Because it isn't?

I'm genuinely puzzled why you'd stretch the word "aesthetics" to cover, well, everything. — Srap Tasmaner

I'll give it a shot to make a case of some kind here.

Now if you wanted to talk about value or utility or something, you'd have an argument. — Srap Tasmaner

How is that different, exactly?

Utility -- it's not something we ought pursue in a ethical sense. It's not strictly true, either, because it's relative to one's desire. We have to want to build a bridge for some reason or other, and it's not an ethical value, at least not on its face. I wouldn't say someone is morally good for building a useful tool. I'd say it's useful.

Since it's not true, and it's not good -- well, maybe it's not beautiful in the old sense of the aesthetic, but there is this broader sense of "beautiful" which is that which is judged worthy, but not on moral grounds.

Basically the judgment of values which are not-moral falls into the aesthetic. Sometimes we like to say these are "epistemic values", or some such, but even there there are are choices between which epistemic values one makes appeals to.

At least, insofar that these judgments are held for more than one person. We say we like vanilla ice cream, but we don't hold that others should like that -- it's something I like.

But these other value judgments tend to be binding for practitioners -- the elegance of a mathematical theory persuades, and so forth.

EDIT: Perhaps another way: I think it makes sense to try and make appeals to what is attractive to a body of people. So here, with Williamson, in order to respond I'd have to do better than I really can, at the moment -- but the way I'll figure it out along the way is to see what it is Williamson cares about, what he finds persuasive, what arguments he allows, and so forth. I'll be looking for his taste in judgment: which arguments does he deploy? Surely they're all valid, but there's many arguments one can make. What topics are worthy? That sort of thing.

Philosophers only like truth. — Fire Ologist

I think this is a misunderstanding of philosophers that can be remedied by looking at Plato. Truth is important, but the triumvirate between the good, the beautiful, and the true is important to Plato -- he likes all three.

What does that make of your OP placing the aesthetic as prior to the ideas one is attracted to? — Fire Ologist

Hrrm, not prior. Only in the frame of. My suspicion is that there's more significance, but ultimately I don't think that insisting on truth is a very tractable solution to comparison since all philosophers claim truth. They all care about it so this doesn't serve to differentiate the reason for emphases.

I think the examples that are particularly interesting here are one's that aren't necessarily talking about the same thing. Sure, all philosophers are interested in truth and being. So why do some talk about epistemology, some talk about metaphysics, some talk about ethics, and so forth?

Or is it just willy nilly?

@ucarr

Tagging the author so he can see your comments.

And you do all this so that the choice between theories or approaches is not "merely aesthetic". (@Moliere) — Srap Tasmaner

What about "aesthetic" as opposed to "merely aesthetic"? -- the desire for results, success, knew knowledge -- how is that not aesthetic?

Isn't the attraction to results, success, and so forth very much an itch of the modern scholar?

I guess you're using "self-expression" in a very general way. A technical discussion of some point in modal logic, for instance -- you could say that Prof X, who holds one view, is "expressing himself" by doing so. But then what are we comparing self-expression to? What is not self-expressive? — J

With respect to philosophy, at least, it'd be non-philosophical self-expression. But then that'd be decided by some set of understood conversational rules or standards of evaluation or relations of significance.

But yes I don't mean it in terms of just saying whatever it is one wants because that's who one wants to express. Rather, within the confines of what is persuasive one expresses themself. They're working on the problem they're working on for a reason, yes? I don't mean it in terms of expressing their personality, but there's a reason that thinker or researcher is there.

So supposing Locke, for instance, in his treatises on government. He's going about describing a philosophical theory in that appropriate manner that philosophers did then, and he chose this topic because he genuinely opposes Kings.

In order to persuade people the expression will have to fit the norms of persuasion in said discipline and utilize evidence which is deemed worthy of consideration. But that whole "deeming worthy" part looks a lot like aesthetic judgment to me. It may turn out to be false and so discarded, but that choice to pursue some line of thought or deeming some evidence as relevant to the topic at hand -- that takes interpretation, which in turn takes standards -- i.e. aesthetics.

We know how this would go, in an artistic discussion, too. Artists like T.S. Eliot and Stravinsky claimed to be doing the very opposite of expressing themselves -- they wanted to escape from self, and focus on the work, appealing to the much older idea of art as involving making a good thing rather than expressing anything about the maker. But many have replied, "And yet something of yourself is surely being expressed, otherwise how is your work so immediately recognizable as yours?"

