There is no deduction or inference or conclusion since these concepts for me apply more appropriately between propositions, not between perceptions and propositions! — neomac


..these cognitive abilities constitute a VALID justification for his perceptual belief (because they are relatively reliable), but not a SOUND justification for his perceptual belief though (because in that specific case they failed). — neomac


Gibberish. One the one hand, you claim there is no inference, deduction, or conclusion possible between mistaking cloth for cow and the assertion "there is a cow in the field", and then call that assertion 'valid' despite just openly admitting that it is not even capable of being so. — creativesoul

You are evidently confused. In the quoted claims of mine the word "valid" is taken as qualifying "justification" (not "assertion") for a perceptual belief as contrasted to "sound" justification (not "assertion") and by analogy with the distinction of valid/sound deduction (not "assertion").

Validity and soundness are qualities, characteristics, and/or features of logical arguments, reasoning, and such. — creativesoul

The distinction valid/sound I'm expressly referring to is related to deduction. Then I'm proposing to extend the current usage of the distinction valid/sound from deduction to other cognitive tasks by analogy.
Here is my proposal (for the third time):

• I think "justification" is a normative term, not a descriptive one. Additionally, justificatory practices vary depending on the genesis of a belief and they have different degrees of reliability (which also means that we distinguish "valid" from "sound" applications). Since our beliefs are fallible, our knowledge and justificatory claims are fallible as well
• since the distinction between justification+"no false lemma" and justification-"no false lemma" looks analogous to the distinction between sound and valid deduction, we could simply talk about sound vs valid justification depending on the context. So in the case of the farmer's false belief, we could say he is validly justified in believing that there is a cow, but not soundly justified. And only the latter case can be called knowledge .

Still waiting for you to clarify how and why you changed your views or the way you present them.

Compare this to a company guaranteeing your computer will turn on. If it doesn't, you have legal recourse for damages and can sue this company. Could Ukraine sue the US for not keeping a promise? — boethius

Of course, if there is an adequate legal codification behind the "security guarantees". Yet that doesn't imply that there will be justice to Ukrainian satisfaction. But this happens also within legal systems where individuals are suing e.g. big companies which have the material resources and political ties to grant them impunity. That doesn't make such legal system an ornament either.
Besides the "security guarantees" may involve European parties too, not only the US.
The main problem with your view is that talking about certainty independently from geopolitical and historical considerations is pointless. Nothing that geopolitical actors can work with. The reason why you are blabbering about it is because you likely want to argue that Ukrainian demands for security guarantees are irrational. Indeed how can a State rationally rely on something that is ornamental, with zero meaning and equates to a cheap/hypocritical flatus vocis like "trust us bro" that any random boethius can endlessly troll anybody about?
That's precisely how dumb your dialectic strategy is.

the "Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances" is very assuring indeed ... but if you actually read it, the actual real substance doesn't seem too assuring at all and didn't actually happen when the time came to "assure" Ukraine about the promises made. — boethius

First, the violation of the Budapest Memorandum is taken into account [1] to condemn Russian violation of international laws (which justifies sanctions and military support to Ukraine). Second, as I have already explained "security guarantees" are precisely contrasted with "security assurances", because the nature of the commitment would be much more costly for those who are engaging in it, legally speaking as well: The Budapest Memorandum was negotiated at political level, but it is not entirely clear whether the instrument is devoid entirely of legal provisions. It refers to assurances, but unlike guarantees, it does not impose a legal obligation of military assistance on its parties. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Budapest_Memorandum) Third, the historical circumstances for the Budapest Memorandum were different from the ones we are living now and the purpose of the Memorandum as well is different from the one addressed by the security guarantees: "Scholars assumed at the time that Ukraine's decision to sign the Budapest Memorandum was proof of Ukraine's development as a democracy and its desire to step away from the post-Soviet world and make first steps toward a European future. For 20 years, until the 2014 Russian military occupation of regions of Ukraine,[50] the Ukrainian nuclear disarmament was an exemplary case of nuclear non-proliferation. " (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Budapest_Memorandum)

Anyways West/NATO/US and Ukraine understanding of what is at stake geopolitically speaking will determine what form of military cooperation [2] must be implemented at the expense of Russia as long as Russia is perceived as a non-negligible threat to the West. So is it rational for Zelensky to pursue security guarantees or equivalent, and for us to believe that some form of security guarantees will be implemented? Given the current circumstances, it's more rational than believing the opposite based on fictional scenarios, or on the preposterous idea that such agreements are ornamental.

I would take you more seriously if you could convincingly argue that the West/NATO/US has actually lost interest/resources or will likely lose interest/resources to support Ukraine against Russia. Alas, it's not the case.

[1]
We the Leaders of the Group of Seven (G7) are appalled by and condemn the large-scale military aggression by the Russian Federation against the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, directed partly from Belarusian soil. This unprovoked and completely unjustified attack on the democratic state of Ukraine was preceded by fabricated claims and unfounded allegations. It constitutes a serious violation of international law and a grave breach of the United Nations Charter and all commitments Russia entered in the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris and its commitments in the Budapest Memorandum. We as the G7 are bringing forward severe and coordinated economic and financial sanctions. We call on all partners and members of the international community to condemn this attack in the strongest possible terms, to stand shoulder to shoulder with Ukraine, and raise their voice against this blatant violation of the fundamental principles of international peace and security.
https://uk.ambafrance.org/G7-condemns-Russian-invasion-of-Ukraine

[2]
Security guarantees come from two main sources: 1) collective security organizations (NATO is the most greatest example) and 2) bilateral defence treaties (for example, Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of Korea, The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America etc.).
Security guarantees are usually defined in the text of a treaty as a duty “to come to one`s defense when it faces external aggression”. In comparison, security assurances are commonly contained in other international legal acts and are expressed in terms of a promise “to provide cooperation and aid (or “assistance”) in case of aggression”. That means that security guarantees impose much stronger obligation, than assurances do, because they are inferred from the source of international law – an international treaty (subject to Art. 38 of IC Charter).
This guarantee means the guarantor’s direct participation in protection of recipient’s national security. Therefore it is usually accompanied by the deployment of guarantor’s armed forces (or assurer) on the recipient’s territory, by creation of joint military headquarters and joint armed squads/units etc.
https://www.academia.edu/16541504/Legal_Notion_of_the_Terms_Security_Assurances_Security_Guarantees_and_Reassurances_in_International_Security_Law

You are literally describing how the word "guarantee" doesn't literally mean "guarantee" ... as why would it be a guarantee in any sense of certainty. — boethius

Guarantee in a sense of certainty doesn't exist anywhere with the reliability of a physical law or mathematical truth. "Guarantee" just expresses a formal commitment to act in a certain way. In geopolitics the nature of the "security guarantee" commitment under discussion is to be distinguished from "security assurance" because the nature of military cooperation should be much more substantial in the former case (comparable to NATO membership). That is the only sense that is relevant for geopolitical reasoning.

Can we count on these "guarantees": of course not! Don't be silly! is your new position. — boethius

Not new, liar. It's simply what is left of your preposterous position to hang on because for all the rest you have capitulated already. You need badly to attribute it "zero meaning" because it probably helps you question the rationality of Zelensky's demands. But you are failing in doing so. Badly.

Again, you may have "bro trends" or bro leverage or other broformation particular to the broverse in which you base your decision to trust your bros. But is the bro code 100% reliable, "guaranteed" in any meaningful sense. Alas, t'is not. — boethius

Since you can't quote literally any parties to support your claim, you invent your own fictional evidences. You look so dumb, bro.

You went from "pre-condition" to "rational requirement" to "considering the nuclear deterrence they both had" ... that I remind you "Ukraine doesn't have!" but apparently that had no relation to your original use of the word "pre-condition". — boethius

Good summary of your neverending misunderstanding, troll. May view didn't evolve. Here is my statement: The best interest of both US and Soviet Union was calculated by taking into account the deterrence means they both had (but Ukraine doesn’t have!), and this was pre-condition for the kind of agreements they could rationally pursue. The word "pre-condition" here expresses a rational requirement for geopolitical agents. And it applies differently in the case the US negotiating with Soviet Union and in the case of Ukraine negotiating with Russia.

You start by contradicting my position, that guarantees aren't ornamental ... and then just repeat my position back to me. — boethius

"Security guarantees" are not "ornamental" or "zero meaning" from a geopolitical point of view. But you think I'm repeating your position because you misunderstand mine. There is nothing in your reasoning that compels me to find the word "ornament" as appropriate replacement for "security guarantees". Even contracts enforced by central state are not guarantee in the sense of certainty. Legal justice more often than we hope can fail us for all kinds of reasons. Are they ornamental for that reason or State is not the guarantor of legal justice? No.
What is fallacious in your reasoning is that we are compelled to consider with "zero meaning" the "security guarantee" just because the word "guarantee" suggests to you certainty. This reasoning is utterly dumb and has no ground in geopolitical rationality. Indeed you are incapable of providing any parties (Russian or Ukrainian or Western) that understand the word "guarantee" the way you suggest.
So you built a fictitious "straw man" to argue against. That's how intellectually desperate you are.

You've basically transitioned into this euphemistic use of the word guarantee: not certain, not legal, no legal recourse — boethius

I didn't transition at all. Depending on the way the security guarantees (or NATO membership) is legally codified there might be occasions also for legal recourse, obviously.

I explain at some length that there can be other reasons outside of what wording is used in an agreement to believe that people, even an entire nation, will keep their word: nearly all of it is called circumstances and leverage. — boethius

I did it repeatedly before you did.

Key words: "If you're saying".

It's called "if" followed by a "then".

It was honestly unclear to me what your position has evolved into with all the goal post moving around. — boethius

Still a liar, my position didn't evolve. It's your understanding of it that did. Still in the wrong direction! Besides, the fact that you use a if-then statement to make your reasoning sound more plausible is still dishonest in suggesting that I'm agreeing with the way you framed the antecedent of the statement which also keeps echoing the claim "An obvious reality you seem finally to agree with". By putting your words in my mouth, you keep suggesting a conceptual framing that you have no reason at all to use to formulate my claims (actual or hypothetical), because I expressly and repeatedly objected against it.

