Just more random thoughts relevant to you, but not enough to question the claim I made and supported by those graphs.

Oh look. Human rights abuses match...wait for it...wealth. Not ideology, not Western culture, not NATO... Money. — Isaac

Buthan and Costa Rica fare better than the US, Russia and Saudi Arabia in terms of human rights yet they are not wealthier than them. Classic Isaac's cherry-picking, isn't it?

So what effect do we think Ukraine's now enormous debt is going to have on human rights? — Isaac

There are ways to deal with it: "Germany agreed to pay reparations of 132 billion gold marks to the Triple Entente in the Treaty of Versailles, which were then cancelled in 1932 with Germany only having paid a part of the sum" (https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/12469/ukraine-crisis/p351).
Or making Russia pay for the reparation also through the confiscation of Russian economic assets frozen in the West.

The greatest gains have been made by Bhutan and Costa Rica, both outside of the Western sphere of influence.

The United States falls below Cuba.

Belarus (a Russian puppet state) has made comparable progress to others in its economic group.

Some of the worst losses are in Spain.

Ukraine have made virtually no improvements at all since he Maidan.

Iraq and Libya both 'benefited' from exactly the kind of Western military intervention you're advocating and their human rights records have worsened.

So no. Once you stop cherry-picking the data to match your theory you see exactly the pattern the experts I cited have described - a big gain post 1945 followed by a very mixed picture unrelated to 'Western' countries. — Isaac

Cherry-picking is wrt a theory. My theory is here: "I’m talking in comparative terms about entity, likelihood, timing of the implementation of human rights supporting institutions within the Western sphere of influence as marked by NATO and EU membership (because these are Ukrainians’ aspirations) wrt non-Western countries, especially wrt authoritarian regimes like Russia, China and Iran and their sphere of influence."

So I didn't say that Human Rights can be successfully implemented exclusively within NATO&EU (or western sphere of influence for that matter), so Buthan and Costa Rica are not good counter-examples. Nor that Western military interventions aim at or succeed at improving human rights (so Iraq and Libya are not good counter-examples). Not that Ukraine outside NATO&EU has improved wrt human rights, considering also how much of the Ukrainian political, military and economic apparatuses fell within Russian sphere of influence. Other random observations about Spain and Belarus, are pinpoiting over nothing that matters here: compare Spain under Franco vs Spain under NATO&EU, compare ex-Soviet republic Belarus state with those ex-Soviet republics that joined NATO&EU.
So you can not accuse me of cherry-picking.
The evidence that I gave to you is proof (however fallible and limited in scope) of what I clam and it's relevant to me, not to whatever random thoughts are hunting your mind.

It's this I was talking about.. But fine, you present 'conceptual frameworks' that apparently don't need proof and then ask for it from others. An odd habit, but understood. So. I'm asking you for you proof now then. — Isaac

Proof of what? Its consistency? What is the proof you are expecting I should provide? Do you see
any logic contradiction or categorical confusion in claiming: “State institutions, as I understand them, presuppose authoritative and coercive ruling over a territory.”? Do you see any contradiction between what I claimed here and all my past claims? I don't. Do you want me to prove its explanatory power? I would need an alternative conceptual framework to compare it within a set of identified phenomena? Where is this alternative conceptual framework? What phenomena are we talking about? No idea. Do you want me to prove that my conceptual framework matches standard usage? I don't think it's that relevant coz terminological issues can be fixed by stipulation, however I could show a dictionary definition for comparison: “state, political organization of society, or the body politic, or, more narrowly, the institutions of government. The state is a form of human association distinguished from other social groups by its purpose, the establishment of order and security; its methods, the laws and their enforcement; its territory, the area of jurisdiction or geographic boundaries; and finally by its sovereignty.” (https://www.britannica.com/topic/state-sovereign-political-entity). Do you see any contradictions between what I claimed and that definition? Do you see any substantive mismatch between my claim and that definition, wording aside? I don’t. What else? Oh, what on earth your objection “Representation is definitely an important tool, but that's not the same thing as sovereignty” has to do with my claim, its consistency or its explanatory power? No idea, my claim doesn’t even mention “representation”, so nowhere I said or implied that “representation is the same thing as sovereignty".
An objection is about what one finds questionable for hopefully “rational” reasons. What are you reasons to find my conceptual framework questionable and in need of proofs?

I'm upholding the position that A and B are underdetermined, against the position that B is correct and A mistaken. I'm not upholding the counter-position that A is correct and B is mistaken. — Isaac

This looks a good example of clashing idiosyncratic assumptions I was talking about, because the evidential indeterminacy claim is itself indeterminate as long as it is not grounded on a conceptual framework for collecting and comparing evidences for a given epistemic purpose: e.g. web app logins are designed to identify the web app accounts, not to identify physical users because 2 different physical users could use the same web app account. So while the usage of a web app account is evidentially determined by the login system, the user is not. Therefore one can not use a login trace as evidence for the fact that e.g. a blackmailing email was sent a by a given physical individual. Unless there are other contextual reliable generalizations or evidences that would ensure this by inference.
That is why it is pertinent to clarify our epistemic standards for assessing evidences.

Your reasoning is flawed for the reasons boethius has already given - You have failed to take any account of the costs. It's insane to propose a course of action based only on the potential benefits without even holding a view on whether they outweigh the potential costs. — Isaac

