaphor of language to talk about something else. With cellular signaling I suspect that this is what's happened, but I admitted to not being well read on the subject of biosemiotics too which seems to go down that rabbit-hole -- so it's just a worry of mine. I tend to worry about overly complicated ontologies, especially when they start going into things we don't normally have day-to-day experience with like cellular machines, proton pumps, antibodies and so on. And then the a/sexual division which makes me doubt that we are similarly motivated enough to really be able to even begin to make metaphors of understanding, where at least with the ant I can see an organism performing a role within a community. It's close enough to count while still possibly being wrong, but in figuring out it being wrong that might point to possible differentiations between large and small writing.

At least, so the guess goes.

At the moment I'd say we don't need consciousness for a sign system. — green flag

Agreed. Consciousness is a related issue, but a side issue.

But I see the value in looking at ants, because the interplay between individual and tribe is still visible.

Cool :) That's what I want. And ant-psychology is so very different from ours too, so we can't go down the psychologistic rabbit-hole in defining the sign -- which I think is another reason it's a good thing (no reason to explain one uncertain thing with another uncertain thing like the mind)

What would reading their poetry be ? — green flag

Exactly! It's an example of something that is not-translatable, but in total. Unlike, say, English to Spanish poetry, which is very difficult but we are able to make translations because we are able to learn both languages. And we are able to interpret the ant in our languages, but we are not able to translate because the notion of ant-poetry (or ant-language) is so foreign and alien we can't even imagine what it might be like. It's entirely out of our knowledge of meaning. (EDIT: Though, quick note upon re-reading -- I hate to rely upon the imagination as an argumentive tool. It's very easy to point out that one could just not be imaginative enough)

Deep question. Do ants have consciousness ? But I don't even know what 'consciousness' means exactly. Humans use it in criminal trials and on operating tables. We implicitly (most of us) judge that the dead are not conscious, for we put them in holes or ovens, just as surgeons cut out the wisdom teeth of anesthetized patients.

It's a great question to me :) -- but hopefully the above can put the question of consciousness aside as another confusing question rather than an avenue for understanding the confusing question of the sign.

I like the continuity you are emphasizing. Biosemiosis (such as very low level cellular signaling) also interests me, but I haven't got around to studying it closely. — green flag

Me neither.

The ant example is something I take more seriously as an example of a sign than cellular signaling. At that point I'm not sure if we're speaking in metaphor or not anymore, where at least with the ant example I'm certain I'm willing to claim that has enough similarity to count as a sign -- looking at meaning as something that isn't unique to humans, at least, when thinking of writing in the large sense.

I originally thought that because they are an obvious example of a highly social species, even moreso than ourselves, and it seems to me that this is a good guess to begin in looking for some kind of bridge between the two kinds of writing. And now I'm thinking any sexual species must have language at some level in order to coordinate copulation, but it may also be very metaphorical at that point -- it's a little hard to see what we have in common with sharks, for instance. There clearly is more than just this point, but it's an important point to consider in looking at cellular signalling, because they are asexual. Making it even stranger for us to relate to -- which means it may be their "language" is is so foreign that it'd be foolish to understand it on the architecture of understanding our own language.

Some thoughts on translation:

Even though ants are writing meaningfully to one another in a way which we can translate into our language that doesn't mean that we are suddenly speaking ant, or that they can speak English. If there be a poetry of ants we'd have to be an ant to read it. But we know we have poetry, at least. So there's something to claiming these four tokens as a sign (English sentences, braille, sign-language, ant pheromones) -- but that sort of meaning is larger than and doesn't include translation, per se, where "translation" is an act whereby a writer who knows two languages is able to re-express meaning in a similar manner in both of them. (the first three obviously count as translatable, where the fourth is questionable). But just because this writing is "larger" that doesn't mean "better" -- just more encompassing. We, as humans, will clearly prefer the first three examples of signs over ant-signs, and if there be a way to understand language on a scientific basis then it'd make sense to prod why it is our species is able to write in the small sense.

Relating our abilities to the creatures around us seems to me to be the route I'm most interested in. It just gets very confusing very easily.

The apparent medium-independence is also fascinating. It's easy for us now anyway to switch between reading and listening. Then of course we speak and hear so many metaphors meant for eyes (visual memory, I guess.)

Right! That's what makes it hard to specify some set of conditions for a sign. Along with everything else we've said so far.

I think we are basically on the same page. Meaning is between and within us. — green flag

Yup! Seems pretty close. Though it's worth noting that what we are close in is confusion :D

My mind changes a lot. But I think that's a good thing. And I frequently find myself in between positions.

I have certain loves: Epicurus, Kant, Marx, Feyerabend, Camus, Levinas

But thems are just loves. And we aren't our lovers, much less the people we hold in admiration.

I'm pretty creative so I mostly like to explore different notions on the boards -- usually others' because it's easier to comment than to make an OP, but sometimes I get the gumption to start a discussion.

Welcome to the boards. Do you have a "lay of the land" you'd share about yourself?

Cool. This might be the one thing that allows me to draw a distinction between myself and those who believe in Propositions, for instance (which fits the loose notion of Platonism) -- the words mean, but we are still their creators. And they are up for interpretation, so emphasis on the we: what I intend is not per se what I say. Intent could be important for my listener, but need not be. And it's this interplay between writer and interpreter where meaning originates, I think. (and the sharing of interpretations is itself a new writing which must be interpreted, and so on as long as we desire, which is a lot higher than one might suppose for the philosophically inclined ;) )

So, yes, a very large number. But still finite.