All you're discovering is that "guarantees" is euphemism for "trust us bro" (as I've been explaining) and, sure, it can be reasonable for Zelensky to get whatever promises and statements of trust he can in a deal, but "guarantees" are purely ornamental.

This is a caricature of what it's understood by "security guarantee". The military cooperation between the US/NATO and Ukraine is the reason why Russia is still fighting, even without agreement on paper, go figure!
— boethius

If the US goes back on its word in the future (such as make certain "assurances" it doesn't give a shit about now), Ukraine will have no recourse. If Ukrainians complain "but I thought it was guaranteed" ... what's the answer going to be from the neocon appreciation brigade on reddit defending the US's position? "All is fair in love and war," or maybe "life's not fair, take care of your own security" etc. — boethius

But your conjectures do not prove anything from a geopolitical point of view. What gives meaning to such agreements is the actual geopolitical and historical circumstances, and their trends.

What do we learn, that simply calling something a guarantee doesn't make it a guarantee. — boethius

This claim is as obvious as "nothing certain in life". Nothing substantively relevant for geopolitical analysis and explanation.

Guarantee in the context of agreements refers to some actual consequence for not delivering. — boethius

Wrong, there can be consequences. These are implied material and reputational costs at least. At worst hegemonic influence.

More appropriate term that describes reality would be that what diplomats call "security guarantees" are actually in the real world of substance "security reasons". They maybe reasons to accept the deal, they may even actually happen, but they are not guarantees in some substantive contractual sense of guarantee. — boethius

There is a contractual sense of "security guarantees" as long as there is a legal codification. The point is that contract between states is not the same as contract between persons since there is no authority that can enforce contract the way a central state can do with individuals. That's all. In any case, that doesn't imply AT ALL that the meaning of such agreements are ornamental or meaningless.

You have simply strawmanned my position with conflating the ornamental nature of guarantee with the idea no one ever does what they promise. — boethius

I didn't claim that either. Indeed you can not quote me, you have to invent a putative conflation between ideas that I never stated nor implied. You are a pathological liar.

validly deduce/infer/conclude "there is a cow in the field" from mistaking cloth — creativesoul

I answered that already but maybe you didn't get it. There is no deduction or inference or conclusion since these concepts for me apply more appropriately between propositions, not between perceptions and propositions! One can more appropriately be said to form a perceptual belief out of his perceptual experiences. How did the farmer form his perceptual belief "that is a cow" by watching a piece of cloth resembling a cow? My answer is that this can be explained as resulting from 2 factors: his perceptual activity (recognizing a cow-shaped appearance) and a cultural cognitive bias (due to the habits of watching cows in that field), these cognitive abilities constitute a VALID justification for his perceptual belief (because they are relatively reliable), but not a SOUND justification for his perceptual belief though (because in that specific case they failed).

First, in our exchange, you wasted all occasions to quote where Zelensky used the word "precondition" which would be relevant to your argument. — neomac


Why would this be relevant to my argument? The word precondition was already being discussed, the point of discussion was if Zelensky's precondition to negotiate were reasonable or not. — boethius

If you want to discuss about "preconditions" attributed to Zelensky ("discussing Zelensky and his preconditions for dozens of pages”) or “Zelensky's precondition to negotiate” based on actual and pertinent evidence, you must (rational requirement) provide such evidences, starting with Zelensky's declared "precondition" statements, if there are any. Isn't that obviously obvious to you? Or should I say “tautological”?

If you want a citation of Zelensky literally using the word precondition, here you go:

"We agreed that the Ukrainian delegation would meet with the Russian delegation without preconditions on the Ukrainian-Belarusian border, near the Pripyat River," he said in a statement. — Reuters

Zelensky demands Russian troops leave Ukraine as precondition to diplomacy — The Times of Isreal
— boethius

So no evidence of Zelensky's declared preconditions in relation to "security guarantees" or "NATO membership", just evidence about preconditions for diplomatic meeting with Russia. That’s why it’s irrelevant to quote him, and you need to conjecture things in the most caricatural way to make a point. Unfortunately it didn’t go well for you.

What is relevant here is that the word precondition was already being discussed, that was the whole focus of my point you were clearly trying to rebut. — boethius

So you are using the word “precondition" the way it suits your argument not necessarily in relation with Zelensky's actual "precondition" declarations and in spite of talking in terms of "Zelensky's preconditions". Then I too used the word "precondition" the way it suits my argument not necessarily in relation with the actual "precondition" statements in your previous discussion on “Zelensky's precondition to negotiate”. Period.
Your historical example of NPT between US and Soviet Union didn’t clarify to me what we could infer from it wrt the Ukrainian case. Hence my objection.
For example, you didn’t consider their hegemonic role to induce compliance also in non-nuclear countries within their sphere of influence, nor the obvious motivation for non nuclear-powers to join such treaties in exchange for a nuclear-power states commitment to curb their military nuclear capacity. As far as the Ukrainian case is concerned, any long-term agreement between Russia and Ukraine must take into account that, given the historical circumstances, Ukrainian security concerns require some form of Western military support (e.g. NATO membership, security guarantees or equivalent) because Ukraine doesn’t have nuclear bombs to protect itself against Russia.
Now let’s loop for the thousand time over your intellectual failures…

You start off with bait-and-switch the meaning of precondition — boethius

Not at all, for the reasons I just explained. Maybe you were misled by the way I formulated my objection due to its syntax and the discussion you previously had with other interlocutors. That was unfortunate, but a misunderstanding nonetheless.

All you're saying is "agents" reason about things. — boethius

That’s again a misunderstanding of my claim. Not what I actually claimed, indeed you can not quote me. You desperately need to rephrase in a caricatural way my point to reach the conclusion that suits you. And that’s intellectually miserable. I’m responsible for what I write, not for what you understand.

But that's simply obviously — boethius

Then you must (logical requirement) converge to my conclusions!

not the point you were making. In using the word "pre-condition" and emphasising that Ukraine is in a different nuclear status, — boethius

That’s again your silly misunderstanding, and your arguments to support it are just a preposterous way to brainwash yourself into believing you are right. But I have no pity for your intellectual misery, as I said.

My point is that any promise to Ukraine by the West is meaningless in itself. The promise would be fulfilled if, later, it suits these powers to fulfil the promise. If, later, it doesn't suit these powers to fulfil the promise then it won't be fulfilled. There's alignment for now (for some arms, but "tut, tut, tut get your dirty hands of the shiny shit"), I'm just pointing out that if that alignment ever went away (such as happened with the Kurds) then no piece of paper is going to matter.

An obvious reality you seem finally to agree with. — boethius

But I don't agree with you, you are a liar if you claim otherwise. In particular, I don't agree with those claims in bold. There are material and reputational costs to take into account while implementing such promises, and implied security concerns that such promises can trigger. It's the promise of having Ukraine joining NATO that has been claimed to be an existential threat for Russia and to provoke its reaction.
From the fact that a paper doesn't compel the West to act in a given way, you infer that it's meaningless. But it's an unjustified claim: even words have no meaning outside their actual usage, but it would be a sophism to infer that, for that reason, words are meaningless! The same goes with "NATO membership" or "security guarantees", it’s the geopolitical and historical conditions that surround such agreements that give meaning and motivate the perpetuation of related informal and formal practices (treaties, alliances, pacts, etc.). And all rational geopolitical actors are aware of this. That's how they deal with geopolitical threats or opportunities.
That's why your argument in support of your claim that such practices are "ornamental" is a straw man argument.

WHO ON EARTH IS TAKING SECURITY GUARANTEES IN THE CERTAINTY SENSE? CAN YOU QUOTE HIM? — neomac


“There is only one goal (from Russia): to destroy our independence. There’s no other goal in place. That’s why we need security guarantees. … And we believe we have already demonstrated our forces’ capability to the world.” — Zelensky, quoted by CNN — boethius

And where on earth did you get the idea that "need security guarantees" means or suggests that the West/NATO/US support is certain or certain because it's signed on a paper ?! Are you crazy, dude?

Now, if you're saying Zelensky knows that security guarantees are only ornamental fluff to promises that will only be kept if it suits the promising party to keep the promise (aka. a nominal but meaningless promise), then I'd be happy to hear that Zelensky isn't delusional on this point of international relations. — boethius

I NEVER MADE SUCH A CLAIM, YOU LIAR, quote where I did! I just claimed that "security guarantees" (or equivalent) are neither "ornamental" nor "meaningless" and that it’s rational for Zelensky to pursue them based on the current geopolitical and historical circumstances.
That is supported by the quotations I previously reported.

Russia doesn't only cite nuclear weapons as a threat from NATO, but forward deployed missile bases.

Tangible weapons systems in the real world owned and operated by NATO that require NATO membership to be deployed in your country.

Now, there was a de facto understanding after the ascension of the Baltic's into NATO that certain systems wouldn't be forward deployed in order to reduce tensions and the possibility of accidents.

NATO then forward deployed exactly those missile systems saying "something, something, Iran" even though that made no sense. Whether this was breaking a promise or not, clearly NATO's policy is to forward deploy threatening weapons systems.

The deployment of actual weapons systems is what matters.

If the Baltics were nominally in NATO but hosted no NATO infrastructure, then, yes, this isn't really a threat as no NATO attacks could be launched given this lack of NATO infrastructure to do so. It's a reasonable compromise to maintain a reasonable defensive posture: we won't forward deploy to the Baltics as we have no intention to attack you, but we will come to their aid if they are attacked.

Of course, once you do forward deploy military systems you are by definition threatening the people in range of those systems and the logic of a defensive posture goes away.

The apologetics logic about this is that Russia shouldn't view these forward deployed systems as a threat, even if there's no other reason for it, because in NATO's heart of hearts they're not "out to get Russia", that's paranoid delusion talk.