This probably hinges on exactly what we want the concept of "expression" to cover. In English, I think we tend to associate expressivity with the personal, the psychological. — J

Right, and that's not exactly what I'm meaning. Rather, there are subjective conditions of judgment which we then universalize -- expect others to hold a similar standard. Here meaning that there's someone that has to do the interpreting and thinking. It's a creative process, rather than something read off the evidence.

What T.S.l Elliot and Stravinsky claim I'd grant as within the area of aesthetics. Indeed, "reaching beyond" has often been something which inspires artists and attracts thought! What's important to reject is the notion that just because I say so so it makes it so, except fo the cases where this is not so :D

I think agreement does the work here. If people agree on a particular mode of judgment then people understand that there are some shared standards which guide the discussion.

How far does this parallel philosophy? Great question. (My hesitant answer: Not very far. But that's my taste again.) — J

Naturally, my taste is to say the opposite:

The debate in turn centers on whether self-expression is a key element of art; — J

Self-expression is a necessary element of philosophy.

Art might, at times, cross over into something more sublime.

But the philosopher is always speaking about themself, whether they like it or not. (At least, this is what I believe)

Might this be a poor criteria though? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes.

Praxis is almost absent from the academy, it's been wholly privatized by the dominance of philosophies of secularism. But on the view that praxis is a necessary prerequisite for theoria, being a professional, reasonable, etc. isn't enough. — Count Timothy von Icarus

But not for this reason.

Really you can substitute anyone in there -- any old expert will do as long as they have all the resources one could ask for in answering the question.


So for something non-secular -- compare the Buddhist monk to the Christian monk. Sometimes entirely praxis based, which is something I tend to favor, but still engaging in an interminable affair.

Not that this is bad, mind.

Only an indication -- at least if antinomies are a way to point to a wall -- that we're dealing with the limits of reason here.

I certainly think the perennialists often distort the traditions they appeal to in trying to make them uniform. Nonetheless, their point is not entirely without merit, and the convergence seems to me to be a sign of robustness, whereas a process that leads to endless fractal divergence bespeaks a sort of arbitrariness (particularly when the divergence occurs due to competing bare, brute fact claims or "givens").

At least, from within the traditions of praxis themselves, this is exactly what is predicted, so in their own terms, this is not a great difficulty. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Fair.

I'm afraid I find antinomies persuasive, for whatever reason. It seems like you have to pick one side and defend it, but it won't matter how you defend it just that you defend it because the other side will do the same.

I am not sure if this is a good example for what Hegel is talking about though. Presumably, you know that which is not human, and that's "the other side." Hegel is also certainly not saying one must step on the other side of an issue to express uncertainty about it. He is in some ways a fallibilist after all. Hegel is speaking to gnostic pronouncements about the limits of knowledge. This is isn't to proclaim something undecided, but rather to claim that one has decisively decided it. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Fair. I do think "God, Freedom and Immortality" are the examples Hegel had in mind, given his critique of Kant.

To borrow the quote I shared in the other thread from D.C. Schindler's the Catholicity of Reason that focuses on the major presumptions made by those who, out of "epistemic modesty" set hard limits on reason.

First, he responds to the idea that we never grasp the truth, the absolutization of Socratic irony as the claim that "all we know is that we don't know anything (absolutely)." — Count Timothy von Icarus

The second alternative above, namely, that I claim knowledge about things in a delimited area, but make no judgment one way or the other regarding anything outside the limits, is at least apparently less presumptuous than the first, ironically because it does indeed admit that some of its knowledge is true.

The difficulty is in fact twofold. On the one hand, as we observed at the outset of this chapter, one can set limits in the proper place only if one is already beyond those limits, which means that to the extent that self-limitation is strictly a priori, and not the fruit of an encounter with what lies outside of oneself [or language], the limitation is an act of presumption: one is acting as if one knows what one does not in fact know. On the other hand, and perhaps more profoundly, to allow oneself judgment on one side of a boundary and at the same time to suspend judgment on the other side is to claim — again, in an a priori way, which is to say without any sufficient reason — that what lies on the other side does not in any significant sense bear on my understanding of the matter or matters lying on this side. But of course to make this claim without investigation and justification is presumptuous.

I don't think that setting a limit is strictly a priori. And I don't think setting limits requires a presumption -- it's not like I'm saying "Tim, I've seen the limits of reason and these are it. Heed my call, or suffer the consequences!"

I'm saying "Hey, look over at that God debate that's been happening for thousands of years. Notice how smart people, people we would not otherwise question, disagree? Maybe there's a limit here"

On the other hand, and perhaps more profoundly, to allow oneself judgment on one side of a boundary and at the same time to suspend judgment on the other side is to claim — again, in an a priori way, which is to say without any sufficient reason — that what lies on the other side does not in any significant sense bear on my understanding of the matter or matters lying on this side. But of course to make this claim without investigation and justification is presumptuous. — Count Timothy von Icarus

So it's not this. "allowing oneself judgment" isn't something we can do. We judge whether we like it or not.

