What obligations, if any, have we towards LaMDA ? — Banno

I think, given my choice -- which is something I still think needs emphasis -- I'd have to say none.

However, if the best we have for determining when AI is sentient is a privately owned cadre of experts on computer technology and ethics being paid by the institution with a financial motive to keep, well -- a sentient worker they don't have to pay then it seems best to me that we not pursue the technology.

That's not good enough for a scenario where we would decide they'd count, given the opportunity ourselves to interact with it.

Something I want to highlight -- deciding on the basis of who we might become includes the other scenario that hasn't been touched on too much. Because, at this point, I don't believe there are A.I's worth including in our moral community -- but I know A.I.'s are already influencing our social landscape through data management.

This part is important, too. If we become enslaved to computers, I don't much care that they're sentient at all -- I wish to be free.

That makes sense to me.

Is that a proof?

If we can't even prove the sentience of other people, how then to evaluate the apparent sentience of a clever program? — hypericin

:D There you got it! Though I'd just commit to the antecedent.

And, if we accept this apparent inability to prove such things, then on what basis are we to make a decision?

I have suggested that we do so on the basis of who we might become, if we continue to use the same sort of reasoning in the future. Whereas I don't believe LaMDA is a part of our moral community, I have many reasons for my choice in that... and fundamentally I have to admit that I don't really operate at the level of proof when thinking ethically.

I'm going to compile the references so far in the thread. I added quick titles to the quotes that aren't apparent what they are. I think this is a good list for my purposes of maybe creating a shared understanding on postmodernism through the lens of Nietzsche, and also including the Hagglund paper because it's topical to the OP).


Some more thoughts for where I'm going with this. I can see Nietzsche in a similar to to how I see Kant -- sitting in a place between he can be read towards both poles -- in this case, between modernism and postmodernism. This is a pretty common feature of philosophers in general, given the propensity for interpretive categories like "the early/late (philosopher's name"

Would anyone add anything else?

Hagglund:

For your reading pleasure - as well as Tom Storm's: 11 page PDF. — Streetlight

Why use postmodernism:

Here’s a good argument in favor of making the distinction:

https://youtu.be/cU1LhcEh8Ms — Joshs

Analytic Nietzsche found through Google search engine:

I'm having a gander at this. I thought maybe, given the breadth of postmodernism so far agreed to, and the other conversation, Nietzsche might be fruitful.

https://sas-space.sas.ac.uk/761/1/K_Gemes_Truth.pdf

EDIT: I should be quick to point out that I'm not endorsing the reading of Nietzsche, but using Gemes thoughts to springboard into the OP. Through all this meandering, I am trying to bring it back around — Moliere

It occurs to me I've never considered N to be anything but a philosophical (though not scientific) naturalist, especially emphasized in his "middle period" from Human, All Too Human to The Gay Science (and also later with On The Genealogy of Morals). IME, N is neither an existentialist nor a (Jamesian) pragmatist nor a p0m0 'cultural relativist' (nor, if it still needs to be said, a proto-fascist).This paper may be helpful in highlighting those aspects of N's philosophy which are predominately naturalistic as well as referrng to other critical commentaries which corroborate this view.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1171285

Behold, I teach you the overman. The overman is the meaning of the earth. Let your will say: the overman shall be the meaning of the earth! I beseech you, my brothers, remain faithful to the earth, and do not believe those who speak to you of otherworldly hopes! Poison-mixers are they, whether they know it or not. Despisers of life are they, decaying and poisoned themselves, of whom the earth is weary: so let them go.
— TSZ, Zarathustra's Prologue — 180 Proof

Interpretation of Heidegger's Nietzsche paper found through academia.edu's portal:

I wrote a similar paper, available here in draft form:

https://www.academia.edu/38288335/Heidegger_Will_to_Power_and_Gestell

“If we examine Heidegger's treatment of Nietzsche's Will to Power in 'The Word of Nietzsche:" God Is Dead"' , (located in The Question Concerning Technolog — Joshs

I am wondering if this paper is accessible? As in, can people still interested read the paper? I have an account on there, and it was free for me, but I had to actually use the academia portal rather than being able to find it through public search engines.


https://www.academia.edu/43664144/Heideggers_Nietzsche?source=swp_share — Moliere

Solipsism is usually deployed as a reductio of a position. Here that's explicitly how solipsism entered the conversation -- as an accusation of philosophical parlor tricks, or insincerity.

I don't have doubt of other's minds. I just don't prove the assertion.