But, if the first reaction of the West to this war in Ukraine is that it's an opportunity to weaken Russia, a geopolitical rival ... then obviously NATO was indeed threatening Russia all along.

Now, being threatened by real weapons systems in the real world does not then justify any action, but it does make this story of "unprovoked attack" absurd propaganda. If you threaten me and I punch you in the face, I could definitely still be in the wrong and be convicted of assault, but it wasn't unprovoked.

But to focus on the central issue we've been discussing: — boethius

In other words, the blablabla was so far out of focus, and therefore ornamental.

HOW DO YOU INTERPRET THIS BEHAVIOR IF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS ARE JUST AN ORNAMENTAL AND NOTHING CERTAIN? — neomac


I have said adding the word "guarantee" to a promise is ornamental. The texts of international agreements still matter for what they actually do: coordinate actions of willing participants. — boethius

ROFL. So finally you are agreeing with me [1], then you must (logical requirement) no longer claim it's “ornamental” or “zero meaning” (on pain of inconsistency).
Besides, your smartass claim was due to an issue with the word “guarantee”, really?! Poor you! And what would be the legal expression you would use instead?! "Security ornaments"?! "Ornamental guarantees"?! “Ornamental ornaments”?! The legal expression "security guarantees" is perfectly intelligible because concerns the task of hedging against geopolitical risks coming from Russia and it implies greater costs than e.g. "security assurances". Besides no rational geopolitical actor can possibly misunderstand the meaning of "security guaranties" the way you suggest. Conclusion: yours is just an embarrassingly overblown straw man argument. Q.E.D.

THE MEMBERSHIP WASN'T IMMINENT — neomac

But to focus on another error in analysis. Everyone says that the footsie between NATO and Ukraine, even if we do see NATO policy is to forward deploy under stupid pretext (like "Iran" needs to be defended from the Baltics ... no closer NATO country or US / NATO base to Iran is convenient for that purpose), didn't matter because Ukraine wasn't going to join NATO anytime soon.

How would the Russians actually know what's imminent or not? — boethius

Blablabla, just to change subject while still implicitly proving that such agreements are not ornamental at all! Catastrophic!

Congrats for your epic fail, dude!


[1]

To the extent there is an international law and rational agents engage in it, there must be some reasonable application for it, independently from any arbitrarily high standard of reliability and compatibly with power balance/struggle concerns. The reason to me is obvious: the international legal framework increases transparency and trust, given the coordinated and codified procedures/roadmap to monitor and measure commitment and implied costs. — neomac

You are claiming that "these sorts of agreements are purely ornamental". I claim that this claim of yours show "completely ignorant understanding of international relations". International law has its use (addressing coordination issues) and can help in increasing transparency and trust. For that reason, rational political agents are engaging in it. — neomac

The thread is discussing Zelensky and his preconditions for dozens of pages. — boethius

First, in our exchange, you wasted all occasions to quote where Zelensky used the word "precondition" in support of your argument.
Second, what may be relevant to your argument, may be irrelevant to mine, as in this case, so your statement may contribute to explain why you misunderstood my claim, that's all.

retroactively dilute the meanings of words to most the goal posts of your claim to something so trivial and tautological it is not wrong — boethius

I'm not diluting anything, I formulated a very consequential reasoning from general principles (pragmatic rationality as applied to geopolitics) to conclusions (what was rational to expect from Zelensky and the West). Besides what you accuse me of ("tautology" which you neither defined nor quoted anything from what I said to prove it is, and can be charitably understood as "obvious truth"), can be retorted to you in the same dumb fashion. Finally, if my actual claim (not the one you attribute to me) was really obviously true to you, then either you must (rational requirement, logic conclusion [1]) converge with my conclusions, or keep as well your conclusion in contradiction with mine and end up with a logically inconsistent position.
See how catastrophic your position is, dude?

you're asking us to believe you were simply not following the discussion and just-so-happened to use the word in a different sense to make an empty point about how people generally make decisions — boethius

I'm not here to convince anybody. I had fun in clarifying my points against you. Instead of addressing them to my satisfaction, you decided to divert attention from them by blabbering about some trivial literal misunderstanding of yours which shouldn't have been a big deal for you to acknowledge and move on, given all my timely and repeated clarifications. If you now look so dumb to yourself, it's all your fault. I have no pity for you.

This is a proposal exactly in the understanding of international relations I've described: whatever the US does, now or in the future, is because it's in the US interest and no Ukraine. — boethius

Oh no no no, that's the sort of claim I made [2]. You keep claiming that this kind of proposal is "ornamental" and meaningless [3]
Besides given the historical circumstances US/NATO/West security interest and Ukrainian security interest may converge profitably for both. And this is another thing you missed from those quotations. Nowhere in those quotations there is a support for the claim that those agreements are ornamental or "zero meaningful security guarantees". Those quotations express the opposite of it, there is strong convergent interest.

There's no charity towards Ukraine now nor in the future. — boethius

WHO ON EARTH IS SAYING THAT SUCH PROPOSALS ARE OUT OF CHARITY? QUOTE HIM!
Until then, I'll consider your reiterated claims as a strawman argument based on a caricatural understanding of other people's claims (mine included).

Why would a nation that has accepted to live within its own borders attack anyone? — boethius

"Security guarantees" are meant to hedge against uncertainty, so by taking into account the pessimistic scenario for security, not the optimistic one. Isn't that obvious to you?

I'm sure you have some new boring diatribe explaining how this proposal is self contradictory — boethius

What?! You'd go so far, to claim that I would argue against the consistency of such proposals I myself quoted to successfully support my claims against yours?! Are you crazy?!

the deterrence means they both had (but Ukraine doesn’t have!), and this was pre-condition for the kind of agreements they could rationally pursue. — neomac

"pre-condition for the kind of agreements" and "but Ukraine doesn’t have!" — boethius

Your argument is essentially based on an association of ideas between terms extrapolated from a sentence whose meaning you find hard to digest. I can concede that association of ideas is good enough for rhetoric not for understanding things logically which you failed to do. Taking into account logic is a precondition for the kind of discussions you can rationally engage in, dude!

having nuclear weapons was not a precondition for pursuing these kinds of agreements — boethius

"Precondition" wasn't referred to deterrence means nor nuclear weapons (this is your misunderstanding), but to considering the available deterrence means as a rational ground for pursuing any kind of security agreement by geopolitical agents. In other words, I was referring to a rational requirement. Indeed, pragmatic rationality is about effectively adapting means and goals, since the goal that geopolitical agents can often prioritize in given historical circumstances is security, then OBVIOUSLY deterrence means will be taken into account, and among deterrence means there might be nuclear weapons (like for the US and the Soviet Union) or alternatives (like in Ukraine). So countries which do not possess nuclear deterrence (like for Ukraine) will rationally look for AFFORDABLE means of deterrence alternative to nuclear weapons, like military cooperation with non-hostile and powerful countries (e.g. NATO membership, security guarantees from the West) that can stand against Russian expansionist and/or nuclear threat. To what extent is such form of military cooperation AFFORDABLE by Ukraine? To the extent the West/NATO/US has security concerns against Russia convergent with those ones of Ukraine, as it happened so far, also thanks to the boasting&aggressive defiant attitude of Russia against the West/NATO/US!
This argument is perfectly consequential and in contradiction to the claim that the military cooperation between Ukraine and the West is "zero meaningful" from a geopolitical point of view. This war is proving exactly the opposite of such spectacularly dumb claim of yours.


Finally, SINCE YOU KEEP DODGING MY QUESTIONS, HERE THEY ARE AGAIN:

• WHO ON EARTH IS TAKING SECURITY GUARANTEES IN THE CERTAINTY SENSE? CAN YOU QUOTE HIM?
• RUSSIA IS CLAIMED TO SEE AN EXISTENTIAL THREAT IN HAVING UKRAINE AND GEORGIA WITHIN NATO, THIS WAS NO ACTUAL NUCLEAR THREAT (BECAUSE THEY DIDN'T HAVE SUCH WEAPONS, AND THE MEMBERSHIP WASN'T IMMINENT) NOR - AS YOU COULD ARGUE - GUARANTEE IN THE SENSE OF CERTAINTY THAT RUSSIA WOULD BE NUKED AFTER UKRAINE JOINED NATO OR AFTER INVADING UKRAINE FOLLOWING THE UKRAINIAN NATO MEMBERSHIP. HOW DO YOU INTERPRET THIS BEHAVIOR IF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS ARE JUST AN ORNAMENTAL AND NOTHING CERTAIN?

UNTIL YOU ANSWER THEM APPROPRIATELY, I’LL KEEP CONSIDERING YOUR CLAIMS FOR WHAT THEY LOOK, A MONUMENTAL STRAW MAN ARGUMENT BECAUSE GROUNDED ON THE CARICATURAL ASSUMPTION THAT SECURITY GUARANTEES IS WRONGLY ASSOCIATED WITH CERTAINTY INSTEAD OF BEING RIGHTLY ASSOCIATED WITH HEDGING AGAINST UNCERTAINTY.



[1]


[2]

So what? There are three reasons your question is failing to take into account:
1. We are in the middle of the war so we don’t see the end of the war nor the full consequences of such war. The Soviet–Afghan War lasted 10 years, could anyone see the end of it and the following collapse of the Soviet Union while they were in the middle of it back then? No, because they didn’t happen yet.
2. Russia was complaining about NATO enlargement since the 90s, did Russia see NATO enlargement stopping for that reason? NATO/US can be as determined as Russia to pursue their goals in Ukraine at the expense of Russia. And since Russia, especially under Putin, took a declared confrontational attitude toward the hegemonic power, Russia made sure that NATO/US will deal with Russia accordingly as long as they see fit.
3. The end game for NATO/US involvement in this war doesn’t need to be to stop Russia or overturn its regime. But to inflict as much enduring damage as possible to Russian power (in terms of its economic system, its system of alliance, its capacity of military projection outside its borders, its its technology supply, its military and geopolitical status) to the point it is not longer perceived as a non-negligible geopolitical threat to the West. — neomac

[3]

Second, Ukraine will receive zero meaningful security guarantees in any peace deal with Russia, other than the ornamental meaning of "trust us bro". — boethius

I've made several accompanied by subsequent argument. You've chosen to neglect all that. — creativesoul

What argument are you talking about? Quote yourself.

