That's for sure. I could even say that one of the most nuanced philosophical thinkers of the 20th century (Heidegger) seemed to find the Nazi narrative acceptable. But that might be gauche. — Tom Storm

Yeh, but Derrida and Levinas baptized his thoughts, if not his soul. ;)

I don't think I'd be a Marxist if I thought we are stuck with our own worldview.

It's not like I started thinking these thoughts from birth, right?

This morning I heard on NPR a person who has schizophrenia who started a podcast, or something like that, to interview people at his campus about what it would feel like if they knew a person with schizoaffective disorder was on campus.

It was NPR so it was a feel good story -- he knew what he was getting into, and had a positive spin on what people said with a hope for more acceptance.

I say this by way of suggesting, at least, that it's not a malfunction so much.

One of the parts of the radio programme that touched me, with my own shit, is where the people he knew learned how to prefer him as he was, and would not want him to be otherwise.

Yes.

Right. For me this almost implies some form of idealism where the object of my toe is just the experience of my toe, without anything more. I think I would also be open though toward some kind of notion of direct awareness of information or something like that which I
think is similar to this comment here you made: — Apustimelogist

I think "information" counts as kind of idealism, if you're positing it as a kind of fundamental substance that everything is composed of.

I'm attempting to articulate a material view of direct realism, however -- along with no foundations I'd say there is no one or two substances which everything is composed of. The task then becomes: how to articulate a direct realism that is material, and yet does not rely upon a notion of substance?

For my part I'm more in favor of the naive view of the world, though I think it's hard to formulate into a proper philosophical thesis.

But to clarify I wasn't trying to necessarily imply anything about the universe being just experiences. I don't believe sufficiently clear notions of fundamental metaphysics are accessible so I don't bother with that. — Apustimelogist

Isn't that pretty much what the topic of indirect or naive realism is about? Fundamental metaphysics?

We can make the notions clear in our conversation at least, I'd say, and I'd even hazard to say that this entire conversation is a bothering about insufficiently clear notions.

But to clarify I wasn't trying to necessarily imply anything about the universe being just experiences. I don't believe sufficiently clear notions of fundamental metaphysics are accessible so I don't bother with that.

I was just saying that I am having what I call experiences and they flow and any time I recognize errors, that is just encompassed in types of experiential flow. And yes, what I would call the self is enacted in the flow too just like you said.

It might not be apt to call it direct realism though because I wouldn't say it conflicted with the idea of mediational processes and a chain of causes originating outside of what is experienced. It is more appropriately, and perhaps trivially, a direct awareness of what is going on in my head which I think is then not the same as the kind of direct realism described on wikipedia or something. It would be quite weakened and I would even push back against the notion of there being a fact of the matter about the sense that these experiences are about objective objects out in the world in the same kind of way I push back against scientific realism. As an analogy, I would say what we perceive is closer to a notion of an instrumentalist science where we construct theories that predict data, as opposed to theories being objectively real. — Apustimelogist

But what does it mean for a color itself to be an affordance? — Apustimelogist

I'm uncertain of the best way to put it, but at the very least what it means is that though direct realists directly perceive objects in the world that does not then entail that what they see is a fixed property, or that there are not other properties which a given perception is not perceiving.

It's mostly the notion of permanent objects and their essences that I'd try to avoid -- things are in constant flux.

Tbh I think the affordance/J.J.Gibson-kind of direct perception is closer to my "direct awareness of information" than it is to more literal direct realism. — Apustimelogist

I had to look up J.J. Gibson. I was using the term more locally, in our conversation -- a term of art meant to contrast with "properties", is what I was thinking.

The objects are there, I just don't think they are what the naive view might believe. Perhaps this is a way of differentiating the naive from the direct realist: I think the naive realist is seeing something real, that literal objects are a part of their experience, but that does not then mean that every judgment about that real thing which a naive realist makes is going to be true or comprehensive.

But judgment is judgment of what is directly perceived (and, of course, judgment influences perception -- but that's not the same thing as saying perceptions are judgments, or rather, must be judgments). (in a sense I'd say that every judgment has a dual-awareness -- the judgment ,and what the judgment is about)

But I suspect maybe that interpretation may be particular to me.

While I've come to discount the notion of an information ontology, you're far from alone in thinking like that.

What can I say? I'm a disagreeable sort. ;)

The idea of affordances definitely was a significant input, among others, to what led me to the idea that our experiences are fundamentally just about "what happens next?" and enacting that... which I see as pretty much just a more general view of affordances. So affordances is an important concept to me but I have gone away from the idea that the kind of qualities I directly experience are literally affordances. If sensory information arises from patterns on sensory boundaries like the retina, then the connection to affordances must come in afterwards.

Heh. Well, I've clarified, but also -- it could just be a case of dueling intuitions here. You'd prefer to start with the information, I'd prefer to start with the objects.

But how do we really differentiate which is the better way to talk?

For me, I don't think it makes sense to say the dress can be two colors without loosening realism and directness, arguably both. But again, I don't think that contradicts my "direct awareness of information" thing imo.