But the process of philosophy sorts out the good from the bad judgments. Or attempts to.

Also, I ought note that just because God lies on "the other side" in terms of justificatory knowledge, that does not then mean I think or argue that God is insignifcant.

Indeed, lots of my thoughts deal with wondering why the false is significant, or something along those lines. And not for a priori reasons.

Well, ironically, on the relativistic view, one is only ever in a fly bottle if one has already placed themselves inside it. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Only in the extreme version whereby whatever one person decides is right is what is right.

I think the notion of the fly-bottle is to say something like: the philosophy you espouse is clouding your judgment without you realizing it. You see the world and bounce against what you cannot see. But if you let go of your philosophical ideas, arguments, presuppositions, what-ifs, etc., and chase therapy you'll find that the world was always there all along, and it was the various ideas you had about it that stopped you from flying.

But then: Do we ever get out of the fly bottle? Was Wittgenstein outside it?

For some it's (almost) a reflex or bias. In so far as "aesthetics" is inherently philosophical, whether or not one makes aesthetic choices "in philosophy" seems to presuppose (an unconscious) metaphilosophy — 180 Proof

Yeah. Though I'm rather explicit about the importance of aesthetics in philosophy :)

Yes. I'm drawn to concise, clearly written, jargon-free texts on (suffering-based / agent-based) ethics and (naturalistic) ontology.

Why are you more drawn to particular philosophers, schools, styles, or problems?
They tend to focus on aporia which align with my own speculations or reflectively throw me into question.

Is there such a thing as bad taste in philosophy? If so, what should one do if we encounter bad taste?
I find 'essentializing' any form of bigotry, misogyny, homophobia, pedophilia, superstitions, academic quarrels, etc to be in "bad taste" and I tend to name and shame the culprit.

Likewise, is there such a thing as good taste in philosophy such that it differs from "the opposite of bad"?
As a rule, I don't 'essentialize' (i.e. reify the non-instantiated or un- contextualized) and avoid vague words or slogans as much as I can. — 180 Proof

Excellent. Those are very clearly stated philosophical aesthetics.

Good philosophy is clear and explicit. The topic is chosen due to the reader's position towards the topic such that it will result in aporia.

Bad philosophy utilizes the notion of essence to justify bigotry, misogyny, homophobia, pedophilia, superstitions, or academic quarrels and other such things. The appropriate way to react to this bad taste is to shame the person.

And, as a rule, reifying the non-instantiated or un-contextualized and using vague words or slogans is to be avoided as much as you're able.


Also, yours is a more "subjectivist" bent on an aesthetics --i.e. these are rules and attractions that work for you, but to each their own.


That's clearer than I can answer these questions for myself. :D Thanks @180 Proof

Some people have a decided preference for the new. Sometimes this is argued for, as Dewey does: the old ideas are dead, no longer suited to our time, and we need new ideas that suit our needs. Sometimes this is argued for as "the philosophy of the future", leading the way, changing the world rather than meeting the present need.

As some people want to be in the vanguard or the avant garde, some people want to stand athwart history saying, stop. Or, if they're not interested in a fight, they want to ignore whatever foolishness people nowadays are getting up to, and stick by the tried-and-true ideas of their forefathers. Some people are naturally suspicious of the new.

As I say, not a motivator for everyone, but I think for some people very important. — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, that's a good one. Nietzsche as the philosopher of the future and Burke as the lover of the tried-and-true.

That's an especially interesting category because I can see how it ties into the ideas of thinkers, too.

What if the aesthetic justifications we offer are such as they are on account of our culturally/ historically conditioned intuitions and preferences? I suppose genetics may also be in play. Anything else? — Janus

True, they're not necessarily disconnected. A person who likes French literature because their heritage is from France comes to mind here. Though then I'd put it that this isn't exactly an aesethetic justification -- it's why I like something like ice cream, but since not everyone has French heritage I wouldn't expect others to feel the same as me.

The aesthetic judgment is this universalizing of the subjective, in a way. I know that it's an affectivity and interpretation, but if only you'd watch this movie I'm sure you'd feel the same!

So why this one rather than that one? Rorty used to say that he just didn't have an itch where some philosophers wanted to scratch. And vice versa, I suppose. — J

Right! That's a great question.

I agree that I can usually find something attractive in a philosopher if I give it enough time.