The latest point was that you could not back up your claims about "there's a cow in the field" being justified. — creativesoul

First we have to agree on the notion of "justification", otherwise we are talking past each other.

You refuse to answer very basic questions regarding how? Instead, you feign ignorance and distract attention away from your own shortcomings by creating confusion regarding what is meant by the words that you must use in order to make your case. Like your herring a bit red, do you?

You've proven my last point rather nicely. — creativesoul

Given our past exchange, I can see why you are on the defensive. I didn't expect much from you either. Still I don't get what your point is. In this recent exchange between us, you didn't explain how you changed your views nor why. So either you quote your actual arguments or you can leave it at that. I suggest you the second, it's safer for you.

I'm still willing to see how "there is a cow in the field" satisfies your criterion for what counts as a justified belief. — creativesoul

Here is my proposal (for the third time):

• I think "justification" is a normative term, not a descriptive one. Additionally, justificatory practices vary depending on the genesis of a belief and they have different degrees of reliability (which also means that we distinguish "valid" from "sound" applications). Since our beliefs are fallible, our knowledge and justificatory claims are fallible as well
• since the distinction between justification+"no false lemma" and justification-"no false lemma" looks analogous to the distinction between sound and valid deduction, we could simply talk about sound vs valid justification depending on the context. So in the case of the farmer's false belief, we could say he is validly justified in believing that there is a cow, but not soundly justified. And only the latter case can be called knowledge.

Do you agree or not? If not why not?

Valid criticism of my own position works too, but if you do not understand it, then it would be unreasonable of me to expect you to provide such. I'm strongly asserting that it is not justified, and I've offered more than adequate/sufficient subsequent arguments and/or reasoning for that assertion. — creativesoul

Where? Quote yourself. I prefer to see the argument. Your self-promoting blablabla are not a replacement for it.

my primary purpose on this forum is to develop methods against bad faith debate. — boethius

That's why I have no pity for your intellectual misery.

Now, unless you're now claiming to have zero reading comprehensions skills, of your own words or anyone else's, at this point in the debate the word "precondition" had been the focus of discussion for several pages with a clear meaning; Zelensky uses the word and everyone in the discussion was using the word in exactly the same way, exactly how the dictionary describes it. — boethius

A sequel of nonsense one after the other:
- I'm claiming that you keep misunderstanding my claim (and I did it even in that quotation!).
- I also explained to you what triggered your wrong understanding of my claim.
- I said nowhere that I used the word precondition as Zelensky.
- You didn't even quote Zelensky's claims where he used the word precondition.
- The rest of your comment follows from your reiterated wrong assumptions, so more of the same intellectual misery, good for the trash bin.

The problem you've encountered is that your position is false: — boethius

Unfortunately for you what I claimed is very much consequential wrt what I argued since the beginning (and you misunderstood) and in line with standard understanding of international relations as applied to Ukraine:
Rasmussen characterized the proposed security pact as part of a long-term answer to the West’s long-standing challenge with Russia, rather than as an act of charity to Ukraine, as Washington tries to pivot more resources to geopolitical competition with China. “If we get this right, the security guarantees to Ukraine could fix the Russia problem, because it is in the interest of the U.S. to have a strong and stable Eastern European partner as a bulwark against Russian attacks.”
Volker said the best way to secure Ukraine over the long term was to focus on the country’s eventual accession into NATO, rather than working out an interim option. “It’s good to have this [Kyiv Security Compact] as an alternative that people can chew on,” said Volker, who also served as U.S. special envoy to Ukraine. “But when you start stacking it against actual NATO membership, and you start considering this as a possibility at a time when Russia will have been defeated and accepted to live within its own borders, NATO is better.”
https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/10/10/ukraine-nato-accession-kyiv-security-compact-rasmussen/

Since you keep dodging my questions, here they are again:

• Who on earth is taking security guarantees in the certainty sense? Can you quote him?
• Russia is claimed to see an existential threat in having Ukraine and Georgia within NATO, this was no actual nuclear threat (because they didn't have such weapons, and the membership wasn't imminent) nor - as you could argue - guarantee in the sense of certainty that Russia would be nuked after Ukraine joined NATO or after invading Ukraine following the Ukrainian NATO membership. How do you interpret this behavior if international relations are just an ornamental and nothing certain?

Until you answer them appropriately, I’ll keep considering your claims for what they look, a monumental straw man argument because grounded on the caricatural assumption that security guarantees is wrongly associated with certainty instead of being rightly associated with hedging against uncertainty.


P.S.
I re-claim all I wrote, word by word:
This is just foolish. At no point did either side threaten the other with a first strike nuclear launch if they broke or pulled out of any agreement.
The basis of diplomatic resolutions between the Soviet Union and the US was that each side saw it was in their best interest to avoid a large scale nuclear war, and each side was able to believe the other side believed that too, so some agreements could be reached.
— boethius

You misunderstood my claim. I was referring precisely to the following condition: “each side saw it was in their best interest to avoid a large scale nuclear war”. The best interest of both US and Soviet Union was calculated by taking into account the deterrence means they both had (but Ukraine doesn’t have!), and this was pre-condition for the kind of agreements they could rationally pursue. — neomac

That's simply not your original claim — boethius

Quote whatever you think was my original claim so I can claim it again and then you explain its meaning to me, dude.

Notice the strong words like "must" ... and absence of words like "optional" or "nice to have, but not like, an actual precondition". — boethius

Sure like a rational requirement, like the rules of logic, that's why the word precondition was appropriate for me to use. In other words, the problem is not the word "precondition" but probably the syntactic ambiguity of "this" which you took as referring to "deterrence means" instead of "taking into account the deterrence means they both had ". This might have triggered your misunderstanding. Anyways it remains a misunderstanding.

Notice the tautological nature of your new claim, which is, seeing as you agree having nuclear weapons isn't a precondition to any agreement about nuclear weapons in anyway, that people just basically take into account information in making decisions. True for pretty much any decisions. — boethius

But I didn’t make anywhere the claim that “people just basically take into account information in making decisions”, indeed you are incapable of quoting any such claim. It's like me attributing to you the claim: "basically nothing is certain in life", which is another obvious truth.
My point was and is that available deterrence means must be taken into account by rational agents in the geopolitical arena for both war time and peace time, since security concerns are of paramount importance in geopolitics. From that follows that it’s rational for Ukraine to look for affordable deterrence means alternative to the nuclear weapons (as long as it doesn’t have it) to hedge against the risks of Russian expansionism: e.g. NATO membership and “security guarantees”. The likelihood of this happening depends on the West of course as much as the support Ukraine gets right now against the Russian aggression and prior to such an aggression, independently from the fact that Ukraine is not a NATO member yet. But as long as the West perceives Russia as a non-negligible threat and has the means to counter it, Ukraine can rationally exploit such condition (as it has managed to do so far) to have the West stick around at the expense of Russian expansionism during war time and peace time e.g. through NATO membership or “security guarantees”.
What’s catastrophic in your dialectic strategy is that after realising you have badly misunderstood my claims, you are trying to make them ultimately appear at the same time as obviously true (by calling them “tautological”) and most likely false (by calling them “ornamental”).
Unfortunately for you what I claimed is very much consequential and in line with standard understanding of international relations as applied to Ukraine:
Rasmussen characterized the proposed security pact as part of a long-term answer to the West’s long-standing challenge with Russia, rather than as an act of charity to Ukraine, as Washington tries to pivot more resources to geopolitical competition with China. “If we get this right, the security guarantees to Ukraine could fix the Russia problem, because it is in the interest of the U.S. to have a strong and stable Eastern European partner as a bulwark against Russian attacks.”
Volker said the best way to secure Ukraine over the long term was to focus on the country’s eventual accession into NATO, rather than working out an interim option. “It’s good to have this [Kyiv Security Compact] as an alternative that people can chew on,” said Volker, who also served as U.S. special envoy to Ukraine. “But when you start stacking it against actual NATO membership, and you start considering this as a possibility at a time when Russia will have been defeated and accepted to live within its own borders, NATO is better.”
https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/10/10/ukraine-nato-accession-kyiv-security-compact-rasmussen/

Since you keep dodging my questions, here they are again:

• Who on earth is taking security guarantees in the certainty sense? Can you quote him?
• Russia is claimed to see an existential threat in having Ukraine and Georgia within NATO, this was no actual nuclear threat (because they didn't have such weapons, and the membership wasn't imminent) nor - as you could argue - guarantee in the sense of certainty that Russia would be nuked after Ukraine joined NATO or after invading Ukraine following the Ukrainian NATO membership. How do you interpret this behavior if international relations are just an ornamental and nothing certain?

Until you answer them appropriately, I’ll keep considering your claims for what they look, a monumental straw man argument because grounded on the caricatural assumption that security guarantees is wrongly associated with certainty instead of being rightly associated with hedging against uncertainty.

Your exact word was "pre-condition".

Pre-condition for what? A deal concerning nuclear weapons. What's the precondition again? Having nuclear weapons, in your rebuttal to my point that the United States and Soviet Union were able to come to agreements despite not trusting each other (that "trust", such as "trusting Putin", is not a precondition to international agreements and treatise and so on). — boethius

Here I claim it again: The best interest of both US and Soviet Union was calculated by taking into account the deterrence means they both had (but Ukraine doesn’t have!), and this was pre-condition for the kind of agreements they could rationally pursue
The problem is not the word "precondition" but the syntactic ambiguity of "this" which you took as referring to "deterrence means" instead of "taking into account the deterrence means they both had ". This looks to me now the likely trigger of your misunderstanding. Anyways you are wrong.

