That certainly seems to apply in dementia: one's self-identity floats away, sometimes with traumatic interruptions en route. 'You are not my child,' says the mother to the daughter, 'she never comes to visit.' If one no longer has anchoring longer-term memories to which to relate one's perceptions, one loses one's self of oneself. And yet, as Moliere says (interesting thread Moliere), up to then the person might well have got along without thinking much about self-awareness. — mcdoodle

Could you speak more about this? I'm still having trouble connecting awareness to identity, even with the example of dementia. Perhaps this is because I think of awareness as withing the context of Searle's discussions on consciousness -- where the term refers to our ability to focus or unfocus our mind upon various things within our environment or mind. I gather that awareness and memory are actually linked in this way of referring to awareness, though.

The second train of thought I have is autobiographical. I moved to a new town where I knew absolutely no-one ten years ago. In an odd way I have constructed a new identity - while eventually emerging from the darkness I was in 10 years ago, to reconnect with friends In knew in my old identity too. Yet of course the experiencing animal feels like 'the same' one, and there are various character traits or dispositions which seem shared between the old and new fellow. — mcdoodle

That's true. I think there's a sense of being a new person when you move like that, as you note at the beginning. I certainly empathize with what you say there.

One other thought: the rational part of us has a strong urge to ascribe some logic to personal identity. But to my mind an individual human being is rarely that consistent: sometimes they will do something that directly contradicts something else they do or have done. The human creature does what it can in each particular set of circumstances to get by, and rationalisations come later. — mcdoodle

I agree, though I might call some instances of rationlisation as going against someone's identity. I don't necessarily believe that just because someone says something about themself, sincerely, that they are correct. (which isn't to say that I'm in a better position to know what is correct, only that they can say false things).

But, yes, I think most individuals are inconsistent. I wouldn't call this a fractured identity, either, but would say that this points to the complexity of identity. As in, it's quite normal for people to be inconsistent with themselves across time in some sort of axiomatic sense of consistency.

What else but genetic instructions would guide the construction and function of the brain? — Bitter Crank

The in utero environment, for one, but also the social environment into which said brain functions is born into and develops within.

I wouldn't claim that DNA doesn't matter. Mine is a more reserved hesitation which would grant DNA, but is uncertain about its centrality, given that we don't form an identity just by having a brain but only within a social sphere. And also, merely a hesitation. It seems that there's a lot of steps from the DNA giving a basis for RNA giving a basis for proteins giving construction to. . . well, the different cells. I actually wouldn't know the steps after that. But my hesitation is based on this knowledge of the sheer complexity involved from DNA to even a single neuron forming, which doesn't touch on how multiple neurons might then be related to the formation of an identity. That isn't to say that we can't understand these things, though -- I just would say I'm ignorant and would want more information before subscribing to a theory of identity where DNA plays a central role.


I suppose I do mean a fully formed, adult identity when I say "identity". Though one could say that a minimilist theory of identity would be when a person forms a belief where the world is separate from myself. But I don't think that we are born with that belief, even if it seems to come pretty early on in our formation.

Our identity is made for us, but it is ours none the less, and is either beyond remodeling after a certain point, or remodel-able only through the most strenuous possible efforts (and maybe not even then). — Bitter Crank

What makes you say that?

I don't even necessarily disagree, mind. I wouldn't say that just because something is constructed that it is remodelable, per se. A marriage, for instance, is built by two people, but can be ruined beyond repair because we have a specific history and sequence of events which aren't ever going to change.

I couldn't say that I believe DNA is as central to identity as you seem to. What leads you to believe that DNA is so central? When you say:

Physical experiences, imagination, acquisition of knowledge (and exactly what knowledge is acquired), insights, social interactions (and exactly what social interactions), exactly what is learned (and not learned) and so forth contribute to a kernel of identity that is present from the beginning of a life. — Bitter Crank

Are these the things which DNA builds?


Mind, I would still say there's such a thing as not choosing who you are. (choice presupposes identity -- there's an actor with agency who chooses, after all.) I just don't think I'd link it to DNA.

Or perhaps our personal identity is not ours, but arises solely from what others tell us, their memories, their desires and their feelings. We learn a language, and we learn to associate words with referents and give them meanings, feelings, desires that are normative, but are felt to be particular to our self, even though they originate outside of us, and we construct our self and limit our self in this manner. — Cavacava

I generally think that our personal identity is not ours (to who would said identity belong? Another identity? It seems that "ours" is tied to "identity" to my mind) -- but I wouldn't say that it arises solely from what others. It seems to me that people are formed by social pressures, but also -- in spite of this -- can feel alienated by their social situation, or feel that "who they are" is in conflict with society.

But, yes, I would say that my view of identity is not one of continuity. There's an odd feeling that who I am today is the same person as who I was 10 years ago, but it's an odd feeling because it's so clearly not the case. I don't think I have an explanation for this feeling of continuity. Probably a weakness in some of my thoughts there. I'd say, in general though, that my opinions about identity fall more into "it's a construct" camp, and that one of the major forces in making that construct is outside of who we are (even historically speaking, prior to there being an "I") but that we still feel like, in spite of this, it is our/my-self.

There's food for wonder there.... the notion that perception, memory, and desire are more fundamental than identity. Do you mean that a creature could have these things without being aware of being a unique individual? — Mongrel

I would agree with that statement. Certainly perception and memory, though I'm a little more uncertain about desire -- however, for the sake of argument and consistency, I'm happy to adopt that stance. It certainly fits what I've said.

That would mean that what you mean by identity is awareness of it?

I don't think so. Could you explain how that follows?

It seems to me that awareness of our identity is separate from the tripartite division of identity-formation and expression. Awareness of one's identity would probably fit in with identity-expression, in that these tokens would be our first indicators about who we are when we reflect upon who we are and want to know that. But it seems to me that a person could get along with their life without self-awareness while still having a complete identity.

I just came across this recently, and it strikes me as topical: https://medium.com/@jencoates/i-am-a-transwoman-i-am-in-the-closet-i-am-not-coming-out-4c2dd1907e42#.wg4l9x8m9

I would say that "getting rid of genders entirely" isn't possible because many people feel they are strongly one particular gender. If one feels that way, then what would it mean to "get rid of genders"? To just not speak about what you feel?

I don't disagree that there are difficulties with the notion @BitterCrank, but I would disagree that we are stuck. I don't think that leaders and followers are ingrained into human nature. I would rather say that our social structures work on human nature to create people who are ingrained to it.

I'd even paint a grimmer picture than the one you do :). But what's the point of doing so? In the end I agree with the ideal. And I even see possible routes if more people agreed that leadership and follower-ship were best left behind, such as introducing school curricula and beginning spoke-wheel democratic reforms, as opposed to strictly representative, at the municipal level.

Leadership and follower-ship are overdue to be consigned to the dustbin of history. — unenlightened

I just want to note that I'm sympathetic to this line of thinking.

The definition of a leader is one who has followers. Period, full stop. In teaching union organizing I emphasize this over and over again because people get caught up in trying to find someone like themselves, more often than not, without a clear-cut definition to think through their situation. People have the tendency to ask "who do I follow" rather than "who does everyone follow"

Something important in that to your question, un, is that it does not disclude good and decent people.

So, definitionally at least, we can have good and decent leaders.

Practically, so it seems, I think we can as well. My doubts arise more from the empirical case where it seems "good and decent" leadership seems to be at a deficit. Of course that depends on what we are looking for in good and decent people or good and decent leaders too. If we are people familiar in the ways of the world we might even endorse someone who wouldn't pass the muster in bible study, so to speak -- they get things done which help people, even if they bend the rules along the way. Isn't that the hallmark of a good and decent person, one who is not only willing to sacrifice for the greater good but also has the courage to do so?

Dangerous thinking in there. But it does seem to me that this sort of thinking, or these sorts of values, are often at the heart of what people mean by "good and decent leadership" vs. "good and decent people" -- perhaps its not that we ourselves are selfish, but that we just have different ideals when it comes to evaluating good people vs. good leaders. (as if they were not quite people themselves) Or perhaps we have just been duped into thinking that we need two different systems of evaluation (or perhaps it's just a learned reflex on our part so that we don't become too disappointed?)


