I'm afraid I'm not following what you're asking after here. What is "per what"? Like, by what authority? Or, by what feature of the world? or. . what?


A description of, say, the watch is true if it describes the watch. Likewise, a description of "watch" is true if it describes "watch". In the case of a descriptive definition we're asking after the meaning of "watch". So, a descriptive definition is true if it describes the meaning of "watch".

So what makes a descriptive definition true, as with any assertion, is the facts. The facts in this case is the meaning. The meaning is determined by usage.

Suppose that instead of "the meaning" of something, we are talking about "the colour" of something. If I demonstrated to you, that we could determine the colour of something by seeing it, and we could determine the colour of something by hearing it, wouldn't you agree with me that we were using "the colour" in two distinct ways? — Metaphysician Undercover

I suppose it depends, actually. If you could reliably hear green, then I'd just say you're using a different method that I'm not actually familiar with, but that there's no difference in the green property. If you're using "green", on the other hand, to describe something which is not green then you'd be using "green" differently.

Common usage is such that "the colour" refers to the visual impression and also to the aural impression. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'd say that common usage refers to the color green, and not an impression of the color green.

Wouldn't you agree that we should separate these two distinct things, such that when we talk about "colour" we can distinguish whether we are talking about the visual impression of the thing, or an aural impression.

I'd say it just depends on if that's important or not. Consider a submarine. A submarine can detect, at a distance, objects by way of echo-location. But there's no need to constantly specify that the submarine is using echolocation when we, as humans, would typically use sight in determining spatial distrubtion of objects. We could just say "There is an object so many meters away from us", regardless. We might even say "I see an object so many meters away from us", even if what I see is a radar.

This is what I am doing with "meaning". We have two distinct ways of determining "the meaning", one, by relating the word directly to an object, as we commonly do in day to day communication, and a second, by relating the word to other words (defining the word) as we do in more sophisticated situations. Do you not agree that we should identify and separate these two, so that when we talk about "the meaning", we can avoid ambiguity, and have a better understanding of what we are talking about.

I think the use/mention distinction handles this well enough, personally, and that there's no need to divide meaning up because we can use a word or we can mention a word.

I say that definitions can be true or false. Obviously a stipulative definition is neither true or false. A descriptive definition, on the other hand, is true or false. It is true in the case where the description describes the meaning of a term, and false when it fails to do so.

I think our disagreement follows more from my assertion that there are more definitions than stipulative definitions. I don't deny stipulation, only that there's more to definition than stipulation.

In the rest of your post, you're saying that the truthmaker for "The definition of 'tomato'," in a context-independent way (re that specific context) is how people use the word "tomato."

The problem with this is that that IS the specific context I was referring to. So that's not a context-dependent "true definition" (re that specific context). — Terrapin Station

Context-independence is your term. Insofar that you're using that qualifier I am too, but it was not I who introduced this notion. Hence why I asked what would count for the qualifier in any case at all, since the way I would put things would be to say there is no such case with regards to anything.

You're agreeing that definition doesn't refer to anything like consensus or conventional usage unless we qualify that that's what we're referring to. — Terrapin Station

"Meaning", but yeah. Definitions describe meanings, by my reasoning. I understand that you don't agree with the distinction, but I'm just making it explicit that this is what I'm saying.

You're claiming that "The definition of 'tomato' is x," unqualified, can be true or false. (And you've also made claims that this is true regardless of usage, although it's fine if we don't bother with that part here. That you claimed the definition, unqualified, can be true or false is enough.) — Terrapin Station

I'm claiming that a definition can be true or false. I'm not sure where I said "unqualified".

When pressed on how the definition, unqualified, and independent of the specific context of usage, which isn't implied by the word "definition," can be true or false, you explain that it's true or false by virtue of how the term has been used. Well, this contradicts both (A) and (B). — Terrapin Station

To me this just seems like a strange set-up. Perhaps it derives from your notions on truth, actually -- since many people seem to believe that truth is somehow a property which pertains outside of context. But that's just a guess on my part, I don't know.

What I can say without reservation is that definitions can be true or false, and they are true or false by virtue of usage. That isn't to say that usage is the same as meaning, but that usage is how we determine meaning. But since I've been relying on usage as my methodology, it would certainly be shooting myself in the foot to then say that meanings exist in an unqualified and independent of specific context way. But, this is an idea I think you introduced which I'm willing to engage, but it's not what I've been saying I believe.