It is flawed according to your epistemic standards. The problem is that I too find your epistemic standards (like costs in number of war casualties vs vaguely potential benefits in terms of timing and likelihood) flawed and useless for my decision making for the reasons I explained.
Here another case to make it more clear: Hiroshima and Nagasaki nuclear bombings. Let’s try to assess it according to your claimed metrics.
Costs: total killed civilians estimates in a range 129000–226000 out of ~72M (so ~0.2%-~0.3% of the population) in 4 days. Just for a comparison with the Ukrainian war: 6114 estimated civilian deaths out of ~43M population (0,01% of the total population) in ~210 days, https://www.ohchr.org/en/news/2022/10/ukraine-civilian-casualty-update-3-october-2022
Benefits (for Japan): democracy almost immediately after, human rights adoption (See art.11 of 1946 Japanese Constitution) and steep growth in GDP per capita in the next couple of decades (https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/gdp-per-capita-maddison-2020?time=1941..2018&country=JPN~RUS).
Now was it worth it to nuclear bomb Japan according to these metrics? I don’t know what your answer is based on your standards and prescriptions (like "to be solely concerned for the well-being of the people there" as compassionate outsiders). In any case this would be an a-posteriori evaluation, because at the time when the decision was taken nobody had your figures for the future benefits of Japan. So at that time was it worth to politically support the nuclear bombing of Japan?
We are in the middle of historical events, future payoffs for each conceivable strategy are not as certain or evident (wrt their likelihood, timing and entity) as the actual costs. Besides, concerning the costs: civilian deaths is a too little metric to assess war damage (how about civilian injuries? How about psychological damage? How about infrastructural and economic damage? How about lasting and likely future effects of all these damages? How about international political equilibria?) but the larger is the number of metrics the difficult is their aggregation (do they have the same relevance or do we have to ponder their relevance? How to assign weights?) and comparison with other historical cases (because maybe not all those metrics are equally available or reliable) or imagine counterfactual scenarios (which depend on a set of assumptions that maybe be questionable).
Not to mention the theoretical and scientific difficulties in assessing the economic, (geo-)political, social, psychological, material links between costs and benefits of complex historical events over generations.
Finally the higher are the rational standards the less affordable they become to average people and the less realistic is our expectations they would comply to them.
That’s why I consider this “accountant”-like approach badly misleading for average people’s political decision making, especially in the heat of historical events, while broad geopolitical considerations and historical evidences (which, notice, change over time: before the nuclear bombing of Japan there was no previous case to compare to) would offer clearer and affordable guidance under uncertainty, in addition to experts feedback and daily news of course.

Well then you should check your historical evidence… — Isaac

Why? What exactly did I say that your experts’ quotations is questioning? Quote my claims that are contradicted by Although their proposal was opposed by the USA, the United Kingdom, France, Austria, Germany, and the European Union or “Both resolutions were adopted by a vote, with most Western countries abstaining”. I can’t find any.
I’m talking about the fate of States that enter the Western sphere of influence not the ones that are outside for whatever reason. I’m talking in comparative terms about entity, likelihood, timing of the implementation of human rights supporting institutions within the Western sphere of influence as marked by NATO and EU membership (because these are Ukrainians’ aspirations) wrt non-Western countries, especially wrt authoritarian regimes like Russia, China and Iran and their sphere of influence.

human rights are associated with the Western Sphere of influence is nothing but Western propaganda. — Isaac

It is Western propaganda of course! But it looks also a reliable one within the scope I’m considering not in whatever ways you may think about it. Unless you are claiming that within authoritarian regimes like Russia, China and Iran according to you and your sources human rights institutions are equally or better implemented than in the West. In this case, there would be another clash of idiosyncratic assumptions which, this time, I have no interest to deal with.

Vague hand-waiving in the direction of possible counterweights does not constitute an argument that they do, indeed outweigh their opposing factors. — Isaac

I see, here is the trend of “Human rights protection, 1946 to 2019” about EU&NATO countries (some are ex-Soviet republics and let’s not forget German reunification): https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/human-rights-protection?tab=chart&country=RUS~CHN~IRN~DEU~ITA~ESP~POL~LTU~ROU~BGR~SVK

Is that enough?

No evidence, no 'proof'. — Isaac

No evidence, no 'proof' of what exactly? I was just exposing a conceptual framework.

The requests for 'proof only started when I objected to that position. — Isaac

That's false. Your objection started with: "How? I don't see the mechanism. Representation is definitely an important tool, but that's not the same thing as sovereignty" (https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/746158)
To which I answered: "I didn't equate representation and sovereignty anywhere. I was talking about pre-condition for the implementation of state institutions that support human rights. State institutions, as I understand them, presuppose authoritative and coercive ruling over a territory." (https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/746177)
So no, I didn't ask you for proofs in this case. On the contrary I exposed once again my conceptual framework. You might have objected that it's incoherent or with little explanatory power and consequently I would have asked you for proofs. But such a random objection like "representation is not the same thing as sovereignty" simply means you didn't understand what I was talking about. That’s all.

You present a position without proof, I object to it, you demand proof of my objection. That's the game we're playing. It's a game of toss and catch with the burden of proof. — Isaac

First of all, I don't feel compelled to prove all I say by default to anybody nor expect others to prove me all their claims by default. For those claims that I find questionable I ask for proofs, if others didn't provide any. Others can do the same, as you did: I take your objections to be about what you find questionable and in need of proofs about my claims. Hence I don’t see anything worth complaining about, so far. Secondly, these shifts of burden of proof are kind of common when we experience a clash of idiosyncratic assumptions, but if your point is that I was unfair to you because you most of the time provide evidence when I ask while I don't when you ask, then you provided the wrong argument to support that conclusion as I explained. Thirdly, if you claim: “I'm quite happy with your position. I don't agree with it, but I've neither the interest, nor have any clue how I would go about 'disproving' it”, then why on earth do you keep making objections?

Classic example...

Let’s assume for the sake of the argument that “In 2 fewer die” is correct and that that’s all that counts. How likely is strategy 2 going to succeed? And how long is it going to take? — neomac


No, let's instead do that with the actual claim I'm arguing against. If you think 1) is the better course of action then you give your figures to support it. And if you just 'reckon' it probably is then stop being so hypocritical in expecting others who disagree with you to do so to any higher standard of proof than you yourself use. — Isaac

This argument is a failure on all grounds: not only because it is another wrong argument to prove a putative "classic example” (and 2 bad examples are not really good stats), but also because all you are asking now I already answered in previous comments and complemented in that part you intentionally left out in that quotation. All that also suggests that you evidently failed to understand "my standards”:

- Let’s start with my standards as I already specified them:
“Honestly I find such quizzes about moral dispositions in different hypothetical scenarios (as in the ‘trolley problem’) highly misleading for debating the issue at hand and therefore useless for my decision process. This is why:

• Ukrainian lives are not at my disposal as money in my pocket.
• I’m not even a political leader with all kinds of information political leaders can afford, popular consensus and peer-pressure to take tough political decisions for long terms goals affecting an entire collectivity.
• I can’t even reliably calculate the costs I or my beloved ones will likely pay now or in 10 years or in 50 years if I now politically support Ukrainian struggles against Russian oppression.
• Actually I believe that everyone in this thread suffers from similar limits, even when they do not support Ukrainian struggles or the Western hegemony.
• I also believe that nobody can frame this war as a game theory study case where outcomes and their likelihood are given. Everybody has to struggle with their personal uncomfortable blindspots as the war progresses.