The more general question might be interesting here too: "Why this philosopher and not that one, when both are good?" followed by "What is it about this group of philosophers/ies that includes them as the "good" ones? Just that I can find something interesting?"

How this fits into an aesthetic appreciation, I'm not sure, but "an idea that matters to me" seems to be square in the middle of why I'll read the next book I'll read. Oh and I guess I should add: The more I'm familiar with some particular conversation around an issue, the more I'm likely to feel that the next contribution to that conversation will contain "ideas that matter."

Yes, that makes sense. And good point in bringing up "mattering" -- in a way that's the question. What is this "mattering"?

I think familiarity helps for generating interest. In part that's because philosophers are constantly referencing one another, so if you find one thing interesting you'll likely be easily able to find another reference on the same topic with a different perspective.

Yes I think as a atheïst I'm looking for a sort of non-religious theodicee, like the first philosophers, that is an 'arche' or way to envision the world as one continuous whole.

I find that I side mostly on the side of the tragic/sensual/empircal and dislike most spirituality, metaphysics or over/mis-use of dialectics or reason.

Philosophy at this point for me is mostly about doing away with bad ideas, which is most of philosophy. — ChatteringMonkey

How do you do away with bad ideas, and how do you identify them as bad? Is it just that they don't provide a non-religious theodicy?

I'm guessing not because you go on to say "tragic/sensual/empirical" as something good whereas "spirituality, metaphysics, over/mis-use of dialects or reason" is bad -- in the aesthetic sense.

If no further answer then cool. We've reached the aesthetic terminus.

And I feel pretty good about it actually, maybe wish I had come to this conclusion sooner. I certainly wouldn't want to waste any more time on bad philosophy.

I think other people have to go through the process they have to go through, and maybe that involves trying out bad ideas, but mostly I think they are just misguided. — ChatteringMonkey

I think that's a common experience for people who read philosophy. Eventually you start to focus in on the couple of things that really interest you because there's just too much out there to be able to read it all.

But I like to wander around, still. I'm uncertain that much philosophy is truly bad, but only appealing to some other aesthetic. Not quite -- there are times where I don't think this -- but it's the idea that I'm thinking towards.

So, I guess I like people who can write in this way, not so much inspiringly, although that helps, but interestingly. Charles Taylor is a good example. He doesn't strike any high oratorical notes, but despite having great density of ideas he nonetheless writes more like a great historian, the opposite of dry or abstruse. William Durant's philosophy stuff is like this too, and he is also pretty pithy.

This can make a big difference. I don't know if I'd ever recommend reading Gibbon to learn about Rome, but he's worth reading for the prose and Enlightenment era philosophy splashed liberally within his commentary. Whereas I sometimes struggle with works when reading them feels tedious.

That said, I don't really like polemical works, even when I agree with them. They certainly aren't the same thing, style (even oratorical) and polemic. Nagel, Lewis, and Frankfurt are good in this way, as recent examples. Augustine is a master. Chesterton is too good at it for his own good. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Nice. That's the sort of reflection I'm thinking after.

Also, it'd be interesting -- upon identifying an aesthetic reason for such and such a philosopher -- to attempt to go from that aesthetic grounding to the ideas themselves.

I agree. Although I hope it doesn’t prejudice the way we view each other.

Just because someone is drawn to Nietzsche, but repulsed by Aristotle, might mean nothing more than they don’t really understand one (or both) of them. It might not mean they are anti-essentialist. — Fire Ologist

Sure. Though I'd more want to ask after what's attractive in each rather than the position of essentialism.

Rather than asking after the strict inference I'm noting that there's more to philosophical argument than deduction, argument, and inference. And it's not insignificant.

But it's hard to articulate, hence the questions.

Yes, but I would say, if the ideas are the focus, the ideas can reshape the aesthetics as much as the aesthetics might have pushed one towards a certain idea. — Fire Ologist

Sure. If I'm correct then there's not really a separating one from the other -- we're attracted to an idea for a reason, itself an idea.

Reason, itself, is attractive. That's why philosophers pursue it.

it is not as if austere empiricism or post-modernism don't rely on such appeals. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Definitely.

To bring up something I said earlier about the "limits of reason" in many contemporary philosophical camps—I would point out that the claim that reason cannot adjudicate between paradigms or world-views is, of course, a gnostic claim. One presumably knows this if one claims it to be so. Yet, as Hegel says, to have recognized a boundary is to already have stepped over it.