I just don't think you need an unqualified and independent of context way for meanings to be in order for them to serve as facts. Since all facts are neither unqualified nor independent of context it strikes me that this is just an odd criteria, too, since even with non-controversial facts (such as "the capital of the United States in the year of our Lord 2016 is Washington DC") neither quality applies.

Well you've totally lost me. If meaning is what a word means, and I can know what "apple" means, and knowing is a capacity, then how can you say "meanings aren't related to our capacities"? Isn't it clear to you that if we can know the meaning of something, and knowing is a capacity then necessarily meaning is related to our capacities. Is knowing not a capacity of human beings? — Metaphysician Undercover

That's fair. I should be more specific. What I mean is that what a meaning is is not related to our capacities. Yes, we can see some kind of relation between our abilities and our words (and the relationship may just be one of knowing or believing), but I just meant to indicate that our capacities do not create meanings.

One person knows the word "apple" as meaning that particular object on the table, and another person knows the word "apple" as meaning "a round red fruit", and both are correct. Do you not recognize a fundamental difference between relating the word to a particular object, and relating the word to a bunch of other words? — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't. Objects and words, insofar that either exists, are existential equals.

No sarcasm on my part. The point is too rarified for me to be able to lodge sarcasm very effectively -- it's kind of one of those things where it's so simple that you already sound dumb for even talking about it, so sarcasm isn't going to exactly work.

In this case, where I say "tomato" means X, we're talking about truth and meaning in a somewhat general way, and I'm trying to make use of an example to give something more concrete to talk about. So, to give an "in the flesh" example:

https://www.planetnatural.com/tomato-gardening-guru/

There is a language which we share, English, and within that language there is a sign "tomato" which means X. The author of that page knows English just as I know English, and they know the sign "tomato" just as I know the sign "tomato". The fact of the matter, in the flesh, is that the author is using the sign "tomato". (interesting to note that the usage of the sign, in this case, doesn't occur within a sentence, but still has meaning) There is a shared Background, and shared meanings, which we were both born into which allows us to discuss how to garden.

The idea is more that if you want to claim that there is a context-independent (per this specific context) truthmaker for "tomato is defined as x," then you should specify what the truthmaker is. — Terrapin Station

I'd hazard that the truthmaker is no different in this context than any other context for which truthmaker is applicable -- it's just the facts.

Facts are never context independent. But I don't think context-independence is necessary for truth.

You're not forgetting that I'm talking about a specific context here, right? Namely, how particular persons are defining/using the term(s) in question. I specified this a number of times. — Terrapin Station

No. I figured what you were saying, though, was that because " there is no truthmaker for "tomato is defined as x."" that it follows that meaning is mental/private/subjective. (Hence why you were saying that we do not figure out what words mean, but rather assign meaning)

And in conjunction with this, you've agreed that "definition," unqualified, does not refer to a non-institutional consensus or conventional usage. — Terrapin Station

Yup.

But I don't think that implies that meaning is mental/private/subjective.

You don't figure out what words mean. You observe usage and assign meaning. — Terrapin Station

I think we're chasing our tail on this one. :D

Re the reason I'm saying that it's not true or false that tomato is defined as x context-independently, that is outside of how someone(s) happens to be defining/using x, and getting back to the thread topic, is that context-independently, there is no truthmaker for "tomato is defined as x." The reason that I'm not reading "defined as" as necessarily referring to the context of consensus or conventional usage I've already explained in detail, and you've already agreed with this; you've already agreed that "defined as" needs to be contextually qualified, that it can't necessarily be read as implying (non-institutional) consensus or conventional usage.

I'd say that anything that is true is not true context-independently. "context-independently" is an imaginary scenario by which we may be able to judge certain things as more or less subjective, but since it is imaginary it's the sort of standard which we can draw wherever our heart desires. It's more a way of creating a point of contrast for comparison than it is a reality.

"All Bachelors are Unmarried" is true only in the context of English. "War is War" is not a necessary truth, but is true in our world. "(A + B) + C = A + (B + C)" is true in basic arithmetic


For what is there a truthmaker, in your view? What is context-independent?