So my political support for Ukrainian struggles is grounded more on the reasoning I exposed earlier (see https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/746949). Reasoning and evidences grounded on historical/geopolitical assumptions that go beyond this war, its major players and its short-terms results are more compelling to me then such quizzes.” (By “such quizzes” I’m referring to a certain way of accounting for costs and benefits of this war that seem relevant to you, in other words we are looking at different kinds of figures https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/747341).

- How about “my figures” to support option 1 according to my standards? Here: how likely is that a pro-West country can implement human rights by being within the Western sphere of influence (so within NATO and EU) than by being within the sphere of influence of an anti-West Russia with a poorer implementation of human rights (see first step), if not now in the future? I say it’s more likely, based on historical evidence (see Germany, Italy and Spain after WWII) and ex-Soviet Union countries that joined EU and NATO after the Soviet Union collapse. Also the democracy index is telling (https://www.visualcapitalist.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/democracy-index-2022-europe.jpg, https://www.democracymatrix.com/ranking): Russian democracy index is lower than any country in the EU and Belarus which is under the sphere of influence of Russia is even lower than Russia, Kazakhstan better of Russia for few points. Is this enough evidence? If not why not? (https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/746949).

- How about “my figures” to question option 2 according to my standards?
Here: “How likely is strategy 2 going to succeed? And how long is it going to take? The West has supported protests and political change for decades in Iran, North Korea, Russia and China with what results for their population's human rights? How about the ex-soviet union countries that had the chance to join NATO and EU? This is hardly unpredictable: indeed there is a part of the local population in any of these authoritarian regimes that profits from the sanctions and political pressure from outside to preserve/increase economic inequalities and support authoritarian regimes to brutally squash local protests (and condemn the population to a miserable life in terms of freedoms, public and private services, or economic survival compared to western standards) or worse aggressively expand outside national borders to gain geopolitical influence (like through wars, proxy wars and terrorism). Additionally, it’s questionable that “life” is all that counts (slavery wasn’t about killing people, Russian oppression isn’t about killing Ukrainians). Finally there is a hidden death toll that one must taken into account when talking about such authoritarian regimes given some inconveniences that add up to greater economic inequalities (the costs of boycotts and sanctions often end up oppressing the local population even more e.g. when the population lacks the foreign treatments necessary for their survivals, or gay or political activists are killed in prison).” (https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/747342)

You're obsessed with proving. It's you who raised the objection to my position, not the other way around. I'm quite happy with your position. I don't agree with it, but I've neither the interest, nor have any clue how I would go about 'disproving' it. — Isaac

That’s a public philosophy forum, we discuss reasons, explore disagreements and assess how compelling arguments sound. And this is how I deal with your claims (like “As compassionate outsiders, our concern should solely be for the well-being of the people there”). If you don’t want to play this game, I don’t care. If you don’t want to play this game with me, then stop answering me.

1) Continued war to retain Ukrainian control over the region and improve the population's human rights by political pressure from their membership of the EU/NATO.
2) End the war by ceding Donbas/Crimea to Russia and improve the population's human rights by supporting protest and political change in Russia.

In 2 fewer die. — “Isaac

Let’s assume for the sake of the argument that “In 2 fewer die” is correct and that that’s all that counts. How likely is strategy 2 going to succeed? And how long is it going to take? The West has supported protests and political change for decades in Iran, North Korea, Russia and China with what results for their population's human rights? How about the ex-soviet union countries that had the chance to join NATO and EU?
This is hardly unpredictable: indeed there is a part of the local population in any of these authoritarian regimes that profits from the sanctions and political pressure from outside to preserve/increase economic inequalities and support authoritarian regimes to brutally squash local protests (and condemn the population to a miserable life in terms of freedoms, public and private services, or economic survival compared to western standards) or worse aggressively expand outside national borders to gain geopolitical influence (like through wars, proxy wars and terrorism).
Additionally, it’s questionable that “life” is all that counts (slavery wasn’t about killing people, Russian oppression isn’t about killing Ukrainians). Finally there is a hidden death toll that one must taken into account when talking about such authoritarian regimes given some inconveniences that add up to greater economic inequalities (the costs of boycotts and sanctions often end up oppressing the local population even more e.g. when the population lacks the foreign treatments necessary for their survivals, or gay or political activists are killed in prison).

What is the price you are willing to pay, in Ukrainian lives, for Ukrainian "liberation" of the 5 annexed territories?

What price are you willing to pay, in Ukrainian lives, and Ukraine still lose the war?

Let's say Ukrainian military is in a position where they could easily defend the rest of Ukraine or could commit to all-in-offensives to liberate the occupied territory at the risk of exhausting their forces and total defeat.

What is your risk tolerance for a failed re-conquest of the annexed territories resulting in the even worse outcome of the complete fall of most or all of Ukraine into Russian control? — boethius

Do you yourself have answers to these questions? Can you show me how you do the math?

Honestly I find such quizzes about moral dispositions in different hypothetical scenarios (as in the ‘trolley problem’) highly misleading for debating the issue at hand and therefore useless for my decision process. This is why:

• Ukrainian lives are not at my disposal as money in my pocket.
• I’m not even a political leader with all kinds of information political leaders can afford, popular consensus and peer-pressure to take tough political decisions for long terms goals affecting an entire collectivity.
• I can’t even reliably calculate the costs I or my beloved ones will likely pay now or in 10 years or in 50 years if I now politically support Ukrainian struggles against Russian oppression.
• Actually I believe that everyone in this thread suffers from similar limits, even when they do not support Ukrainian struggles or the Western hegemony.
• I also believe that nobody can frame this war as a game theory study case where outcomes and their likelihood are given. Everybody has to struggle with their personal uncomfortable blindspots as the war progresses.

So my political support for Ukrainian struggles is grounded more on the reasoning I exposed earlier (see https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/746949). Reasoning and evidences grounded on historical/geopolitical assumptions that go beyond this war, its major players and its short-terms results are more compelling to me then such quizzes.