I think that maybe this is the sort of stuff that might differentiate naive from direct realists -- naive realists won't have a reason or address the indirect realist's objections, but direct realists attempt to do so with philosophy rather than bald assertion.

Eh, not other dimensions, no. Just the mind interacting with itself -- something the mind is trained to ignore to pay attention to the important things. (EDIT: Or, even more abstractly, it's really just a local, ontic interpretation of experience, which we have been taught to treat in a certain manner in an industrial society with a division of labor, etc.)

I am not sure I see a profound difference tbh. Disruption of normal functioning is what the indirect realist sees as disruption of normal representations. — Apustimelogist

Right -- but indirect realism has problems. These are explanations for phenomena used to support indirect realism which don't resort to the position of indirect realism to make the case for naive realism more plausible.

I don't think that undermines the point, though. Hallucinations show that the mind can create experience. Once you notice that, reality will always be taken with a grain of salt. — frank

Hallucinations show that we experience the world differently from one another -- but that doesn't mean it's the mind creating experience, I'd say.

In the case of starvation, for instance, sometimes people's experiences have been interpreted as religious visions of a truth beyond the everyday -- what is colloquially called "hallucination" can be interpreted as another layer of reality which our normal functioning has been trained to ignore (and which is why the disruption of normal functioning turns the mind on itself -- which is what I'd say hallucinations are.)

And sometimes people do see features which are not actually there from some other person's perspective, like hallucinations. Someone on an LSD trip might see motion in the carpet where another person sees none at all. (Though I guess you might say motion and non-motion are both there?) — Apustimelogist

I think hallucinations are a different case than illusions in that I wouldn't reconcile them the same way. Illusions can be covered pretty well by the duck-rabbit, but hallucinations like one experiences on hallucinogens or when they don't have enough sugar to make the brain function as it normally does don't work that way.


For hallucinations I simply note that in every case we can find some physiological reason why they are hallucinating -- usually it's a physical, chemical reaction that's taking place which disrupts our normal functioning. I like to point out starvation as a means for visions because it demonstrates that we don't need a "foreign" substance to our bodies, but even if our bodies don't get what we need then our minds don't behave like we normally expect -- that is, total hallucinations, if we do not analyze them using Cartesian assumptions, are evidence that our mind is a part of the world because the world influences it, rather than the other way about. (Still thinking over the other stuff, but I had a ready-made response for the example of total hallucinations, or dreaming too if we want to go through that :D )

Yes, when you put them side-by-side but I am still not sure what the latter really means in terms of being aquainted with the world. — Apustimelogist

Let's go with 's link and pick out a definition, such as:

We said above that what distinguishes the classical, Russellian notion of acquaintance is, minimally, that (i) it is a non-intentional form of awareness: acquaintance with something does not consist in forming any judgment or thought about it, or applying any concepts to it; and (ii) it is real relation requiring the existence of its relata; one cannot be acquainted with some thing, property or fact that does not exist.

So I'd claim that I am aware of my toe, and that awareness is not intentional, which I take "intentional" to mean the philosophical use:

In philosophy, intentionality is the power of minds and mental states to be about, to represent, or to stand for, things, properties and states of affairs — first sentence of the SEP article on intentionality

Something that's probably confusing in the mix is that I'd be inclined to endorse this version:

...There are consistent ways to accept acquaintance theory without accepting classical foundationalism. some might agree that we do have some knowledge by acquaintance and appeal to such knowledge in the dualism debate in the philosophy of mind

I wouldn't pick up foundationalism, but in a debate between naive and indirect realism I'd be inclined to accept that there is non-inferential awareness, at least. The bit on "intentionality" I'm a little less certain about -- it seems to me that awareness can be about something without being inferential or judgmental, so there's a kind of intention I'd accept while still using some of the specifications of the SEP's article on acquaintance.

To me, there are basically just sequences of experiences and we can be erroneous about what experiences will happen next, or what experiences accompany each other. That is all. And recognizing errors itself involves some sequence of experiences. — Apustimelogist

If it's all just experience then wouldn't that be a kind of direct realism? There wouldn't even be a self as much as a local bundle of experiences which gets in the habit of calling itself "I", erroneously.

What if two people see the same object in two different ways due to an illusion, yet they are both directly aquainted with that object? — Apustimelogist

I think objects have affordances more than distinct properties.

So the black/gold/blue/white dress: The dress is all four colors, and which you see depends upon the context. It's our logic of "color" which is amiss, because we believe that an object cannot be both black and gold in the same place at the same time, but given the intersubjective nature of color I'd revise our logic on color -- it seems that objects can be both at once, given the dress -- and we're inclined to call the affordance we don't perceive an illusion.

And if one rejects this? — AmadeusD

Then I'd set aside whether we are conscious or figure out some other way to work consciousness into an account of direct, or naive, realism.

Especially since perception doesn't need to be described in phenomenological terms to understand it in a functional manner -- we can sidestep the question entirely and just focus on perception and whether or not perception is an intermediary between ourself and the world, and why.