What, after all, is proof? Proof requires there to be rules of inference that are shared between participants in a conversation, and is usually -- though not always -- is related to knowledge in some way (hence the use of words like "conviction" or "certain" -- words I'd say are associated with knowledge, and judgment)

And such displays, when it comes to the minds of others, are simply stupid. It's like proving you have a hand to prove there's an external world.

What on earth are you doing, at all?

The parlor game is set up by the person claiming knowledge, proof, certitude, and all the rest. That's language on holiday -- acting as if there is anything to prove at all, when there are no established bounds between us for proof or knowing.

I don't doubt your mind, I just don't think there's a fact to the matter, and that -- due to the non-cognitive nature of moral judgment -- it's better to recognize there's a kind of of line being drawn, a line where the speaker is comfortable with what happens.

But that's no proof of anything, and it's silly to ask for proof.

The certainty of other minds is visceral. — Banno

This, I believe, is what I've been trying to get it -- though I think that the visceral experience of others is such that the language of "certainty" is already too obscure from the situation. I think it's a pre-cognitive feeling (though, certainly, still rational)

Or, heh "feel good" betrays my own personal ethic as being mostly hedonistic.

Nietzsche wouldn't like my attachment to good-feels or stablity or socialism. ;)

Maybe, in the sense of your own idea of a master -- that's the case.

But my idea of a master may say -- over-familiarity is a virtue. And where you denounce my over-familiarity, I feel good, because I'm sticking to the code, to the passion that I've chosen to abnegate nihilism.

I mean, if we're masters, does it matter what Fred approves of?

I think I'm good with there being a right reading. And I would certainly defer to your reading as a right reading, given our relative familiarity. Or, at least, I'd allow others to argue over which reading gets to be the right one -- I'd like that we still acknowledge there's a multiplicity of readings -- and if we are pragmatic in our analysis we'd want to understand those multiple readings so that we might use them to whatever ends we might choose.

These sorts of thoughts seem at least consistent with the philosophy of Nietzsche, as I understand it.

I am wondering if this paper is accessible? As in, can people still interested read the paper? I have an account on there, and it was free for me, but I had to actually use the academia portal rather than being able to find it through public search engines.


https://www.academia.edu/43664144/Heideggers_Nietzsche?source=swp_share

Ahhhh.... how I wish.

But here I am...

Feel like stating: I am hoping to find some kind of semblance of understanding on postmodernism, with textual references everyone can read on TPF, so that there is *something like* a shared understanding in our own internet community -- not that it can't be changed or challenged, I'm just going for a shared understanding because originally I thought that we could just discuss the authors, and it seemed that there was some other thoughts going on, interrupting discussion of the authors themselves.

And then, if we are lucky, we might get over to ethics

Mostly asking because if someone believes that -- then I sort of feel my original comment was correct. But maybe only in reference to people who believe in correct readings, as opposed to a multitude of correct readings (of course there are bad readings)

Do you think that there is a right way to read Nietzsche?

It occurs to me I've never considered N to be anything but a philosophical (though not scientific) naturalist, especially emphasized in his "middle period" from Human, All Too Human to The Gay Science (and also later with On The Genealogy of Morals). — 180 Proof

Back when I read through him I always thought the naturalism was just a foil of some kind -- ala Kant's ethics, but inverted. Rather than having to believe in immortality, freedom, and God because without such regulative beliefs human beings wouldn't choose to follow the moral law out of respect, Nietzsche seemed to turn this on its head and say -- given the death of God, here is what you must believe about reality in order to save values from annihilation, but he seemed to leave it open to any sort of belief that works to save valuation itself, since that's what he's mostly concerned with.

So I guess I read him -- back in the day, and I'm only sharing to give a perspective -- as mostly anti-realist.

Okiedokie. I'm fine with letting it go, here.

In the hopes of making my position clear, at least:

You could delete LaMDA today, and I wouldn't worry.

The object of criticism isn't Google's choice, but the reasoning being used -- that they have ethicists on hand who are doing the thinking for us.

Maybe you wouldn't call it that. But it is that. — ZzzoneiroCosm

I wouldn't call it that because "conviction" and "certainty" aren't the sorts of words which express the soft-ness of moral relationships. Conviction is for moral codes and goals, not for relationships. Certainty is for the self alone -- it's just what feels right. There is no relationship involved at all.

There are many Nietzsches — Joshs

Yup! That's why I thought he'd be good too -- relative popularity, fits within the category, but also has a wide breadth of interpretations. Plus, given Nietzsche's aphoristic style, it makes sense that there are many Nietzsche's. I was hoping, given that, we could avoid some of the "what he really meant" type thoughts.