One thing about the quote -- it seems the speaker believes that they are good and decent as much as the person they're hoping to push out of office. But, to read your article, that's far from the truth.


Also, I got to thinking about "what are the tactics which the good and the decent can't use?" In the main it seems to me that we have manipulation in mind. But, in my experience at least, manipulation isn't quite as widespread as we tend to believe. Not that people aren't tempted to manipulate or don't try to manipulate people. But, rather, people are usually pretty good at sniffing out manipulation. While there may be some grade-A sociopaths who've made their way to the halls of power using their uncanny ability to read people, I think people in power have a tendency towards sincerity if that's not the case. What's incredible is how much they believe what they are saying, even though what they say is manipulative and seems to be designed to push the buttons of a certain group of people. (speech writers and experts playing their role, I suppose)

((This admixture of sociopathic power-seekers and sincere idealists probably explains why political groups are a confusing lot, and that it's easier to simply look at them all as corrupt.))

When manipulation is not in play something that is in play is the need to simplify what is complex so that your people can understand the situation and, hopefully, have some opinion that they want you to act on rather than delegating everything to you. That process of translating technical policy and circumstantial situations into easier decisions for people not involved in the day-to-day operations of an organization (be it party or otherwise) is where, so I believe, a lot of automatic manipulation occurs. So you have good and decent people throughout the halls of power, from the lowest to the highest, and they all have to be able to perform this skill of breaking down the situation they find themselves in to a set of choices to be evaluated by people who are not in the day-to-day operations. Even Jesus Christ himself, to use a character earlier, had motives and agendas he was trying to accomplish. For the greater good, no less. It would only be natural for him to perform this act of translation in favor of his goals. (or, if he's climbing the party ladder, in favor of the goals of his employer, the party, in the hopes that someday he'll get to. . .) ((afterthought: You may believe the third way is to explain this act of translation. I encourage anyone to try doing so. It's a move outside the game -- it is a philosophical move -- that accomplishes nothing but making you look strange))

So this is just the long way of arriving at a support in favor of good and decent people in government. While not all of them are, I would say that there's more than what we might prefer to say (given our disappointments with government, perhaps). But that the system of representation has limitations, and being good or decent does not erase those limitations. They could be thought of as necessary limitations if representative systems are the best we can hope for in our and any life.


Another thought on goodness and decency: It seems to me that we learn goodness and decency to be a deferral of desire, or the control of desire, or acquiescing to the desire of others. But in government, and in the search for power, we are fulfilling desire. Indeed, this is perhaps one of the hardest things to help someone over when I have tried to train leaders, and may be insurmountable in some people. Goodness, in the case where you are representing people, is not stepping back and letting others have their way, but is pursing the good of the people you represent even if it happens to take away from others you don't represent. So, in part, all this might depend on what we are thinking about when we think of the words "good and decent".

I, for one, do not want my politicians to acquiesce. In fact it seems to me that much of my dissatisfaction with the Democratic party is that they give up on things that effect me and mine all too easily (mostly because it doesn't effect they and them, except through the abstract system of representation).

It seems believable to me. Sounds a bit like the Democratic party at home.

I am pretty ignorant when it comes to British politics. Thanks for helping alleviate that ignorance some.

@unenlightened

What's your take on this article? http://time.com/4383419/brexit-labour-party-jeremy-corbyn/

A guess that's a bit of a shot in the dark, but some first thoughts:



I have used the same phrase but in different ways. In those cases it was often on the line of knowing somebody's heart is in the right place but they weren't able to gather a following, or that they didn't inspire confidence. Here this seems different because you're claiming that he did inspire a following. If that's the case then he's certainly a leader. It doesn't matter how one inspires people, only that you have followers. So I would read the comment more along the lines of trying to cash in on disappointment that people might have in order to benefit himself or others he is beholden to. (It should be noted I know nothing about British politics -- this is just my guess).


All this to say that, no, I don't think he is right as a matter of fact. As society is organized we certainly need leaders and leadership (I believe that British parliament is, at least, first-past-the-post style elections? So we are similar in that regard, at least). And those journeys to leadership, because they are invested with power, are beset by the traps and snares of the greedy, ambitious, and self-serving (many of who already have what they want, but wish to protect it).

So we would expect fewer of the good and more of the greedy.

In addition, this reliance upon leaders to do our bidding for us, I think, makes this an easier thing to do. We are, after all, human -- even if we are good and decent. So if you are the leader who has put in the time and effort to lead, it might become pretty easy to convince yourself that you deserve something for it.

I think I'm sort of echoing mcdoodle here, now that I'm reading it.

I think that's a pretty big question ;). I doubt my answer would elucidate much. Generically it is a social construct, but of the big variety -- larger than any one institution, it is multi-generational and moves across borders. It's similar, in many ways, to racism. The violence which women experience, the way rape is handled in court, the manner in which women's health issues are political issues to be discussed in the first place, the earning gap, and the way women are portrayed in the media are all evidence of the patriarchy. But there are many books available to read which are better than this hap-dash explanation. Heck, there's an entire field of study dedicated to this sort of thing.

I'm fond of https://www.amazon.com/Sexual-Politics-Kate-Millett/dp/0252068890 because its theory of patriarchy is very clearly stated and makes a good deal of sense of many aspects of patriarchy, but there's a huge selection of readings out there on women's studies. The best way to understand it is to just dive into the theory, history, and so forth. Then you'll have a better view of what isn't quite amenable to easy to think about and clearly stated theses :)

Seriously, I have no clue what the hell feminism is supposed to be these days. You can't get an adequate definition without someone calling bullshit.

So what is feminism? A common definition is that of a desire for gender-equality, and yet this is often a ridiculed position within certain feminist circles. If we can come to an agreement as to what feminism is, has feminism accomplished its goals? Is the notion of the Patriarchy a legitimate notion? Is feminism still needed today? — darthbarracuda

Feminism is a political and social movement which focuses on sexual equality, obtaining power for women, and dismantling patriarchy (generally speaking). Most histories of the movement begin with what is termed "first wave feminism", which was the fight for female suffrage but has flowered into a much wider umbrella.

There are many kinds of feminisms and feminists -- it's good to be mindful of that. There is no monolithic feminism to contend with -- feminists disagree with one another. Pleasing one group of feminists, if such is your goal, won't please another group and vice versa.

I am a feminist for several reasons. But what began my identification down that path a long time ago was a desire to not play out certain male roles and to not be constrained by certain male roles which I think are damaging to healthy living. In addition I generally believe in equality, and so find that to be a worthwhile goal on all fronts.

Some of the things which feminists have set out to do have been accomplished, and some haven't -- again, depending on the feminist group you are talking to. Since it is a social and political movement it's not quite amenable to sharp definition, or even to clear-cut consensual goals. But this is true of any social or political movement, and is far from unique to feminism. So to answer the title question -- wtf is up with feminism is feminism is a social and political movement, and not a singular philosophical thesis, and so it's going to contain a multiplicity of viewpoints, opinions, desires, expressions, goals, and so forth, and probably won't be amenable to the clean-cut treatment -- at least, as a movement, if not for a particular feminist philosophy -- which we tend to enjoy as philosophically inclined people.

I disagree that we ought to go into interpretation assuming that what we're interpreting works or is correct; I hold that such a view amounts to making a position unfalsifiable and has allowed you to disregard my criticisms on the simple grounds that they declare Epicureanism false in some way, which is an absurd maxim to abide by. You seem to think charity requires of us that we assume as a working rule that our interlocutor is right, which is obviously ridiculous. That's not what charity is, and it makes decent criticism impossible. Yes this conversation is a waste of time if you continue, as you have, to disregard what I say just on the grounds that it disagrees with Epicureanism. Read what you've written and tell me that's not exactly what you've done -- not dismissed it because it's wrong, but because it results in Epicureanism being in some way incoherent as a whole. Well then, why am I wasting my breath, since all roads lead to the Garden for you, and this is an a priori constraint on your interpretation of the philosophy? — The Great Whatever

If all roads lead to the Garden for me then I couldn't even disagree with the philosophy. I certainly do. My disagreement has been with your interpretation on the basis that it is uncharitable, not because I think Epicureanism must be correct. Correctness is a different sort of judgment from interpretation. Further, I wouldn't criticise your interpretation on the basis of whether your are correct or not because there are multiple interpretations -- I'll emphasize again that we're dealing with an ancient text written in a culture we have no tangible contact with, and merely translations of said text, and on top of that we aren't even dealing with an entire text, but fragments. Clearly there are going to be multiple interpretations, even of the fair variety. However, I think there are certainly more charitable interpretations at hand than what you present thus far.