I don't think this is true, personally. Consciousness does not extend at all.. It couldn't, on any account of it i've heard.

Even from the head, or is consciousness limited to the going-ons of the brain?

That some pretend that consciousness is something even capable of 'literally' touching the world is probably one of the more embarrassing aspects of human theorizing.

I'm not sure why.

I think it's interesting stuff.

That consciousness literally extends outside of the head and touches the world is kind of why the problem of consciousness is a big deal for some. Granting that it does, and granting what we know about perception it doesn't make sense -- but then some say it does make sense, it just doesn't get along with the science and that's the whole problem.

But I'd say that the distinction between naive and indirect realism operates at a higher level of abstraction than the problem of consciousness -- we could be consciousness-realists or anti-realists, and fall either way with respect to naive or indirect realism regarding perception and objects, just framing it in different ways when it's brought up (it's different, but understandable why the problem comes up regarding perception)

For my part I think reductios work because if the indirect realist position turns out to be absurd, or at least results in undesirable conclusions, then it seems that the indirect realist has some explaining to do -- if the naive realist position accommodates these absurdities and can explain the original problems that the indirect realist brings up, then it'd be better to believe in naive realism.

P1. We are acquainted with the phenomenal character of experience.
P2. According to the naive realist, the phenomenal character of experience is constituted of distal objects and their properties.
C1. Therefore, according to the naive realist, we are acquainted with distal objects and their properties.
P3. According to the indirect realist, the phenomenal character of experience is constituted of mental phenomena.
C2. Therefore, according to the indirect realist, we are acquainted with mental phenomena.

Note that the term "mental phenomena" is impartial to property dualism and eliminative materialism.

Note also the technical term "acquainted", as described here.

And as explained above, for the phenomenal character of experience to be constituted of distal objects and their properties it requires that perceptual experiences "literally extend beyond the subject's head, to encompass what the experience is of". — Michael

I think I've managed to rephrase in these terms in my conversation with @Apustimelogist

And I believe I accept "literally extend beyond the subject's head" -- sure.

I'm not sure how else we'd be acquainted with the world unless our experiences literally extended beyond our head. Otherwise we'd only know our head, and infer that we have a body.

I think I am acquainted with my toes in the same way I am acquainted with my head.

A lot of people take this line, but it seems plainly available to deny that there's any necessity between awareness and experience. — AmadeusD

My thinking is that we're ignorant about any relationship between awareness (or perception) and experience, so we ought not believe people who claim to know until they demonstrate more. But, ultimately, if what I'm saying is true -- that we are a part of the world -- then I can't think of a reason why we couldn't, in principle, recreate the conditions. I just think we're ignorant now to a point where we're not even sure what would count as consciousness -- so there's a good reason to remain skeptical.*

In terms of perception I'd say AI demonstrates some of the more dry and functional ways of putting "perception", but I don't believe the internet is conscious for all that.

*EDIT: Also why it's a good topic for philosophy: It's not clear enough yet to be a science.

Well alright, but then I think I would be interested in whether you would think it acceptable for an indirect realist to call you an indirect realist, since you are not necessarily contradicting their beliefs at all as far as I can tell. — Apustimelogist

The indirect realist says that we are acquainted with sense-data, and that we only infer that there are objects from that sense data.

I believe we are acquainted with the world, which happen to contain objects.

Is that not different to your mind?

I don't see the contradiction in the idea that there are things that happen beyond our immediate perceptions which we create stories to try and explain even if we cannot definitively know anything in a perfect way. — Apustimelogist

I haven't claimed there's a contradiction. Indirect realism is logically possible.

Let's grant indirect realism: There are objects which cause experiences and the objects, while real, are not what we are directly acquainted with. Rather we are directly acquainted with our experience and make judgments about objects from that experience, and the so-called naive realist is ignorant of this fact -- so the indirect realist denies naive realism.

The motivation for indirect realism comes from various phenomena of perception such as dreams, hallucinations, and variance in discriminatory ability.

My thought is -- according to the indirect realist we can be in error about perception evidenced by the belief that there is some belief called "naive realism" that is false.

So how does the indirect realist account for error about perception, if not another intermediary?

To me it seems like it's much more elegant to simply say we can be fallible, and not come up with some metaphysical explanation as to why towers which are square appear round from a distance. Which to me indicates there's no separation between myself and objects, no experiential-film or sense-data that exists between myself and the really real objects -- there's just the familiar world that we can be wrong about sometimes.

I am not sure I understand. — Apustimelogist

Eh, no worries. I was on a bit of a tangent about how there's a more extreme version of the belief which just flips the indirect realist's priorities on its head -- no subject, only objects, and from these objects we make inferences about perception.

I really don't think its as complicated as you make out. The only way information gets into our brain and cause sensory experiences is by stimulating sensory receptors. The light hitting my retina is causing patterns of excitation at any given time. If artificially exciting them in an identical way did not produce the same results it would seem inexplicable to me. Why wouldn't it? To me that is an unnecessary skepticism. — Apustimelogist

I'd believe that if we recreated the conditions for creating perception then we'd produce the same results, but I don't believe anyone really knows those conditions.