It's rational to want to shit gold (in a rectally safe way and not a "careful what you wish for way"). It's rational for Zelensky to want to be king of the world. — boethius

I see you understand the word "rationality" as arbitrarily as you understand the word "precondition". Still waiting for you to quote who believed in security guaranties in the sense of certainty. Try harder.

And, if we were only talking about "action must be taken", that's ambiguous enough, but the context is incredibly clear, specifically the word "attack" is incredibly clear without alternative meaning. — boethius

Like "pre-condition" I guess. BTW "clear" in the sense that is obvious to you or in the sense that we should really care about?

If by look for you mean some actual objective ... and you are now placing "security guarantees" in quotations to emphasise the ornamental meaning of the phrase in the context we're discussing, then yes, we do agree. But all you're saying is that Ukraine (if it wanted to get a peace deal) should seek as good a deal as it can get, which is obviously true. — boethius

You are getting closer to the same conclusion. But since you keep insisting on talking in terms "ornamental" then I'll ask you again: Russia is claimed to see an existential threat in having Ukraine and Georgia within NATO, this was no actual nuclear threat (because they didn't have such weapons, and the membership wasn't imminent) nor - as you could argue - guarantee in the sense of certainty that Russia would be nuked after Ukraine joined NATO or after invading Ukraine following the Urkainian NATO membership. How do you interpret this behavior if international relations are just an ornament and nothing certain?

He simply argued that Benkei's understanding of Zelensky's claims wasn't obvious — neomac


But it is obvious. — boethius

I wasn't arguing to support Christoff's understanding of Zelensky (I find Zelensky's attitude toward the missile incident questionable). I was arguing against the claim that Christoff committed a fallacious attack ad hominem.

It cannot be clearer that you are claiming the US and Soviet Union can make deals without trusting each other because of the nuclear weapons. — boethius

And what holds for US and Soviet Union doesn't necessarily hold for other countries not possessing such weapons, like Ukraine.

Saying "nuclear weapons" is a precondition to a deal about nuclear weapons, is a tautology. — boethius

I never said such a thing. "Precondition" was referred not to nuclear weapons but to taking into account means of deterrence available to geopolitical subjects concerned about security. The US and Soviet Union possess nuclear weapons so they will take that into account. Nuclear weapons are something "that Ukraine doesn't have!" therefore it's rational for them to find an alternative (e.g. whatever kind of economic-military alliance with the West that could help them hedge the risks coming from Russia). That and only that is what you must have inferred from my claim as I repeatedly clarified.
Now for the tenth (?) and last time. I'm not interested in feeding your personal guinness record of intellectual failures.

If there is a peace deal, the situation will be the same. — boethius

Same with respect to what? If sunk costs are of significant magnitude for Russia or more consistent for Russia than for its rivals then the situation is not at all the same in some relevant sense.
Besides Russia couldn't know at the beginning of this war what would have costed to them this war. Worse than this, it seems to have badly miscalculated a lot of things (https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/putins-miscalculations). And once one is trapped inside a sunk cost fallacy, it's really hard to stop it.

reading comprehension. — boethius

The irony.

So either you're saying nothing at all, just that people have the idea of nuclear weapons in their head in making deals about nuclear weapons, or then you're saying something meaningful that would have been meaningfully connected to the point you are responding to: that actually having the nuclear weapons is "pre-condition" to making a deal about said nuclear weapons, as a substitute to the trust that gave rise to this discussion. A meaningful argument, just obviously wrong. — boethius

"Again, reading comprehension".

If we agree on this point, then we agree that this is in no war a guarantee. — boethius

I totally agree with you if and only if you totally agree with me that is perfectly and pragmatically rational for Ukraine to look for "security guarantees" or equivalent to hedge against the risk of Russian adventurism at Ukrainian expenses.

If we also agree the US is not going to nuke Russia if they invade again (or at least not due to anything written on any piece of paper with the word "Ukraine" on it), then there is just no guarantees available. You can call something a guarantee; you can write down "the US will see to it that this deal is respected, that's a Uncle Sam guarantee!" but it's not a guarantee in any sense more than ornamentation added to the agreement for PR purposes. Wording and PR does have some consequence, it's not meaningless, just the US is not about nuke anyone simply due to PR optics of not-nuking them. They'll nuke Russia if they genuinely believe Russia is going to nuke them now or after some series of events they come to believe are inevitable. The decision to nuke Russia or not will have anything to do with any promises to Ukraine; I guarantee you that in the certainty sense of guarantee. — boethius

You are pointlessly obsessing over nuclear bombs. Russia is claimed to see an existential threat in having Ukraine and Georgia within NATO, this was no actual nuclear threat (because they didn't have such weapons, and the membership wasn't imminent) nor - as you could argue - guarantee in the sense of certainty that Russia would be nuked after Ukraine joined NATO or after invading Ukraine following the Urkainian NATO membership. How do you interpret this behavior if international relations are just an ornament and nothing certain?
BTW, for the third time, who on earth is taking security guarantees in the certainty sense? Can you quote him?

Has nothing to do with my point. My point is simply that obviously Russia is willing to pay the cost of war with Ukraine under certain circumstances (such as circumstances that literally exist right now ... if they weren't willing, then they'd be withdrawing right now and the war would be over). Therefore, you could never reasonably assume such circumstances would not reemerge in the future regardless of any peace deal today. If there's no third party to keep Russia to its promise to not reinvade in the context of a peace deal (even ignoring the problem of why we'd believe such a third party would actually act), then there is simply nothing that can be remotely described as a guarantee of not being reinvaded available to Ukraine. — boethius

Your point looks ornamental, once you take into account my points. Again, who on earth is reasonably assuming such circumstances would not reemerge in the future regardless of any peace deal today? Do you have actual quotes to provide or it's all a strawman argument you are looping over?

However, if this damage is indeed significant, then it would be reason to assume that Russia would not restart a war that was so damaging. — boethius

After some more blablabla you finally converge to my conclusion. So I can spare myself commenting the rest of your blablabla.

You were criticising his method of argument and suggesting he's a dishonest interlocutor, which is ad hom, because you were attacking him personally rather than his argument.

(As per the basic definition:

Ad hominem means “against the man,” and this type of fallacy is sometimes called name calling or the personal attack fallacy. This type of fallacy occurs when someone attacks the person instead of attacking his or her argument.)

https://www.google.com/search?q=ad+hominem&oq=ad+hominem&aqs=chrome..69i57.2566j0j1&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8 — Baden

An attack can be called "ad hominem" and yet not be fallacious in the specific sense of: "A makes a claim x, B asserts that A holds a property that is unwelcome, and hence B concludes that argument x is wrong" (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ad_hominem). As far as I've understood from the recent exchange between the two, @Christoffer didn't conclude nor suggest that @Benkei's understanding about Zelensky's claims was wrong out of Benkei's dishonest way of arguing. He simply argued that Benkei's understanding of Zelensky's claims wasn't obvious (It could be actions to put much harsher pressure on Russia, it could mean actions to rally military defense lines at the borders, it could mean actions to, as I said, initiate a no-fly zone and be more active in the defense of Ukraine rather than just sending weapons. It could merely mean that the world needs to take more action to prevent Russia from continuously killing civilians.) and then he additionally argued that Benkei's way of arguing was dishonest (The way you handle discussions like these, pointing out that something is "obvious" when it clearly isn't obvious, other than supporting your own argument, makes it impossible to have a discussion with you. You demand that your interpretation is the valid one and then everyone around you should comply based on that interpretation because then you can win that argument... wake me up when you're a more honest interlocutor. ).
And therefore claiming or suggesting that Christoffer committed a fallacious argument ad hominem is questionable. While one can more easily argue that Benkei's claim "I get you're not a native English speaker and the finer points of the translation are lost in you" is a fallacious ad hominem attack, because he seemed to conclude that a correct understanding of Zelensky's claims (like his) depends on somebody being a native English speaker. But that doesn't logically nor empirically follow at all.

So I agree a quick ending is unlikely, but not impossible. — Olivier5

Any possible military success in that direction is conditional on the military support the West provides to Ukraine. And I'm not sure the West will continue as Ukrainians may hope.

literally cite the claims I'm rebutting that you just continuously deny ever making. — boethius

I never denied making the claim you literally cite (quote where I did). I continuously denied that you literally understood my quotes and I still do ("taking into account the deterrence means they both had" is the "precondition for the kind of agreements they could rationally pursue" (like the NTP and prior to that the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty ). So "precondition" refers to a rational requirement for the US and Soviet Union to take into account their deterrence means while pursuing their agreements (like the NTP and prior to that the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty ).).
Again I'm responsible for what I write not for what you understand.

It hasn't deterred Russia right, but Russia is paying and might pay more. So I'm not sure that what you presume is correct. Russia now knows better the costs of its adventurism. — neomac
Do you see Russia stopping the war of their own accord? — boethius

So what? There are three reasons your question is failing to take into account:
1. We are in the middle of the war so we don’t see the end of the war nor the full consequences of such war. The Soviet–Afghan War lasted 10 years, could anyone see the end of it and the following collapse of the Soviet Union while they were in the middle of it back then? No, because they didn’t happen yet.
2. Russia was complaining about NATO enlargement since the 90s, did Russia see NATO enlargement stopping for that reason? NATO/US can be as determined as Russia to pursue their goals in Ukraine at the expense of Russia. And since Russia, especially under Putin, took a declared confrontational attitude toward the hegemonic power, Russia made sure that NATO/US will deal with Russia accordingly as long as they see fit.
3. The end game for NATO/US involvement in this war doesn’t need to be to stop Russia or overturn its regime. But to inflict as much enduring damage as possible to Russian power (in terms of its economic system, its system of alliance, its capacity of military projection outside its borders, its its technology supply, its military and geopolitical status) to the point it is not longer perceived as a non-negligible geopolitical threat to the West.

So, what would be the reason to assume they are not willing to pay the same cost in the future? — boethius

But will it is not all that matters, what also and primarily counts is the actual material and human resources one country has to achieve its geopolitical goals.