If you've read Bertrand Russell's A History of Western Philosophy you'd get similar treatments in his chapters on Nietzsche and Hegel. If, in fact, Russell's interpretation of Nietzsche or Hegel were correct then his criticisms would have a lot more weight. As they are, however, it reads better as a joke book of sorts and a good example of why interpretation is so important prior to criticism.

Sure it is, and in fact you just said it again: — The Great Whatever

And perhaps this is where we are crossing paths, too -- as I emphasized above, I am not dealing in correctness here as much as I am dealing in interpretation of belief. "Working", in this sense is just "coheres together".

How does the Epicurean deal with the problem of pain? How does the Epicurean philosophy make pain easy to endure?

Not "Does the Epicurean philosophy make pain easy to endure" -- but "How does it. . ."

See the difference? The first is after a fact. The latter is after a meaning.

First of all, if you a priori don't accept any conclusion to the effect that a tenet of Epicureanism is false, on the grounds that this is uncharitable, then Epicureanism is literally unfalsifiable. I hope that rereading this you see that it's an absurd position. So being charitable I'll assume you can't have meant it, I guess. — The Great Whatever

That's not what I said?

As for criticism being rendered inoperable -- Yes, exactly. Until you understand something you can't criticize something. In order to understand something one must interpret charitably. This is especially the case when dealing with ancient texts being translated from cultures we have no tangible familiarity with and who we cannot even so much as ask a question of.

Now, perhaps you already understand Epicureanism. I would say in only some parts I do, but others I do not. Especially how Epicureanism treats pain -- I would say there's a tension in the philosophy here. But I don't think that the entire project collapses in on itself due to the tension, at least not yet, and it seems to me there there is a workable solution to the tension.

At the very least, if it be so central -- and given the philosophy, it seems to me pain is quite important -- then it makes sense to figure out how this concept works within the philosophy assuming that it does, in fact, work as a practical rule of interpretation.

These are things I said earlier, but it is worth saying them again because, while it may sound absurd to you that I'm still reading with this sort of thought in mind. If that renders my thoughts a waste of time then I apologise for wasting yours. But, all the same, it has been worthwhile to me thus far because your points have motivated me back to the texts.

Because, if you accept that pain is in some cases not easy to endure, then you cannot also accept that pain, as a general principle is easy to endure. I'm not sure how you're squaring this contradiction for yourself, other than by saying 'yeah well that rule of the tetrapharmikos only applies sometimes,' which renders it totally impotent, since then Epicureanism is not only not a universal cure, but only a cure for those seasons in which you're not in serious pain that's hard ot endure -- in which case, who gives a shit, we don't need philosophy for times when everything is easy to endure! The insight of the Epicurean position is presumably that all suffering, even the difficult, can be made easy to endure, or else it has no bite. But this is precisely what you've denied, and then acted as if it isn't a problem! Is Epicureanism really so weak that it amounts to 'life is easy when life is easy?' Is a philosophy even needed for that? — The Great Whatever

First off, this was just one possible solution to the problem. I'm not necessarily committed to saying that it only works sometimes. Mostly it's a problem I'm trying to work out. Of course if there is no workable solution then, hey, strike against the philosophy. But I'm not yet convinced that this is the case -- especially considering there are workable solutions.

Second, if it works sometimes, most of the time, and even helps to ease pain in times of duress, I would say that "renders it totally impotent" is an exaggeration on your part. Especially considering the frequency of torture. Supposing 100 things happen to you in your life, and 1 percent of those things is torture, and such-and-such a way of life helps you with the other 99 percent of things -- then, clearly, even if you are in error one time, you have a net benefit.

There is no 'Epicurean concept of pleasure.' There is only one concept of pleasure, which both the Epicurean and other hedonists make claims about. The Epicurean then makes, in my estimation, a false claim -- namely, that freedom from pain is itself pleasant.

To see why this isn't so, we can note that corpses are free from all pain and struggle, yet they feel no pleasure. So it must be that living free from all pains and struggles, and experiencing this freedom is what is good, not simply being free from it. But what is it to experience this? In eating we experience pleasure as a relief from hunger, as well as from the stimulation of our taste buds. But these are both kinetic pleasures by the Epicurean's account. So the taste itself cannot be the pleasure that matters, nor can it be relief from pain. Rather, the Epicurean has to say that the state itself of not being in that pain must be pleasant. But pleasure is a feeling, and so must have some phenomenological quality (which is why corpses don't undergo it, because they feel nothing). So what does not being in any pain feel like? Well, precisely nothing -- there is a feeling to relieving one's bladder, or the taste of a delicious food, but there is no feeling at all of 'not being hungry,' except insofar as it is kinetic satisfaction of, and so removal of, hunger. If you abstract away from all kinetic aspects of pleasure, there results no feeling at all, and so no pleasure. So Epicurus is wrong: it is not pleasant to be free of pain, but rather indifferent. — The Great Whatever

Eh, I think this is kind of a strawman account. The distinction between kinetic and static pleasure isn't some kind of central distinction to the philosophy, one (though we have already talked about that, so I feel like we might just repeat ourselves here), and the pleasures you're talking about are clearly necessary and natural pleasures. So they are the one's one is meant to fulfill in order to be happy. Even if "there is no such thing as necessary and natural pleasures", then even by the reifiecation these things are clearly what is meant. This doesn't really speak against anything Epicurus states.

Clearly the Epicureans think that physics founds ethics in some way -- they, like the Stoics, were after what is the natural end of human beings, which requires knowledge of the natural world. However you want to put this, as providing a 'justification,' or 'foundation' or whatever, it doesn't matter. The point is that they see physics as somehow integral to ethics, which I'm skeptical of. As to the reference to Lucretius, the question is not whether the Ecpicureans think there is some such tie or attempt to provide one, but whether there is one, to be found in their theory or anywhere else. — The Great Whatever

Then I must say we are talking past one another. In order to do as you say here:

And our goal is also to acknowledge that when the best of our most generous interpretive efforts still make the philosophy founder, we have to admit the inconsistency rather than continue to deny it. — The Great Whatever

We must first be able to state the inconsistency. And if there is some way to make a philosophy work then even if there's a tension (of which any philosphy has) that is not the same as the philosophy simply being inconsistent with itself.

Before being able to judge something true or false, I think you have to understand what is being said first. And in order to understand what is said, we must be charitable. I would say that I am still at the stage of understanding -- where there are some things which are clearly in contradiction to what I believe, and so I am settled (at present, at least), this is not one of them.

So I am asking -- how does the 4th precept fit into the philosophy of epicureanism? How is it possible for it to make sense? Your answer here is simply that it doesn't, because it is false. I find that unsatisfactory because it leaves much to be explained, and because it is uncharitable.

My point is, first, that this is precisely not what Epicurean philosophy claims to do, and far from placing limits on itself, has a Hellenistic machismo that promises, with careful application, to bring about the invincible sage, that is undisturbed by torture. These are not human limits; they are fantasies (barring perhaps, extraordinary feats of asceticism, which are not recommended by Epicurus). — The Great Whatever

I must disagree. The thing is, the torture claim isn't a quote from any Epicurean text. It comes from Diogenes Laertius' description of Epicureanism, and could just as easily have come from the polemical works I referenced as much as Epicurus (in fact, the reference to the brazen bull is in the polemical works). So as interpreters we have to figure out what to do with it -- do we accept it as cannon, or not? If we do, then how does that fit with the claim that pain is easy to endure, and that the sage is one who is happy regardless of the circumstances? If not, then what is being claimed about pain and how do we deal with the problem of pain within Epicurean philosophy?