I would ask whether *anything* could ever count as *indirect* under this view. — Apustimelogist

Well, I hope not. That's the idea! :D

Notice how it parallels the claim of indirect realism -- experience or sense data is what we are directly acquainted with while objects are inferred and judged. My thought is this is a conceptual distinction rather than a scientific one. I don't think it's a matter of knowledge as much as an interpretation of what we know.

I don't know why I'd prioritize ipseity over the object. In a way I'd be more tempted to say we have an indirect knowledge of ourselves more than we have indirect knowledge of objects. We make inferences about the kind of creature we are and we do so through the direct mediation of the familiar world. At the most extreme I'd say there is no knowledge to be had about ourselves, though I know where my car keys are all the same, and that seems a bit too much to me in the same way: conceptual clarity is achieved as the sacrifice of fidelity to our intuitions.

On the othet hand, if you think of the fact that we, as parts, can be decomposed into parts then there are parts which mediate eachother's interactions with the rest of the world... visual cortical states, sensory states on the retina, photons travelling in the air. I can maybe in *some* sense interact with patterns in the outside world but not without those patterns appearing on the surface of my retina through photonic interactions and then the correlations appearing in cortical states. If that information is about something that has happened on the surface of a car 30 feet away then I do not see how there is not mediation there which leads from events at the car to what I see.

If, in this decomposition, one could name something which is not a part of the world then you might have a candidate for indirect realism.

I think it's harder to do than with internal/external, or with Cartesian assumptions. Descartes' philosophy is pretty lock tight if we want to favor it, and it even appeals to a lot of basic intuitions. It's almost like there's a reason we still talk about it! :D

A lot of where I'm coming from is in rethinking these questions at a philosophical level so it's not so much these facts that's at dispute: Rather, I can't see how we'd be able to tell the story about retina, photons, or brains without knowing -- rather than inferring -- about the world.

Else, "retina, photons, brains" are themselves just inferences about an experiential projection in a causal relationship with a reality we know nothing about, but just make guesses about.

The only problem with this view being that we do know things, so it falls in error on the other side -- on the side of certain knowledge which rejects beliefs which could be wrong, when all proper judgment takes place exactly where we could be wrong.

I am not sure I agree. Our experiences are a direct result of stimulation at sensory boundaries so I do not see an immediate biological or physical reason to suggest that artificial stimulations couldn't produce the same experiences in a brain in a vat scenario. Neuroscientists can already cause familiar experiences by artificially stimulating sensory receptors or brain cells. — Apustimelogist

There's a difference between being able to accomplish something, and knowing something.

I'd liken our neuroscientists to medieval engineers -- they can make some observations and throw together some catapults, but they do not know the mechanical laws of Newton or its extensions.

It's more because we're ignorant of how this whole thing works -- even at the conceptual level, which is why it's interesting in philosophy -- so I wouldn't believe it without more. I'd think the person was making some sort of mistake along the way, in the same way that I thought about the Google employee who thought that later iterations of ChatGPT are conscious.

I could just be cribbing from him. I read that book forever ago.

"Empirical" works for me. Mostly I just mean -- what would I believe, given what I know? A very limited case of "possible", but one we use.

Weekends and laziness put a delay on my reply, but I finally thought of something.

See, for me I do not see why it would not be the case for the brain to have the same experiences if the sensory inputs were the same. I don't think a body would matter either as long as the sensory inputs mimicked those it would have had from a body. — Apustimelogist

There's three kinds of possibility I want to distinguish: Logical, metaphysical, and a third kind that I'm having a hard time naming but "actual" works.

I have no argument for the logical possibility of the BiV.

But metaphysically it seems that the argument for indirect realism requires a distinction between an internal and an external world, or something similar. Every articulation seems to posit at least three metaphysical kinds: ipseity, mediation, and world. Somehow ipseity is given priority to world in the articulating of indirect realism.

Keeping with the notion that direct realism is the negation of indirect realism, the argument need only deny ipseity, mediation, or world. "Mediation" is what I choose to target. In a direct world "mediation" is covered by "activity" -- it's only by acting within a world that mediation can occur at all. In place of internal/external I'd put forward part/whole. We are a part of the world, and there is no thing which mediates between ipseity and world, or between part and whole. Rather, we directly interact with the world as a part of it -- the world interacting with itself, in the broad view.

In terms of actual possibility, though, that only requires us to take a survey of our knowledge at the moment, and our ignorance of the brain and experience and all that seems to justify doubt that were some scientist of consciousness to claim they have a brain in a vat which is experiencing I'd simply doubt it without more justification. It's entirely implausible that we'd stumble upon how to do that given the depth of our ignorance.

If you're familiar with Disco Elysium then I think this is a good album which Sad FM mimicked well.

I guess the main arguments against this is illusions and misperception. — Apustimelogist

Ah, sorry. (EDIT: just for missing this last question, I mean -- I looked over what I wrote and saw I posted before I responded here)

Yes, I think that's right.

Dreams, illusions, misperceptions -- why do those happen? If perception is direct then how can we be wrong about perception?