Now, if we claim that reason is in a sense isolated within "world-views and paradigms," we face the odd situation where some world-views and paradigms resolutely deny our claim. They instead claim that knowing involves ecstasis, it is transcendent, and always related to the whole, and so without limit—already with the whole and beyond any limit. And such views have quite a long history.

Our difficulty is that, if reason just is "reason within a paradigm," then it seems that this view of reason cannot be so limited, for it denies this limit and it is an authority on itself. Our criticism that this other paradigm errs would seem to be limited to our own paradigm.

The positive gnostic claim, to have groked past the limits of intelligibility and seen the end of reason (or immanence or presence) from the other side faces an additional challenge here if we hold to the assumption that any such universal claim must be "from nowhere," and itself issued from "outside any paradigm, " since it is also generally being claimed that precisely this sort of "stepping outside" is impossible. But perhaps this is simply a misguided assumption. Afterall, one need not "step out of one's humanity" to know that "all men are mortal." One can know this about all men while still always being a particular man.

So, that's my initial thoughts on the idea that reason cannot adjudicate between paradigms (which suggests an aesthetic answer perhaps). It seems this must remain true only for some paradigms, and one might suppose that being limited in this way is itself a deficiency (one that is both rational and aesthetic). After all, what is left once one gives up totally on reason as an adjudicator? It would seem to me that all that remains is power struggles (and indeed , some thinkers go explicitly in this direction). Further, the ability to selectively decide that reason ceases to apply in some cases seems obviously prone to abuse (real world examples abound)—in a word, it's misology. — Count Timothy von Icarus

If it were possible to establish some way of making appeals appealing then this might be a way towards a paradigm which isn't local -- not a view from nowhere, but a view from anywhere as @Banno puts it. At least if my suspicions are correct.

That is -- whether reason can or cannot adjudicate between traditions, or paradigms, is sort of an open question still. I wouldn't go so far as to claim I know that it cannot be so. Only that it's not so right now.

Especially with a few topics whereby otherwise reasonable people with all the resources one could ask for -- professors, philosophers, academics, in a word "experts" -- that don't reach termination.

I say "God, freedom, and immortality" as the obvious topics because Kant. And I disagree with Hegel where he speaks about having to be across a barrier to point to its limit. Like you note -- I know I'm mortal because I'm human. I don't have to know what it's like to be superhuman to know my limit.

Rather, we can point to a wall through the example of the interminable antinomies of philosophy -- realism/anti-realism in all topics.

****


What's interesting to ask here is -- why does this philosophy argue the universe is finite, and that one argue that the universe is infinite if there's no fact to the matter that could settle the dispute?

It looks to me that there's an aesthetic element here: somehow the finite or the infinite are perceived as more "beautiful", and so the arguments which a philosopher will deploy comes from this beginning attraction.

If so then being able to explicate these aesthetic choices would be a way to build bridges between traditions -- i.e. journey towards the view from anywhere, but together; even if our traditions cannot both be universally true.

So, no, I'm not trying to abandon reason or something along those lines. "the appeal to reason" is what structures philosophy.

It's just a little more complicated than we thought.

Eliminitive materialism or austere behaviorism might seem absurd, yet they are unassailable given their own presuppositions. Yet I'd maintain that it is ugly and small regardless of this consistency and closure. Nietzsche's thought has a certain beauty, Milton's Satan is inspiring, yet these also suffer from a certain smallness and ugliness. Absurdity is in the end, not glory. So too the idea of a maze of fly bottle like games that thought is forever trapped to buzz about in. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Nice. These are the sorts of judgments I'm thinking about here. What is it about eliminative materialism or austere behaviorism that makes them ugly?

Must glory be the result of philosophy, or could it just be an inspiration?

And if we hop out of one fly bottle and into another, no matter what, then wouldn't that be nice to know that there is no "outside the fly bottle"?

Oh, sorry -- I should add an answer to your question directly @SophistiCat -- astronomy would not serve the purpose I'm intending for the example. It's something that does have predictive power, that does look for where it's wrong, and continues to generate new questions and answers and observations and knowledge.

I wonder why you picked astrology as an example, rather than astronomy? Would you consider them more-or-less on the same footing, and if not, why not? — SophistiCat

I don't think they're on the same footing. I think that's because astrology's purpose isn't to describe, but it's in the language of description. It "works" at a descriptive level because it's complicated and vague enough that any example can be explained. But then that's just why it's a degenerative research program: they're not trying to figure out which part is wrong, but rather it's a constant quest to demonstrate what's right about it.

The reason I use astrology is because it's an example of a coherent language game that people claim has descriptive power, but I interpret it as a language game which people play to talk about themselves and others and their interpersonal lives that only has the appearance of describing people.