You seem to be arguing that Ukrainians fighting more, regardless of outcomes, is a humanitarian accomplishment. — boethius

Then you seem to have misunderstood my argument.

If Zelensky sued for peace in the early stages of the war, say the first days, and basically Ukraine lost Russian occupied Donbas and Crimea and the war ended, are you willing to argue that would have been against human rights on Zelensky's part? — boethius

Not sure what you mean by “against human rights” in this case. But it’s beside the point. When talking about human rights I’m more interested in long-term and systemic outcomes not in short-term episodic outcomes (which is what you scenario looks to me like).
As far as I’m concerned, the critical point in geopolitical terms is that as long as Putin challenges the Western-backed World Order the outcome of the Ukrainian war must look a military and political defeat for Putin as convincingly as possible to all incumbent World Order challengers (Russian political elites included) no matter what Putin or the Russian propaganda says. And I political support this goal for the reasons I explained earlier (see https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/746949).

You seem to have disassociated the costs of your proposal from the imagined benefits — boethius

How many lives do systemic and long term political conditions supporting human rights cost to you? What is the likelihood of their success as of today, or in 10 years, in 50 years to you? What compelling evidences do you have to back your claims up? What’s the math you are doing to calculate costs and benefits? Take your time.

Chicago Riots killed 43 people, part of a series of about 50 such riots which, together with many peaceful demonstrations, brought about the changes in American civil rights.

The Ukraine war is currently killing 600 people a day. — Isaac

First this doesn't prove my point wrong. Secondly, you are comparing a political struggle within a hegemonic democratic regime to a war between Russia and Ukraine critical for the World Order. It's a bit of a stretch. Third tell me how many such examples you can find within the history of authoritarian regimes.
It would have been more fair to compare the Chicago Riots with Euro Maiden protests. But this was part of the genesis of the Russian aggression of Ukraine, so back to square one.

You think the "chance" of Ukraine improving its human rights record is worth thousands of deaths and can't be achieved any other way. I can't argue against a callous disregard for human life nor a dysfunctional imagination. — Isaac

Dysfunctional imagination? Your concern for “human life” is at odds with your concern for “human rights” on historical grounds. The end of foreign, political, social oppression doesn’t come without people putting their own life and others' at risk of a bloodshed, so no progress toward “human rights” can get there in a certain, straight, compassionate and peaceful way as one would hope (the recent Iranian protests are another good example of this point). So I get why you need lots of functional imagination to overcome your intellectual impasse.

You, neomac and @Olivier5 alike are all seeing this like we're choosing wallpaper. If you're choosing between A and B but to get B requires years of brutally destructive land war, then B had better be bloody fantastic. It had better have every citizen decked out with their own fucking floating island in the Mediterranean. A slightly better human rights report (but still bad) is not worth the death of thousands of innocent people. I can't believe I've just had to write that. — Isaac

I can't believe I had to read it once again. Such a claim "A slightly better human rights report (but still bad)" is highly misleading. My political support to Ukraine is for granting their chance to grow in prosperity and political freedoms within the Western sphere of influence in the next decades. The importance of granting them this chance goes however beyond the Ukrainian people themselves and their struggle against centuries of Russian oppression , it concerns also the World Oder as we know it and the power conflict between Western World and the emerging authoritarian regimes. Now since human rights and democracy are best implemented in the West than in the emerging authoritarian regimes, I choose to side with the West. And I also think this conclusion is backed by pragmatic considerations under uncertainty, factoring in realistic expectations about individual, collective and State dynamics. At least until someone proves me wrong, of course. So try harder.

Well then I don't see much evidence that your (4) follows. Countries with a long history of democracy and free press tend to have better internal human rights. It's not a magic pill. You don't just get human rights with membership. — Isaac

Nowhere I said that support for human rights comes with membership as a magic pill .
If our decisions require pragmatism under uncertainty, we are interested in relative likelihood and evidences to assess it. So I was talking in terms of relative likelihood. And I claim that it’s more likely that a pro-West country can implement human rights by being within the Western sphere of influence (so within NATO and EU), than by being within the Russian sphere of influence. What evidences do I have for this? Historical evidences (see Germany, Italy and Spain after WWII) and ex-Soviet Union countries that joined EU and NATO after the Soviet Union collapse. Also the democracy index is telling (https://www.visualcapitalist.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/democracy-index-2022-europe.jpg, https://www.democracymatrix.com/ranking): Russian democracy index is lower than any country in the EU and Belarus which is under the sphere of influence of Russia is even lower than Russia, Kazakhstan better of Russia for few points. Additionally, as already pointed out, candidature to NATO/EU membership doesn't come without scrutiny and places some burden on the candidate to prove also their commitment to EU/NATO charter which include democracy, individual freedoms and human rights (nothing alike can be found on the Russian side).
So I would consider such evidence strong enough as long as you do not have at least equally strong evidence to the contrary, namely that within Russian sphere of influence countries have a greater chance to see human rights implemented equally or even better than in Western countries.

There's no question of ceding the whole of Ukraine to Russia so what possible relevance would that have to this discussion? — Isaac

Because Russia is at war with Ukraine and annexed part of Ukrainian territory, against its will. But even if you want to exclude Crimea and Donbass from this discussion, the problem is still there: did you forget the story of Ukrainian neutrality?
BTW since you are so passionate about human rights, how does having Crimea and Donbass annexed to Russia get those regions likely closer to having a more Western-like implementation of human rights institutions?

As long as you keep evading my counter-arguments, ditching my questions and shifting focus, you are no longer compelling. Try playing the devil's advocate some times instead of always playing dumb.

No it isn't. Pro-west is not a single measure but is made up of military, economic and cultural forces. — Isaac

Who said so? My requirement is minimal: for me pro-West simply means to be in favor of being part of the Western sphere of influence like by joining NATO and EU.
You can raise the standards of analysis as high as you like, but the question remains: according to your vague but certainly greater measuring standards is Ukraine more pro-Western than Russia? Besides you didn't offer any evidence to support the claim that Ukraine is exactly as anti-Western as Russia if not more. And by removing the Donbas region and Crimea from the equation Ukraine would be even more pro-West than it already is, because those regions (being more pro-Russian) are likely more anti-Western than the rest of Ukraine.