I think I'd say perception is an activity, and just like any activity -- like nailing boards or riding a bike -- we can make mistakes. These mistakes do not imply we are separate from the world, though, but rather that we are part of a world that interacts with us (disappoints us)

if you artificially stimulate sensory receptors of a brain with identical DNA to you in a way which is identical to the history of organic sensory stimulations you have personally encountered in your life, it will have the same experiences as you have had. — Apustimelogist

I don't think so, no. Maybe? but also maybe the only way to do so is to envat the brain in a body that lives a life.

I see it as a logical possibility, and possibly a metaphysical possibility, but not a real possibility.

What is your alternative? Through an extended mind framework where the mind encompasses the body and environment, etc? — Apustimelogist

Still thinking on it. :)

No alternative, yet. At this point I'm only convinced that something is real; hence, realism.

@Banno puts realism as the belief that bivalent logic is the proper logic to use for the subject at hand -- so if it is real then we ought to believe that the various rules of logic we use are at least bi-valent. There is a true and false and nothing in-between. Contradiction is forbidden.

In a plain language sense -- the keys are either in the car, or they are not in the car. So the keys are real because the affirmation and the negation are a tautology.

The implication being that the things that are not-real can use other logics. Such as a painting being both beautiful and horrifying. In a bi-valent we'd be tempted to say these annul one another, but that's not the appropriate way to put things. We can see the painting is beautiful yet horrifying, and so express that in a different logic from the logic of realism.

I mention this because it's a contender for realism that I'm still wrapping my head around, but it's definitely different from the old in/direct debate.

It dependa what you mean by object here. My instinct is to interpret object here as in some hypothetical object in the outside world. From my point of view, perception and myself are essentially not distinguishable. What you commonsensicallg would call your self are just sensory experiences pretty much imo. — Apustimelogist

"outside world" is the part I'd question. There is no "outside" world -- the old external world of philosophy -- just as there is no "internal" world, at least metaphysically. I think these are turns of expression meaning something other than the ontological implications -- that I exist, that I interact with my perceptions and only my perceptions, and these perceptions interact with objects outside of me that I make inferences about.

I don't make inferences that much about the things in the world.

Which, at least by my reading, means we'd get along -- I originally started by saying "What if we just are our perceptions?" to argue for direct realism, because then there'd be a 1-step relation -- I am my perceptions, and my perceptions are of objects, and therefore there's a direct realtionship between myself (perceptions) and objects.

I think the self is more than this, but I don't believe the self is homuncular, which I think indirect realism can easily fall into.

To be honest I am not entirely sure what direct realism means. — Apustimelogist

I started with something substantive, but the reason I put smilies on my answer was because it was a minimalist position which seemed to be similar to how @Michael framed indirect realism.

I would kind of agree with both but I don't have a strong opinion because I am disinclined against realism. I think the notion of indirect realism is kind of a functionally useful way of talking about the brain though. I feel like it is implied by models in neuroscience, even if minimally or if one doesn't want to attach too much metaphysical implication to it. — Apustimelogist

I think indirect realism is soft anti-realism, or at least the gateway to it.

I think you're right about the implications of neuroscience -- if all we take as our truths are neuroscientific truths then indirect realism is not a bad inference.

It's more upon the inspection of what indirect realism entails that doubt creeps in.

So you don't believe the brain in a vat could have the same experiences? — Apustimelogist

I think the BiV is a thought experiment that updates Descartes' Evil Demon to a scientific world. Descartes used theology because it was popular then, and I'm not familiar enough with the history of BiV's to say who, but it's basically an update to the Evil Demon since culturally scientific justifications are thought to be better than theological ones, unlike the time Descartes wrote in. Philosophically it's the same.

In that thought experiment the BiV has to have the same experiences. That's the whole idea.

But that does not mean that metaphysically perception exists in the head.

For my part I'm mostly criticizing indirect realism on the basis of what I see as its implications. The argument that started me on this path was the infinite regress argument against indirect realism: if perception is an intermediary between myself and the object, and all experience is perception rather than the object, then I'm not sure why there couldn't be another intermediary between myself and my perception -- a perception of perception.

And so on. It's not that we need to posit more intermediaries, but if not, then why are we positing the original intermediary? How many intermediaries are there? Is there a way to distinguish between them?

If so, then there could also be a way to distinguish between our "intermediate" perceptions and the object.

My thought is that the object is always more than what we perceive, but that doesn't mean that what we perceive is not real -- it could just be a direct link between me and the world that partially reveals the world.

On the more continental side I'd call it being-in-the-world. The object and subject come together as a pair.

(a couple of edits after the fact, sorry)

I've taken up the "direct" side, but only lightly. Others have been doing the heavy lifting.

All this affordance stuff is still going on inside our heads. We could be brains in vats artificially having our sensory receptors stimulated and experience the same things as if outside of the vat. — Apustimelogist

It seems to me that this is a primary point of contention.

I'd prefer "realism" over "direct realism" -- the "direct" part is more defined by the "indirect" explanation. It's a response to indirect realism rather than a naive assumption.