So, "rationally" it would be nice to have some better reason, such as the US nuking Russia on behalf of Ukraine and being deterred that way. The only problem is there's no rational reason for the US to sign up to that, much less actually do when called upon.

Which is the core fallacy of Zelenskyites: that whatever is good for Zelensky to be true (at least according to him) we should also believe is true, or at least nevertheless support whatever he wants and is trying to get in saying whatever we agree isn't true. — boethius

Zelenskyites: Sure, maybe. But that's just all rational decision making that we should support and encourage escalation, if that's what Zelensky wants, it's just clever to use the missile issue to try to escalate. You see, he "believes it" so it's ok to say what you believe even if you have no evidence for it. — boethius

You keep generically mentioning people without quoting them: who are the Zelenskyites ? Can you quote them? Given the twisted way you literally processed my claims I prefer check their claims by myself. And if you can not quote them nor prove that they claim what you are attributing to them, your argument looks like a strawman.

The reason to believe Russia won't just re-invade is exactly as you describe: it's costly. — boethius

Since you can perfectly understand that there are implied and increasing non-negligible costs, especially when it’s matter of sunk costs and its psychological effects (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sunk_cost#Fallacy_effect), talking about actual willingness or hypothetical willingness in conjectured scenarios doesn't suffice to reason about this matter. And for that reason I’m not sure that Russia could rationally want to aggress Ukraine again.
But assuming that Russia wants or could want to do that (rationally or irrationally), then the West must damage Russian resources to pursue that goal as long as possible and with most enduring consequences as possible, if they rationally believe that Russia constitutes a non-negligible geopolitical threat to the West and as long as they have means to do that.

a potential scenario that makes clear the ornamental nature of any "guarantees" to any peace deal concerning Ukraine. — boethius

If "ornamental" is meant to suggest that it's irrational for Ukraine to look for “security guarantees” (or NATO membership for that matter) and claiming otherwise shows "completely ignorant understanding of international relations" because an avg dude like you can conjecture random scenarios where these “security guarantees” aren’t effectively pursued or deterring enough, then that's bullshit. As I said:

— neomac

• International relations include a legal framework based on voluntary acceptance by acknowledged independent nations. Within this legal framework one can implement “security guarantees” (https://www.academia.edu/16541504/Legal_Notion_of_the_Terms_Security_Assurances_Security_Guarantees_and_Reassurances_in_International_Security_Law).
• The primary involved parties in the Ukrainian war are clearly interested in such “security guarantees”: Putin urges West to act quickly to offer security guarantees. (https://www.npr.org/2021/12/23/1067188698/putin-urges-west-to-act-quickly-to-offer-security-guarantees). And Ukraine showed interest in having one, given the consequences of the Budapest Memorandum about “security assurances” (https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/stvorennya-mehanizmu-bezpekovih-garantij-dlya-ukrayini-stane-76129).
• To the extent there is an international law and rational agents engage in it, there must be some reasonable application for it, independently from any arbitrarily high standard of reliability and compatibly with power balance/struggle concerns. The reason to me is obvious: the international legal framework increases transparency and trust, given the coordinated and codified procedures/roadmap to monitor and measure commitment and implied costs.

I've quoted it back to you several times:

You misunderstood my claim. I was referring precisely to the following condition: “each side saw it was in their best interest to avoid a large scale nuclear war”. The best interest of both US and Soviet Union was calculated by taking into account the deterrence means they both had (but Ukraine doesn’t have!), and this was pre-condition for the kind of agreements they could rationally pursue. — boethius

You keep quoting only the claim that triggered your misunderstanding without taking into account all my clarifications. But you misunderstood that quote: "taking into account the deterrence means they both had" is the "precondition for the kind of agreements they could rationally pursue" (like the NTP and prior to that the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty ). So "precondition" refers to a rational requirement for the US and Soviet Union to take into account their deterrence means while pursuing their agreements (like the NTP and prior to that the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty ).

It cannot be clearer that your implication is that it would not be rational for Ukraine to enter the same agreements without nuclear weapons. — boethius

I clarified what I could infer from my claim about Ukraine (not having nuclear bombs): since Ukraine doesn't have nuclear weapons, the deterrence strategy available to Ukraine in negotiating with Russia (which has nuclear weapons) can not be like the one available to the US in dealing with the Soviet Union. Therefore Ukraine is rationally looking for alternatives (e.g. security guarantees, NATO membership and the like)
So you must have understood from that too that I couldn't mean what you keep attributing to me like a fool.

Since, you moved the goalpost from "pre-condition" (the word you use) to "rational requirement" to "taking into account". — boethius

You understand words the way you like without double check, then you iterate on a huge strawman argument built out of this misunderstanding, and despite all the clarifications I've given to you. And you wanna get away with it? Are you crazy, dude?!

First, as a general principle, this is not a "precondition" or "rational requirement" — boethius

That's not what I claimed.

Second, Ukraine will receive zero meaningful security guarantees in any peace deal with Russia, other than the ornamental meaning of "trust us bro". — boethius

I'm not interested in claims, I'm interested in arguments.

there is no meaningful leverage NATO would have anyways that would actually stop them short of nuclear weapons, which obviously they won't be "deterring" Russia with concerning Ukraine. — boethius

I'm not interested in claims, I'm interested in arguments.

We can be pretty sure of this because NATO has already applied maximum pressure of sanctions and arms supplies and this hasn't "deterred" Russia from their course of acton, so presumably if Russia invaded again then the reasonable bet is we'd (at best for Ukraine) just be back in this same situation — boethius

It hasn't deterred Russia right, but Russia is paying and it didn't finish to pay. So I'm not sure that what you presume is correct. Russia now knows better the costs of its adventurism.

Whatever US promises to do and doesn't do, there would unlikely be any consequences at all. — boethius

I'm not interested in claims, I'm interested in arguments.

But whatever the consequences for breaking the agreement, they would not be "much" as some sort of contractual result.

The consequence for Russia of reinvading Ukraine would be war and likely sanctions and international pressure, perhaps from their own partners if it's a second time around of this mess for no reason.

This would be the reason to expect Russia to abide by a peace agreement, to avoid the negative consequences of war they have also experienced.

However, being nuked by the USA would not be a reason.

If there's a peace deal and then later war resumes, the reasonable expectation is that the parties to the agreement will do in the future whatever their policy is then in the future anyways. For example, let's say in the future Europe's and US economy is really hurting, monetary crisis, real domestic problems, in addition to potential war with China invading Taiwan any moment, all sorts of messes all around the world, and they simply don't have the capacity for this same kind of conflict, pour in billions and billions ("carte blanch"), then what we would expect is that their policy then would be "sorry Ukraine, but you're on your own this time" regardless of what is written on any piece of paper. — boethius

More claims and conjectures and ornamental blablabla.

First, your idea that the US and Soviet Union entered non-proliferation agreements based on the idea they could deter the other from not breaking them with their nuclear weapons. — boethius

Never made such a claim. Quote where I did.

is simply false. US and Soviet Union could sign a non-proliferation treaty one day — boethius

Besides, since when conceivable possibilities constitute evidence to falsify factual claims? Here: The impetus behind the NPT was concern for the safety of a world with many nuclear weapon states. It was recognized that the Cold War deterrent relationship between just the United States and the Soviet Union was fragile. Having more nuclear-weapon states would reduce security for all, multiplying the risks of miscalculation, accidents, unauthorized use of weapons, escalation in tensions, and nuclear conflict (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_on_the_Non-Proliferation_of_Nuclear_Weapons)

That's in no way a "pre-conditon" in the sense Zelensky — boethius

Quote Zelensky. And then comment. Besides I didn't claim anywhere that I would use the word "pre-condition" the way Zelensky does.

Saying parties take information into account to make decisions ... is obvious. — boethius

Saying that nothing is certain in this life... is obvious.

So, where is the debate on this topic: — boethius

Security guarantees (or equivalent).

But, if there is some version of "precondition" that's not some vacuous tautology — boethius

As if you knew what "tautology" means

just reminding us that decisions are in fact based on information — boethius

Never made such a claim. On the other side you are trying to sell us that international relations is matter of "certain" or "ornamental". That is substantive steamy bullshit. Period.

However, the fact that non-nuclear states both can for pretty clear rational reasons (of making the world as a whole a safer place and being unable to compete in the nuclear game anyways) and actually do engage in non-nuclear proliferation treatise, often the exact same ones as the nuclear powers, is pretty clear indication that your idea of a "rational requirement" is also obviously false. — boethius

For the sixth time, the general principle is the following: available deterrence means are taken into account by rational agents when engaging in negotiations.
I'm not relating states attitude toward agreements and negotiations to one specific type of deterrence.
What is rational is to reliably relate available means wrt desired goals. Any rational agent will take into consideration available means to sanction agreement defection. For example, for countries without nuclear bombs it could be to military ally with those compliant which have them and apply economic/diplomatic sanctions to the rogue countries.

Now, the meaning of this paragraph is clear — boethius

I'm responsible for what I write, not for what you understand.

Zelensky has been demanding certainty (which is certainly rational to want) but phrasing things in absolute terms like "pre-condition" (you use this term because Zelensky uses this term). — boethius

It isn't absolute, for 2 reasons: first it's not a necessary condition, and secondly, it's conditional on the rationality of the agent. Concerning Zelensky perspective I clarified my point: since Ukraine doesn't have nuclear weapons, the deterrence strategy available to Ukraine in negotiating with Russia (which has nuclear weapons) can not be like the one available to the US in dealing with the Soviet Union. Therefore Ukraine is rationally looking for alternatives (e.g. security guarantees, NATO membership and the like).

You didn't even quote who is understanding "security guarantees" in terms of certainty. So everything you said about it sounds like a strawman argument which you are idly looping over.

Looking forward to explaining all that to you for the 7th time, dude.

What general point? — boethius

Here: available deterrence means are taken into account by rational agents when engaging in negotiations.