... We're talking about the situation in Donbas. — Isaac

No you are talking about the situation in Donbas. I'm talking about Ukraine as opposed to Russia.

NATO is a military defensive organisation and the EU an economic one. Neither decision 'unquestionably' shows anything about a commitment to the sorts of human rights gains that the countries within those institutions enjoy. NATO particularly has absolutely no human rights element whatsoever. — Isaac

Again, it’s a step-by-step reasoning, at step 3 I didn’t talk about “commitment to the sorts of human rights gains that the countries within those institutions enjoy”. I simply asked you if Ukraine is more pro-West than Russia? The answer is unequivocally yes.

Nor are Ukraine 'ready to suffer a war against Russia' for that move. There's no link at all. The fiercest fighting against Russia has come from the ultranationalists, the very same groups opposed to westernisation. — Isaac

You mean that the exclusive overwhelming reason why Ukraine is fighting against Russian oppression, is because a tiny minority of Ukrainian ultranationalists is taking hostage Zelensky’s administration and the rest of the population to keep fighting Russian oppression exclusively out of spite of Russians? And that Ukrainian ultranationalists (like the ones who joined the Euro Maidan revolts) didn’t want Ukraine to join NATO and EU?

I’m reasoning on a step-by-step basis :

• First step: human rights is an acceptable way to identify collective well-being? Yes
• Second step: are human rights better implemented within Western countries? Yes
• Third step: is Ukraine more pro-West than Russia? Yes. Asking to join NATO and EU, and be ready to suffer a war against Russia to defend their choice wrt anti-Western rhetoric and hostility from Russia are unquestionable evidences for that. And if this is no evidence I don’t know what is.
• Fourth step: how likely is that a pro-West country can implement human rights by being within the Western sphere of influence (so within NATO and EU) than by being within the sphere of influence of an anti-West Russia with a poorer implementation of human rights (see first step), if not now in the future? I say it’s more likely, based on historical evidence (see Germany, Italy and Spain after WWII) and ex-Soviet Union countries that joined EU and NATO after the Soviet Union collapse. Also the democracy index is telling (https://www.visualcapitalist.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/democracy-index-2022-europe.jpg, https://www.democracymatrix.com/ranking): Russian democracy index is lower than any country in the EU and Belarus which is under the sphere of influence of Russia is even lower than Russia, Kazakhstan better of Russia for few points. Is this enough evidence? If not why not?

maybe the theory that only authoritarian states can respond to existential crisis with "what needs to be done" is correct and perhaps all the authoritarians getting together in a club is better odds. — boethius

By “only authoritarian states can respond to existential crisis with "what needs to be done””, you mean by directly engaging in aggressive wars and territorial annexations as old empires did? Or by extorting smaller countries by force, because that's what they do?
By “all the authoritarians getting together in a club is better odds” you mean that a club of authoritarian regimes like China, Russia and Iran are better odds for peace and prosperity in Europe than the US hegemony?

Neither Ukraine nor Russia are ‘Western'. — Isaac

The difference however is that Ukraine is more pro-Western than Russia. So as long as Ukrainian are open to enter the Western sphere of influence cooperatively, I would welcome it.

I haven’t. — Isaac

Your prescription was “As compassionate outsiders, our concern should solely be for the well-being of the people there”. How likely is that a random individual or collectivity or State in the West can be so compassionate to be concerned solely for the well-being of the people there? I see it as pretty much unlikely at any level. That is why your prescription looks damn challenging to be euphemistic.

No it isn't. I'm a member of the electorate in one of them, I hold them to account. It matters tremendously what I think they out to be concerned with. — Isaac

I wasn’t questioning the relevance of your moral standards to you nor the relevance of your political choices in a democracy. Again, I am questioning its relevance to establish what individuals, collectives or States are capable of. A part from that, people can surely have all the unrealistic expectations and set their moral standards arbitrarily high as they like, of course.

And the argument is thst there's little to chose between Ukraine and Russia on that score — Isaac

Little? The difference is dramatically under our eyes: Ukraine is more pro-Western than Russia. And risking their lives because they want to enter the Western sphere of influence isn’t a little difference to my standards. On the contrary I find it the opposite of compassionate just to call it “little”.

For myself, I cafe little for nation states, my view of nationalism is that it is an ersatz sense of identity for the lost and bewildered, frightened and alone. — boethius

It’s hard to follow the logic of your reasoning. First you start with “let us say you wanted to preserve Western preeminence” as if the sake of your argument is to see how to achieve that goal more effectively than simply by supplying weapons to Ukraine, but then you conclude with “making peace with the Russians” for Europeans (to grant economic prosperity independently from the US?) and “realise its ecocidal corrupt mania” for America (namely, giving up on their hegemonic role?), neither of which ensures Western preeminence.
Indeed the series of discrediting remarks against the West (in relation to starting an economic war against Russia, to support but not ally with Ukraine, overstating the Russian threat, Western political cowardice, more total war on tictoc) that you repleted your argument with seem aiming at questioning the desirability of pursuing Western preeminence more than finding a way to preserve it.
So your point is that the West should give up on its idea of World Order, Europe should only pursue economic prosperity by making peace with Russia, and the US should give up on its hegemonic role? And then we will more likely have peace? Is that it?

The Scandinavian countries have been part of mutual defense agreements for over a decade, so what exactly do you believe has changed that would make this so significant? — Tzeentch

Russia will have to deal with a larger NATO alliance, once again at the doorstep of Russian territory. More militarised and committed to serve NATO’s agenda in Europe and in the Artic region, at least. And a more hostile NATO agenda, since east Europe and Scandinavian countries are more likely to fear Russian expansionism and revanchism than western European countries. And if this happens Ukraine could be next. That’s even more likely without Donbas and Crimea because only Crimea and Donbas were significant to Russian security concerns right?

I never said it was conclusive. I literally state in my argument that "never say never" there's just no actual evidence now that Finland and Sweden in NATO matters. — boethius

I never said you said it was conclusive. As long as you keep reasoning with one-sided hypothetical future scenarios I expose my counter-arguments. What kind of actual evidence are you looking for? How come you ask me for actual evidence when you content yourself to hypothesize future scenarios? How come you say "never say never" and one line later you write "If you assume Finland will never actually invade Russia" ? Finally, the way I see it: the problem is not Finland expanding in Russia, but Russia expanding in Baltic sea.