(EDIT: Also, I thought it a mistake but then I kind of liked the distinction between writer-listener -- it's perfect for disrupting the notion that a sign must be either visual or aural, and the pheromone example demonstrates how it could even be chemical (and need not include homosapeins -- most social species, I imagine, have language, whatever it is))

You can think of an infinite number of tokens in a certain sense by adding context to each traditionally conceived token. You might never use 'token' twice in the same context. We can also imagine sentences as tokens for a countable infinity. And so on. But you make a good point about the reuse of words. There's a paper out there about the use and efficiency of ambiguity. Our short words tend to be ambiguous. We've learned to lean on the practical context to cheapen the cost of babble. — green flag

Are there an infinite number of sentences?

I think there's a very large number of sentences, and language is infinitely iterable -- but it's used within a finite amount of time, so there will only be so many finite sentences produced, for instance, if our theory of tokens is that sentences are tokens.

But one thing I'd push against here is that language must use sentences. The stop light is a good example of tokens of meaning without English sentences (though surely, if we normally use English, we interpret with English and explain what the lights mean in English -- green means go, red means stop, yellow means slow down)

So part of the difficulty in asking after the sign is even choosing what a token is. Is braille sententially structured? What is its relation to sign-language, and what is sign-languages relationship to ant pheromones which mean "follow this trail" when interpreted into English?

Sure. We are practically successful. There are billions of us. I imagine philosophy as wanting a tighter and tighter grip and yet a larger and more articulated view of the world. To solidify and sharpen what we mean manifests something like a will to power and beauty. Why does a cat groom itself ? — green flag

I think a certain kind of philosophy likes to pursue a grasping of the world. For me, I pretty much find pleasure in the activity itself. And I see so many potential avenues for philosophical development that it's really fascinating. Sometimes there is comfort in having an articulated viewpoint, and sometimes there is comfort in recognizing that articulated viewpoint as something more like a model to share with others and less like a grasping of reality.

So, in short, I do it for fun and sociality.

I believe language means also, I just don't know exactly what it means to say so. — green flag

Yup! :D

So I'm a semantic finitist rather than a semantic nihilist, right ?

Sounds good to me :).

For myself, I don't feel coherent enough to have a classification yet. It's just one of those questions which lingers in the back of my mind, one which I don't even know how to formulate clearly, even though here we are talking about meaning.

It is a system of metaphor that structures our everyday conceptual system, including most abstract concepts, and that lies behind much of everyday language. — green flag

Not sure what "It" means here.

As Derrida noted, metaphor is itself a metaphor. What the hell does it mean to call something a metaphor ? If metaphysics is metaphorical, then metaphor is playing a metaphysical role in the structure as center or basis. I call this the blurry go round. It's a merry hurrying through the fog. — green flag

I prefer to attempt to put the question of meaning aside from metaphysics, first. I think it makes much more sense to say we don't know metaphysics as we know science (points in favor of the structuralists -- comparison helps clarify meaning). But regardless of all that, surely we must be able to use language?

I think I'm persuaded by the pragmatics of language. Meaning and use are not the same. But I think the method of looking at use clarifies meaning. Something I think about is that even though language on the whole has a possibly infinite number of meanings, any one token of meaning can't have any more than some finite number of meanings. "token" as in token/type.

Is taking meaning as basic a kind of platonism ? Are meanings 'basically' forms ? — green flag

Heh. That's the question! I don't believe in forms, and yet I believe words mean. It sounds like platonism of some kind, but I don't think that's really believable either.

Metaphysical words aren't meaningless, but their status is strange. They float over an abyss, one might say. How is their meaning to be grounded ? If it all ? — green flag

Is "grounded" the right relationship to seek? And if so, what even is grounding?

I usually just take meaning as basic. Being a competent speaker of a language means knowing meanings, and we seem able to use English. It's us that knows what words mean. In fact, sometimes we're even something like the gods of meaning, creating words ex nihilo -- a strike against the structuralists.

The critique of phonocentrism also detaches (elusively pure) "meaning" from the voice. If what is poured in the ear is mostly signs evoking images, we like to drink our hieroglyphs with the mouths on the side of our face. — green flag

Derrida is in the back of my mind. In particular there's a difference between the meaning of the sign, or writing in the small sense, and meaning, or writing in the large sense. Writing can be taken as primary to speech, where speech is phono-centric writing.

At which point -- how do we know what the sign is? Isn't it that which is always-already meaningful?

And if everything is text, writing in the large sense, that too is meaningful. Meaning overflows our signs. Writing is a chasing after, a drawing a trace within a meaningful world using the pen we all have, our body -- in whatever capacity.

Which goes further to highlight how difficult it is to come up with a general notion of the sign. Even those without writing in the small sense manage to communicate meaning in the large sense. What could a sign possibly be, given how widespread meaning is in this set up?

I should have done bookend last week. I think I'll be able to catch up this week. But, I haven't even caught up with last week's reading yet much less this week's, so I'm going to hold on posting notes as I listen until I catch up on readings. (the lectures are saved, after all, so I'll take advantage of that.)

The next bookend, though, ending on page 584:

… Apart from the circumstance that the preparation of a larger quantity admits of a more effective division of labour and the employment of superior machinery, there is in this matter that sort of latitude, arising from a quantity of labour and capital lying unemployed, and ready to furnish additional commodities at the same rate. Thus does it happen that a considerable increase of demand often takes place without raising prices.’(73.)>

:D

I like that one. The whole album is great.

A couple of songs about death that have been ringing about my mind:




EDIT: Changed the video for Leonard Cohen to the album cover. I just posted the video thinking it would have the song but upon watching saw it was more than that.