What is asserted by the quotes, however, is the ability to face death with happiness, even a painful drawn out death -- as Epicurus did. While not a super-human feat, it is also something that must be learned (because not everyone faces death like this) and is actually what philosophy has laid claim to outside of Epicurean texts: learning how to face death.

What your describing is one possible interpretation by the texts, I grant. But it is not the only one. And if there are different interpretations which don't have the philosophy collapsing, then the principle of charity would dictate that we go with them. Especially when dealing with ancient texts where ambiguity and a multiplicity of interpretations are easily on hand given the state of the evidence.

My second point is that you cannot just bite the bullet on this and then just go on affirming that pain is easy to endure. As if the contentless modifier 'more or less' helps?

Why not?

Clearly, pain is not easy to endure, and Epicurean philosophy does not help make it easier to endure, and the sage has no way to free himself from bodily pain by studying the philosophy.

Here I believe you are simply asserting that the Epicurean claims are false. These assertions are not so clear to me.

I also doubt very much that Epicurus was anything more than a man. The sage is an ideal of the doxography; we don't expect to actually see sages walking around. Maybe people thought Epicurus was actually such a sage, which again is in keeping with the 'invincibility philosophy' of the Hellenistic schools.

Does your doubt matter, when the sage isn't anything more than a man who has perfected a way of life? Of course he was just a man. His flaws are evident in his writing. Being a sage doesn't exempt one from being a human.

Okay, but this seems opposed to what I was responding to, so I don't know what you mean. — The Great Whatever

I mean that it doesn't really go against anything I said. What is universal to Epicurean philosophy, such as his theory of pleasure, does not forbid sexual activity, or eating cheese, or having money. There are not particular rules or laws which an Epicurean must follow in the sense that you shouldn't have bacon mixed with cheese, that luxury is forbidden, etc. etc. What is universal is a set of categories which holds for people. But within those categories variation can play a part. You mentioned luxury and sex. But neither of these are forbidden, according to Epicurean principles -- not intrinsically. It doesn't work like that. Rather, if your desire for sex is an unnatural and unnecessary one, then you should not act on said desire. But if your desire for sex is a natural and unnecessary one, you can act on that desire.

It's not the particular action which is forbidden.

When Epicurus recommends against luxury and sexual desire it is because people are made anxious by the pursuit of such things. It is the disturbance of tranquility that he is combating, not the particular actions.

I disagree in the sense that pleasure is not a technical concept but a folk concept, and insofar as hedonists make claims about it, they do so in reference to the folk concept (indeed I doubt hedonism has any use at all if it tries to invoke a technical concept of pleasure, which is why utilitarianism in my opinion is a dead end). So no 'theory of pleasure' is going to give you a better grasp of that folk concept, but there can be true or false claims made about that very concept. — The Great Whatever

What does that matter?

Let's go with it being a folk concept. So, you are a hedonist. Meaning, pleasure is what we should pursue -- it is the only good.

OK. So, how do I do that? What is pleasurable, or what is pleasure? These are natural questions to ask of any hedonist.

Even if it is a folk concept, that doesn't mean the philosopher is unburdened to defend their hedonism.

The assertion that a lack of pain is itself a pleasure, or that there is a static form of pleasure, is such a false claim made by the Epicureans, in my view. Perhaps this comes about as the result of a desire to turn pleasure, a fleeting, temporary, contingent thing, into something immortal, which is always going to be the Epicureans' absurdity. To correct these mistakes, we should not invoke a theory of pleasure, but return to the phenomenon and point out in what way the Epicureans mischaracterize it, and why their philosophy has led them to do so.

Again, this only follows if you have a concept of pleasure -- or "the things themselves" -- to contrast against the Epicurean concept of pleasure, or "The phenomena itself" as described by the Epicurean.

I have doubts both that physics is foundationally relevant to ethics (perhaps it is instrumentally) and that the Epicureans did any useful physics. What we know of their theories makes them seem speculative and unhelpful. — The Great Whatever

I don't think it makes sense to look at ancient theories in light of foundationalism. The search for foundations, I don't believe, is what drives very much ancient philosophy but modern philosophy.

As for whether they did or did not do useful physics -- I mean, I wouldn't know whether or not that's the case. I do know that their atomic theories cohere well with modern atomic theories, though. But this was not by the same methods as modern atomic theories.

But is there any real sense in which Epicurean views on nature tie organically to their ethical project? — The Great Whatever

Definitely! Lucretius' poem does a superb job of demonstrating this.

It seems in the modern imagination the latter has retained some interest while the former hasn't in the slightest. Is everyone involved in modern Epicureanism just deluding themselves? And if not, doesn't that show the physical project to be of little importance?

I don't think I can say much about people involved in modern Epicureanism because I'm not involved in any sort of organized effort. But I can say that the physics ties into the ethics because it gives a pseudo-justification to the ethics. I say "pseudo-" because I think the ethical project takes prominence, though there are those who disagree with that.

Regardless of what we might give priority to in our reading, though, the physics and the ethics both support one another quite well. The ethics makes sense in a world where we have very little control over said world (it is a random collection of atoms extending infinitely upward and downward), where there is no afterlife (because the soul is a collection of very fine atoms), and where the Gods do not interfere with our lives (various superstitious explanations about nature are false). The physics makes sense in a world where we live as another one of the world's creatures with its own particular habits and needs.

I never said his theory of pleasure wasn't essential to the project, only that the Epicureans understand pleasure in a certain way, creating divisions between the static and the kinetic, and valuing the latter only insofar as it is on road to the former. Epicurean pleasure is negative and still, a pleasure of freedom from ill. The question as the letter points out is 'necessary for what?' If it's necessary for eudaimonia, the final end, and freedom from bodily pain is among what's necessary for this, there's just no getting around that you need to be free from bodily pain to be happy. And I think this is pretty obviously right. The problem is that once you admit this plausible principle, you're stuck as an Epicurean, because you have to say that the sage somehow must be able to avoid bodily pain with impunity, which he can't. The Epicurean wants, on the one hand, to have complete control and freedom over his life, and on the other, to base his ethics around what by its nature can't be controlled. I don't think there's a way of resolving this dilemma. — The Great Whatever

Just as a note I can go with your states all the way up to "a pleasure of freedom from ill". Sounds good to me.

I suppose, for me, I just see it as a tension in the philosophy -- I don't see it as sinking the project. It could be a strike against its internal consistency. But if there is a way for people to deal with pain, and Epicureanism helps one deal with pain, then I'd say that the Epicurean philosophy is still accomplishing what it set out to do within the bounds of human nature (i.e., it is internally consistent), even if there are cases where the notion of a sage simply will not apply (i.e. it does not accomplish what was set as a standard or interesting thought experiment by the interests of ethical conversation in his time and place).

Because it's the case that Epicureanism sets out to cure what ails people due to and through human nature. Autarky comes later as a result of being free of anxiety. Having a tranquil mind is the primary goal.

It's more than that -- it makes one tenet of the tetrapharmikos obviously false, which is what we started out with. I think an Epicurean philosophy that abandoned the abstract ideal of an invincible sage is perfectly coherent, but it goes against the spirit of the philosophy, and eudaimonistic philosophy generally. — The Great Whatever

I think you're overstating the case here. If a philosophy helps people within those human limits -- including the sage (which, in this case, is not just abstract, because there's Epicurus) -- then it accomplishes all that a philosophy can do. If torture is beyond that limit then what does that matter? Pain, more or less, is still easy to endure.

I mean, if you wanted, we could draw a convenient distinction just to make it true in all relevant circumstances :D. But that would be silly. And perhaps the project for invulnerability really is just silly, when the results that came from that question could still have worthwhile thoughts?

I would say "yes".

Also I would note here that we're sort of dealing with an empirical question. It could be elucidated if not resolved through experiment. Since that's the case we're also just dealing with "sounds plausible" -- it may sound implausible in certain circumstances, but that doesn't mean that it's false, only that it sounds implausible. I note this because, in interpretation, I don't think that it makes much sense to follow what sounds plausible to us. The whole point of understanding a work is to find what made sense to the person writing it, to the extent that this is possible. So while it may sound implausible, our goal as interpreters (so I would say) is to figure out how to make it plausible.