The indirect realist believes that experience is "in the head", and that if we were sufficiently knowledgeable then the brain in the vat is a possibility.

The direct realist denies this.

:D

A minimalist version of the thesis to ensure nothing can be attacked but the negation :D.

Well, what is the example you have in mind? Presumably you have an example that parallels the "wind"? — Leontiskos

The aesthetic might parallel wind here: there are gradients within the aesthetic. The beautiful and the sublime come to mind; and here these gradients need not have opposites but rather can be more or less relative to itself. And if you establish some kind of standard to judge more and less then you'd establish a gradient.

Though I had meant the example you presented.

I can think of more plausible examples that mimic the arbitrary nature of your example. The choice between regular M&M's and M&M's with peanuts seems morally arbitrary or amoral (not sure which phrase I prefer). We can have arbitrary rules that we follow and even though they mimic or can be interpreted within a moral dimension I'd say they're amoral actions -- outside the scope of moral thinking.

Yes, and the finger-crossing example was risky in that it is easily misunderstood. I was only trying to illustrate the role of susceptibility and negligence. It is (intentionally) artificial because no one holds that rule. Of course, there is a sense in which it is important to consider subjective moral evaluations (in part because conscience is always a moral factor), but I think we can leave that to the side for the moment. — Leontiskos

Ah ok. Hopefully the above example does a better job, then. It did strike the thought in me, at least!

Great OP.

I would have said your example of the person with the rule to not cross their fingers while urinating is a good example of a non-moral act in the wider sense you're talking about. It's not morally evaluable because it's not morally significant. So that leads me to objection 5.

Objection 5: Morality correlates to importance

Moral acts are important acts
Not all human acts are important acts
Therefore, not all human acts are moral acts

This is similar to Objection 2. I would respond by saying that everything someone does is something they consider worthwhile or worth doing. The simple fact that time is scarce leads us to try to use our time wisely and do things that are worthwhile.

On the other hand, not everything is equally worthwhile, and someone might use the idea of morality to denote those things or rules that are worth taking especially seriously. This is fine so long as we do not forget that there is no qualitative difference between more important things and less important things, for all things that are worth doing have a minimum level of importance. — Leontiskos

Along with objection 2 -- I'd say there are moral acts as you use the term, and non-moral acts -- or, rather, I think I'd prefer "activity" so as to encompass more than a singular act, but rather the patterns within a world.

But rather than saying "this one falls in the middle and so is neither good nor bad", I'm thinking that some acts simply don't fall on the spectrum. To use the light/dark spectrum as analogy, "wind" is real but has no brightness because it's a pressure gradient, rather than a light gradient.

But then when it comes to "What makes activity moral?", in the wider sense, I haven't an answer there. All I have is an example that seems troublesome, but you seem to bite the bullet with your example of the rule to not cross your fingers while urinating as morally evaluable.

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Part of me wonders here, though: Surely we can evaluate any action on a subjective basis of an arbitrary rule -- but that ability doesn't indicate something about moral life, just as your finger-crossing example doesn't really seem to, though it can be evaluated along a subjective rule.

I'm having a hard time articulating the difference into a proper theory though.

I'll push against the notion that Paul only spent so many years, tho maybe you could find a bit in the movie that proves it :) -- the movie felt more "thematic" and so didn't give details like that to my first watching. I just mean i didn't notice and liked how Stilgar was convinced because of the prophecy -- it wasn't the appearance as much as the neotenic boyish-man who refused the prophecy still fullfilled everything. Stilgar didn't care about the looks. He only cared about the truth-conditions of the prophecy, and even this nonbeliever met the conditions.

I only used the word "access" because it's the term Moliere used. He said "in terms of the epistemological problem of perception we have direct access to some kind of object". Given that he referenced the epistemological problem of perception I assumed by "access" he was referring to knowledge. — Michael

That works for me. I'd claim that we have knowledge of perception and we have knowledge of objects.

It seems, right now, that the difference might be more on the other side of the problem -- rather than "the world", what is it that is in/directly related to perception which gives knowledge of the world through inference?

My attempt to phrase your indirect realism:

I/we:Percepts:the world

Where ":" is "gives knowledge" "is knowledge giving"? might be better -- or "is related in a knowledge-like way"

Whereas the direct realist claim might be, and I'd be sympathetic to this:

I/we=percepts, which in turn know the world (and which we are a part of, and so can come to know ourselves and our percepts).

We have access to percepts. Percepts are often the consequence of the body responding to some proximal stimulus (dreams and hallucinations being the notable exceptions). The proximal stimulus often originates from some distal object.

The nature of our percepts is determined by the structure and behaviour of our sense organs and brain such that different distal objects can cause the same percept and that the same distal object can cause different percepts (e.g. the dress that some see as white and gold and others as white and blue).

This is indirect realism. Any direct realist who claims that this is direct realism has simply redefined the meaning of "direct" into meaninglessness. — Michael

We have access to percepts. And we have access to the world. It is through this access that we are able to determine when we are hallucinating or dreaming and when we are not.