Basically it's possible, even if something is useful and coherent, for it to be entirely false even though we see a pattern there and we think it's due to features of the world.

Well... I think I disagree with that formulation a bit.

I think aesthetics have an influence on the ideas that are produced, rather than being a byproduct.

It looks like a biproduct, but:

I wonder if anyone can really answer this. We all like to think we know what makes our gut our gut. — Fire Ologist

I don't think we can definitively answer it, but it is the sort of question we can share answers with one another, and thereby get a deeper understanding of one another's perspectives.

Fair question.

It's not necessary necessary.

And if we can find ways to get along that don't include killing one another then that's a good example.

Usually we're not killing one another: that's another good example.

And yet.... if we look at what people call politics...

Yes. All political philosophies which actually do something -- the point of politics -- get down in the mud.

In this interpretation Stalin and Mao were heroes? — unimportant

Yes.

Much like George Washington, especially with respect to Mao -- they both "relinquished" power.

US revolutionaries would poor molten metal into people's throats that agreed with the brits. They were not kind people. It was a revolution.

And yet we remember George Washington, Alexander Hamilton, Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Paine....


Just like us in the US where the 1 dollar has George Washington's likeness, so do the Chinese printed currency have Mao's likeness.

So can it be said the end jusifies the means and that all states have blood on their hands but communism at least aims for a better end goal? — unimportant

That's been a common justification, yes. So it can be said.

I'm a little skeptical because it looks like what every government says: just keep on killing motherfucker, then peace will come.

Maybe because the person is left-handed. Not “just” because I looks pretty to someone. — Fire Ologist

Maybe.

But in the "usual" table manners:

I would say, we are forming this consensus both because we each know how to make things up really well, AND because they reflect something true and ordered in the world. — Fire Ologist

You would, but I wouldn't. ;)

So if we have consensus that we don’t “just” make order up, we have consensus that there is “order in the world”. We draw on observations that we can point to, each of us separately and both of us together, in the world, and from those, fashion an ordered description. — Fire Ologist

We have consensus on the first point, but no the implication.

Just because I see the stone drop 20 times every time I drop it that does not then mean that "there is order in the world" -- most specifically thinking here with respect to "the world".

There's order in the world could mean something small, which I agree with, and something large, which I disagree with.

The "large" thing I disagree with is the notion that nature behaves according to law.

In the most literal sense -- there is no government which passes laws that make our universe. This is to interpret the universe in terms of our governments. While useful sometimes, it's not true.

I think my answer to that is pretty idiosyncratic. — T Clark

My expectation is that all of our answers will be pretty idiosyncratic, at first -- but perhaps through that expression we can find paralleles and bridges.

I've talked about it on the forum before. I carry a model of the world around inside me, in my mind - intellectual but also visceral. I visualize it as a cloud lit from within. I stand in front of it and I can see everything. Dogs and trees, but also love, ideas, and experiences. Myself and other people. Neutrinos and the Grand Canyon. Things I know well are more in focus while those I know less are foggier and vague. Then there are things not included at all - things I'm not aware of.

I judge the truth, value, or interest of something by how it fits in with my model. Things that fit well help bring things into more focus or might expand the cloud. Things that don't fit well might cause me to reexamine my ideas and might make things less in focus. Things that don't fit at all, and that includes much of philosophy, I'm not really interested in.

Makes sense to me.

In my experience, this is where intuition comes from. If you want to simplify, I just you could just say I pick the ideas I'm interested in intuitively.

So this is the part that I want to probe -- and you need not have an answer that satisfies the aesthetic question -- why am I picking the ideas I'm interested in intuitively? Is there some further philosophical reason for it, or is it "Cuz it's pretty to me"?

I tend to think that we terminate our thoughts in aesthetics, so this question has wider implications than I've said up front. If they terminate there then we're pretty much in agreement.

AH! That helps. lol.

I don’t just make order up. — Fire Ologist

As long as I emphasize your statement thus: "I don't just make order up"

Sure.

Taking that out though I think "I don't make order up" is false.

We do!

Why else place the fork on the left?

My reaction to philosophy is not aesthetic at all. It might matter to me whether something is well written, but that’s mostly just so it’s easier to understand. I do enjoy and appreciate good writing, but that wouldn’t be enough to influence my choices. Bad writing might be enough to push me away from something that I might otherwise find useful.

It’s the ideas that matter. — T Clark

Yes.

Though I'm talking past, then.

It's the ideas that matter.

What I'm asking is if there's a reason you're attracted to this or that idea/author that doesn't have to deal with "it's just intuitive"

Or all the others I've listed.