There's a difference in what usually when we say we can cope with X, or get better at dealing with X, we don't mean we remove it, but make its presence more tolerable. If we could remove it, we exactly wouldn't have to cope with, or get better at dealing with, it. With pain this distinction seems not to hold. I can't make sense of undergoing pain and easing it -- to ease pain is simply for pain to go away. — The Great Whatever

Not sure how to make it clearer to you than the example of a child burning themself vs. an adult burning themself. We could also look at physical sports and activity -- where someone who is new is not used to physical pain as much, but as you have to deal with it you learn how to cope better with physical pain.

Heck, emotional pain is similar, insofar that we deal with emotional pain in the correct way.


If we learn how to cope, then the pain is reduced. If not, then the next time we are hurt it hurts just as much as the first time. This seems to me to be a fairly common experience. (And I would note I don't think the mechanism is exposure -- mere exposure is not enough. There's more to it than that).

But yes, pleasure is always from a first-person perspective, and nothing is essentially guaranteed to be pleasant or painful, and there is no ultimate measure of what is or is not either of these other than the feeling itself. — The Great Whatever

Then I'd float the idea again -- it's your notion of pleasure which you differ with Epicurus on. And depending on which notion of pleasure we believe to be true then that is what would implicate who is reifying what, no?

Epicurus seems to speak explicitly against luxury and sensuous gratification, in a sort of moralizing tone, and defensively as if he knows, claiming to be a hedonist, that people will accuse him of approving of or recommending these things. Certainly Epicureanism makes explicit universal recommendations for how one ought to live. — The Great Whatever

I don't deny any of this.

What Epicurus says about sex and money is based on how these things affect people. But, again, there's nothing wrong with satisfying natural and unneccessary desires insofar that we retain ataraxia. That's the entire point of the tripartite categorization of pleasure -- to differentiate between what must be satisfied to be happy from the desires which do not need to be fulfilled, and to further differentiate between those what can cause anxiety from what will cause anxiety.

It seems to me that anyone who claims hedonism, at least in the philosophical sense (we can be practical hedonists without this, of course), owes their readers a theory of pleasure.

But why would a work on nature be relevant? — The Great Whatever

Because it's nature which gives sense to the ethic -- in the world, as portrayed by Epicurus, the Epicurean doctrine is what makes sense. Further, it is human nature, in particular the nature of our soul, which gives the ethic its force.

Lastly, it seems to go against the claim that epicurean philosophy is just a collection of maxims. Without having the actual texts it's not clear-cut -- but since Epicurus uses arguments in all of his letters, including the letters on nature, it would seem to me that we can't call Epicurean philosophy a collection of maxims only.

Yeah, a pretty clear statement of the division is in Lives & Opinions 10.136: — The Great Whatever

Thanks! I don't pretend to know and have read everything, even of what I'm familiar with. I've tended to jump back and forth between the primary texts and secondary texts to help me understand them. As I noted, my quest to understand Epicureanism is an ongoing project.

However, I don't think that this division here goes against what I'm saying about Epicurus' theory of pleasure being central to the philosophy. I'd rather say that this is one way of summing up the philosophy, but that the majority of the philosophical work is being done by the theory of pleasure -- that this is the "main thrust", so to speak -- where the division between natural and necessary, natural but unnecessary, and unnatural and unnecessary desires is how a proper Epicurean is meant to sort their desires and then act to fulfill the first category in order to obtain the goal of peace of mind and freedom of bodily pain (which you may say I'm contradicting myself here -- I admit there's a tension, but I'm trying to figure out how to resolve that tension more than anything -- but perhaps freedom of bodily pain does not mean we do not feel bodily pain, but rather, a lesser degree of pain? At the least this would make sense if pain is inevitable, which would at least cohere well

From the Letter to Menoeceus:

We must also reflect that of desires some are natural, others are groundless; and that of the natural some are necessary as well as natural, and some natural only. And of the necessary desires some are necessary if we are to be happy, some if the body is to be rid of uneasiness, some if we are even to live. He who has a clear and certain understanding of these things will direct every preference and aversion toward securing health of body and tranquillity of mind, seeing that this is the sum and end of a happy life. For the end of all our actions is to be free from pain and fear, and, when once we have attained all this, the tempest of the soul is laid; seeing that the living creature has no need to go in search of something that is lacking, nor to look anything else by which the good of the soul and of the body will be fulfilled.

My emphasis. I don't see any way to read this other than being free of bodily pain as being necessary for happiness. — The Great Whatever

So I tracked down my copy of the letter. I think it a lesson on the importance of interpretation. I'll type out what my copy states:

One must reckon that of desires some are natural, some groundless; and of the natural desires some are necessary and some merely natural; and of the necessary, some are necessary for happiness and some for freeing the body from troubles and some for life itself. The unwavering contemplation of these enables one to refer every choice and avoidance to the health of the body and the freedom of the soul from disturbance, since this is the goal of a blessed life. For we do everything for the sake of being neither in pain nor in terror. As soon as we achieve this state every storm in the soul is dispelled, since the animal is not in a position to go after some need nor to seek something else to complete the good of the body and the soul. For we are in need of pleasure only when we are in pain because of the absence of pleasure, and when we are not in pain, then we no longer need pleasure

I honestly couldn't argue which is the better interpretation. I don't have that kind of basis. I imagine that it would rely upon which way we're trying to make the philosophy cohere together based on several texts, to be honest. It wouldn't surprise me if you could kind of go one way or the other, at least without some pretty deep study. But this should highlight where some of our difference in opinion comes from on this particular point.

The other solution that comes to mind, for me, is to strike out the example that Diogenes Laertius uses of on the rack, since it is not in quotes, and simply give up the ground on invulnerability in all circumstances. But that wouldn't work to make sense of pain in the context of the ethics of the day, at least as I've come to understand them through the secondary literature.

What I'm saying is, I don't see how this differs from simply conditioning oneself to feel less pain. — The Great Whatever

Does it have to differ? What if "conditioning oneself to feel less pain" is, more or less, what makes pain easy to endure?

If you are asking whether pleasure is a feeling, then yes -- and I'd say also that I don't know of any way to understand pleasure except as feeling, to the extent that this seems not to be a theoretical commitment but rather a facet of competence with the lay concept. Epicurus at least seems to agree -- again from the letter:

...we make feeling the rule by which to judge of every good thing

If your point is that pleasure needs to be seen as something other than a feeling, then I can't understand that claim except to treat it as the countersensical suggestion that pleasure ought to be treated as something other than pleasure. Or perhaps that you have some reason for being a hedonist nominally but at root are actually not interested in pleasure, but something else (some other human fulfillment) and so your ethics are not hedonistic (meaning they aren't Epicurean). — The Great Whatever

I am not asking whether pleasure is a feeling or not. I grant that pleasure is a feeling.

I'm asking whether the theory of pleasure I put forward captures that feeling, for you.

As I understand it, when people talk of pleasure they mean that it is. . .

Subjective -- The person who feels pleasure is the one who can say whether or not this or that is pleasurable. The speaker has priority over anyone else on whether or not such-and-such is pleasurable.
Empirical -- One cannot know what is pleasurable without having tried this, that, or the other thing/activity/state/etc. You must try it out to know if something is or is not pleasurable.\
Phenomenological -- related to the first, but I like to state this explicity; pleasure is had only from a first-person perspective. I differentiate this from the first category only by saying that the first governs the rules by which we may speak of pleasure, while this latter point gives the ontological foundation for said rules.


If this is the case then it would be a reason why you wouldn't agree with Epicurus, who maintains that not only that pleasure is the rule, but that pleasure works in a particular way. He claims to know what is pleasurable for you, for me, and for every human.

Now, having said this, there's something else that should be noted -- Epicurus' philosophy does not really focus much on particular actions or things. It's not that this, that, and the other are forbidden. And I don't think that a proper Epicurean would be against this, that, or the other on the basis that everyone will react to it in the same manner. So I don't think a charge of hubris would apply so easily, at least, as the strong statement above seems to indicate. There's plenty of leeway for "trying things out" and seeing what works for you in a particular circumstance. What is "fixed", so to speak, is fixed by human nature, and that leads to how we can free ourselves from anxiety, and thereby live a joyous life.