So, direct realism. Both percepts and world are accessible.

Which means what? — Michael

The same as it means to perceive causes and effects -- one has to start somewhere. We can call that starting point "blotches of color", "cause-and-effect", "the cup", or any other such things. In terms of the epistemological problem of perception we have direct access to some kind of object, be it causes, cups, or color-blotches.

does experience provide us with direct knowledge of the external world? — Michael

Both direct and indirect realists are realists rather than subjective idealists because they believe that the existence and regularity and predictability of experience is best explained by the existence of a distal world which behaves according to regular and predictable laws. — Michael

Both the direct and indirect realist infers the existence of some entity from some effect it is claimed to have caused — Michael

I don't infer the existence of some entity -- I infer that there are causes and effects because I directly perceive the entity.

I'd also say there is no external world as much as a world.

I'd also say there's no "distal object" -- that this is a conceit of indirect realism.

***
I think internal/external has been already mentioned as a point we could drop, but you're insistent upon it when you say "external world", so I can't approach that angle.

Inference is the basis of your understanding of direct realism, so it seems we're just saying "yes/no" to one another there -- not exactly fruitful.

"Distal object" is a term of art that was invented for this discussion, but I'd say "distal" poisons the well in favor of indirect realism.
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So I feel like there's a web of thoughts that are very different from mine, which are likely informed by philosophy, but I remain uncertain how to proceed.

Is direct realism a contention with inference, a contention with internal/external, or a contention with "distal object"?

You are one of these indirect realists, but are there others? Who ought I read to get a better picture?

:up:

Philosophically speaking I believe the desire to save the afterlife is more against the notion of philosophy -- living a good life with respect to the facts such that more of us can be happy, or some such thing.

And you're right to note that nonbelievers have sacrificed their life for an idea -- philosophically speaking: maybe we, as a species, could do better. No afterlife imaginaries there, simply the acknowledgement that you'll be over soon and you hope it matters eventually for the people you know.

Maybe, instead of a general "let's see who shows up" we could do something more limited and focused.

That'd actually be someting like Socrates' Cafe as we used to run it -- we'd try to come up with a question beforehand that seemed philosophical-ish but attractive, and then use that as a means to teach people philosophy through doing it together.

That's probably more fun than just saying "uhhh OK So what's up, huh?"

Here I think we're small enough, especially in terms of willing participants, we could probably even broach some fairly controversial topics just to generate interest. Existence of God, personhood, just war.... not sure exactly.

Finding the right topic would be the key, though, to having people actually participate.

. . .

Maybe even . . . in/direct realism. *gulp*

I liked it too. I just can't get into the main cast. Thimotee and Zendaya for main characters in a movie like this is just... — Lionino

Is there an actor or actress you would have preferred?

I'm not sure what I mean by "the first to capture the mood", but I did have a deeper emotional connection to the new film than the old miniseries, tho of course that's predicated upon being familiar with the books, the miniseries, and then coming upon this movie.

I really liked it a lot. The fist one more than the 2nd, but that's only cuz I had a few nitpicks on 2 -- overall it ought be watched together, like Kill Bill 1&2.

I will probably watch the miniseries eventually — Lionino

If you mean the Sci-Fi Channel miniseries I like it a lot. It's what inspired me to read Dune in the first place because I liked the miniseries so much.

It's a solid bit of storytelling.

This is a great intro to historiography. I especially like that he's using a narrative we USians are familiar with, but is not controversial in the political landscape to demonstrate his point.

:D

I thought it was great. I bought a popcorn so big I didn't finish it in spite of the length of the movie, and had a great time.

I think the new Dunes are the first to really capture my experience of the first novel. The focus on the emotive aspects through the creation of mood worked for me in 1, and it worked for me in 2 as well.

it should be comforting to know that one's beliefs and guesses about a potentially comfortable, earth-like afterlife are more likely to be correct than any given guess a magical supercomputer could make about a correct hell. If people know that, then there is less to worry about concerning what might happen when we die, and we can all focus on the important stuff. — ToothyMaw

One part of knowledge is belief. In order for someone to know something they also have to believe it, at least with respect to propositional knowledge.

That's what the "persuasion" part is about -- it justifies the belief such that a person is persuaded to believe it for such-and-such a reason.

But if a Christian believes in an eternal hell because this is what they learned at Church, and that's where you go to learn truths about the afterlife, and your argument is not persuasive, then they'll continue to believe in an afterlife that's not-earthlike, and thereby would not claim to know that earth-like afterlife guesses are more likely than non-earthlike ones. They'd claim to know, instead, that hell is an eternal torture, and you ought not do the bad things else you'll go there. (Basically, the magic supercomputer won't come into their reasoning at all -- it seems like a diversion from the truth)

Is it not the case that Camus and Nietzsche, start with nihilism, more or less as foundational - there is no inherent meaning, value or purpose - and then devise a response to this, which is essentially subjective or personal? Maybe I'm the only one who thinks this, but no matter what one does to rehabilitate the implications of nihilism, it remains in some way a nihilist project. — Tom Storm

I don't think they start there as much as reject nihilism -- but I'd still interpret them, personally, as meta-ethical nihilists. But I'm kind of mix-and-matching here -- meta-ethical antirealism is a very analytic position, and in analytic philosophy you often try to strip terms of their emotional valences in order to set out a clear set of logical relations between propositions so they can be evaluated.