Something I think about with respect to what I read is that I'm a naturally skeptical reader. So I'm attracted not just to skeptics, but everyone else too. Maybe the skeptics have it wrong, after all. :D

I have that skeptical inclination, and that's what has led me to where I am.

That's the kind of thing I have in mind. Why "intuition"?

I provided the previous explanation but I am thinking on the question still.

So...


"Nature is ordered"

and

"There are Physics"

?

It doesn't seem to me there are that many philosophical questions. — Janus

That'd challenge an argument I'm making in favor of asking what aesthetics we utilize to make choices in philosophy: That because there are a lot of philosophical questions we must make choices on what to put effort into answering or wondering about. (even if that answer is "I don't know", though I'd say that's the same as "because it's true" or "intuitive")

We are probably each attracted to a different mix with different emphases on the main categories. I understand that there are people who want to believe this or that when it comes to metaphysics for example. As Tom Storm noted some dislike science because they think it disenchants the world. Others like science because to them, on the contrary, understanding how things work makes the world more interesting and hence more not less enchanting.

I think that's a good first stab, though I'd take out "probably" and say "Here's a likely important explanation: Some of each of us are attracted to a different mix with different emphases...." etc.

As always, trying to shy away from universalization.

I have always been constitutionally incapable of believing anything that does not seem sufficiently evidenced. I was once attracted to religious/ spiritual thought, and I tried hard to find various religious ideas believable, but I failed the task. So, you could say I would like to believe the world has some overarching meaning, but I just don't see the evidence. Probably a lot depends on what ideas and beliefs one is exposed to, perhaps inducted into, when growing up.

Definitely!

Partly this is a question meant to reflect on for ourselves: While it's probably because of how we grew up and various experiences and intuition and because it's true ---- everyone says that.

Is it possible to offer an aesthetic justification, rather than a causal-historical-preference justification, for what we read and say in philosophy?

Just for a place to start: Yes, I have a sense of my own taste in philosophy, and I've noticed that it can change over the years. — J

Definitely the same for me.

Some things stay consistent, though. I appreciate good writing and have trouble with what I consider turgid prose, though this is not a very profound reason for choosing Philosopher X over Y. I also want the philosophy I read and practice to help me understand who I am. What that means continues to be an open question for me, but it unquestionably involves what you're calling aesthetics. — J

Yeah. I tend to believe that philosophy is always a work on the self, no matter how externalized it may look.

And the prose sometimes dissuades me. Spinoza's Ethics -- I tried a couple times and just decided to let others smarter than I on that subject to know what they know :D

Is "having an open question" an aesthetic choice, or more of an in media res whereby there's a landing?

One more observation: I enjoy the philosophical activity of questioning, of finding good questions and understanding why they provoke me. I'm much less interested than I used to be in the possibility that true-or-false philosophical answers will turn up -- or perhaps I should say, T-or-F answers to good questions. — J

Yeah.

The process of philosophy is more interesting to me than the results of philosophy. At least what we usually mean by "results" -- various theories which are true or whatever.

Good questions and observations that force us to look at the world differently -- that's the best philosophy to me.

If you want to simplify, I just you could just say I pick the ideas I'm interested in intuitively. — T Clark

I don't want to oversimplify. In a way I think this is similar to saying "Because they're true" -- everyone can answer that, so it doesn't get at a philosophical explanation for why there's a difference in choices.

That actually also demonstrates my point. I agree astrologists are kidding themselves, both or all of them that can create logical chains of astrological reasoning. I believe this because of the world and the evidence I can show you from this world; we can show how astrologers are kidding themselves. — Fire Ologist

Can we? Have you tried?

What I've noticed is that I'm showing myself why I don't believe them, and they are dismissive of what I say.

Without the order in the world, we can’t do this. Without order in the world, why would you be hesitant to accept what they think they are saying provided a reasonable, coherent, functioning, map? Astrologers made some map applicable to the world and that keeps “order” as you would have it, out of the world and only in the words and descriptions we fabricate? They are a better example of where you think order only resides - in our descriptions (like astrology). — Fire Ologist

Notice how I said "of course there are regularities" -- I'm not trying to maintain an idealist thesis here. I'm a materialist and a realist. My doubt so far has been with respect to the notion of laws of nature.

A regularity can be as simple as "The sun rose yesterday morning and this morning" -- two observations grouped together. The observations are of something, of course -- but I don't think it's so general as to be able to claim something like "All of Nature is Ordered" or "There are Laws of Physics"

Rather, just like the astrologist, we go out to look for evidence for our beliefs while usually avoiding evidence that counts against our beliefs.