So perhaps you would also differ with respect to human nature being so fixed -- or, even, it seems to me, you claim that it is in a state of flux. I wouldn't agree with the latter, even if I also don't agree with the former notion that human nature is immutable (though never explicitly stated, it would seem to me that this is a reasonable inference from the basis that the Epicurean philosophy is meant to be a universal cure).

-Pleasure is good insofar as it is pleasant, not insofar as it services a notion of happiness or eudaimonia. Happiness, if there is such a thing, is worthwhile for pleasure's sake, not vice-versa. — The Great Whatever

On the rest of what you say I'll grant, though your fourth statement strikes me as odd. Here, however, I would note that you are in agreement with Epicurean philosophy. It's perhaps one of the strongest reasons I disagree with Epicureanism, in the end. But the Epicurean puts forth pleasure as the goal.

Heh. The first thought that came to mind is likely annoying -- BUT, I would say it depends on the rest of the story :D.

The paragraph establishes a feeling of sadness and nostalgia in me, and captures a multi-faceted experience too from the history of a place to the feeling of wind on someone's face.

But it would depend on how this weaves its way into the rest of the story, I think. I would expect the writer to at least be consistent in style, but does said style contribute or take away from the basic elements of character and plot, and do these basic elements weave together to establish either a mood or theme which is supported by the style, or taken away by the style?


By itself I would say that the style is fine. But, admittedly, I also do not mind labored and awkward prose put to good effect. If it causes me to skip around in thoughts and that skipping about seems to add to the mood (perhaps putting me in a similar mood to what the protagonist is feeling?) then I think that superb. If not then I don't mind it, though I might wonder what all the fuss was about.

If your point is that pleasure needs to be seen as something other than a feeling, then I can't understand that claim except to treat it as the countersensical suggestion that pleasure ought to be treated as something other than pleasure. Or perhaps that you have some reason for being a hedonist nominally but at root are actually not interested in pleasure, but something else (some other human fulfillment) and so your ethics are not hedonistic (meaning they aren't Epicurean). — The Great Whatever

The rest I still must think about, but I wanted to respond to this -- here I am attempting to stay away from what I believe is ethical, but am rather attempting to make sense of Epicurean philosophy. While, granted, I have sympathies to epicurean ethics, I don't think (or, perhaps, no longer think?) it even possible to be an Epicurean today. At least minimally speaking I don't think it possible to be an Epicurean in the same vein as Epicurus and the communities that sprang forth from there were. It would have to be called Neo-Epicureanism or something to distinguish it, since there is no continuity between the communities of the past and people today who claim to be Epicurean.

Just to lay that out there. The beliefs I'm espousing are not so much about the topic of ethics as much as they are about how Epicureanism works (even though I am not and, according to what I believe, cannot be an Epicurean).

Epicureanism's main thrust and appeal was that it was not esoteric, that anyone could practice it and reap its benefits. — The Great Whatever

This is something appealing about Epicureanism to myself (and is probably what anyone from today would find appealing next to some of the more aristocratic sentiments expressed in the day), but I don't think it was the main thrust.

Happiness is.

So aside from the weakness of claiming there were (probably?) deeper doctrines that we don't and can't know about right now,

As for "probably" -- if we accept Diogenes Laertius as a source when describing rather than quoting (as I do in the beginning of the post -- where the quote about being happy on the rack comes from, though it is problematic), then he describes several texts Epicurus wrote, including one called On Nature comprising of 37 books.


Insofar that by "deeper doctrines" all we mean is "more than maxims", we already have access to them too. Even letters do more than speak about maxims -- they contain arguments. But we don't have to rely upon the letters alone -- there's Diogenes Laertius' chapter on Epicurus, Cicero's De Finibus (polemical), Plutarch's Against Colotes (polemical) Lucretius' poem On the Nature of Things, and the remains of an inscription done by Diogenes of Oenoanda just as a few examples. I know there are more texts than this, too, but these I'm at least familiar with.

it seems that even if this is true it's not going to save the common case, which is what is so important to the Epicurean to begin with.

Again, I would say that this is only appealing to us because of the cultures we live in. But I wouldn't say that this is the focus of Epicureanism, as much as it is a result of its methods. If there be a universal cure, then it would apply across the board, not just to the sage.

That correct way being the achievement specifically of static pleasure, which is the freedom from pain. — The Great Whatever

Sort of. First, the division between static and dynamic pleasure is not necessarily an Epicurean one. This way of understanding Epicureanism is at least contended in the literature, and I haven't been able to find the division in the Epicurean texts. If you know where to look I'd be much obliged to you for pointing this out.

As of right now, at least, I'd say the better way to understand the proper way is to understand Epicurus' theory of pleasure. Happiness is achieved by pleasure. Pleasure is the fulfillment of natural and necessary desires, as opposed to the other two kinds of desire which are "natural and unnecessary" and "unnatural and unnecessary". (logically speaking there could be a fourth, but in terms of the philosophy there are no unnatural and necessary desires).

Under this rubric I'd categorize the avoidance of bodily pain as natural but unnecessary, if we accept the DL quote at least. And there is at least reason to believe that the philosophy applies, even in extreme cases, because Epicurus died a horrible death and, again if we accept the texts as evidence in the first place, faced said death with the appropriate Epicurean attitude (though, granted, said death was specifically not one of torture on the rack, or in the brazen bull). While it makes sense to avoid pain, what we have control over is a calm state of mind, which helps us deal with bodily pain.

But, aside from extreme cases, yes -- mental tranquility and freedom from bodily pain are very important to living an Epicurean life. But this is not the correct way -- this is the goal. The correct way is better understood, so I would claim at this point at least, through Epicurus' theory of pleasure. (which is what leads to things like the necessity of self-reflection, so that one can appropriately identify their desires and categorize them, then act on the appropriate ones).

But this is precisely what's under question. How does the Epicurean deal with pain? — The Great Whatever

Exactly :). That's my question. One thing that may differ in our approach here, though, is that I'm assuming from the start that there's an answer to the question -- not that Epicurus fails here, but rather, that I'm failing in understanding.

I'd note that it's more of a practical hermeneutic rule on my part rather than a belief I necessarily hold, except insofar that it is necessary to believe in order to test a belief.

Clearly it can't be by impotent mental tricks, which you seem to agree. But then, we seem to have no evidence that they do, except precisely by avoiding it, which is what the Epicurean recommendations amount to.

It is the tricky part, I agree. If we accept the evidence of Epicurus' death, however, then we have evidence of possibility, at least, of enduring extreme pain. The popularity of the philosophy just shows that Epicurus' philosophy was not only something that applied to him, though it's possible that the philosophy applies differently in the two cases (the lay Epicurean vs. the Sage being quite different in their life patterns, at least, even if they draw from the same texts and doctrine).

The "how" is exactly what my question is.

My guess, right now, is that the Epicurean way of life transforms character to be the sort of person that is better able to deal with pain than before they were an Epicurean. Otherwise impotent mental tricks, such as remembering happy times with friends, would have no effect.

I'll remention here because I'd like to see what you think of the argument: Children feel pain to a greater degree than adults do from the same sources of pain. You burn your hand on a stove you don't go crying about it. You may not be a happy Epicurean, but there's a difference in the feeling of pain between these two events. I'd say that this is due to development in dealing with pain. If that were the case, then it seems plausible, at least, that we could further develop ourselves so that pain is less of a nuisance (easy to endure), no?

There is no such thing as an unnatural or unnecessary desire. Epicureans treat temporary, contingent, custom-bound properties of things (like the desire for a luxurious lifestyle) as if they were inherently bad in virtue of conflicting with a static human nature. This is reification because it takes what is situational and treats it as essential. There is nothing good or bad about wanting a luxurious lifestyle in of itself. — The Great Whatever

I'd half-way agree with you, here. Epicureans believe in a static human nature. I'm with you on that. But the Epicurean doesn't treat a desire as intrinsically bad. There are no intrinsic bads -- there are only things bad insofar that they violate what is good, i.e., what leads to a happy life -- pleasure.