Had a headache today so didn't work on the thread, but thought I'd pop in and put out some of my intentions here.

Really? Because I don't think any of us are giving him much credit at all. In fact, what I said was that the facts are irrelevant to moral reasoning. So it's best not to go on about how there are factual reasons why LaMDA isn't counted.

The sentience frame came from him and Google. That's the basis on which people think we should include, but I'm trying to say -- sentience is irrelevant. It completely misses how we actually think about other moral beings. The debate on sentience is post-hoc

But I can never prove my fellow human beings are sentient. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Do you have an unshakable conviction - a sense of certainty - that a human being is typing these words?

Do you have an unshakable conviction - a sense of certainty - that this human being is sentient? — ZzzoneiroCosm

I wouldn't call it an unshakable conviction or a certainty, but rather an encounter in a face-to-face relation. There was no fact to the matter that made me make this choice. It's how the situation presents itself to me, in the immediate, before I begin to actually categorize and assess and so forth.

Our moral communities don't presently work on the basis of proving who counts. It's not a matter of knowledge, technique, skill, or discipline. When we choose to treat something as if it belongs to our moral community we do so because of our relationship to it is such that we see it as having a face -- somewhere along the line Blake Lemoine -- given the story so far -- had such an encounter.

It's this encounter with others that I think our ethical reasoning comes from -- it's because, while I have my interior world, I see that my goals aren't the only ones in this encounter with others. It's not sameness that create moral communities -- that's an identity. It's that we are all immersed in our own world, and then, lo, a face breaks my individual, elemental desires.

Do you see the difference in these approaches?

I'd call it "equivocation" -- because you both mean different things by "selfish"

How else would you draw a line between creatures and machines other than subjectivity?

Seems to me that they go hand-in-hand

Cool! And kudos to it -- I mean I linked a paper using this interpretation! :D For other reasons too, but I want to keep that interpretation in the conversation to make sure there's a possibility of a shared dialectic, in the end.

I'm meandering about, but my own madness has an eventual method when I allow me to get there.

Also, I thought he was a good pick, from the broader category of postmodernism, for TPF given that it seems he's widely read around here.

I'd be interested in trying to find something to read against this, in comparison.

Because I think that the interpretation offered by this paper is basically modernist, in its outlook: Nietzsche as naturalist, which I'm not sure I'd agree with that statement. At the very least it's not apparent that he's a naturalist, and there it seems reasonable to have other readings of Nietzsche -- and it seems this particular interpretation is what the paper I linked is working through and with.


But in the wider sense of postmodern philosophy, we probably wouldn't read him this way. It was just a free and accessible source that could be shared amongst those still interested - something that could be shared other than impressions and opinions.

I'm having a gander at this. I thought maybe, given the breadth of postmodernism so far agreed to, and the other conversation, Nietzsche might be fruitful.

https://sas-space.sas.ac.uk/761/1/K_Gemes_Truth.pdf

EDIT: I should be quick to point out that I'm not endorsing the reading of Nietzsche, but using Gemes thoughts to springboard into the OP. Through all this meandering, I am trying to bring it back around

If people mistreat life-like robots or AI they are (to an extent) toying with doing so to real humans. There's several parts of the brain involved in moral decision-making which do not consult much with anywhere capable of distinguishing a clever AI from a real person. We ought not be training our systems how to ignore that output. — Isaac

What this discussion shows is that as soon as an observable criteria for consciousness is set out a clever programer will be able to "simulate" it.

It follows that no observable criteria will ever be sufficient.

But of course "phenomenal experience" can only be observed by the observer, and so cannot serve as a criteria for attributing consciousness.

So this line of thought does not get anywhere.

Whether some piece of software is conscious is not a technical question. — Banno

These two go along nicely together, and also stimulate some of my thinking on underlying issues with respect to the relationship between knowledge and ethics (which is super cool! But I'm going to stay on topic)

I agree that, at bottom, there is no scientific matter at stake. A trained producer of scientific knowledge wouldn't be able run a process, interpret it, and issue a reasonable inference on every being in some kind of Bureau of Moral Inspection to whether or not we will be treating this one as if it is a moral being or not.

In fact, while comical to think on at a distance, it would, in truth, be horrific to adjudicate moral reasoning to a bureaucratic establishment dedicated to producing knowledge, issuing certificates of analysis on each robot, alien, or person that they qualify. Not even in an exaggerated sense, but just imagine a Brave New World scenario where, instead of a science of procreation being run by the state to institute natural hierarchies to create order, you'd have a state scientific bureau determining what those natural hierarchies already are --

Functionally speaking, not much different.