Logic is upfront when we're talking about truth. A truth realist will deny that the mechanics of meaning are ultimately significant with truth because a proposition can be true though it's never been expressed and no one knows it. This must be so. Otherwise there would be no detectives. — Mongrel

See. . . that definitely strikes me as a semi-platonic entity then (it may not be strictly platonic, so that's why I say semi- in that it relates to some features of platonic philosophy). If a proposition can be true even though it's never expressed and no one knows it, then the proposition has a reality all of its own -- and propositions are even thought to be the vehicle through which we can translate to different languages, so whatever language we might be speaking would be inconsequential to the existence of propositions. Language wouldn't even need to exist for propositions to exist, in that case, as I see it.

That's just something that I'm incapable of believing in.

Truth I could at least see as semi-plausible as a platonic entity. Not saying I believe in it, but it's at least believable and something I could consider seriously.

But some kind of language-invariant meaning that's also true above and beyond usage just seems like a convenient just-so story to me.

Language, I can see, exists all on its own. It has an independent reality, of a sorts. It's pseudo-real, and exists in the same way as anything else we might posit exists. But then I would also say that "it is raining" means something different from "Es regnet".


Surely there's some other way of thinking about truth, and believing in detectives, than believing in the existence of propositions which are never expressed and never known.

No, that's not exactly what I'm going after either. Or, at least, if it is true, I don't believe that language is a series of barks chained to our reproductive worth to the species.

(EDIT: though, by the same token, I don't think language makes us special in comparison to other animals either.)

Mostly because words have meaning (or sentences, at least, do).


Maybe it's just the sound of proposing "propositions" that makes me think of them as magical fairies -- that's the connotation that I hear when hearing someone propose propositions.

So do you agree that we need to respect two distinct senses of "meaning"? One is associated with the capacity to relate words to objects, and the other is associated with the capacity to relate words to other words, form a definition. — Metaphysician Undercover

If that's the conclusion I should draw from what I said, I don't see it as of yet. Meanings aren't related to our capacities, so just because we have different capacities -- are able to do different things with words -- that does not then mean that words have two different senses of meaning. We can use "apple" and we can mention "apple", but that's just us using the same word in a different way.

In fact I'd be rather suspicion of a theory of meaning that treats words like tags that we can put on objects, to be honest. We do things with words, and one of the things we do with words is refer -- but that's no different than if I were to point at something.


"meaning" has many meanings, and if that's all you mean by sense then I don't see it as controversial. Maybe I don't get what you mean by sense.

One doesn't even know what proposition is being expressed unless the context of utterance is known.

John said "2 is a prime number."
Bill said, pointing to the number 2 written on the blackboard "That is a prime number."

Different sentences, different utterances, same proposition. — Mongrel

OK. Then yeah, I certainly misunderstood them.

Sounds and marks won't work as primary truth-bearers in spite of their ready visibility. If you and I are in agreement, it's not sounds or marks we're agreeing to. — Mongrel

That's fair. I agree.

I get the objection to propositions based on ontological considerations, but as photographer would often say: reality is what we can't do without. Before you ditch propositions, recognize what you're saying you can do without.

There's the ontological consideration, but also it seems an odd way to talk about meaning too. Propositions focus on such a very specific use of language, and it seems to me that if one were to base a belief about meaning on them that they'd just be over-generalizing and getting it wrong. Some meaningful sentences are true, but then if we just understood meaning then that would give a means to truth (at least, truth understood in this way -- the kind of truth which telling the truth relies upon)

As I mentioned, it's communication itself that's undermined by that rejection. — Mongrel

Cool. I'd have to read the dude you referenced, I think.

My immediate thought is that we could just take meaning for granted. It seems more plausible, to me at least, to believe that our expressions are meaningful rather than to rely upon a belief in propositions to say what it is that makes them meaningful. We don't have to know what it is that makes a sentence meaningful to know that it is meaningful, after all.

They know what apple means.

But maybe they don't know how to define a word, yet. They haven't reached the ability to begin thinking about their words in the same way that they think about their apples. So they know what "apple" means, but they may not know what "The word "apple"" means.

But these aren't two types of definition, one is a definition, the other a direct relating the word to an object. The latter is knowing what "apple" means by being able to point to an apple, it is not in any way defining "apple". — Metaphysician Undercover

If someone uses the word "apple", then they are not defining it. They are demonstrating competence of the language, but they are putting the language to use.