The "negative" press also served as justification for Russian partial mobilisation. Of course, that has a political cost but will have a military benefit. — boethius

"negative" press is shitty justification then: a "special operation" shouldn't have required such a mobilization, and how calling Russian general idiots or claiming "Moscow should consider the use of low-intensity nuclear weapons in Ukraine given the recent setbacks it has suffered on the battlefield", can justify throwing in there more Russian soldiers in the battlefield is hardly understandable.

I'm not sure what you thought I was arguing, but my point was simply that all the negative press today can turn positive tomorrow if gains start to reverse. That a lot hinges on whether recent Ukrainian gains are sustainable or not. If Ukrainians gains aren't sustainable then they burn out, the front stabilises as a consequence.
As a general principle, however, definitely decisions should be based on what's likely to happen in the future. I fail to understand how that wouldn't apply here. I drink water because it's likely to keep me alive (in the future), and I avoid falling off high structures as it's likely to get me killed (in the future), even putting aside exceptions, the basic decision making process is what's likely to happen in the future. — boethius

OK then take your time to quantify the "likelihood" of all your ifs in your previous couple of comments.

The US, and the West in general, post-WWII, were (in my opinion) a very much soft power based imperialism centred around "peace keeping".
Brokering a deal with the Russias would have maintained that soft-power privileged position and the soft-power leverage over Russia in gas revenues, and the prosperity of America's "partners". — boethius

All right. Now that the toy is broken, what would be the best course of action by the West according to your possible future scenarios? What is their likelihood? What are your actual evidences to support them?

Just so we're clear, I don't pretend to have conclusive arguments. Observers like us are probably only seeing half the picture, and the best we can do is make educated guesses. — Tzeentch

We can still discuss why your argument is not conclusive based on educated guesses. Hence my comment.

As I stated in my last reply to you, NATO expansion in general is an issue to Russia. How could it not be? It is essentially an anti-Russian alliance. — Tzeentch

Then there is no way to downplay the importance of having Sweden and Finland in NATO as Putin tried to do. And again, NATO's mission was essentially an anti-Russian alliance, but this alliance's objectives can be revised or replaced according to the current security global challenges (https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2022/06/29/national/japan-nato-china/).

Crimea only becomes a problem as a result of NATO expansion. With a neutral Ukraine, there is no threat of Crimea being cut off, since they'd have to be crazy to try it. — Tzeentch

As much as Sweden and Finland only become a problem as a result of NATO expansion.

In other words, if Russian (or anti-NATO) propaganda states that NATO expansion at the expense of Russian sphere of influence is an issue, then also Sweden and Finland entering NATO is an issue for Russian (or anti-NATO) propaganda.
If Russian (or anti-NATO) propaganda states that “denazifying” Ukraine means regime change and this is not what is happening, then this is an issue for Russian (or anti-NATO) propaganda.
If Russian (or anti-NATO) propaganda states that “neutral” Ukraine means Ukraine not in NATO, then increasing the likelihood for Ukraine to enter NATO is an issue for Russian (or anti-NATO) propaganda.
If Russian (or anti-NATO) propaganda states that Russia is just a special operation that will last days not months, but duration and Russian mobilization contradict this, then this is a problem for Russian (or anti-NATO) propaganda.
If Russian (or anti-NATO) propaganda states that Russia is the second strongest military in the world, but it performs as poorly as they did up to now, then this a problem for the Russian (or anti-NATO) propaganda.

The more you nuance or rephrase the Russians' stated reasons and objectives to match what Russians could actually achieve so far, the more overblown the Russian (or anti-NATO) propaganda sounds.

Personally I think the notion of human rights is a good starting point. — Isaac

OK let’s do a step forward and ask: where do you think human rights are better supported: in Western countries (e.g. the US, the UK, Germany, France) or in the countries hostile to the West (Russia, China, North Corea, Iran)?
I think Western countries have institutions that support human rights within their territory (certainly for their citizens) better than in countries hostile to the West, no matter how imperfect and corrupt. And for that reason I personally would prefer to live in the US, the UK, Germany and France, than in Russia, China, North Corea and Iran, even if I were to be materially richer in the last non-Western countries, then I would be by living in some Western country. Therefore I’m open to share the standard of life I’m experiencing in the West with those people who are open to share this standard of life cooperatively.

The intention is not to 'prove' it. — Isaac

All the worse. If you set challenges to others (“as compassionate outsiders, our concern should solely be for the well-being of the people there”) which look grounded on unrealistic expectations about how we human individually or collectively can act, your challenges doesn’t sound that compelling.

States ought to be concerned with the welfare of all humans the interact with, as should anyone. I think nationalism is a cancer on human societies. — Isaac

It’s irrelevant what you think States ought to be, a realist view is about how States actually act in the geopolitical arena. I also think that Russian ought to respect international law and withdraw from Ukraine all together and the US or NATO didn’t do anything illegal from an international law point of view to support Ukraine (and certainly nothing as criminal as Russian aggression and annexation of Ukrainian territory), but then you can claim that according to a realist point of view Russia perceived NATO expansion as a threat to national security and therefore they would have reacted accordingly no matter the costs. And again, according to a realist point of view, no States can act compassionately in the way you prescribe as “concern should solely be for the well-being of the people there”. Additionally, while I can see how enforcing a certain international legal order can be within the means of great powers, I hardly see how great powers can enforce people to be “solely concerned for the well-being of the people there” as compassionate outsiders.

Yes. But it doesn't matter which. No-one is contemplating leaving Donbas as no-man's land. — Isaac

Yes it does. Because depending on the context there are political elites one can trust more or less for being up to the task.