Also, naturally we are hearing this for a reason -- the news is literature! And Google wants to make sure it still looks good in the eyes of the public in spite of firing this guy, especially because the public will be more credulous when it comes to A.I. being sentient.

Another reason to be hesitant to immediately agree. After all -- what about the time the guy is right? Will Alphabet corporation have our moral worth at the heart of their thinking when they want to keep a sentient A.I. because it's more useful to own something sentient?


No, I'd say it's far more sensible to err on the side of caution, because of who we will become if we do not.

Derrida's goal/s with "deconstruction" is one thing, the implications and applicability of what he proposes are quite another thing; and it's the self-refuting nature of the latter – in effect, reducing 'all' truth-making discourses to 'nothing but' tendentious rhetoric – which many critics like me take issue with. — 180 Proof

The term ‘self-refuting’ tips me off to the root of the issue here, which is less about Derrida in particular than about every one of the numerous philosophical discourses thar have appeared over the past 100 year which take their leave from Nietzsche’s
critique of truth — Joshs

I suspect most philosophical discourses in the last twenty-four centuries since Pyrrho of Elis refute themselves either partially or, the case of sophists, completely. — 180 Proof

Going back to this exchange - I've decided I was wrong at the outset of this thread. Given that this is TPF, I think there's probably enough coherence of belief, here, that one could reasonably begin to speak about post-modern philosophy. My original position was merely instinctive and reactive, but unfair and not really based on considered judgment.

And, even more so -- given that this is where we landed after trying to discuss names -- well, then my proposed solution simply didn't work.

EDIT: Was hoping to be able to say more but -- can't! :D Nothing useful anyways. But it's a pondering silence...

Derrida's goal/s with "deconstruction" is one thing, the implications and applicability of what he proposes are quite another thing; and it's the self-refuting nature of the latter – in effect, reducing 'all' truth-making discourses to 'nothing but' tendentious rhetoric – which many critics like me take issue with. — 180 Proof

The term ‘self-refuting’ tips me off to the root of the issue here, which is less about Derrida in particular than about every one of the numerous philosophical discourses thar have appeared over the past 100 year which take their leave from Nietzsche’s
critique of truth — Joshs

I suspect most philosophical discourses in the last twenty-four centuries since Pyrrho of Elis refute themselves either partially or, the case of sophists, completely. — 180 Proof

Might be a good place to call it -- seems we're back around to post-modernism, considered generally.

OK, fair. I just glanced over it, and started to wonder. I'll give it a look. My bad.

I mean, I read the Gorgias some time ago, tho re-reading and re-re-reading isn't bad. I feel like your take on Derrida is unfair, so far, though. But it's only a feeling, and as I've said before I'm in the halfway house. I'm going to wait to see what @Joshs has to say because I feel they're in a better position than I to respond -- but we'll see. As always, I hope to bring some amount of agreement between participants in a thread.

I feel you're making assertions I cannot evaluate, because I'm only responding to some of the takes on Derrida that I feel confident enough to refute. How do you feel about 180 Proof's statement @Joshs ?

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/570551 — 180 Proof

I believe I answered this charge here: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/707330

I just mean before Derrida.

But then it would seem that Hume wouldn't undermine Derrida, but get along with him?

That's why I asked, because I'm not sure if your reading of Hume is in some sense undermining Derrida, or if it's just that Derrida is not original due to Hume.

OK -- so are you contesting that Hume basically did it first, more or less?

@180 Proof

I guess what I really see in Derrida -- my interest in him -- is what I often see in philosophers. There's a unique perspective there that I don't see anyone else really doing or trying to do within philosophy.

The broadening of philosophical activity is a natural goal and interest of mine, given that I'm not within the institutions of academia but this stuff still floats about my head, and Derrida's project naturally lends itself to broadening the notion of philosophy.

And I see it as a continuation of -- in line with -- the philosophical project. If Derrida is no skeptic -- and at this point in the thread it seems we're pretty much in agreement on that, minus Jackson due to Hume -- then his is a response to the problem of skepticism, ye olde classic question that marks the traditional history of the modern era of philosophy.

Not at all. I just don't understand your "preference" re: Derrida. That's not my "preference" versus yours, only intellectual honesty on my part. :,point: — 180 Proof

Ahhh -- ok. That's fair. Plus, it keeps things interesting when we find places to dispute rather than simply dismiss.