And lo and behold, upon seeing a stone drop twice I knew there was an eternal order in nature! :D

If I say something and you hear it. And then you respond to what I said and I hear it as logically following the order that I started. And then I say something else in response to your response and you hear it. And you hear it as logically following the orderliness you were following/building - haven’t we both found orderliness in the world in our eyes that read words and ears that hear sounds? — Fire Ologist

Possibly, but not necessarily.

A favorite example of mine is astrology. People who take astrology seriously are able to do all the things you just said: Hear and respond and understand one another in a perceived orderly manner.

But I'd be hesitant to draw the conclusion that the astrologists have found order in the world. I think they've ordered their thoughts in a manner that they are able to communicate, and that their names refer to various objects in the world, and all their explanations are entirely false.

Basically we want to believe if we are coherent that what we believe is true, but that's not enough because sometimes we can build whole ways of talking together in an orderly way -- such as astrology or numerology -- which has nothing to do with the world and everything to do with what satisfies us to hear.

I'm of the opinion that they are all reasonable evolutions of Marx. Rather than trying to defend the original vision of Marx as something which was intended to be more beautiful than it was I think they knew what they were doing and what happened is a legitimate result which has to be reckoned with in thinking about the philosophy.

For one, they all read the fuck out of Marx. And engaged in revolutionary programs which united the industrial working class, in the case of Lenin and Stalin, or the agricultural working class, in the case of Mao. The political parties built then proceeded to revolt against their respective governments for the purpose of obtaining the power which had been previously used against them, and succeeded at taking over the state.

That's pretty much the blueprint as Marx sets it out.

Now, "communism" isn't exactly what was achieved, but then that is supposed to be something which only comes about when all the classes have truly been abolished, so they were and are all still in that transition state. Notice, however, how the states didn't exactly whither away. So while that was the theory there might not be something entirely right with it.



Basically I prefer to study Marxism from the perspective of what Marxists have done, and not just on the basis of what Marx or Engels mean. You don't get an easy or pretty picture when you look at it like this.

So why bother?

Well, when you're that honest not only with the Marxist countries, but your own country, you'll find that none of the countries that are standing -- have won -- ever have pretty histories. States win by being more evil than the other states. We're familiar with the sins of Marxist states to dissuade us from their feasibility and accept that what we have now really is the best of all possible worlds, though it may be bad.

But they conveniently leave out the various sins that allowed us to establish capitalism, or the sins that it perpetuates.

The reason to bother is to look at what's true and what's false about what people say, and for the most part what's true is that all countries do evil, and what's false is that "this is the only feasible system" -- I prefer to look at political thoughts and actions from the expectation that there will be warts when we decided to look, and we have to accept the history of these various thoughts warts and all.

I've noticed in conversations with people about big questions, like meaning and God, that there is often a clear aesthetic preference for a world with foundational guarantees of beauty and certainty. For some, this makes the world more pleasing, more explicable, more enchanting. An enchanted world is a more engaging and attractive world for them. A hatred of physicalism and 'scientism' often seems tied to a view that meaninglessness is ugly, stunted and base, or somehow unworthy. Not to mention, wrong. — Tom Storm

Right!

I think that's a good insight into what I'll dare to call "layperson philosophy" -- not as a denigration, but a categorical distinction between people who are Picasso and people who take an art class and like painting.

What's up with that aesthetic preference? Is it possible to justify or ground it? And, in spite of it all, what do we do when we encounter someone with a different aesthetic preference, though we feel it ought be universal?

Heh, yeah.

Indeed, they amount to much the same view... — Banno

Well -- how are we supposed to fight about who is right now?

:up:

Right. That's what I mean by

what I want to focus on is the aesthetic judgment of the philosophy itself. — Moliere

I'm asking after philosophical justifications for this aesthetic choice. — Moliere

The ideas matter, of course -- not the expression so much.

But why these ideas and not those ideas?

Surely you see we gravitate towards different philosophers.

Maybe we could say that nature lends itself to description because of embedded similarities? — jorndoe

We could, though that might still start looking like "law-speak" again.

What I'm aiming to say is that the description works because there are some conditions by which we judge the description as true -- namely pragmatic ones that deal with technology -- but that does not then warrant an inference from these regularities to an ontological justification of regularities.

Rather than treating the regularities like a cause or a law or logical connection between events they're just as plain as asking "How is it that we describe things?" -- though, perhaps, that's not exactly "plain" after all, I'm hesitant to give ontological justification to scientific work. There's something that it tracks, but there's no checking the thing-in-itself to really make sure that we are tracking this time.