If someone is teaching another the meaning of "apple", then they may choose, rather than speak the meaning, to demonstrate the meaning by showing the pupil an apple.


So being able to point to an apple, and pointing to an apple, is using "apple". Demonstrating to someone how to use "apple" is a way of defining apple. Telling someone what an apple is is another way of defining "apple". So if we are asking a clerk for an apple then we are using the word "apple", and if we are telling someone about "apple" then we are mentioning the word "apple".

Two different propositions were expressed. An utterance is sounds or marks, generally... not really a good candidate for truth-bearer. — Mongrel

What were the two different propositions? To my understanding, propositions are generally taken as the content of certain expressions. No? Does the location in which we speak change the semantic content of an expression?

I may just misunderstand propositions. Because I would say that "It is 5:00 PM" is expresses the same proposition regardless of the speaker -- so your assertion that there are two different one's runs counter to my understanding. (which, as I've noted, isn't in any way professional. I'm certainly open to reading more. I'm just interested in the topic, so I'm talking)

Propositions don't operate on "possible contexts." A sentence is uttered to express a proposition. Listeners either understand what proposition was expressed or they don't. No malarky about computer generated poetry here. — Mongrel

Propositions don't, but language does. An understanding of meaning without somehow incorporating context doesn't strike me as terribly helpful because meaning changes so much with context.

Why not computer generated poetry? Isn't computer generated poetry just as much a part of language as declarative sentences?

That's the crazy part about language. It has meaning regardless of intent. If a computer generates a sentence, then we know what it means even though there wasn't even a speaker.

What's wrong with sounds or marks, vs. propositions? To me it seems that I know the former exist because I see them. But the latter strike me as convenient inventions that don't even account for language meaning, but only the meaning of very particular types of sentences which some philosophers have an interest in. Granted, these are the sorts of sentences we're usually interested in when talking about truth-apt sentences, and therefore truth, but still -- it seems to me that meaning is wider than truth, and truth is just one goal a sentence can accomplish.

While Saussure certainly believes meanings are in the head, I don't think that is necessary to take on board if we talk about language in terms of signs. A sign is composed of both a signifier and a signified. The marks can be the signifier. And truth is the property which a signifier has to some fact. The signified is the meaning which "comes along with", but given that semantic meanings of words are resilient to change -- whereas the marks in a given context aren't (whether "mark" be understood as phonic or visual), and in fact vary considerably with context -- it makes sense to assign truth to the mark rather than the meaning to account for the variety in contextual use.

It may be counter-intuitive to say that the marks we see bear truth -- but that doesn't mean it shouldn't be the case, no? I can see that because a mark can have different meanings that maybe it's a bit of a bait-and-switch move... but it seems to me that just because a mark can look different and mean the same, or vice-versa, that there's still good reason for attributing truth to the mark because it's the very thing which is in context.

I don't think so. Meaning isn't the same thing as definition, so there's no need to say there are different kinds of meanings just because we define a word in different ways.

I couldn't disagree with these two paragraphs more strongly than I do. In my opinion, it's rather clear that you have this stuff factually wrong. — Terrapin Station

Cool.

The factual side of language certainly isn't that words have definitions (which you'd call "meanings") that can be different than usage. That goes against the factual evidence. Words are defined however people choose to define them. They can do something highly idiosyncratic there, or they can follow suit with how the vast majority of people are defining the term, or they can do anything in between. None of that is right or wrong, by the way. And typically, those definitions, that usage (of the vast majority that is) shifts over time. — Terrapin Station

Hold on there. A definition is not a meaning. A definition describes the meaning. When someone uses a word, they are not defining it. They're using it.

Haha--no, that isn't true. It's only true that that's the conventional definition — Terrapin Station

I understand that you disagree. But the best reason I seem to get for you is that your idea about meaning accounts for being able to use words idiosyncratically.

But if we can figure out what words mean by their usage, then I don't see an issue with new uses of words, and it seems that we have a way of understanding shared meanings, rather than having them be private.

How about both? I'd call the former a descriptive definition, and the latter an ostensive definition. So they are two different definitions of the meaning, but we can both fairly say we know the meaning of the word, I think.

I'm having trouble following this... sorry. — Mongrel

No worries at all. Please question away -- I'm far from an expert on this subject. I probably know just enough to hurt myself, really ;).