If you can have a luxurious lifestyle without anxiety then there's nothing wrong with it. The error is in thinking that a luxurious lifestyle will relieve you from pain, when it won't -- especially when people who are rich often worry about maintaining their riches, and thereby make themselves unhappy. But if you were an Epicurean who happened to inherit a trust-fund, for whatever reason, and it was just added to your life through no struggle of your own, then there'd be nothing wrong in keeping it if it didn't lead you to become anxious in trying to maintain it.

I don't necessarily agree with the Epicurean categories, but I find them more useful than the usual division of pleasure today -- which is largely subjective, empirical (in the sense that one must try it themselves) and phenomenological. While even human nature, so I would agree (just to switch to my beliefs, vs. Epicurean beliefs), is not static, I think there are too many commonalities between humans to treat the notion as fallacious.

So I suppose that while I agree with you that "human nature" is a reification, I'd just note that it's a practical one which yields practical knowledge (which is contingent, as you note), if not universal knowledge. (which would be a strike against the Epicurean claim to a universal cure -- but the notion of a universal cure is not what I would defend. I fully confess that I doubt this. My aim is to understand what is valuable, though, rather than discount Epicureanism on some of its more exaggerated claims which were more a product of the state of ethics at the time, so I would argue).

But there may be circumstances in which the pursuit of a luxurious lifestyle is beneficial. Doctrines about what is natural or unnatural -- which a naturalistic eudaimonism like Epicureanism must commit itself to -- must perform these reifications, or else collapse into a different kind of hedonism (I would say a genuine hedonism) that treats pleasure as good on its own terms rather than because it checks off certain requirements having to do with final ends and human nature. — The Great Whatever

I would note here that it seems to me your notion of genuine hedonism here seems to be committed to a theory of pleasure which states that pleasure is subjective, empirical (as in, one has to try things out, not in any scientific sense), and phenomenological as I mentioned earlier.

Would you say that's true or false? I'm just guessing because that strikes me as a good approximation of how people talk about pleasure.

Which would highlight where you differ from the Epicureans. But if that be the case then I would at least float the idea (to see how you would respond) that your disagreement is not with how Epicureans deal with pain (as a related aside, though not necessarily direct to Epicureanism: is pain not inevitable, after all? Won't every life feel pain?), but with their treatment of pleasure.

And if that is the case, wouldn't the charge of reification just depend upon which theory of pleasure we think is true? (not rhetorical -- I want to hear what you have to say to the question)

I just wanted to note I liked reading your explanation about having different parts of you being persuaded and other parts not. It hit some correct notes to me.

I think that certain deep anxious states (like common anxieties about their appearance and death) tends to not just be about the object of anxiety, but something rooted elsewhere. So the Epicurean Arguments that are laid out don't really serve as a good framework to the people who are grappling with those problems. It's the self's relation to the objects of their thoughts & emotions that's often more important. — Saphsin

I agree entirely here. I think this is the function of the Epicurean community, and the maxims. In some sense one is meant to take certain tenets on faith not because there are not arguments, but because once we are already ensnared by an irrational anxiety then we require an irrational means to undo that anxiety. It's not the object -- it's that we are pursing something that is no object in the first place, yet we treat it as such (wealth and death come to mind as the obvious examples here, but anthropomorphized Gods and other superstitions fit too).

I think this relation between to the self and the object tends to mean something unique to the experience for each person (a narrative) which is why I think you can often learn more insight from people who can empathize with your experiences (or can analyze them to a high degree) than from general practitioners who just happens to know a lot about how the mind works.

If that were so I think that this would be a blow against the Epicurean cure, too. The cure is meant to apply to all humans, I think. It's not meant to apply to people in particular circumstances with particular experiences, but something that is commonly felt by mankind.

(not saying you're wrong, by any means. Just responding more than anything)

. Epicureanism and Stoicism create an image of a person who is able to deal with pain and whatnot by sheer will alone - what a strong person they must be! Essentially, these kinds of beliefs revolve around a quest for the ideal hero. — darthbarracuda

In the case of Epicureanism, at least, they did more than create an image -- Epicurus was the person you were meant to aspire to become like.

But it was not by sheer will alone. In accord with the philosophy it seems to me that what was meant to change one's character was the power of reason -- but in practice I think the Epicurean community plays a larger role in being able to accomplish (or progress, at least) along the Epicurean path. At least, this would go in line with my reasoning I've put forward in this thread. But it fits very well with what goods Epicurus emphasized -- self-reflection, autarky, and friendship with fellow Epicureans.

What Epicurean wisdom amounts to, most generously interpreted, is a set of maxims for avoiding typical sources of pain in life — The Great Whatever

I'd disagree with this assertion because there's more to Epicurean philosophy than maxims. That maxims are for initiates more than anything -- but for those that wished to dig deeper there were texts upon texts to do so. It just wasn't necessary to do so in order to live a happy life. (hence, the maxims for those who wanted to live as an Epicurean, but maybe did not want to be a philosopher).

The great difficulty here is just how little that's left to infer from over the ages. But there's enough evidence to indicate that there's more to the philosophy than maxims.

And the entire philosophy is not just about avoiding pain -- it's about living a happy life, and the answer to the happy life is pursuing pleasure in the correct way.

The focus on pain, here, is just because I find this to be the problematic (from my perspective) part of the philosophy, not because this is all of what Epicureanism entails. Especially since, though it is hedonic, the Epicurean does not avoid pain, but deals with it (since pain is an inevitable part of life) -- and deals with it by directing our focus to what it is we do have control over, rather than what we do not.

I don't think it makes sense to cope with pain. By the time it hits, it's already too late -- pain is pain, it doesn't get better except by being eliminated. But then that's not coping with pain, but rather avoiding or eliminating it. — The Great Whatever

But what if you felt pain to a lesser degree because of your general state of mind? I think that makes a great deal of sense. I can remember what pain was to me as a child, for instance. It hurt a great deal more than it does now.

The Epicurean life is perhaps so simple and safe that it minimizes risks of certain pains, but even then it reifies certain things that are clearly instrumental, like eschewing luxury.

I would say this isn't quite accurate, either, or is at least ambiguous depending on what you mean by "luxury".

A particular luxury isn't a bad thing, per se -- it's just that the pursuit of luxury can seduce one into forgetting what makes human beings happy. Luxury would safely fit into the category natural but unnecessary desires, like sex, because it's a creature comfort, but it's not necessary for the fulfillment of a happy life.

Though if you mean the pursuit of a luxurious lifestyle then, yes, that would seem to fit into the unnatural and unnecessary desires, and therefore would be forbidden according to the ethic. Not sure which you're saying, though.

What do you mean by reification? What idea are Epicureans treating like a thing? I would claim the opposite -- that as far as philosophy goes, Epicureanism tends towards eliminating reifications than making them. For example, the pursuit of luxury -- where men would pursue luxury as if it were something that can be held onto, Epicureans would say that an item of luxury is of course pleasurable, but that you are hurting yourself because of some idea you have about the luxurious lifestyle when you could just fulfill your desires which are natural to you and, thereby, be happy.

I think that's the easy way out, though. :)


I'd also say that though I find the extreme cases (which were relevant to the day, but I'm not so sure we care about invulnerability) hard to buy that there may still be something to the philosophy -- something reasonable and worthwhile -- when an Epicurean isn't trying to defend against counter-examples. If the Epicurean way of life could relieve pain, in the no-bullshit way of actually doing so (as opposed to having a practical benefit by simply believing that pain is easy to endure), then I'd still say that there's merit to the claim.

And it strikes me that there are people who are better at coping with pain in their life, even if they are not going to stand up to torture. I could see how a disposition would lend itself to being able to endure pain, too. So, it seems to me, there's plausible reason for accepting that there might be some way to make one better able at coping with pain (though whether Epicurean philosophy actually accomplishes this is another question -- just saying I wouldn't write it off as absurd in lesser, more common, cases)

If that the question be then I'd say the question is confusing because it's neither.

But I could see an argument for a particular aesthetic, in the same vein that we might conceive of a particular ethic, counting as "objective", depending on what we mean by the latter term. If we mean that it has some sort of independence then it's a bit harder to push, but if we mean, as you say, that we require others to see things as we do -- then there's a good case, though "objective" is weakened in that case.