Neither Camus or Nietzsche wrote in this style, so I'm kind of introducing an interpretive device to their works in calling them meta-ethical nihilists -- I think it's the appropriate categorization, but it's not the categories which Camus or Nietzsche are using.

For Nietzsche it's Christianity and its attendant slave-morality, in light of the death of God, that brings about the most decadent kind of nihilism. Even though his project is descriptive here I can't really read Nietzsche other than preferring master-morality over slave-morality, given his general criticisms of all the examples of slave-morality he puts forward.

That master-morality preceded slave-morality, and so in a way you can read Nietzsche as restoring the good, old religion in the face of the decadent religion of the last man: Though what he calls "good" isn't what Christian's call "Good", obviously, and has more to do with aristocratic self-overcoming in their pursuit of power to a point of overcoming even the overman -- the overman overcomes himself.

So meta-ethically I'd still classify him as a moral antirealist because he's not really the sort to propose true moral propositions -- but that's not the sort of nihilism he's rejecting either.
****

With Camus I think he considers the possibility of nihilism because of the absurd encounter, and begins with the only question that one need answer in light of the absurd: to kill oneself or not. But then through the process of thinking that question he arrives at a position where that even if there are no values (or God) suicide is not permitted at a logical level -- which seems to me to count as a pretty strong ethical belief.

For him there's the possibility of nihilism, the absurd encounter, but then heroic rebellion and acceptance of the absurd is the logical conclusion one should follow rather than the path of suicide -- a kind of ultimate nihilism where nothing matters, even subjectively, and so one kills oneself to escape the inescapable nothing.

****

So given all that I'd say yes, you're right, but there's more, and thanks for the prodding because it's helping me to think through these authors and try to make some distinctions in drawing out a "map"

I agree with you. However, Fooloso4's points about the way she makes her point are also important. The issue crops up all the time in reading texts from the past - and the present. Her ideas about marriage, family, maturity were pretty much conventional, though not uncontested, at the time and still exist. We need to be able to acknowledge both sides of this, though I haven't worked out how to do so properly. — Ludwig V

Nice.

I feel the same.

Including how to work out these points properly. The "meat" of the sandwich-article, to interpret the speech that way, was what I mostly skipped over and @Fooloso4 has criticized well.

Yes, they are linked to each other. Well, those approaches have a common concern and the latter is life. I also have my problems with discerning each of them. Sometimes, they feel closer than separated. Nonetheless, I still remain with the same thought that existentialism cares more about life than nihilism or other types of absurdism. If we compare different texts, I guess the differences are apparent. — javi2541997

Cool.

I have more positive feelings towards absurdism than the thread has so far expressed. I'm a lover of Camus -- at least what I've read, and I think he's the only one I'd say is an absurdist as opposed to an existentialist (though I'd classify him as an existentialist, in a historical sense)

This is very interesting! :smile: And we could spend hours and hours debating on this topic. Yet I think it is plausible how a text by an existentialist suffers from despair about doubting what is the right way to act. While a nihilistic jokes about this. — javi2541997

That's insightful! Though Nietzsche, with The Gay Science, would be an obvious example to bring up in terms of how you parse him into those categories. He can be read as both at once, or neither: he's no nihilist as much as an anti-nihilist, and is joyful in the meta-ethical anti-realist sense that @Tom Storm expressed (at least as I understand him), and uses that joy to counter the sad and somber nihilism that he associates with Christianity(socialism, etc.)

The notion of "suffering" makes sense as a uniting theme, even if there are more joyful existentialists (or, if we prefer, post-existentialists -- thinking Derrida and Levinas now more than categorical classifications)

Both K and N explicated some kind of doubt about what we believe we're doing and why, and the latter existentialists -- so I interpret them -- attempted answers to those questions. In this sentence I mean "existentialists" in the historical sense, rather than philosophical sense (the group of people we usually associate with the word, and the interpretations of their works)


Well -- that's enough rambling for now.

Yup. This speak to my doubts, though I'm trying to be as charitable as I can.

Oftentimes beliefs in an afterlife are harmful to this life; if you believe your kid will go to hell for sinning then you'll not care so much about the happiness of the kid in the here-and-now, but the long-term afterlife future -- and so they'll need to be taught, even if they are made unhappy by the teaching, how to behave properly. (Justification for all sorts of emotional manipulations that will yield the correct beliefs and behaviors)

And oftentimes a belief in an afterlife causes anxiety more than it helps anxiety -- especially because the belief does nothing to alleviate the fear of death. Most fear death regardless of their beliefs, yet people will also go against what makes them happy in order to appease the afterlife (and so they get both the anxiety of death and the anxiety of not doing the right things to alleviate death).

Though I think I'm preaching to the choir here.