Consider agreement. Two people are willing to assert the same truth-bearer. It can't be that they're willing to make the same utterance. I can't make your utterance and vice versa.

True. But then suppose while I was in California I were to say, "It is 5:00 PM". And my cousin, who lives on the East coast, were to also say "It is 5:00 PM" at the same time in a telephone conversation. Only one of these utterances is true, even though they express the same semantic content. (well, OK, they could both be false as well -- but they can't both be true :D)

One of the reasons I like the focus on utterances is that it seems, at least, to be a nice and neat way to accept all the messiness of context without getting lost in the mud of possible contexts.

This paragraph isn't at all clear to me, unless for some reason--though Lord knows what reason--you'd be reading "consensus" as necessarily referring to some sort of formal agreement a la your comment about a committee. — Terrapin Station

More just that language isn't something which is institutional, as "consensus" seems to imply to me -- though there are other ways to institute, of course, than by consensus. I do not hold that meanings are made by consensus. There are even uses of similar phonemes which are unrelated to one another, and there are more or less popular uses of certain words, as well as archaic usage too.

There are institutions dedicated to language, but language came prior to said institutions.

Institutions are where we get conventions from. So, therefore, language is not purely conventional. I would say that there is a fact to the matter.

That sentence doesn't make sense to me, either (including grammatically). — Terrapin Station

"Tomato" means. "means" is a verb, indicating that the word is an active participant in language, regardless of intent. In the same way one might say "The rock is", I was stating ""Tomato" means" to indicate there is a fact to the matter.

Other than that, definitions only obtain via stipulation (per usage at least). — Terrapin Station

:D -- I am trying to draw a distinction between what you are smashing together. Definitions obtain via usage, not stipulation. So, it is either by use or by stipulation, at least if we happen to be just that smart and are debating the only two theories that are possible. ;)

To highlight the difference:

But then it's just a matter of whether other people will agree with that stipulation or not. If lots of folks agree and follow suit, then it becomes a conventional usage, and dictionary authors note it when they're doing their work. — Terrapin Station

Agreement is a kind of institutional action -- a way of creating institutions. But it is not agreement which gives meanings to words. We are able to stipulate, of course, because anything can serve as a sign. But this does not then mean that agreement creates meaning -- even if we agree to use "The crow flies from coast to coast" to mean "I'm a member of the Communist Party", and even if the entire communist party began using it in this manner, that would not change the meaning of "the crow flies from coast to coast".

There is a certain history to words which agreement is unable to overcome. People don't follow suit and decide to create language. Rather, we are born into a world with language, and it already means something, regardless of my intent.

I'd say that this is what your theory is unable to explain -- it explains how it is we can take a sign to mean something, but it doesn't explain the factual side of language.

(c) Definitions are stipulations, not truth claims — Terrapin Station

I think this is our only point of contention, really.

Anyway, so you mostly learn the conventions of the language in English class. You could separate prescriptions from that, but really, prescriptions are the conventions of a particular population (such as English professors and other people considered language experts)

On my view, one can not learn, or share, etc., meaning. Meanings are mental-only, and can't be made non-mental. You learn definitions and observe (behavioral) usage. Meanings are something that happen inside an individual's head, from a first-person perspective. (This is a response to your final question as well.) — Terrapin Station

Cool.

Then I'd submit to you that I know "tomato" means a round, soft, red fruit that is eaten raw or cooked and that is often used in salads, sandwiches, sauces, etc.

If I know that "tomato" means a round, soft, red fruit that is eaten raw or cooked and that is often used in salads, sandwiches, sauces, etc., then it is true that "tomato" means a round, soft, red fruit that is eaten raw or cooked and that is often used in salads, sandwiches, sauces, etc.

If an utterance is true, then there is a fact to the matter.

If there is a fact to the matter with respect to language, then not all language is stipulated.

An utterance is a matter of language. And so I'd conclude that there is something missing in the belief that "all English definitions are stipulated"

This is just a bit more formal way of presenting what I already stated above.

"Definition" does not refer to consensus usage. The latter I've already assented to.