Having nuclear deterrence was not a "pre-condition" to entering non proliferation treatise, as countries with zero nuclear deterrence (including Ukraine) enter the same agreements. — boethius

If you think that's what I claimed. You are twice wrong (and for the fifth time!) as I explained here:

I suspect you took pre-condition as "necessary condition" instead of "rational requirement", and "the kind of agreements they could rationally pursue" as suggesting a one-to-many generalization between one type of deterrence (nuclear weapons) and states (with or without nuclear weapons) instead of a many-to-many generalization between types of deterrence and states. You were wrong in both cases. In other words, I didn't claim that possession of nuclear weapons is a necessary condition for agreements between states (with or without nuclear weapons ).

However, there is simply no system of "guaranteeing" any party will actually follow any agreement. — boethius

You forgot there are two meanings? Are you reading yourself? And neither Russia nor Ukraine would look for the kind of system of "guaranteeing" that you are imagining, of course. They are looking for the "security guarantees" that can be implemented.

There are two meanings to guarantee: certainty or then purely ornamental expression of confidence that is in no way certain. — boethius

Please read.

In short, the alternative you are selling me is between “certainty” and “ornamental”?! Are you crazy?!
Even our legal system grounded on the coercive power of a democratic central government can not make certain that our rights will be protected as it is expected, often it may look pretty darn disappointing at it. Yet I wouldn’t consider our legal system “ornamental”. Even NATO membership doesn’t make sure that everybody will act according to commitments. Yet I wouldn’t consider NATO membership “ornamental” (were this the case NATO enlargement wouldn't have been perceived as an existential threat by Russia, right?!).
“Voluntary” means that there is no apparent coercion, it doesn’t mean “for free” or “at whim”: in the domain of international relations there are explicit/implicit costs/benefits to join/challenge a certain order that rational political agents must take into account to optimise their strategy wrt potential/actual competitors/allies in the global arena.

Calling such "security guarantees" "ornamental" is a way to dismiss them which is unjustified from an international relations perspective (even if they are not certain). Your disquisition about the semantics of "guarantee" is irrelevant and embarrassingly clouding your reasoning about basic concepts of international relations. Suck it up and move on.

"The probability of a Ukrainian military victory — defined as kicking the Russians out of all of Ukraine to include what they claim as Crimea — the probability of that happening anytime soon is not high, militarily," Milley told a news conference at the Pentagon.
https://www.voanews.com/a/ukraine-military-victory-unlikely-soon-top-us-general-says/6837655.html

You literally state "this was pre-condition for the kind of agreements they could rationally pursue".

What was the "pre-condition"? "taking into account the deterrence means they both had". — boethius

Right, and I took the case of the US and the Soviet Union both as a way to illustrate this general point, and to compare it to the hypothetical case of Ukraine negotiating with Russia.

Which is obviously contradicted by other non-nuclear states doing the same thing, so obviously nuclear weapons isn't a pre-condition for "the kind of agreements they could rationally pursue", as other actors pursued the same agreements without having nuclear weapons. — boethius

You got it all wrong for the forth time despite all the clarifications I already provided to you!
Now I suspect you took pre-condition as "necessary condition" instead of "rational requirement", and "the kind of agreements they could rationally pursue" as suggesting a one-to-many generalization between one type of deterrence (nuclear weapons) and states (with or without nuclear weapons) instead of a many-to-many generalization between types of deterrence and states. You were wrong in both cases. In other words, I didn't claim that possession of nuclear weapons is a necessary condition for agreements between states (with or without nuclear weapons ).
I claimed that available deterrence means are taken into account by rational agents when engaging in negotiations. In the particular case of the US and Soviet Union joining the NPT (and prior to that the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty), they were factoring in the deterrence means available to them (i.e. nuclear weapons).
I also claimed that since Ukraine doesn't have nuclear weapons, the deterrence strategy available to Ukraine in negotiating with Russia (which has nuclear weapons) can not be like the one available to the US in dealing with the Soviet Union. Therefore Ukraine is rationally looking for alternatives (e.g. security guarantees, NATO membership and the like).

The precondition of any agreement is that the parties involved have some reason to pursue an agreement. Having nuclear weapons is not a "pre-condition" for entering that "kind of an agreement".

Lot's of non-nuclear powers have entered the same non-proliferation agreements ... without having nuclear weapons.

What you are saying is both meaningless and false.

The only "precondition" to negotiating any agreement is being able to communicate. Just declaring preconditions is just a way of saying you won't negotiate, or then because you think the other party will give you concessions for free for some reason. — “boethius

Dude, for the third time, you are mistaken about what I claim. I didn’t write anywhere that nuclear weapons is a “precondition of any agreement”. Means of deterrence available to the US and the Soviet Union (i.e. the nuclear arsenal) during the Cold War were factors rationally taken into as incentives toward solving conflicts through relatively balanced agreements. Since Ukraine can not count on equivalent deterrence means, then Ukraine can not rationally pursue with Russia the kind of agreements that the US could rationally pursue with the Soviet Union. Yet the US/NATO may have a strong rational incentive to weigh in and back up Ukraine at the expense of Russia as long as Russia is perceived as a threat to the West. And by this way some “security guarantees” may be implemented e.g. to replace NATO membership.

This is what Russia wants: Negotiate with the West, the counter-party with the actual leverage (the weapons, the money, the economic sanctions). — boethius

Russia as a declared challenger of the Western-led world order wants to negotiate with the West in position of strength. US/NATO as the challenged power has a strong rational interest to the exact opposite.

Ukraine will not and cannot get any sort of guarantee from the US, or anyone else, in the "sense of certainty". — boethius

Who is talking of “security guarantees” in terms of certainty? You didn’t quote anybody.

Again, if Ukraine signs, their guarantors sign, and then the "guarantors" don't do what they guaranteed, or did it in a bad faith way that is not fit for purpose. Is this a guarantee?

There are two meanings to guarantee commonly used: certainty (I guarantee you the sun will rise tomorrow) and a promise that is in no way certain (satisfaction guaranteed!). Now, the talk of US nuking Russia or doing something else, if they don't abide by the agreement or reinvade or whatever, if meant as a guarantee in the second sense (a promise that maybe kept, maybe not, the word "guarantee" just being an expression of confidence by a party that could be trying to deceive you), I have no issue. However, if people want to be able to actually visualise how Ukraine could be certain the agreement would be followed, and what the guarantee is in this sense, then we definitely seem to agree that there is no such guarantee.

Now, if such wording is useful diplomatically and adds some prestige reasons as additional motivation for parties to ensure the agreement happens, sure, have at it, add the word guarantee and "guarantor" after every sentence. — boethius

I don’t know who are the people you are referring to. We will see what security guarantees are going to be negotiated/implemented, if needed. From an international relation perspective, I find simply myopic to downplay the fact that States (like Russia and Ukraine) are seeking “security guarantees” just because such “guarantees” are not certain.

is exactly what I'm describing to explain why “guarantee” in such agreements would be ornamental and not representing something actually certain.
I point our your explanation is the same as mine (Ukraine will never get any sort of guarantee from anyone, other than ornamental) ... and then you complain that I'm not using your definition of international law as entirely voluntary? — boethius

In short, the alternative you are selling me is between “certainty” and “ornamental”?! Are you crazy?!
Even our legal system grounded on the coercive power of a democratic central government can not make certain that our rights will be protected as it is expected, often it may look pretty darn disappointing at it. Yet I wouldn’t consider our legal system “ornamental”. Even NATO membership doesn’t make sure that everybody will act according to commitments. Yet I wouldn’t consider NATO membership “ornamental” (were this the case NATO enlargement wouldn't have been perceived as an existential threat by Russia, right?!).
“Voluntary” means that there is no apparent coercion, it doesn’t mean “for free” or “at whim”: in the domain of international relations there are explicit/implicit costs/benefits to join/challenge a certain order that rational political agents must take into account to optimise their strategy wrt potential/actual competitors/allies in the global arena.

First, the deterrence means was not a pre-condition of the agreement but what the agreement was about (we both have too much deterrence to our mutual detriment). — boethius

Again that's not what I claimed. I didn't talk about the content of the agreement. Read carefully: The best interest of both US and Soviet Union was calculated by taking into account the deterrence means they both had (but Ukraine doesn’t have!), and this was pre-condition for the kind of agreements they could rationally pursue

That Ukraine has no nuclear deterrence just means that it needs to consider the fact that Russia does.

If you feel it's "unfair" that stronger parties have more influence over events than weaker parties, I don't know what to say other than welcome to the real world. — boethius

If the West is involved in this war there is a reason and if they want to weigh in about this agreement at the expense of Russia, Russia must deal with it, even if Russia thinks it's "unfair" to them.

But, ok, the question then comes up of what would actually make the US enforce the agreement? Especially if doing so risks nuclear confrontation with Russia they have zero rational reason to risk that for the perceived benefit of Ukraine (risking nuclear war doesn't necessarily benefit Ukraine in any net-present-value calculation of any plausible metric of human welfare, but let's assume it does for the sake of argument). — boethius

Ukraine's position now is basically "we'll start acting rationally if the world is changed to suit our irrational desires". — boethius

You are just reinforcing my impression that you have no clue what you are talking about. The Western involvement in the war in Ukraine is not for Ukraine, it's for the West. If a hegemonic power perceives a non-negligible threat to its hegemony, it will react accordingly. Russia is expressly framing this war as a struggle for the World Order at the expense of the Western/US hegemony. That's why Russia must now suffer the consequences.

International agreements are all voluntary. And so, a "guarantee" is likewise a voluntary thing ... and therefore not any sort of actual guarantee. These sorts of words in these sorts of agreements are purely ornamental. — boethius

What looks ornamental to me is your latest contributions to this thread. Money, law, language are based on voluntary accepted conventions. So what?

US can guarantee whatever it wants, doesn't mean it's going to do that. — boethius

So what? State powers (and even criminal organizations) ground their power not just in brute force but also in consensus and reputation relative to their competitors and among competitors&allies for their own selfish interest!