Further, the difference between Sweden, Finland and Ukraine should be obvious. Sweden and Finland have no strategic relevance to Russia at all, while Ukraine is the most important region for Russia outside of Russia proper. — Tzeentch

Same response:

However correct, your argument is far from being conclusive for 2 strong reasons: 1. if Crimea was the issue, Russia could have clearly stated that the problem is not NATO expansion, but the control over Crimea. Talking generically about NATO expansion and Russophobia (think about Russian minorities in Baltic Regions), signals generic aspirations over territories and people Russia perceives as “theirs”, no matter what NATO countries have to say. 2. Finland and Sweden inside NATO and militarisation are relevant for the control of the Baltic Sea which is of unquestionable strategic importance (https://dgap.org/en/research/publications/russias-strategic-interests-and-actions-baltic-region). And evidently in line with Russian expansion trends (under Putin) to encircle Europe, given Russian militar and threatening presence in north Africa, in the Mediterranean Sea (bridged by the control over the Black Sea) and Baltic Sea (see Kaliningrad). Besides Russian aren’t certainly short on pretexts or motivations hostile to the West (see the wild resentment and grievances against the West exposed in their State TV). — neomac

However, there is also another big military difference in that Finland does not host any Russian naval bases, whereas Ukraine hosted one of Russia's most important ports.
There is a lot of pretty common sense reasons Russia would view Ukraine in NATO as a major threat to its security, which has no parallel with Finland. Of course, "never say never" but I seriously doubt anyone in Russia, Finland or the whole NATO seriously believes in any conflict between Finland and Russia, with or without Finland in NATO. — boethius

However correct, your argument is far from being conclusive for 2 strong reasons: 1. if Crimea was the issue, Russia could have clearly stated that the problem is not NATO expansion, but the control over Crimea. Talking generically about NATO expansion and Russophobia (think about Russian minorities in Baltic Regions), signals generic aspirations over territories and people Russia perceives as “theirs”, no matter what NATO countries have to say. 2. Finland and Sweden inside NATO and militarisation are relevant for the control of the Baltic Sea which is of unquestionable strategic importance (https://dgap.org/en/research/publications/russias-strategic-interests-and-actions-baltic-region). And evidently in line with Russian expansion trends (under Putin) to encircle Europe, given Russian militar and threatening presence in north Africa, in the Mediterranean Sea (bridged by the control over the Black Sea) and Baltic Sea (see Kaliningrad). Besides Russian aren’t certainly short on pretexts or motivations hostile to the West (see the wild resentment and grievances against the West exposed in their State TV).

For now. Things can change. Now, if you say this is one negative for now, then we agree. — boethius

Things can change, but the blow to Russian national pride hurts now in this world, not in possible future world.

So, if Russia is confident that Ukraine cannot sustain this offensive, then the greater the despair the greater the catharsis and euphoria when the tide is reversed. And such an observation is not "copium" but psychology 101 and hinges on the "if" statement. If Ukrainian gains are sustainable then the greater the despair the greater pressure to start use tactical nuclear weapons or justify some other policy shift. — boethius

Propaganda is not for free, it has its material and human costs and its unintended consequences. So I wouldn’t bet much on Russian masterminding Western propaganda at this scale of confrontation on a world stage. Besides since the bites of humiliation are entering national TV in Russia, we can no longer consider it just “Western” propaganda. The usage of nuclear weapons will be a further confirmation of Russian weakness because it will mean that Russia didn’t prove capable of defeating Ukraine backed by Westerners on conventional war grounds.

"last word" so to speak (only in Russia). — boethius

The more Russians are mobilized to the war or flee from Russia and sactions+economic recession bite, the more Putin’s last word risks to fade away (inside and outside his circle), if military performance on the battle field proves to be as poor as it was so far.

Most importantly, even the Western media is forced at some point to recognise Russia is "winning" if they clearly are. This was what was happening before these offensives. Ukraine was "resisting" heroically around Kiev and the withdraw from the North was a huge victory for Ukraine and Embarrassment for Russia, war crimes rinse repeat, but after some time even the Western media had to recognise that Russia was winning, especially after Ukraine retreat from major centres like Donetsk. — boethius

Your speculation has some merits, but in so far as it’s a broad and one-sided prospect of possible future scenarios not only it has little chance to weigh in the decision process of Western governments, but it should not weigh even in the decision process of ordinary people, precisely because the lesson for anti-Western forces (Russian and beyond) would be that broadly assessed possible future threats (no matter how likely) would be enough to persuade Western general public to recoil and question their governments’ decisions.

The argument that this war is finally the "kick in the arse" Europe needed to transition to renewables all along, is not a good argument, it simply establishes we have been led by traitors to European citizens and all of humanity and all life all this time. — boethius

Putin and China are questioning the West-backed world order. The West must respond to that threat with determination. That’s why Putin unilateral aggression must fail in a way however that is instrumental to the West-backed world order. If this war is not just between Russia and Ukraine, then it’s not even just between the US and Russia, it’s between whoever wants to weigh in in establishing the new world order, either by backing the US or by backing Russia.

The mention of armageddon could be just empty talk, or then it could be simply preparing to deescalate the situation. The US administration has gotten what it wants from the conflict (ending cooperation between Russia and Germany, militarisation of Europe, boosting energy profits, is very doubtful good things for NATO as a whole, but it is certainly good for Biden's donors), so "averting nuclear war" is obviously a good rational to end the conflict in one way or another if it's now simply becoming a headache to deal with. — boethius

Yes that was the point I was making.

Sweden has essentially zero military significance.
Finland in NATO doesn't really change anything as there's extreme low probability that Finland would house NATO nuclear missiles or be a staging ground for a NATO invasion of Russia, which is also unlikely to happen anyways.
The only military scenario where Finland in NATO is relevant is if Russia planned on invading either Finland or then NATO countries, which again is very low probability. — boethius

NATO can be repurposed also defend the West from the Rest. And if NATO expansion in Sweden or Finland is not a problem, neither should have been NATO expanding in Ukraine.

As for military humiliation, the war is not over. — boethius

It doesn't need to be over to assess how poorly Russian are military performing. Even they themselves are complaining about it in their national TV.

And, again, the extent to which there is real pain and disruption doesn't change the immense competitive advantage to the rest of the world that hasn't sanctioned Russian energy, in particular China and India. — boethius

Well Indian, Chinese, Russian, and anti-Capitalist should be happy then. The US and the Western American-led oppression of the rest of the World is on a path of self-destruction. That's why they should absolutely continue to support Ukraine to fight Russia.

Playing devil's advocate:
- Expansion of NATO (Sweden and Finland) possibly Ukraine
- End of economic cooperation between Russia-Germany (destruction of North stream)
- Militarization of Europe
- Western Russophobia & military humiliation of Russia
- Besides boosting American companies selling weapons and shale gas, of course.