I imagine what's throwing us off is this:

Now, if everyone began to use "tomato" as "used for emphasis", then the meaning of the word has changed. — Moliere

But there is a difference between saying that we can tell what "tomato" means by what everyone uses "tomato" as, and that a descriptive definition refers to consensus usage. A descriptive definition describes the meaning of a term. We can tell what the meaning of that term is by the extension of usage of said term. There's not exactly a Committee for Consensus on the Sign which holds conventions to ensure consensus is reached, at least with most natural languages.

A stipulative definition is understood because I know what "to stipulate" means. "Tomato" has meaning regardless of what a person might stipulate it as because "stipulate" means. So, no, just because someone can use a sign idiosyncratically that doesn't sink the notion that "tomato" means something regardless of said stipulation.


Also, I think you're focusing on my former part -- admittedly larger -- of the post in this dialogue, whereas I'm focusing on my questions, such as:

How would you deal with, say, the existence of an English class? What is it they are learning? The mathematical average of the contents of a culture's mind? — Moliere

Which seems to me to be the results of your theory -- that what you learn in English class, when you learn word meaning, is the average of mental contents -- which sounds a lot like consensus to me, but maybe not to you.

But if I could just have one question answered, because you seem to be indicating that I have it wrong, this would be the one:

what would you say we learn when we learn the meanings to English words, given that meanings are mental/private/subjective? — Moliere

I'm not sure what this is directed at.

Well, I don't want to boil semantics down to pragmatics, more than anything. So "attached" just means it's not merely the usage of an utterance which is the meaning, but that the meaning of some utterance can be determined by the extension of usage.

This is not my account, but my understanding of your account. Just to be clear.

Yeah, as truth-bearers. And it would differ, at least from my understanding of Propositions, because the meaning is attached to utterances -- the extension of usage. Propositions, from what I understand, are semi-Platonic entities.

It seems to follow from your theory of stipulation -- at least, that's the best interpretation I can come up with, given that meanings are mental/private/subjective. When a class learns the meaning of the word, and the meanings of words are mental/private/subjective, then it would seem that the meanings we learn are some conglomeration of mental meanings.

Obviously the hypothetical person is stipulating another definition. But not many people are using said definition, no?

But you seem to be saying I have it wrong. So, what would you say we learn when we learn the meanings to English words, given that meanings are mental/private/subjective?

The latter.

As in, the whole process of definition relies on truth, so trying to define truth will necessarily result in circularity? Or just a general skepticism, given the results so far?

Sorry @Mongrel for the divergence. If you think it's not quite applicable, we could move this to another thread. My thought was that "meanings" could actually serve as one half to the correspondence theory -- meanings could correspond to facts, whether those facts be about English or otherwise.


"associating" differs in meaning from "defining". And, yes, we certainly disagree on word meaning.

Were you to define "tomato" as "used for emphasis", and by "define" I mean "descriptive definition", then that definition would be false. This is because the meaning of a word does not belong "in the head", as you say. We may take a sign and stipulate a meaning with that sign. But "tomato" still means "a round, soft, red fruit that is eaten raw or cooked and that is often used in salads, sandwiches, sauces, etc." -- I can imagine other ways of phrasing this too that would be true -- regardless of your stipulation.

Now, if everyone began to use "tomato" as "used for emphasis", then the meaning of the word has changed. But that, in and of itself, is no reason to think that meanings on "in the head".


Consider, for instance, the following:

Heber brewed a of gone huber of a draken fitch-witch wherever why to run gone mad

I can tell you what I mean by this, but clearly it doesn't mean anything in English -- because there is a fact to the matter of English(just because we are "in L" does not mean there is no fact to the matter). Also, the word "mean" here has two different meanings -- my first usage means "intend" and my latter use means "extension of a word".

Hence why I'd say there is more to definitions than stipulations. There are stipulative definitions, but there's a reason one must stipulate -- because the meanings of words are often more diffuse than some given speaker might wish to express.

Now, intentions are mental and we can intend this or that meaning with a word. But meanings differ from intent.


All that being said, you are of course free to postulate and even stick to a strictly stipulative theory of meaning. But it is at the very least idiosyncratic. What reason would you have for believing it, given that we have to learn a language, after all, and that there are at least purported facts about language. How would you deal with, say, the existence of an English class? What is it they are learning? The mathematical average of the contents of a culture's mind?

What would motivate such a belief?

Sorry I missed that. Off to work atm, but your reliance on "the meanings themselves" looks suspect to me. Will post more later, but that's likely what I would respond to when I have time to think more.