The talk of guarantees has been some sort of actual guarantee, like US using nuclear weapons. — boethius

Dude, it's not up to you to determine how these security guarantees are implemented. The security guarantees do not need to consist in the US swearing on their mother's head that they are going to nuclear bomb Putin's ass if he defects the agreement and act accordingly. It could simply require the forms and degree of military cooperation between Ukraine and its guarantors.

To the extent there is an international law and rational agents engage in it, there must be some reasonable application for it, independently from any arbitrarily high standard of reliability and compatibly with power balance/struggle concerns. — neomac

Is completely false, unless your just repeating what I stated and what you claim to have issue with. — boethius

You are claiming that "these sorts of agreements are purely ornamental". I claim that this claim of yours show "completely ignorant understanding of international relations". International law has its use (addressing coordination issues) and can help in increasing transparency and trust. For that reason, rational political agents are engaging in it.

International law is not "law" (in the sense of law within states) and "legal framework" is not a "legal system" (in the sense of legal system within states). Same language maybe used, but referencing completely different things. — boethius

I'm talking about https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_law
So if you have a problem with the standard usage of the term "international law", I don't care.

This is just foolish. At no point did either side threaten the other with a first strike nuclear launch if they broke or pulled out of any agreement.
The basis of diplomatic resolutions between the Soviet Union and the US was that each side saw it was in their best interest to avoid a large scale nuclear war, and each side was able to believe the other side believed that too, so some agreements could be reached. — boethius

You misunderstood my claim. I was referring precisely to the following condition: “each side saw it was in their best interest to avoid a large scale nuclear war”. The best interest of both US and Soviet Union was calculated by taking into account the deterrence means they both had (but Ukraine doesn’t have!), and this was pre-condition for the kind of agreements they could rationally pursue.

But the idea that guarantees are needed to enter into an international agreement is just a high school level and completely ignorant understanding of international relations. There is never any guarantees. — boethius

My impression is that you have no clue what you are talking about:

• International relations include a legal framework based on voluntary acceptance by acknowledged independent nations. Within this legal framework one can implement “security guarantees” (https://www.academia.edu/16541504/Legal_Notion_of_the_Terms_Security_Assurances_Security_Guarantees_and_Reassurances_in_International_Security_Law).
• The primary involved parties in the Ukrainian war are clearly interested in such “security guarantees”: Putin urges West to act quickly to offer security guarantees. (https://www.npr.org/2021/12/23/1067188698/putin-urges-west-to-act-quickly-to-offer-security-guarantees). And Ukraine showed interest in having one, given the consequences of the Budapest Memorandum about “security assurances” (https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/stvorennya-mehanizmu-bezpekovih-garantij-dlya-ukrayini-stane-76129).
• To the extent there is an international law and rational agents engage in it, there must be some reasonable application for it, independently from any arbitrarily high standard of reliability and compatibly with power balance/struggle concerns. The reason to me is obvious: the international legal framework increases transparency and trust, given the coordinated and codified procedures/roadmap to monitor and measure commitment and implied costs.

https://www.dw.com/en/russian-missiles-cross-into-nato-member-poland-report/a-63770954
shit hitting the fan?

for Russia this war is about securing land access to Crimea — Tzeentch

Maybe Kherson is not as high priority as land access to Crimea, yet it has its strategic importance (i.e. securing freshwater canals to Crimea).
Nevertheless there are demographic and economic reasons why giving up on those areas would hurt Ukraine badly:

Russia is going to get what it wants, and the only variable is how much of Ukraine will be destroyed in the process. — Tzeentch

Does Russia want Kherson?

Zelenskyy outlines Ukraine’s 10-point "formula for peace" at G20 summit

Details: Ukraine has outlined the following 10 propositions:

• Radiation and nuclear safety.
• Food security.
• Energy security.
• Release of all prisoners and deportees.
• Implementation of the UN Charter and restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity and the world order.
• Withdrawal of Russian troops and cessation of hostilities.
• Justice.
• Immediate protection of the environment from ecocide.
• Preventing escalation.
• Confirmation of the end of the war.

https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/11/15/7376378/

:up: :100:

US and the Soviets never trusted each other, but entered into all sorts of agreements — boethius

US and Soviets had also deterrence means that Ukraine doesn't have though.

Ukraine's current position is the best it's ever going to be, — Tzeentch

What makes you think so?

Since you refuse to take a position — creativesoul

I took a position about the notions of "justification" and "knowledge". Here:

I think "justification" is a normative term, not a descriptive one. Additionally, justificatory practices vary depending on the genesis of a belief and they have different degrees of reliability (which also means that we distinguish "valid" from "sound" applications). Since our beliefs are fallible, our knowledge and justificatory claims are fallible as well (link)

since the distinction between justification+"no false lemma" and justification-"no false lemma" looks analogous to the distinction between sound and valid deduction, we could simply talk about sound vs valid justification depending on the context. So in the case of the farmer's false belief, we could say he is validly justified in believing that there is a cow, but not soundly justified. And only the latter case can be called knowledge. (link)

or offer valid criticism of mine — creativesoul

I didn't even get what your point is. You didn't explain how you changed your views nor why.

We could say it. It would not make it so. — creativesoul

Again it depends on what "justification" means to you.

Belief that there is a cow does not follow from mistaking cloth for cow. — creativesoul

"Follow" means what? If "follow" means "come after", then it can follow. If "follow" means some causal link, then it can still follow. If "follow" means "justifies" then we are back to square one: what do you mean by "justification"?

The United States pressured Ukraine to show willingness to negotiate a few weeks ago. — Tzeentch

Prior to the midterm elections. Now the situation doesn't look so bad for the Democrats though.

Are you claiming that the farmer's belief that there is a cow in the field
justified? — creativesoul

Again, it depends on what one means by "justification". If justification must comply with the "no false lemma" (or equivalent) then the farmer is not justified, if justification must not comply with "no false lemma" (or equivalent) then the farmer could be justified. You didn't clarify your understanding of "justification". On the contrary, your wrote:

It makes no sense to judge whether or not the farmer's belief is justified unless we carefully examine what grounds that target belief. — creativesoul

as if you didn't want to talk about justification before talking about belief.
So again, what's your point?

My point is the following: since the distinction between justification+"no false lemma" and justification-"no false lemma" looks analogous to the distinction between sound and valid deduction, we could simply talk about sound vs valid justification depending on the context. So in the case of the farmer's false belief, we could say he is validly justified in believing that there is a cow, but not soundly justified. And only the latter case can be called knowledge.

Do you agree that at time t1, this particular farmer looked out into a particular field at a particular piece of cloth and mistook it for a cow? — creativesoul

Yep. And?

Starting at "there is a cow in the field" does not consider the false belief, the case of mistaking cloth for cow, the belief that a particular piece of cloth in a particular field is a cow. — creativesoul

So what?

As if any judgment habit counts... — creativesoul

For what?

After 10 posts of yours I still didn't get what your point is.

This would be true if any daughter of literally anyone in Russia was murdered by a Ukrainian operation. — boethius

Are you suggesting that “literally anyone in Russia” whose daughter got “murdered by a Ukrainian operation” could become Kremlin ideologue? Coz that’s what the linked article was about.

And war policy hawks, even "philosophical" one's like Dugin, are rarely, if ever, some sort of threat. It would be like saying The Project of a New American Century and company, was a threat to Bush since he didn't invade Iran like many were insisting. — boethius

The analogy doesn't hold to me. First Putin's regime is authoritarian, more pyramidal, more relying on strong man figure and censorship of opposing views: so the more disgruntled voices by political and intellectual elites who once supported him unconditionally become public the greater is the pressure on the leader. Secondly, Dugin’s complaint is not important because of him, but because it might express a feeling deeply shared also among people within Putin’s closer entourage and since military defeat may increase a dictator’s odds of forcible ouster, perceived defeat may be as well insidious.

The oligarchs didn't overthrow Putin, the protesters in the streets didn't overthrow Putin, neither the rank and file or the generals, and Dugin is just now next on the list of people that have not overthrown Putin. — boethius

Western propaganda is not only for Western consumption. Putting all the blame on Putin, stressing his military humiliations and suggesting regime change can be instrumental to boost Putin’s paranoia at the expense of his entourage and offering a way out to potential high rank defectors as soon as things are going to look intolerably shitty to them. That’s part of the psychological warfare which is meant also to provoke decisional mistakes in Putin and his entourage. And if the mistakes were not enough for a coup from his entourage, they might still be enough to trigger a regime collapse.

For example, the "meme" of "everything is going to plan," which no Russian official has ever said — boethius

Yet,

“Putin says: everything is going to plan in Ukraine”
https://www.reuters.com/article/ukraine-crisis-putin-russia-idUSS8N2UP08I

“The work is proceeding in a calm and rhythmic way. The troops are advancing and reaching those endpoints that are assigned as a task at a certain stage of this combat work. Everything is going according to plan”
https://www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2022/06/30/2736617/russia-s-operation-in-ukraine-going-according-to-plan-putin

And in state run TV:
“We’ve been told that everything is going according to plan. Does anyone really believe that six months ago the plan was to be leaving [the city of] Balakliya, repelling a counteroffensive in the Kharkiv region and failing to take over Kharkiv?” usually pro-Putin political expert Viktor Olevich said on the state-run NTV channel, the Moscow Times reported.
https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/09/12/pro-kremlin-figures-voice-frustration-after-ukraine-routs-moscows-forces-a78769

BTW I use memes like this for mocking not for their truth value.

When the offensives started we were made all sorts of promises about Russian lines collapsing, morale so bad the entire Russian army would essentially just disband into the fog, taking Kherson by force and encircling the Russians there (not just Russia withdrawing), and pushing deep into Russian territory all the way back to the Russian border!!

Has that plan happened? — boethius

Did Western/Ukrainian officials state: "Everything is going according to plan"?

we were made all sorts of promises about Russian lines collapsing — boethius

Can you quote these promises?