I will say that I don't think aesthetics is the same as ice cream, if that's all that we mean by subjective -- where you may like vanilla and I like chocolate, and there's nothing more to it than that, I'd say that aesthetics is more complicated than whether or not we happen to like this or that composer.

First I want to say it was wonderful to read your reply Saphsin.

Secondly, two things come to mind -- one is the role of rationality in ancient ethics, and two is the differences in rationality between antiquity and modern day.

It would seem that your finding is something of a challenge to the stoics and the more rationalist interpretations of the epicureans. While the arguments were persuasive to your reason, you claimed they were not enough to influence your character -- that this took something more than the argument. Something like an insight into yourself and why the argument was not moving you initially, based on your description. And so reason was not enough to modify character, therefore it must take more than reason to get one to a place where said beliefs become practical. The philosophers art is not enough.

But then I'm reminded that reason and emotion were not so cleanly separated in antiquity as they are often today. Might we consider the insights into your character which helped you reach a state of mind where the epicurean cure became effective as reason operating on the soul, if in fact reason is not separate from emotion? Perhaps the arguments differ from the power of reason, where the former gave you the goal (as you said), and the latter is what operated on your soul (used in the broad, non-spiritual sense) to help you realize that the cure could help you with your fear of death?

I don't know. A bit of free association going on there. I don't really have an argument against anything you've said, just a reaction.

I think and thought it did as well. But I don't think that it sounding like bullshit is enough to discount the notions at play -- Epicureanism was a widespread way of life back in the day. So clearly people saw something in it (though what that is may be and is disputed, I only mention this to say that it's not some flight of fancy dreamt by an individual person). Also, it can't be dismissed that Epicurus endured a painful death using this technique.

So my object is more to gain an understanding of the philosophy -- while my initial impulse of this particular part of Epicurean philosophy was to be dismissive, that's far from helpful in understanding it. Epicurus was no slouch. So, presuming that there is something worthwhile to be had to the fourth part of the tetrapharmakos, that it is not merely practical advice to assuage anxiety but also seems to have a direct relation to the actual endurance of pain, in what way can we make sense of this?

that's what I'm attempting to illuminate through my answer.

I think you're favoring a particular answer in the way you are framing aesthetics -- namely, in terms of aesthetic experiences. Further, I'd push the issue a bit and say that not just any feeling counts as an aesthetic experience -- sometimes you just have an experience, or an emotional experience, but just because there is an art-object which this is directed at or caused by that does not then mean that your emotional reaction is specifically an aesthetic experience. Usually aesthetic experiences are reserved for terms like the beauitful and the sublime, for instance. Feeling anger or humor while watching a drama may be a part of the total aesthetic experience of beauty, sublimity, or whatever, but is not itself the aesthetic experience.

I think, also, that if aesthetics is objective as usually understood by that term, then an art-object is objectively good or bad -- rather than right or wrong. Your subjective experiences can be neither right nor wrong, but supposing you were to react to the plight of Oedipus with laughter then it might still make sense to say that your taste is bad.

Hrm! You're right. Sorry. I was mislead by the second sentence which just used "Africa", so the entire time I was thinking the entire continent.

I honestly feel that the question is not specific enough for me to grapple with. Imagine saying Europe is amazing, or North America is amazing. My immediate thought is -- which part? And what is so amazing about that part? What led to this, that, or the other?

Even cities take on geographies and histories which are diverse and multifaceted. How does one, then, evaluate a continent?

I also would say I'm just not familiar enough with African history to have either a pessimistic or optimistic attitude. So I can't answer your question in the specific. But the one thing that leaps out for me is that Africa is huge, and I would have a difficult time answering said question for places I do have a decent grasp of the history on.

Reading groups are the shit! :D I think I could actually swing one now, too. Not sure I could lead it, but I could participate. My most recent phil reading has been the small stuff on my shelf that I haven't read yet -- nothing with any kind of coherent project or anything, but more of a mixed hodgepodge.

If Deleuze tickles your fancy I'd be more than happy to dig into Deleuze with people. I read Anti-Oedipus about 2 years ago, now, but I came away from the reading with impressions and a feeling of its whole rather than a real understanding of the text in spite of my efforts to do otherwise. Perhaps the level of understanding I sought isn't there to be had, but I enjoyed the effort a great deal. And his summary of Kant's critical philosophy is superb (his history writing is a beacon of clarity). So I know I'd enjoy reading any of his works.

Or anything, really. As I said, I don't exactly have a direction with my philosophy reading atm.

I'm not sure what ground rule would help on issues, it's not as if they have bad culture. — shmik

I guess my thinking here is that, though we set out our arguments in the form of persuasion, it might be helpful for people to understand that, in philosophy, few are persuaded. So, at least insofar that we believe philosophy is actually worthwhile, we must be doing something else aside from persuading (though, on the rare chance, we are sometimes persuaded too -- it's just not the norm, at least not within a particular conversation).

I don't disagree that there's some difficulty in being able to actually grapple with serious philosophical issues in a forum format. I think that this might also be the result of misunderstandings of ground rules between speakers, too -- not just on the philosophical issues, but even the rules which govern a productive philosophical conversation, which seems to change with the format because it falls somewhere in-between a casual conversation and a formal paper.

Perhaps there could be a better understanding if one were to be more specific about the rules of a particular thread?


I've noticed what you speak of in some of my phil readings -- like, I lacked the ability to create what seemed like a good conversation starter about something I had an interest in.

At the same time, I have got to say that forums like these have been most beneficial to me in being able to express and read thoughts and arguments. In some sense the benefit was just having an outlet and a place where I could gather suggestions for further reading. This latter point is what has always kept me around the forums -- without a formal environment, it's been the best thing for finding new philosophy sources to track down and ponder.


Another motivation for my posting, when I have the time, is when I see someone grappling with issues that I've been motivated to grapple with I want to help them to think through them -- it's hard to think in a bubble, and it helps to have a conversation partner.


(And, I agree @csalisbury -- reading groups, whether it be books or papers, have been my favorite aspect to the forums)

So far? I am rather fond of gardening. And cooking. And labor politics. I do those things.

I don't think I would know what I have not reflected upon, for the moment that I said I had not reflected upon it -- I would have at least thought about how it could use some more thinking. And, likewise, I think your question of "Why?" could only be answered after the fact of my realizing that I hadn't reflected on some topic.

I am sure there are sundry topics, thoughts, opinions, and so forth that haven't crossed my mind. I would say that's the case for most everybody, but you say you have nothing which is unreflected. How do you ascertain that?

You bring up a lot of issues that I think would be best treated separately, Bitter.

When it comes to Right to Work legislation, I would say that it's unfair to labor unions and so shouldn't be law. Everyone at a workplace with a union benefits from union activity. And unions have to represent everyone fairly in a workplace, whether they actually become members or not. In my experience the non-members drained union resources more often than members by demanding help more often than the members -- so I'm more than happy to ensure that the union actually has the resources to have enough staff to process said issues, rather than having all the responsibility without having the resources to hire the staff necessary to run a traditional business-style union. They're going to use our resources either way, and benefit from union activity either way -- so it's only fair that they pay for union activity rather than let a group of people do all the work for them.

In an idealistic sense I can see why RtW laws are attractive. You think, before you do this, that people are generally decent and they'll actually contribute once they see the benefits and that this will provide pressure for unions to represent their members better -- but that just ain't so. I heard enough people say to me, "If you're going to help me anyways, why should I pay for it?" when talking union in a RtW state to know it. Also, even with RtW, the thing that keeps a union representative isn't financial pressure but participation. If people participate then the union is representative -- by withdrawing dues you actually make it easier for people to not participate, and thereby let a union be run by fewer people, making it less representative.

My activity varies depending on what's up in life, what I feel like might actually generate a conversation, and whether or not someone has already said what I would more or less say.

But I usually check in daily. I just don't always post.

I would say that it wouldn't require any more bureacracy than is already in place -- you'd just add it to the checklist for the fire martial, give a timeline which is reasonable for businesses to comply, and badda-boom. The usual.

It just depends on what sort of priorities we'd like to set for society.

For my money, I'd say it's worth it when I consider what else we spend money on. If the budget weren't as silly as it already is then I might see a point, but this actually helps people feel included in a society which is a lot better than a lot of what we spend money on :D