However I would say that we always want to avoid harm, while we don't always want to obtain pleasure because the costs (pain) may be too high. — darthbarracuda

Why would you say say that?

I mean, if people were rational, then perhaps that'd be the case.

But there are people who desire harm, and not just as a form of pleasure. An act can be both painful and harmful, and people will still desire it. I don't know if you know people like this -- but one example that sticks out to me is a series of bad relationships I've witnessed. They desire the person, even though that person is harmful for them, and results in pain. But they want that person, in spite of the evidence that that person is neither healthy or pleasurable for them.

Well I suppose this is where cosmic metaphysics might start to come into play. If we can't actually conceive of someone as not being a slave to their will, then perhaps it is actually the case that the will is metaphysically superior than the do. — darthbarracuda

I think we can conceive it. Most certainly it is conceivable. I'm stating that even though we may conceive of god-like features, and even desire ourselves to be god-like, and pursue this status, that in spite of desire we just aren't the sort of creature who can be without desires. If we were to succeed in making a one who acted out of something other than desire, then I don't think we'd be able to reasonably say that that one is human.

Deflation isn't so bad. You know what truth means in the sense that you know how to use the word. There probably isn't any definition that would be useful for teaching people what truth is. Since a definition is an assertion, the learner has to know what truth is in order to understand what a definition is. So the learner knows what truth is prior to hearing any particular definition. — Mongrel

That argument makes sense to me. But it doesn't seem to answer the question, ya'know? It seems more like an argument for the possibility of answering the question, "What is truth?"

That depends on your definition. :D

Stipulative definitions are stipulative. But definitions in the dictionary, at least if we follow the Oxford model, are descriptive. So if one gave a descriptive definition of "tomato" as "to move with rapid jerky motions" that would be a false assertion.

There are also prescriptive definitions -- you may say "Irregardless" to mean "we can ignore that point because what's salient is...", but some may say that you should just say "regardless"

There's a cool article on definitions in the SEP: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/definitions/

http://hinterlandgames.com/

That's been the game I've played most recently. I have a thing for trying out survival games -- some of them aren't that great, but the genre isn't exactly established yet either so I like to see how different people do them. At a minimum I always figure they'd make great engines for other folks to make a story with.

One survival game that has created something really cool:

http://store.steampowered.com/app/282070/

Just prior to that game:

http://stoicstudio.com/

There's only 2 in the series, and they plan on making a third. It's a story-driven turn-based strategy game, with a kind of Oregon Trail element thrown in. The reason I thought it was cool is that the whole game is animated in the old-style of animation, where they drew the characters and colored them. I've also found the story compelling.


And just prior to that, though very different in tone from the previous ones: http://stardewvalley.net/

Playing that game just made me feel happy every time I'd play it.




Everything I've read on that game is that the hype did not live up to reality. And not in some sense where they didn't quite reach their goals but still made something worthwhile, but starkly so.

I would say that fear is an negative emotion that motivates a desire-creation that further motivates action. Fear makes us uncomfortable. So basically all desires are spawned from the instantiation of a negative experience. The insidious part about all this is that positive experiences, although being positive, will always promote a negative experience. — darthbarracuda

I suppose this is what I'm trying to get at -- your account seems to focus on what we would term are pleasures derived by satisfying needs and wants. But desire is not all about pleasure, or even concern (which seems to enter your account in the same way as desire -- at the beginning, but isn't mentioned again). It's not even all about wants or needs, or the combination of these four. Desire is not separate from emotion, as you seem to indicate in your treatment of fear. Emotions don't make desires, but emotions motivate us -- just as desires motivate us. They do similar things, and are often concurrently with one another, and may even be synonymous (though I'm not willing to state that). It would be better, at least from my standpoint, to just use the terms "pleasure", "wants", and "needs" rather than "desire" -- especially as your account of desire seems to somehow exclude emotion.

Further, I thoroughly disagree that desire is spawned from negative experiences only. Smoking cigarettes, for instance, is a positive experience which reinforces the desire for cigarettes. (or, at least, is that way for many people -- obviously not everyone has a positive experience smoking cigarettes. But you get the point).