Now Biden is ready for peace and the "armageddon" argument comes in handy.
https://www.commondreams.org/news/2022/10/07/demands-peace-talks-intensify-biden-says-putin-nuclear-threats-risk-armageddon

Not in isolation, no. The Russians could be liberators come to free the people from tyrannical rule, they'd still be the invaders. You have to have some clear notion of the relative harms to pick sides, it's not sufficient just to say one side is being invaded. — Isaac

I disagree. I see compassion as a supportive feeling we have for other people’s suffering, it doesn’t presuppose an accurate or wider/est calculation of relative harms.

I'm not struggling with that, personally, so you'll have to explain a bit more about the difficulties you're having. — “Isaac

You are not proving to be “solely” concerned of the well being of the people there, by engaging in anonymous armchair chattering about “people there” on a website. I don’t even think it’s a reasonable expectation since we are human being too physically, socially, intellectually and morally limited to be unconditionally determined by such a goal. So I deeply doubt that it make even sense to prescribe we should “solely” be concerned of the well being of the people there. And states according to a realist view that you seem to share with Mearsheimer don’t care about people’s feelings or moral, they are self-preserving geopolitical agents in competition for power. So your prescriptions about compassion sound cheap (because from an armchair) wishful (because unrealistic from an individual and collective p.o.v) thinking.

How? I don't see the mechanism. Representation is definitely an important tool, but that's not the same thing as sovereignty. — Isaac

I didn't equate representation and sovereignty anywhere. I was talking about pre-condition for the implementation of state institutions that support human rights. State institutions, as I understand them, presuppose authoritative and coercive ruling over a territory.

"pragmatic decision under uncertainty"
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/745864

Pragmatic reasoning based on your ideologically-inspired goals, questionable as anybody else’s.

"As compassionate outsiders, our concern should solely be for the well-being of the people there. (The whole reasoning)"
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/746063

What is the well-being of the people? Don’t I show compassion for the well-being of “the people there” if I show my support for a Ukrainian feelings against Russian oppression, humanly perfectly understandable? Why should I “solely” be concerned for the well-being of the people there, to prove that I’m a compassionate outsider? Either solely or nothing: why are you talking in terms of out-out? How come there is no third way here? How do you think is capable to “solely” be concerned for the well-being of the people there? States as agents of a geopolitical power struggles as Mearsheimer sees them? Random anonymous armchair chatters on a website as you and me are?

“If we supply such enormous quantities of aid, we have a right and a duty to ensure that aid is being used to promote only humanitarian goals. Sovereignty for some group over some territory is not a humanitarian goal.”
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/746064

But it can be a means to achieve “humanitarian goal” if by “humanitarian goal” you are referring to human rights as we, in western democracies, understand them and sovereignty can be a pre-condition for the implementation of state apparatuses supporting human rights.

which strategy is most likely to quickly reduce the scale of war crimes. — Isaac


Try reading first, commenting after. If you have anything to contribute about what course of action is most likely to REDUCE the severity of war crimes then let's have it, because I don't know if you've noticed but continued war doesn't seem to be doing that. — Isaac

Total and irrevocable surrender. Ukrainian should pay for all the material and human losses Russia has suffered up this war, give up on their national identity, let Russia annex whatever they want on the terms they want, condone rapes, killings and destruction perpetrated by Russians, and refrain from denounce future oppression. And believe from now on that whatever the Russians did to the Ukrainians during the special operation was meant for their good, since Ukrainians are their brothers, as everybody knows since ever. And whenever the Russians feel like to kill rape and destroy Ukrainians it is always for their good, nothing worth to fight against, or even sacrifice a minute of their life to worry about because the evil is the imperialist-capitalist-colonialist-globalist-world-mongerist-america and all its ludicrous cheerleaders (like the all ones you are objecting to in here). This would be the most likely way to quickly reduce the scale of war crimes.

As if Russians are not known for their ethnic cleansing penchant in the occupied territories:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Samashki_massacre
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethnic_cleansing_of_Georgians_in_South_Ossetia
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deportation_of_the_Crimean_Tatars

For example, NATO eastward expansion (which Baltic states have participated in) is a big, if not "the" big reason for the current war, which plenty of experts predicted would happen (including the US's own cold-war top analysts's and policy makers), and the current war is a major threat to Baltic security. Things can be argued both ways ... but people can feel safe independent of whatever the facts are. — boethius

If Russia feels threatened by NATO expansion (it doesn't matter if they are justified), NATO expansion is the culprit. If Eastern European countries feel threatened by Russia and therefore join NATO as deterrent against direct aggression (it doesn't matter if they are justified), NATO expansion is still the culprit. Why is that always NATO expansion is the culprit that can not be excused/justified based on perception/reality analysis of moral or geopolitical reasons?

what kind of likely loss do you have in mind?

Not sure Putin is interested in peace
https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/07/20/russia-ukraine-war-odesa-black-sea/

The bitter truth may simple be that Russia can't lose. But it must not win either.

Thanks!

I found it here too: https://unrollthread.com/t/1548697349676998656/ (more practical if one wants to save it)

Leonid Volkov (Alexei Navalny chief of staff) opines (Jul 17, 2022):


Ignoring the usual political slant, I see a couple of worthwhile points. By the way, the reduction-to-chess-game misses the killings and bombing. — jorndoe

Did you post a link to an article after the first line? I can't find any.

"We" are going to "beat the Russians", and who do you suppose is going to make that sacrifice to uphold your ideals? — Tzeentch

Are you kind of suggesting that Ukrainians are supposedly going to sacrifice their lives to uphold Wayfarer's personal ideals?

the US sending weapons to Ukraine to fight Russia invading Ukraine is immoral because it protracts war and increases casualties, right?
https://ru.usembassy.gov/world-war-ii-allies-u-s-lend-lease-to-the-soviet-union-1941-1945/

Excuses were - Russian-speaking population, oppression of language, NATO risk to warm-water port access. — Isaac

Who said anything about "justified". Where did I even mention the word? — Isaac

what is the difference between excuse and justification to you as applied to the Russian annexation of Crimea?

Is Putin Russophobe?
https://www.wireservice.ca/putin-sends-ethnic-minorities-to-die-who-are-the-buryats-kazakhs-tuvans-corriere-it/