The point I was getting at was that the requirement to fulfill desires, however illusory this satisfaction is, manipulates us into harming ourselves. — darthbarracuda

I would say that pursuing our desires can lead to self-harm. I may desire to maintain a healthy diet, for instance, and pursuing that desire wouldn't harm me. I may desire the best tasting food all the time, and pursuing that desire could (insofar that "best tasting" is, as is often the case, unhealthy)

Further, "harm" is already a word bound up in the logic of desire, no? It's not like I have my desires over here which manipulate me in the middle to go to the harms over there. I want to avoid harms. And these are the things which I need to avoid.

Yeah, it seems related to the paradox of desire. The point being, however, is that a happy slave is still a slave. — darthbarracuda

But your terminology of "slave" is only relative to some sort of demi-god-like character, because it is based on a freedom that is not only unattainable, but could reasonably be interpreted as some kind of super- or post-human freedom. You seem to believe that we could only be free and not a slave if we were to act out of something other from desire.

What, literally speaking here, on earth would that be?

As such I would submit to you that there is such a thing as freedom even if we have desires. It is not the freedom of ex nihilo, but it's certainly different from being a slave. (or even a slave to our passions, which can, of course, lead to harm -- I think I'm more disagreeing with the scope of your claims than anything. Desire can certainly lead to harm as well as a deprivation of freedom, even human freedom. It's just not universal of desire)

That makes a good deal of sense to me.

Heh. I'm even anti-representaitonal in my thinking on knowledge, it's just that all the alternatives I've read on truth are either 1) obviously not what truth means (coherency, pragmatic), 2) flabbergasting (anything somewhat related to deflationary approaches)

Then there's this other side to me that wonders about other uses of "truth" which don't seem to be addressed by any of the theories. Not that these would be what truth is, per se, but then what is it people mean by "truth" if they are not meaning truth?

So I can see the motivation for wanting another theory of truth aside from correspondence. I just haven't found that bridge into the topic which makes it easy for me to make heads or tails of.

Eh.. anyway. The way you have framed the issue makes it sound like you accept Correspondence theory. Is this the case? — Mongrel

It's more or less how I think about truth, yes.

But I think I've mentioned elsewhere I find most of the stuff I've read on truth confusing. So I just default to the theory that at least makes sense to me. It does, at least, seem to encapsulate what truth means, at least, if not what truth is.

I'd hazard to say that desire is more complicated than needs/wants, especially when needs and wants are imagined along a scale of intensity more than some kind of difference between them.

Think of fear. Where would that fit in your schema? I imagine that we'd posit that it is a pain, and to relieve pain is a kind of pleasure. But I would say this is to misunderstand fear. Fear is neither a need nor a want, and it can vary in intensity so that it is more pressing than either needs or wants. Yet I would classify it as a desire, though it is unrelated to pleasure per se (though I do believe there is a pleasure in a continued state of non-pain -- that is a specific kind of pleasure, but I wouldn't define fear along the lines of this pleasure-pain)

But this is somewhat grammatical. I tend to think of desire in fairly wide terms -- and I also tend to believe that the satisfaction of desire is somewhat illusory, that there is no lack which is being filled in the pursuit of desire. I would say that 'filling a lack' is more characteristic of our needs than desires, as a whole. (food, shelter, sex -- the craving returns, but they are satisfiable too, unlike many of our desires)


Also, I'd posit to you that desires don't force us to do things, but rather as you note near the end that desires are "woven into" our being. Not sure if I'd go so far as to say all sentient creatures are like this, but I think it's safe to say humans are. But if that be the case, then desires don't force us to do things, but rather that desires are a necessary condition for our being -- without them we wouldn't be. An analogue to desire would be the body; we are not our bodies, at least as we usually understand what a person is (whatever the factual scientific picture might paint in the end), but we certainly wouldn't be without a body.

As such, a concept of freedom which denies desire is literally a super-human concept. It may in some sense be coherent and even make sense for super-human beings. But not human beings. (and, I'd hazard, that we posit it as we, as human beings, often have the desire to be more than what we are)

A truthmaker is an entity which makes utterances true (or sentences, if you like).

A justification is a reason to believe.

Justification has precious little to do with truth, on my view. Sure, insofar that we want to know we want to believe what is true. But justification has to do with belief and persuasion more than truth.

EDIT: By 'entity' I mostly mean to denote individuated existence -- events, objects, persons would all qualify.